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Abstract 
This thesis offers an analysis of the ideology of the Conservative Party under the leadership of 
David Cameron between 2005 and 2015, considering the extent to which the party still embodies 
a form of ‘conservatism’ and, further, what sort of conservatism that might be. This is conducted 
via the application of a theoretical framework combining a strategic-relational understanding of 
political action, with the conceptual or morphological approach to analysing ideologies. It 
therefore contributes to understanding both the character of contemporary British conservatism, 
and the role that ideas and ideologies play in political life at various points in the governing and 
electoral cycle more broadly. 
 
The research uses the Party’s approach to working-age welfare policy as a case study, being an 
area of policy that has been of a consistently high-profile over the period in question and which 
has been utilised for several different purposes. It focuses on three central research areas: firstly, 
how Conservatives have understood key concepts relating to welfare, considering what this can 
tell us about wider views on the relationship between society, the state and individuals; secondly, 
how these understandings relate to wider conservative ideological perspectives, and finally how 
these perspectives have both shaped and been shaped by political practice and strategy, notably 
in the arenas of electoral appeal and policy development and implementation.  
 
The thesis concludes that despite indications in the opposition years of Cameron’s leadership that 
the Conservatives might seek to move away from or at least draw a line under the Thatcher 
years, this possibility has remained largely unrealised in 2015. The constraining role of ideology 
has been significant: ‘modernisation’ was conceived within a Thatcherite ideological framework 
which shaped the strategies perceived to be available to the party in developing its approach to 
social issues and re-invigorating its electoral appeal. Although there were nascent signs of 
ideological developments within this framework, changes to the strategic context within which 
the Party is situated between opposition and government meant that in the latter it reverted to 
more traditional Thatcherite perspectives. The research therefore suggests that these legacies 
continue to exert a significant effect on Conservative policy and positioning, and will be 
important in understanding the actions of the in-coming majority Conservative government. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Does the Conservative Party under David Cameron still represent ‘conservatism’ as an ideology 
– and if so, how, why, and in what form? Cameron was elected in 2005 on a platform of change: 
the need for the Conservative Party, in some way, to move away from its recent past in order to 
make its way back into government. Shortly before winning the leadership, Cameron claimed 
that ‘fundamental change’ rather than ‘some slick rebranding exercise’ was needed to 
reinvigorate Conservative electoral fortunes, and to enable the party to respond effectively to the 
political and social conditions of the day (2005a). Some interpretations of the Conservatives 
under Cameron, both within and outside the party, have suggested that this necessitated, and has 
subsequently entailed, substantive ideological change. Notably, this is thought to have occurred 
around social policy, orientated in a socially liberal direction to match the economic liberalism of 
the Thatcher years, and hence leaving the parliamentary party ‘conservative’ in name only 
(Beech, 2015; 2011; Marquand, 2008). Yet for others, the Conservatives remain (for better or 
worse) the ‘same old Tories’. Clearly there is a great deal of divergence in how the Conservative 
Party, post-2005, might be characterised and understood. 
 
This debate is at the heart of this thesis, which seeks to explore the Parliamentary Conservative 
Party’s (PCP) relationship with conservatism under Cameron’s leadership between 2005 and 
2015 via an in-depth study of the party’s approach to welfare policy. It is concerned firstly with 
the development of Conservative ideas in this immediate period, considering this in relation to a 
range of contextual factors. These include the imperative of achieving electoral success, the need 
to respond to and ultimately attempt to shape the political, social and economic context, and the 
pressures introduced by specific policy problems. Welfare policy is used as a focus through 
which to identify and trace different strands of thinking on social issues within the PCP, and to 
consider the impact and usage of these ideas in both opposition and in government. However, in 
analysing the ideas of the contemporary party and relating these to the context in which it exists, 
the research necessarily takes a wider perspective than the specific period that it focuses on. It 
looks backwards, linking the conservatism of Cameron’s party to both past British Conservative 
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traditions and conservative ideological frameworks more broadly. It also looks to the future, 
laying a foundation for understanding how the decisions taken and the ideas that have been 
emphasised, rejected or re-constituted in this period might contribute to shaping both future 
Conservative ideological perspectives and strategies, and the British political landscape within 
which the PCP exists. 
 
As such, the conclusions drawn from this research are interesting and important on a number of 
dimensions. They pertain directly to the debate regarding the modern Conservative Party’s 
relationship with conservatism, and the case study approach deployed provides a substantial and 
original empirical contribution to this. When analysed within the innovative theoretical 
framework of the research, this constitutes a well-grounded and nuanced challenge to the idea of 
a socially liberal Conservative Party, as many of the ideas surrounding this policy area have 
much wider implications in terms of understanding how the PCP approaches social issues. 
Beyond this, the research draws attention to the importance of ideas in understanding political 
action, and considers how the deployment of ideas varies in line with electoral and governing 
imperatives. Through this, the case study can offer a window into wider issues, both theoretical 
and practical. Significantly, it provides both a means of analysing the practical usage and 
application of political ideologies, and a demonstration of how this can occur within a defined 
context. As such, the research illustrates not just that ideas matter in understanding outcomes, but 
why they matter, and in what ways. In turn, this contributes to understanding the relationship 
between political parties and the British political system, illustrating how ideas mediate between 
the two and how this has a real impact on context and decision-making that goes beyond the 
Conservative Party itself. Therefore although the focus of this research is the Conservative Party 
in a defined period of time, the conclusions drawn have a much wider relevance to the study of 
conservatism, ideas, and British party politics and policy-making.  
 
This chapter outlines the project. I begin by discussing an issue which, although not the main 
focus of the thesis, nonetheless requires addressing in order to contextualise the analysis. This is 
the situation with regard to welfare policy and connected issues in the period immediately prior 
to the one under consideration, which is addressed via a discussion of the impact of New Labour 
in this area. I then go on to define the focus on welfare policy, outlining the approach taken to 
this in relation to alternative possibilities, followed by a brief discussion of the key contributions 
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and arguments of this research and the limitations of these. Finally, the chapter offers outlines of 
the subsequent chapters and a discussion of the research methodology. 
 
1.2 New Labour, and the Conservatives in opposition 
When Cameron was elected as Conservative leader in 2005, he faced considerable challenges. 
The Conservatives had been in opposition for eight years and had lost three general elections, 
struggling to learn the lessons of defeat and enact an effective challenge to New Labour. The 
circumstances in which the Conservatives had sought to regain power after 1997 were very 
different from those which presaged its last period of electoral dominance under Thatcher. Upon 
coming to power within a favourable economic context, New Labour conclusively pushed social 
issues onto the agenda. Notable within this was a focus on poverty and ‘social exclusion’, which 
New Labour proposed to address partly through an ambitious programme of welfare reform. The 
centrepieces of this comprised greatly expanded welfare-to-work programmes and a raft of 
enhanced tax credits, alongside measures such as a National Minimum Wage and a focus on 
child poverty and deprivation (Hills, Sefton and Stewart, 2009).  
 
The Conservative record on these issues was not good. The number of people living in poverty in 
Britain doubled between 1979 and 1997 (Coates, 2005: 19), and the income gap between the 
richest and poorest people in the country increased almost year-on-year in the same period 
(Belfield et al., 2014: 38). Additionally, New Labour had effectively (but not necessarily 
accurately) sought to portray the Conservative approach to welfare issues as passive, willing to 
blame the poor for their situation but not to provide them with the help that might allow them to 
improve it (Atkins, 2011: 114). It was within this context that Theresa May memorably referred 
to the Conservatives being seen by the electorate as the ‘nasty party’ (2002), and Cameron 
proposed that altering this perception was central to reinvigorating Conservative electoral 
fortunes (2005a).   
 
However, it was difficult to see where the Conservatives could begin to confront New Labour on 
such issues. This was firstly because elements of the policy agenda on welfare built on 
Conservative reforms from the 1980s and 1990s, furthering a focus on employment and 
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increasing conditionality attached to the receipt of benefits. The trajectory of New Labour’s 
reforms, in this respect, offered continuity rather than change.1 The programmes and policies 
themselves also appeared to be performing quite well. The New Deals, implemented against a 
backdrop of falling unemployment, nonetheless produced some good results when their effects 
were isolated, up until around 2003 when these levelled off (McKnight, 2009; van Reenan, 
2004). As such the Conservatives had little space to challenge these, and little reason to do so.  
 
Similarly, increasing income inequality was arrested through substantial investment in tax 
credits, and child poverty consequentially fell, although not by as much as New Labour would 
have liked (Hills, 2013). While some Conservatives might have felt uncomfortable with the 
means through which advances were being made in this area, or even with the goal of decreasing 
inequality overall (see Chapters 2 and 4), directly challenging such policies risked reinforcing 
the impression of the Conservatives as harsh and uncaring. In this respect, focusing on child 
poverty in particular was a shrewd political decision by New Labour (although not, as Chapter 7 
discusses, one that has subsequently proven immune to challenges). Equally, however, given the 
strong emphasis on this policy agenda and the extent to which New Labour drew on it within 
their governing strategy, it was becoming increasingly clear that doing nothing on welfare and 
connected issues such as poverty and disadvantage was not an option for the Conservatives. 
 
As New Labour’s time in government wore on, however, flaws in their poverty strategy began to 
emerge. Alongside this, a Conservative critique of the approach began to develop. The content of 
this critique is part of the main subject matter of this thesis and is discussed in the subsequent 
chapters, but it is worth outlining some of the key weaknesses of New Labour’s approach here as 
a means of contextualising this.  
 
As discussed, all of the New Deals achieved some success initially. However, in addition to the 
slowing of gains mentioned above, there are further caveats to the success of these programmes. 
They tended to deliver the best outcomes for claimants with a history of steady employment, and 
were much less effective for those with no employment history, a history of unstable 
                                                 
1 A discussion of the relationship between Thatcherism and New Labour is outside of the scope of this thesis: 
however, Driver and Martell (2006) and Heffernan (2000) provide comprehensive accounts of this.  
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employment, or low qualifications. ‘Recycling’ of claims was also an issue: around two thirds of 
all new JSA claims per year (an average of 1.6 million) were repeat claims (Finn, 2011), 
suggesting that there were problems around job retention for claimants who did move into work. 
There was also insufficient linkage between the New Deal infrastructure and in-work support, 
meaning that many of those who did move into employment found themselves trapped in low-
paid, low-skilled work, which is often also lacking in security (Leitch, 2006: 51). Although the 
New Deals represented a significant expansion of welfare-to-work, there were clearly areas in 
which their effectiveness fell short of what was expected. After 2005, both the Conservatives and 
Labour began to move towards considering these shortcomings, with Labour implementing the 
Flexible New Deal and the Conservatives developing the Work Programme in response to a 
review of the system by David Freud (2007), who would later receive a life peerage from the 
Conservative Party. 
 
Additionally, after a promising start, New Labour’s progress on poverty and inequality began to 
stall. Some of the innovations that had provided the initial progress were of a sort whose effects 
could not be easily replicated. Firstly, for example, the National Minimum Wage provided a 
significant ‘jump’ in income to the 1.5 million people who were earning less than £3 per hour in 
1997 (Coates, 2005: 20). Whether or not this was seen as good in itself, it certainly made it 
difficult to sustain progress, especially as New Labour’s commitment to the National Minimum 
Wage stressed that its level should be recommended independently by the Low Pay Commission. 
By limiting its own input on this, New Labour may have helped to bolster the credibility of what 
was perceived as a risky policy, but it also reduced its own ability to push for large increases. 
Secondly, tax credits provided an important means of boosting incomes, including those as a 
result of low pay. However, these required sustained investment to maintain progress. Having 
been reticent to make the case for higher taxes to fund this, New Labour was not able to replicate 
the achievements of the first four years in office (McKnight, 2009; Sefton, Hills and Sutherland, 
2009). Finally, on a slightly different note, New Labour had discreetly increased the incomes of 
workless households with children during their time in office. Income from such benefits is 
vulnerable to inflation. This produced a situation whereby with high inflation during the 
economic downturn in 2009/10, some of the strongest income growth was amongst those wholly 
reliant on benefits, in comparison to sluggish wage growth (Belfield et al., 2014: 5). 
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All of this meant that New Labour became increasingly politically vulnerable on these topics on 
several fronts, representing a series of opportunities for the Conservatives to intervene and, 
potentially, to challenge New Labour’s apparent dominance on social issues. This is explored 
further in subsequent chapters. Overall, the changes brought about in the British political 
landscape by New Labour forced the Conservatives to deal with some issues that they would 
probably have preferred to avoid – and that, indeed, the leadership largely shied away from 
facing between 1997 and 2005. It is within this context that Cameron’s leadership of the party 
should initially be viewed.  
 
1.3 Scope of the research 
Even if a broad consensus had been reached that some kind of change was needed in the 
Conservative Party in 2005, much less could be said of the level of agreement regarding what 
form and direction this change should take. As indicated above, New Labour had pushed issues 
around poverty and disadvantage onto the political agenda, requiring the Conservatives to act on 
areas of policy that had been relatively neglected under Thatcher owing to the overwhelming 
focus on the economy, and that had proven challenging for subsequent leaders (see Chapter 5). 
Yet while for some Conservatives the obvious response to this was a parallel extension of the 
economic liberalism that was a hallmark of Thatcherism, into social liberalism, for others a 
socially conservative response was required (Streeter, 2002: 9).  
 
The ideological direction of ‘modernisation’ was therefore contested from the outset of 
Cameron’s leadership. The direction that it initially appeared that this would take, in line with 
Cameron’s own, self-professed ‘liberal conservative’ values was not universally accepted within 
the party owing to the existence of a significant intra-party division on ‘social, sexual and moral’ 
issues (Hayton, 2012: 19; Heppell, 2013). This became painfully evident in the ensuing furore 
over totemic social liberal policies such as same-sex marriage (Hayton and McEnhill, 2015). As 
one MP of the 2010 intake suggested, there were those in the party who had ‘never accepted the 
intellectual underpinning of so-called “modernisation”’, alongside a suspicion that ‘some of the 
modernisers – but by no means all – seem to want to engage in a repudiation of everything 
Margaret Thatcher did and a bit of an embrace of everything Mr Blair did’ (Burns, private 
interview). Welfare policy, understood in relation to the remit of the Department for Work and 
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Pensions, provides an interesting location through which to explore the resolution of these 
debates and, consequentially, the implications for conservatism within the Conservative Party.  
 
This thesis focuses on working-age welfare policy and, after 2010, the actions of the DWP. 
Questions around this policy area have loomed large within the PCP during the period with 
which this research is concerned, and it has consistently formed a significant part of the 
Conservative Party’s agenda. It was the focus of an entire, influential section of Cameron’s 
policy review in 2006, led by Iain Duncan Smith; within the ‘Big Society’ and ‘broken Britain’ 
narratives in opposition, and within the austerity and reform programmes introduced in 
government. These culminated in the Welfare Reform Act (2012), which, in April 2013, brought 
in the majority of policy that this research focuses on. Welfare also played an important role in 
the Conservative election campaign in 2015, and further reforms in a similar vein to those 
enacted under the Coalition appear very likely under the in-coming Conservative majority 
government. 
 
Yet working-age welfare policy has been used for different purposes, often varying with the 
electoral cycle. Initially a means of demonstrating change and inclusiveness in opposition, it later 
became a vehicle for illustrating an authoritarian ‘toughness’ and willingness to make difficult 
decisions in government. Pensions policy, in contrast, has been both much lower-profile and 
utilised in a far more consistent manner, which is closely related to the imperative of retaining 
Conservative support amongst pensioners. What makes working-age welfare such an interesting 
case is its consistently high profile combined with the volatility in how it has been deployed. 
This means it is particularly apt for exploring shifts in the usage of and emphasis on different 
ideas, as well as the contextual pressures and that prompt such changes. 
  
The research further confines the focus of the analysis to the PCP. It seeks to understand  
decisions and strategies in this area as they are conceived by elite actors within the Conservative 
Party, in relation to the broader governing and electoral context in which it exists. Political elites 
can be assumed to act strategically: that is, they formulate actions in pursuit of a range of varied 
goals and aims. These goals do not exist singularly or in isolation from each other. It is not 
possible, practically, to isolate elements of what can broadly be termed ‘statecraft’ (Bulpitt, 
1986): for example, separating electoral motivations from governing motivations, or party 
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management concerns, or problem-focused policy issues. Neither is it feasible to assume that all 
of these concerns are of consistently equal importance, particularly in the months surrounding 
general elections. Strategic action therefore involves balancing this multitude of pressures in 
pursuit of the different, but often interrelated goals that political parties seek to achieve. 
However, even well-informed actors cannot ever have perfect knowledge of their circumstances: 
context is never fixed, and actors are unable to predict with any great accuracy changes in 
context or ‘events’. This requires continual assessment and potential adaption of both means and 
ends. As such actors must rely on their ideas as a frame through which to access this complex 
landscape, and hence in formulating strategy. The ideas of elite Conservatives, the way that these 
influence decisions, and the way that they are formed and adjusted in relation to context, both 
historical and present, are hence central in understanding outcomes in the policy area at hand.  
 
Within this it is necessary to take into account factors outside the party, such as the electoral 
context or the strategies of the opposition. Nonetheless, it is how the Conservative Party itself 
has responded to these within the time period concerned that is the object of inquiry here. The 
case study method deployed is an appropriate means of analysing contemporary developments in 
depth. This can offer a window into the longer-term possibilities for Conservative policy 
development. However, the theoretical foundation of this thesis emphasises that strategies must 
be flexible and that events, often largely outside of the control of elite actors, may engender 
substantial strategic revisions. Extended discussion of the longer-term development of welfare as 
an element of a hegemonic approach therefore seems somewhat premature and speculative. As 
one analysis notes, there is ‘every reason’ to believe that Conservative moves towards 
establishing a permanently ‘leaner’ state are vulnerable to roll-back (Ashbee, 2015: 171-172). 
With many developments still on-going and an unavoidable lack of historical perspective on 
these, the focus of this work is on understanding of the usage of welfare in terms of shorter-term 
goals and the interaction between these and policy priorities and effects. In turn this could 
provide a foundation for understanding longer-term developments in the usage of welfare, but it 
does so with the conviction that understanding the detailed decision processes underpinning such 
developments is an essential precursor to this. Therefore the longer-term usage of welfare policy 
is discussed in Chapter 5 and returned to in Conclusion: however, it is not the focus of this 
research. 
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The research is operationalized through a combination of Colin Hay’s Strategic-Relational 
Approach (SRA - Hay, 2002), and Michael Freeden’s morphological approach to ideologies 
(1996) which, it is proposed, can be used to ameliorate a weakness within the way that the SRA 
conceptualises the process of ideational development. The SRA has previously been applied to 
both party politics (Hayton, 2012a) and policy – not least within Hay’s own work (see Chapter 
2). However, in identifying this weakness and proposing a solution to it, this thesis therefore 
makes a theoretical contribution, in additional to its substantial empirical one, which is returned 
to below.  
 
There are a number of alternative analytical angles that might have been taken on this topic. One 
could consider the relationship between New Labour and the Conservatives: how might 
Conservative policies and political decisions be explained in respect of the impact of New 
Labour on the political, economic and social landscape? This, however, would tend to focus the 
analysis on New Labour itself, which is at cross-purposes to the central task of this thesis. We 
might consider the role played by external actors in influencing the Conservative policy or 
ideational development process: notably in relation to this period, the role of think-tanks has 
already attracted some attention (Pautz, 2013). Finally, we might focus on the broader social 
context around the policy area, considering how this introduces pressures on the Conservatives 
to respond and hence informs strategy, perhaps framing this in relation to social attitudes towards 
welfare issues at the level of the electorate. The decision to focus on the Conservative Party itself 
reflects the theoretical approach of this thesis, which emphasises the agency that its elites possess 
in responding to context. These alternative approaches reflect slightly different emphases and 
different locations of inquiry: they might, in turn, arrive at different conclusions regarding the 
nature of change in the party and the primary influences on this. This divergence is not 
necessarily problematic, as long as the perspective from which the research has been conducted 
and the basis on which its conclusions are made, is clear from the outset. This is returned to 
below, in the discussion of research methodology 
 
The approach outlined also therefore imposes certain limitations on the research and the claims 
that can be made for it. The central one is that the conclusions drawn pertain specifically to the 
Conservative Party in the period 2005-2015: these cannot be generalised to other conservative 
parties or other British parties, or other periods outside of those specifically discussed. This is 
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because the analysis is tied to the actors involved, whose particular interpretations of their 
circumstances and hence their decisions are inextricably embedded within that context. 
However, this does not mean that the claims have no analytical or empirical utility beyond this, 
as returned to below.  
 
What the research presented here does do is contribute to a broader political analytical tradition 
of studying the Conservative Party, which is still emergent in relation to Cameron’s leadership. It 
utilises an innovative theoretical framework to explore the relationship between Cameron’s 
Conservatives and conservatism as an ideology in a way that is sensitive to the constantly 
changing political context in which the party operates. This can account for the range of different 
pressures and imperatives that it has to negotiate, which will both contribute to shaping, and 
themselves be shaped by, the strategies adopted and executed by Conservative elites. By 
focusing on a specific policy area and using this as a means through which to analyse 
Conservative ideas in depth, the research offers a different way of approaching the topic of the 
Conservative Party and conservatism to that used in existing extended studies in this area (see 
Chapter 3). In doing so, it adds value not only to this specific research area by offering a nuanced 
analysis from a different perspective, but also to the broader understanding of how, and in what 
way, ideas and ideologies matter in the practice of politics. As a result, the conclusions of this 
research (and the application of the method more widely) could finally contribute to a second 
research area which is more focused on the analysis of policy itself and its impacts. Through 
understanding the processes that have led to particular policy decisions, and the ideas and 
perceptions that these are constructed with reference to, we are better placed to assess policy 
success or failure on the Conservative Party’s own terms.  
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 begins with an exploration of perspectives on structural and agential, and material and 
ideational factors in understanding political action and the process of change. Through this, it 
introduces the SRA as a central component of the theoretical foundation for this thesis. The SRA 
provides a convincing and nuanced account of the significance of ideas in informing action, and 
can adequately account for the range of real-life pressures and motivations that inform political 
decision-making and ideological development. However, it is less effective at theorising the 
process of ideational change itself. This would seem to be an essential step in any account of the 
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role of ideas in political life. I therefore propose a way of ameliorating this weakness, combining 
the SRA with the morphological approach to theorising ideology advanced by Michael Freeden. 
This can provide a means of analysing not just whether change has occurred, but in what ways 
and to what extent. Following this, the chapter discusses how this approach will be applied to the 
research topic of this thesis and outlines central research questions. These are: 
 
1. What are the key concepts informing the Conservative Party’s approach to welfare 
policy, and how are these decontested in relation to one another? 
2. How do these concepts relate to the wider structure of conservatism? In particular, to 
what extent do they reflect, subvert or re-constitute the character of previous 
Conservative ideological traditions? 
3. How have these ideas been utilised in practice, in relation to policy and the competing 
strategic motivations that impact on this, and what is the effect of this on the character of 
the Conservatives’ conservatism? 
 
Both the SRA and Freeden’s morphological approach suggest that ideas and ideologies have a 
crucial bearing on political action: and yet, many Conservatives have displayed, and continue to 
display, a distinct unwillingness to acknowledge the role played by ideology in their own 
decisions and actions. Drawing on Freeden’s adaptable and flexible definition of ideology as 
outlined in the previous chapter, Chapter 3 explores the literature on what ‘conservatism’ means 
in historical perspective: what is it, and what is ‘conservative’ about the Conservative Party? The 
chapter considers this first in theoretical terms, before going on to discuss manifestations of 
Conservatism in the post-war period, notably considering how the apparent disjuncture between 
One Nation and Thatcherite forms of Conservatism might be understood. It argues that the two 
display greater continuity than is often claimed, particularly with respect to individual and social 
morality. Certainly, both fall within the conservative ideological family. Where they differ is in 
their attitude towards the interventionist state, and this has remained a key issue within British 
Conservatism. This discussion provides a basis for analysing the ideological heritage from which 
Cameron’s Conservative Party has developed, in subsequent chapters. Finally, the chapter offers 
a brief overview of the existing literature on ‘Cameronism’, situating the present research within 
this.  
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The main contribution of Freeden’s morphological approach is to direct our attention towards 
concepts as the building blocks of ideologies. This suggests that while different ideologies may 
seem to use the same concepts, these are often imbued with different meanings owing to their 
position in the ideology’s structure and the concepts that they are connected to. Chapter 4 
identifies and explores the central concepts informing Cameron’s Conservative Party’s welfare 
policies, considering these in relation to each other and in terms of how they relate to the broader 
ideology of Conservatism. It is suggested that hostility towards the interventionist state, tied to 
the concept of ‘responsibility’ and poverty expressed as ‘welfare dependency’, is central to 
contemporary Conservative ideology on welfare. This is widespread across the PCP, suggesting 
that on this significant area, One Nation Conservatism no longer offers a viable alternative view 
of the state-society relationship, and that on this aspect of ‘modernisation’ at least, the party is 
largely unified. As such, the chapter finds Cameron’s Conservatives attempting to expound a 
post-Thatcherite approach to social policy – and developing some potentially interesting ways of 
doing so - whilst still heavily constrained by the same assumptions and suspicions of the impact 
of the state that underpinned Thatcherism.  
 
The continued strong influence of Thatcherite Conservative ideology over Cameron’s party 
therefore has significant implications for the kinds of strategies that it is willing to adopt. As the 
SRA suggests, even while considering a specific policy area, formulating strategy is not solely a 
matter of resolving policy problems but is linked to other party political concerns. One very 
important such concern is electoral strategy and appeal. Chapter 5 explores how the 
Conservatives have utilised and deployed the concepts outlined in the previous chapter in 
attempting to further their electoral advances. It considers the electoral challenges that the PCP 
has faced since 2005. In particular, it seeks to explain the increased prominence of welfare policy 
within Conservative positioning between opposition and government, and how this can be 
understood in relation to the change of context, strategic learning and development. The chapter 
argues that both the financial crisis, and the failure to win an overall majority in 2010, had an 
important impact on the party’s use of welfare, transforming it into a high-profile electoral issue 
on which the Conservatives perceive that they can win support without having to make a 
potentially troublesome departure from Thatcherite principles. This, of course, exerts a 
considerable influence on the sorts of policies that have been considered viable since 2010. The 
chapter discusses these in relation to the outcome of the 2015 election. 
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Chapters 6 and 7 explore the translation of the ideological concepts set out in Chapter 4 into 
policy proposals and then concrete policy, with reference to a range of contextual factors 
including the electoral imperative identified in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 explores the aspects of 
reform developed in opposition, focusing on Universal Credit and the Work Programme. The 
chapter shows how the relatively coherent framework for policy set out in Chapter 4 has been 
put under pressure within the reality of government, which has served to bring tensions within 
the PCP, regarding both immediate priorities and broader ways of thinking about the relationship 
between state, society and individual, to the surface. There is evidence of longer-term, 
substantive thinking on reducing reliance on the state in both policies. While proceeding from 
Thatcherite-influenced assumptions about the basic undesirability of state welfare provision, 
these propose a means of alleviating ‘dependency’ that goes beyond simple welfare 
retrenchment. This incorporates a significant dimension which views reliance on benefits as a 
matter of rational choice, essentially drawing economically liberal market logic alongside 
traditionally conservative moral perspectives on the undesirability of welfare support and 
importance of work. However, this more innovative policy element is undermined by both the 
identification of the immediate need to reduce spending as the central task facing the 
government, and the elevation of the electoral significance of welfare.  
 
Like Chapter 6, Chapter 7 concentrates on the translation of ideas into policy. It focuses on the 
package of reforms introduced after the Conservatives moved into Coalition government, 
examining changes to Disability Living Allowance, the Social Rented Sector Size Criterion or 
‘bedroom tax’, the benefit cap and changes to benefit up-rating. The chapter draws out further 
tensions between these strategies and those outlined in the previous chapter, emphasising the 
extent to which these reforms draw on moralistic, traditionally conservative understandings of 
the effects of welfare support. These are not necessarily compatible with the more liberal-
influenced reforms discussed in the previous chapter. Combined with the need to reduce 
spending urgently, in line with economic ideology and electoral imperatives, the result is a 
heavily Thatcherite-influenced approach which suggests that reliance on welfare cannot co-exist 
with self-sufficiency for individual claimants. The direction of reforms discussed in this chapter 
cuts across the thinking behind those discussed in Chapter 6, being illustrative of a deeply 
negative view of the state’s impact on society and individual behaviour. Even transitional 
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support is viewed as a sop to welfare dependency, understood primarily as a consequence of 
individual moral failings. The ascendency of this approach further illustrates where the balance 
of power lies within the Conservative Party under Cameron. This links welfare policy back to the 
broader question of Conservative change and development since Thatcher. Overall, Conservative 
thinking on welfare and the relationship between the state and society remains both firmly within 
socially conservative parameters, and quite under-developed from Thatcherism. ‘Modernisation’, 
it seems, has yet to effectively permeate this aspect of Conservative thinking. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
In the final section of this chapter, I discuss the research methods employed in this thesis 
alongside their limitations and suitability for the topic at hand, as well as outlining how the data 
was collected and analysed. At this point, however, it is perhaps useful to explicitly state the 
ontological and epistemological position from which this project is approached. The ontological 
position taken here, and embodied in the SRA, is anti-foundationalist. It suggests that there is not 
a ‘real world’ that exists independently of our knowledge of it: instead, it is actors themselves 
that constitute the landscape in which they operate (Parsons, 2010: 97). This necessarily leads to 
an epistemologically interpretative approach, emphasising that social processes and outcomes 
‘cannot be understood independently of our interpretation of them: rather it is these 
interpretations/understandings of social phenomena that directly affect outcomes’ (Furlong and 
Marsh, 2010: 199). Additionally, as discussed in greater detail below, starting from such an 
ontological position entails accepting that the researcher is not in a sufficiently privileged 
position to be able to assign meaning to the actions of others. In adopting the position that the 
world is socially constructed, the aim of this research is to study and understand these particular, 
subjective constructions. This has methodological implications for the research. 
 
The main methodological implication of proposing the centrality of ideas and interpretations in 
understanding political outcomes is that actors’ interests, interpretations of context and strategic 
priorities cannot be assumed or ‘read off’ from looking at either the ‘facts’ of context or material 
circumstances, or the outcomes (in terms of policy) themselves. Writing on the application of the 
SRA and the privileging of ideas within this, Marsh points out that ‘in order to identify the 
agent’s preference, their perceptions of the strategic context, the reasons for their strategic 
choices and their reflections on the outcomes of their actions, we need to ask them’ (2010: 219). 
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It is therefore essential that agents are directly involved in the research process, and that they are 
given the opportunity to explain their own perceptions and ideas of context relating to the policy 
area discussed. In understanding decisions and outcomes, it is important to interrogate the ideas 
underpinning these as they are explained by the actors involved. Without this, any conclusions 
drawn regarding motivation, influence or understanding (and, ultimately, the variety of 
Conservatism that we are looking at) might be incorrect, but would certainly be invalid, since 
one cannot assume on behalf of the researcher a superior vantage point for detecting 
Conservative politicians’ reasons and understandings. 
 
The bulk of the research for this thesis is therefore qualitative. In some instances, notably related 
to electoral strategy, statistics in the form of public opinion polls are used, since these indicate 
potentially important influences on the direction of policy which cannot be adequately captured 
though qualitative means. Two main sources of qualitative data are used: semi-structured elite 
interviews, and document analysis.  
 
Interviewing is a particularly appropriate method for this study for both methodological and 
practical reasons. Methodologically, interviewing works well as a means of investigating the 
complex issue of actors’ subjective interpretations of problems and goals (Furlong and Marsh, 
2010: 200). Semi-structured interviewing is more appropriate than a rigid interview structure. 
This allows participants to explore issues in their own terms, emphasising ideas and events that 
are important to them and their understanding of these: in effect, it transfers some of the control 
over the interview to the participant while still maintaining a coherent core across interviews 
(Bernard and Ryan, 2010: 29-30), which is directed by the research questions outlined above.  
 
Moreover, in elite interviews the balance of knowledge and expertise is usually in favour of the 
participant (Burnham et al., 2008: 231): Conservative MPs should be expected to understand 
more about the internal workings of the party than the researcher, for example. It is therefore 
sensible to allow some latitude within the interviews, to account for individuals’ divergent 
interpretations but also for their particular strengths in knowledge and understanding and areas of 
interest, which a more standardised interview might preclude discussion of (Manhein, Rich and 
Willnat, 2002: 321-323). In this way, richer and more detailed data can be obtained. Since 
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responses were not going to be quantified, the lack of standardisation in this approach is not a 
major concern (Burnham et al, 2008: 240). 
 
On a more practical level, this thesis is concerned with very recent events. There is not currently 
a significant amount of literature such as memoirs, which might offer an alternative insight into 
the way that actors concerned interpreted and responded to their context, available. Even if this 
was available, it would tend to only give the perspectives of the central actors which, while 
undoubtedly important (as discussed below), is only part of the story. Interviewing thus offered a 
way of exploring very recent developments with actors whose perspectives might not otherwise 
be available. Indeed, since the bulk of interviewing took place between September 2012 and 
June 2013, the implementation of the policies discussed was unfolding concurrently.  
 
This, in turn, leads to a further methodological point. There are specific difficulties and 
challenges inherent in ‘real time’ research. These include, for example, the problem of 
maintaining perspective with regard to the wider significance of particular events, which 
becomes increasingly difficult towards the end of the time period in question (Hazell and Yong, 
2012: 6). For this reason, much of the analysis here focuses on the measures introduced through 
and prior to the Welfare Reform Act (2012). This can, with some confidence, be assumed to 
mark a significant juncture in welfare policy development, although later events are also 
discussed, notably with reference to the 2015 election. The time frame discussed in the 
interviews also covered a much longer period (as the project focuses on developments since 
2005 in relation to the Conservative Party’s past), allowing for some reflection on the more 
enduring significance of developments. Furthermore, the use of additional data sources was 
helpful in determining the wider significance of issues raised in interviews. Nonetheless it is 
important to bear in mind that the full significance of the policy and political decisions discussed 
here may not become apparent for some time. This research therefore necessarily takes what 
Farrall and Hay refer to in their exploration of the legacy of Thatcherism as an ‘implementation 
perspective’ in trying to understand developments unfolding almost concurrently (2014: 16): 
however, such a perspective offers significant scope for further research building on this. 
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In total, sixteen Conservative MPs were interviewed.2 Conservative MPs were initially contacted 
on the basis of a clear demonstrated interest in the policy area: for example, those who held or 
had held ministerial positions within the DWP or former DSS, those who had contributed to 
parliamentary scrutiny of welfare reform, or those who had published material on the topic. 
Document analysis itself was therefore central in informing this. Eleven of the interviews were 
arranged through this process, with another five obtained by writing to all remaining 
Conservative MPs. The MPs tended to prefer to talk in broad terms about ideas around welfare 
(and the interview topics were directed towards this), rather than the specific technical details of 
policy. This reflects the role of MPs as generalists, and was helpful in acquiring the kind of data 
required for this project. 
 
However, there were limitations to the data obtained from interviewing. Again, some of these 
were practical, and some methodological. On the practical side first, despite a number of 
approaches, none of the DWP ministers during the time period in question nor other key figures 
such as the Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed to be interviewed. This reflects the difficulty of 
interviewing MPs belonging to the party in power, and particularly those in cabinet or ministerial 
roles. It also underscores the importance of not relying solely on one data collection technique. 
This would apply even if these actors had agreed to interviews. From a methodological angle, the 
main issue with interviewing is how to interpret the data obtained (Lilleker, 2003).  It may not be 
accurate, and the reliability of the accounts given by interviewees might be questionable. As 
such, the interviewer ‘must constantly be aware that the information the interviewee is 
supplying, can often be of a highly subjective nature’ (Richards, 1996: 201). This is of particular 
concern in relation to topics such as the balance of power within the party, why certain aspects of 
policy have been emphasised over others, and why particular decisions have been made.  
 
Use of additional data sources compensated for both of these problems. Welfare reform has been 
a very high profile topic in the 2010 to 2015 parliament, and the Conservative Party’s approach 
to social policy formed a significant part of the ‘modernisation’ agenda leading up to 2010. The 
leading actors in relation to this policy area directly, and the trajectory of policy more broadly, 
                                                 
2
 Initial contact with potential interviewees was made by letter, with a follow up phone call or email after two weeks 
if no response was received. This usually resulted in a decision, although in some cases a third and final call was 
required. 
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are on record speaking about their motivations and understandings, either implicitly or explicitly 
in a number of primary document sources that are publicly available. These include materials 
such as transcripts of speeches and articles by Conservative MPs, literature including pre-2010 
policy papers, and Hansard records of parliamentary debates and proceedings pertaining to the 
reforms that were studied. 
 
Document analysis therefore comprised a second main source of data. Overall, the data obtained 
from document analysis enabled a fuller and more accurate representation of the development of 
ideas on welfare across the Conservative Party than interviewing alone. This provided an 
essential means of establishing the extent to which backbench MPs’ perspectives were 
concordant, or discordant, with those of party leaders. Essentially, document analysis provided a 
means of triangulation which is essential in supplementing, and allowing cross-checking of the 
material obtained through interviews (Davies, 2001). This helped to fill in the gaps in interview 
data, providing additional material which strengthens the confidence of the conclusions drawn 
from the project (Lilleker, 2003). This made up for much of the shortfall associated with the lack 
of interviews with senior Conservatives, and helped compensate for the methodological 
difficulties of interviewing. 
 
The interviews with and statements of Conservative MPs themselves form the primary material 
for this thesis. Beyond this, there was a body of secondary material that contributed to filling in 
the broader context within which the Conservative Party operates, or ‘telling the story’ of how 
the party’s approach to welfare developed (Vromen, 2010: 262). Further secondary document 
sources included a wide range of materials, from newspaper and journalistic reports, to 
parliamentary publications such as the inquiries of select committees into aspects of welfare 
reform. Given the relatively current nature of the topic at hand, think-tank and charity reports 
and government departmental publications were particularly useful secondary sources, often 
providing the most up-to-date analyses in terms of the development and implementation of 
policy and the concerns that fed into and arose from this. 
 
Interviewees closely linked to the development of welfare policy, but outside of the PCP itself, 
were also contacted. These were ‘informed observers’, with various levels of closeness to the 
party. They included Labour members who had worked closely on welfare policy, including 
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some who had worked with the Coalition such as Frank Field; former and current civil servants; 
representatives of think-tanks such as the Centre for Social Justice which had played a 
significant role in developing some aspects of welfare policy, particularly in opposition; others 
who had been involved in the SJPG policy review in 2006, and representatives of charities and 
non-Conservative think-tanks which had been involved in the policy process, often during the 
parliamentary scrutiny stages. Here, the response rate was much better than amongst MPs. There 
were 27 interviewees in this group, bringing the total to number of interviews to 43.  
 
The content of these interviews was much more varied than those of the Conservative MPs, 
reflecting the diversity of the participants and the slightly different purposes for which the 
interviews were conducted. For example, civil servants tended to prefer to focus on technical 
detail regarding policy development and implementation issues, while some think-tank and 
charity participants were more inclined to discuss broader ideas around welfare policy in 
addition to the policy developments themselves. Most interviewees were able to offer insights on 
aspects of the priorities of the Government and the process of policy-making. This was helpful in 
filling in the background to how Conservatives understood and approached the issues that they 
sought to address, as well as providing a further form of triangulation with the Conservative 
MPs’ interview data. 
 
Interviews were conducted in person wherever possible. However, due to scheduling difficulties 
(both my own and that of the interviewees) and time constraints, some were conducted by 
telephone. Telephone interviewing brings a range of challenges that are more easily overcome in 
person, notably around establishing rapport with interviewees which is essential for in-depth 
qualitative interviewing and the lack of non-verbal cues (Stephens, 2007). However, as Burnham 
et al. (2008: 234) point out, it is possible to exaggerate the extent to which real rapport can be 
developed in a single interview, whether face-to-face or not. Such disadvantages do not 
necessarily add up to a case against telephone interviewing. Overall, the benefits of being able to 
interview these participants compensated for these shortcomings, and there was not a noticeable 
difference between the sorts of responses gathered from the telephone interviews and those 
conducted in person. This was undoubtedly aided by the fact that most of the interviewees would 
have been experienced in this style of interviewing.  
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Having discussed how the data was collected, and from where, a final task is to outline how the 
process of analysis was approached. This was carried out via a thematic analysis, which is a very 
common (if somewhat poorly-defined) method of qualitative data analysis. A complete thematic 
analysis proceeds from identifying, analysing and reporting patterns as they occur across a 
particular data set, through the process of coding each item of data and then collating these codes 
into wider themes. This then allows for ‘[making] a judgement about the data in light of the 
theoretical framework’ of the research (Burnham et al. 2008: 245). Thematic analysis is often 
used within other traditions: for example, Bernard and Ryan (2010) locate it within analytical 
approaches including narrative analysis, discourse analysis and grounded theory. However, 
Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest that it can be conceived as an analytic method in its own right – 
albeit one that is flexible enough to fit within a variety of theoretical frameworks. In using 
thematic analysis in this way, Braun and Clarke suggest that it is important to be clear about the 
theoretical approach underpinning the analysis. Many of the important features of this – for 
example, regarding epistemological concerns around what claims we can make of the data – are 
addressed in full in Chapter 2, and so will not be repeated here. However, there are a number of 
other choices and judgements that inform the analysis process that are worth briefly addressing 
and explicitly outlining (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 82-86).   
 
The analysis for this thesis was problem-driven. It sought in the first instance to address a 
specific initial research question, outlined above, in identifying the key concepts that 
Conservatives use to inform and convey their approach to welfare, and the meanings and 
understandings that MPs attach to these. This then formed the basis for the subsequent analytical 
task of considering these in relation to historical variations of Conservative ideology, and the 
ways that these ideas are translated into practice. As such the coding process involved 
identifying a set of themes which, in this case, are analogous to these concepts. The themes that 
were judged to ‘count’ were those that occurred regularly in Conservative discussion around 
welfare (indicating some level of ideational significance), thus capturing something important in 
relation to the central research questions (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 82). As the research was 
concerned with actors’ interpretations of concepts, the analysis was conducted at a latent level. 
This is where the analyst ‘starts to identify or examine the underlying ideas, assumptions, and 
conceptualizations - and ideologies - that are theorized as shaping or informing the semantic 
content of the data’, as opposed to a semantic level where the analyst ‘is not looking for anything 
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beyond what a participant has said or what has been written’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 84). 
Clearly, the latter approach would have been inconsistent with the research aims of this project 
as it would not take us beyond the ‘naming’ of concepts, into considering how they have been 
decontested. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the context within which the Conservative concern with this policy 
area has developed, beginning to identify a range of pressures that the party was responding to 
when Cameron won the leadership in 2005. These include its own legacy on welfare and social 
issues, changes in the political and social context brought about by New Labour, the challenges 
of ‘modernisation’ in relation to party management, the on-going electoral imperative, and 
specific policy problems. All of these are essential factors in understanding the response of the 
Conservative Party to social issues in 2005 and throughout the following decade, and these are 
explored further in Chapters 4 to 7 of this thesis. It has also outlined the contribution of this 
thesis to existing research on the Conservatives and conservatism, and political parties and 
ideology more broadly. 
 
The theoretical angle from which this task is approached emphasises the role of ideas in 
understanding decisions, specifically paying attention to the way that the ideas of Conservative 
elites provide ‘points of access’ to the densely-structured political, economic and social context 
within which strategies are formulated and re-formulated. This grounds the analysis firmly in the 
‘real life’ of the Conservative Party, in relation to governing context. To carry this out, the thesis 
deploys an innovative combination of the SRA and the morphological approach to ideologies in 
understanding Conservative ideational development. In doing so, it makes a theoretical 
contribution to the study of ideas and ideologies in political life (see Chapter 2). 
 
The depth of analysis contained in this research, and the policy area-focused angle from which it 
approaches the topic, means that it also makes a substantial and original empirical contribution 
that complements much of the existing scholarship on the Conservative Party. By considering an 
entire area of policy in detail, the analysis contained here aims to understand the ideas informing 
this on a deeper level to much of this existing work, which has often engaged with policy in a 
more limited sense owing to variations in focus (see Chapter 3). In turn, this research 
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significantly adds value by bringing a different perspective to bear on understanding the ideology 
of the Conservative Party (since ideas related to this policy area pertain to much wider issues 
than welfare policy), and provides a nuanced account of how, and why, Conservative ideology 
has developed in the way that it has. Finally, its empirical conclusions are illuminating beyond 
the immediate topic at hand, providing a detailed illustration of the role and application of ideas 
in political life, and the differing contextual factors that have influenced this in the context at 
hand. 
 
Overall, the thesis argues that ideologically, the Conservative Party was very much socially 
‘conservative’ when Cameron took the leadership, and it remains so after the 2015 election. 
Given the narratives of change and ‘modernisation’ that have surrounded Cameron’s leadership, 
this is perhaps surprising, but socially conservative perspectives on individuals, the state and 
society have been more, not less strongly emphasised as the decade has worn on. This is 
significantly due to the ideological framework within which ‘modernisation’ was conceived, 
developed and implemented, which was recognisably Thatcherite. In turn, the pressures of 
governing in particular have forced a retreat from the more innovative aspects of the party’s 
approach to social issues that some Conservatives began to articulate in opposition, and clearly 
hoped would come to fruition in government. Instead, what we have seen between 2005 and 
2015 is a strong re-assertion of Thatcherite social conservatism.  
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Chapter 2  
The Strategic-Relational Approach and ideological morphologies 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The accusation of ‘having an ideology’ or being motivated by ideas is often used in a pejorative 
sense in political argument. This is particularly notable in relation to the Conservative Party. 
Throughout much of its recent history it has often sought to deny the status of ‘conservatism’ as 
an ideology, instead presenting a commitment to guiding principles of pragmatism or ‘common 
sense’ in opposition to this. This tendency is no less prevalent in contemporary British party 
politics: acknowledging one’s ideological influences is, it seems, deeply unfashionable and 
perceived as electorally unappealing (see Chapter 3).  
 
However, the central theoretical claim of this thesis is that ideas matter, both in informing 
decision-making and governing strategies in the shorter-term, and in constraining or enabling 
longer-term policy trajectories. Decisions are indicative of the ideas and perceptions of those 
who make them, and this is no less applicable to Conservatives than to those of other political 
persuasions which are perhaps more easily identified with the concept of ideology. It is also the 
case that decision-making with regard to policy does not occur within a vacuum: perceptions of 
other, perhaps competing priorities will impact on the process, affecting ideas around the policy 
area in question and shaping eventual outcomes. This chapter is dedicated to supporting these 
premises and explaining how they are deployed in informing this study, which requires exploring 
the ontological and epistemological assumptions sustaining this position. These are fundamental 
questions of what the nature of ‘reality’ or the social and political world is, and what we can 
know about it (Furlong and Marsh, 2010). Addressing these issues is the object of this chapter, 
which provides a theoretical foundation for the remainder of the thesis. 
 
The first section of the chapter introduces the basis of the theoretical approach of the thesis, 
which is the Strategic Relational Approach (SRA) as developed by Colin Hay. The SRA points 
towards the role of actors’ ideas in understanding political outcomes, alongside an appreciation 
of the way that these ideas may be adjusted or re-evaluated in relation to contingent contextual 
events. Ideas are thus intrinsically connected with ‘real life’ – they shape, and are shaped by, the 
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context within which parties operate. Through this, ideas are implicated in actors’ capacity for 
strategic action, meaning that ideational factors are allocated a central role in understanding 
outcomes. However, the chapter suggests that while the SRA effectively illustrates the centrality 
of ideas in understanding political outcomes, it is not so effective in theorising the process of 
ideational change itself. In seeking to understand the relationship between ideas and political life, 
this seems to be an important step, yet it is one that Hay omits. The second section of the chapter 
suggests a means of ameliorating this weakness. It introduces Michael Freeden’s morphological 
approach to ideologies as a means of understanding ideational change which can be combined 
with the SRA to produce a comprehensive theoretical framework for this thesis. This can be used 
to investigate the extent of change and the role of the ideas in this, the ideological orientation of 
change, and the level at which this change occurs, whether ideologically substantive or more 
superficial. Finally, the third section discusses how this is applied and utilised within this thesis, 
including further discussion of the central research questions to be investigated. 
 
2.2 Ideas, context and political action 
Justifying the central theoretical claim underpinning this thesis regarding the significance of 
ideas in explaining and understanding political outcomes necessitates exploring the ontological 
and epistemological assumptions sustaining this position, in relation to other opposing or partly-
opposing positions. The starting point for this is considering the relationships between structure 
and agency, and ideational and material factors in political analysis. Hay notes: ‘whether in 
sociology, social and political theory, political science or, now, international relations, the 
tendency has been to keep separate the twin conceptual pairings structure/agency [and] 
material/ideational.’ Challenging this tendency, he suggests that: ‘the issues of structure and 
agency, the ideational and the material cannot be separated and should not be “bracketed”’ 
(2001). This is the basis of Hay’s development of Bob Jessop’s SRA (1996; 1990) in his seminal 
2002 work Political Analysis. This work informs the theoretical claim of the significance of 
ideas within this thesis, and is the basis of the discussion in this section. 
 
Questions of structure and agency (or ‘context and conduct’) refer to the relationship between 
the individual, and the social context in which they exist. Fundamentally, these questions 
concern ‘the extent to which political conduct shapes and is shaped by political contexts’ (Hay, 
2002: 89), or how far individuals are free to act in accordance with their own desires, in pursuit 
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of individually or collectively-defined goals. This is the issue of ‘agency’, referring to action or 
political conduct. In this context agency is usually associated with deliberative action: the agent 
is conceived as both rational and capable of reflexivity, and as motivated with respect to 
particular intentions or preferences (Giddens, 1984: 5-8). Conversely, ‘structure’ refers to ‘the 
setting within which social, political and economic events occur and acquire meaning’, and 
implies some kind of ordering or ‘patterning’ of social and political behaviour (Hay, 2002: 94; 
Giddens, 1984: 16-17). Therefore addressing the relationship between structure and agency 
requires consideration of the extent to which actions are constrained, enabled, or rendered more 
or less likely by the existence of social conventions, norms or institutions – and, conversely, how 
such structures are shaped and re-shaped by political conduct.  
 
The nature of this relationship – and of the intrinsic nature of both ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ - has 
become a central topic of debate within political science, reflecting its status as ‘something of a 
cottage industry throughout the social sciences’ more widely (Wendt, 1987: 338).3 Yet, as Hay 
acknowledges, the structure-agency debate is ‘not a “problem” to which there is, or can be, a 
definitive solution’. This is because each position in the debate rests on ontological assumptions 
regarding the nature of social and political reality. These cannot be resolved via appeals to 
evidence, as a solvable empirical problem could be, and to suggest that this is possible is to 
‘conflate the empirical and the ontological’ (2002: 90). For example, it is possible for those with 
differing stances on the relationship to identify and agree sets of empirical observations that lead 
up to an event, while nonetheless disagreeing considerably on the relative importance of 
structural and agential factors within these. These are claims that cannot be adjudicated 
empirically (see also Hay, 2009a; 2009b). As such, structure-agency (or context-conduct) is ‘not 
so much a problem as a language by which ontological differences between contending accounts 
might be registered’ (2002: 91).  
 
The idea of a largely unfettered agency is perhaps appealing (particularly, as is evident in later 
chapters, in relation to the topic of this thesis and the capacity of individuals to shape their own 
life paths). It suggests individual control, free will, and the corresponding absence of constraints. 
                                                 
3
 Hay (2002: 89-115) and McAnulla (2002) provide overviews of the contemporary nature of the debate and 
positions within it. 
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This leads to the idea that the particular lifestyles that people lead, and the positions that they 
achieve, are a result of their individual choices. The other extreme – a fatalist approach in which 
life unfolds according to some preordained path,  determined in this case by independent social 
structures which allow little or no room for human agency – potentially leads to quite bleak 
conclusions for both the topic at hand and more broadly (Gamble, 2000: 12-14). More 
pressingly, neither of these provides particularly satisfactory explanations for behaviour 
considered independently (Gamble, 2000: 17). Instead, the very existence of the structure-agency 
debate suggests: 
 
That human agents and social structures are, in one way or another, theoretically 
interdependent or mutually implicating entities. Thus, the analysis of action invokes an at 
least implicit understanding of particular social relationships (or ‘rules of the game’) in 
which the action is set - just as the analysis of social structures invokes some 
understanding of the actors whose relationships make up the structural context. It is then 
a plausible step to believe that the properties of agents and those of social structures are 
both relevant to explanations of social behaviour. (Wendt, 1987: 338) 
 
The implication of this is that positions within the discussion of structure-agency do not need to 
fall squarely on one side or the other and, as noted below, such positions have become less 
prevalent in recent years. Neither, however, is resolving the theoretical debate a matter of 
deciding how great a proportion of the explanation to allocate to either side, as Hollis and Smith 
point out (1991). Rather, the beginnings of a social ontology such as that contained in Wendt’s 
statement above constitutes a ‘general statement of the manner in which agents are believed to 
appropriate their context and the consequences of that appropriation for their development as 
agents and for that of the context itself’ (Hay, 2002: 113). The ontological position taken in this 
respect will indicate which aspects of explanation should be emphasised, in turn suggesting 
suitable areas of investigation and informing the methods that are appropriate for doing this 
(Hay, 2002: 95-6).  
 
The limitations of theoretical positions that rely heavily on either structural factors (structuralist 
approaches) or agential factors (intentionist) approaches have been widely discussed.4 In short, 
the central theoretical criticism of these is that ‘for structuralists, structure determines agency, 
                                                 
4
 Hay (1995) offers a review. 
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and for intentionalists, agency causes structure’. This essentially reduces structure to agency and 
vice-versa, leaving little that is either theoretically or analytically productive or useful (Hay, 
2002: 116). This led to the development of a body of work supporting moves towards a 
theoretical and analytical ‘middle ground’ (Adler, 1997). This includes the SRA, which seeks to 
explain ‘structure in relation to action [and] action in relation to structure’ while retaining some 
level of separation between the two (Jessop, 2001: 1215), as well as Anthony Giddens’ 
‘structuration theory’ (1984). It also includes a further significant approach, in the 
morphogenetic/critical realist position associated with Margaret Archer (2000; 1995; 1986).  
 
All three approaches share a common goal, in theorising the relationship between structure and 
agency whilst attempting to avoid falling back on mono-causal understandings of political 
outcomes, thus seeking to avoid the pitfalls of both structuralist and intentionalist explanations. 
However, the conceptualisation of the status of and relationship between structure and agency 
differs, notably between the critical realist positions and the SRA, as recent debate has illustrated 
(Hay, 2005; McAnulla, 2005). Hay proposes that critical realist approaches support an 
ontological dualism between structural and agential factors, in maintaining that both play a role 
in explanation, and also that both ‘exist’ and cannot be conflated: there is a ‘real world’ that 
exists independently of actors’ cognition of it (Hay, 2002: 24). The SRA, while falling into the 
same broad category of approaches to structure and agency, differs in its ontological conception 
of structure from the critical realist position.  
 
Hay’s position is that ‘structure’ and agency are not ontologically separable. This forms Hay’s 
central contribution to constructing a theory of structure and agency that fully overcomes the 
dualism between the two (and thus avoids claims that either is conceptually prior to the other). 
As King (1999: 201) notes, one of the major points of Archer’s work has been ‘the rejection of 
any social theory which threatened to conflate society and the individual, or structure and 
agency’. Her position shifted from referring to the divide as purely analytical (1989), to explicitly 
differentiating between the two ontologically (2000; 1995) and, crucially, suggesting that 
‘structures pre-exist agents (or subjects)’ (Hay, 2002: 124). Hay’s criticism of this follows King 
(1999), in suggesting that Archer’s position presents a rather individualistic perspective on the 
morphogenetic sequence, or the way in which structures are transformed or reproduced through 
action. King argues that Archer arrives at ‘the sociological conclusion of the existence of a social 
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structure from the perspective of a single individual’ (1999: 217). While this seems to ‘capture 
well the practical consciousness of engaging with a densely structured social and political 
environment’ (Hay, 2002: 125), it erroneously leads to the conclusion that ‘because I have no say 
over the conditions of my actions, the social conditions of actions are independent of anyone and 
exist autonomously’ (King, 1999: 217, emphasis added). Had Archer ‘de-centred her perspective 
to see that the constraint which I face is other individuals – and no less serious for that – just as I 
form some of the social conditions which mutually constrain these others, she would not have 
fallen into ontological dualism’ (King, 1999: 217; Hay, 2002: 125-126). Structure or context is 
therefore understood as the product of human interaction and only exists insofar as it is 
understood and experienced by actors, neither pre-existing nor continuing to exist on a separate 
level to this. 
 
Hay further contends that by insisting on the temporal dualism of structure and agency and the 
pre-existing character of structures, Archer’s view (in contrast to the individualistic perspective 
from which it is derived) implicitly exhibits a somewhat limited role for agency which is framed 
as ‘rather episodic, disjointed and discontinuous’. He argues that the impression of structure as 
‘distant, external and long-enduring’ contrasts with a characterisation of agency as ‘an ephemeral 
or fleeting moment’. This: 
 
Seems to imply a residual structuralism punctuated only periodically yet infrequently by 
a largely unexplicated conception of agency. This appears from the shadows and returns 
swiftly from whence it came, a perturbation or disruption in the otherwise pristine logic 
of structural reproduction. (Hay, 2002: 126) 
 
Thus Hay proposes that such an approach can tell us little about the process of interaction 
between the two aspects of explanation. Instead, it reproduces a version of ‘methodological 
bracketing’ proposed by Giddens (1984: 288-93) in which it is possible to consider either 
conduct- or context-related aspects of a given situation. This results methodologically in a 
‘simple alternation between structuralist and intentionalist accounts’ (Hay, 2002: 120) which 
fails to live up to the initial theoretical promise of the morphogenetic approach in helping us to 
understand the dialectical relationship between structure and agency. 
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In addressing these weaknesses, the SRA posits the ontological relationship between structure 
and agency as a duality, rather than a dualism, with the two concepts separable only as analytical 
devices. This, then, differs considerably from approaches such as critical realism which posit a 
separate realm of ‘the real’ even if we do not have unmediated access to it (McAnulla, 2005), 
and moves the SRA closer to some varieties of interpretivism (see Finlayson et al., 2004 for a 
review). For Hay: ‘neither agents nor structures are real, since neither has an existence in 
isolation from the other - their existence is relational (structure and agency are mutually 
constitutive) and dialectical (their interaction is not reducible to the sum of structural and 
agential factors treated separately)’ (2002: 127). Hay acknowledges that structures may serve as 
‘useful analytical abstractions’ (2005: 40) that can aid our understanding of political outcomes 
(see also Hay, 2014). However, he maintains that ‘it is important that this analytical distinction is 
not reified and hardened into a rigid ontological dualism’ (2002: 127-128). Ultimately, it is this 
ontological separation within critical realism that leads us towards a conception of the 
relationship between structure and agency that is characterised by dualism, rather than duality. 
Instead, Hay suggests that we ‘concentrate upon the dialectical interplay of structure and agency 
in real contexts of social and political interaction’ (2002: 127). 
 
The link between structure and agency in this understanding is the concept of strategy. Actors 
are presented as being strategic, capable of devising means of realising their intentions, and 
revising these as required. Hay argues that this, in itself, is illustrative of a dynamic relationship 
between actor and social context: 
 
To act strategically is to project the likely consequences of different courses of action 
and, in turn, to judge the contours of the terrain. It is, in short, to orient potential courses 
of action to perceptions of the relevant strategic context and to use such an exercise as a 
means to select the particular course of action to be pursued. On such an understanding, 
the ability to formulate strategy (whether explicitly recognised as such or not) is the very 
condition of action. (Hay 2002: 132) 
 
Thus rather than looking at either ‘structural factors’ or ‘agential factors’ in understanding and 
explaining political action, Hay suggests that a more enlightening approach is to consider the 
relationship between strategic action on the one hand, and the strategically selective context 
within which that action is formulated, and on which it impacts. These are the key concepts 
within the SRA. The first implication of this is that not all outcomes are possible in any given 
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situation and, further, not all outcomes are equally likely. This is because ‘the context itself 
presents an unevenly contoured terrain’, which favours the adoption of certain strategies whilst 
mitigating against others. Hence, the SRA suggests that ‘over time, such strategic selectivity will 
throw up a series of systematically structured outcomes’. Consequentially, ‘while the outcome of 
any particular strategic intervention is unpredictable, the distribution of outcomes over a longer 
time frame will exhibit a characteristic regularity’ (Hay, 2002: 129-130). This is represented 
diagrammatically on the following page. 
 
However, it can be seen that faced with apparently similar contexts, actors do not always chose 
the same strategic courses of action each time. This will, to some extent, reflect subtle 
differences within the terrain facing each actor: one significant benefit of the SRA is that it is 
flexible enough to accommodate such change in context. However, even within a strategic 
context that is ostensibly the same, and between actors facing similar challenges, actors still do 
not necessarily adopt the same strategies: indeed, if they did, this would render the SRA 
deterministic, leading us towards predictive, rational choice-like models of political behaviour. 
To shed light on why certain strategies are selected over others by specific actors, Hay makes the 
link with another set of conceptual tools. These are considerations of the relative significance of, 
and relationship between, material and ideational factors. 
 
Material and  ideational questions consider the extent to which outcomes can be understood in 
relation to the interests of actors, or to their beliefs and ideas, or through some form of 
interaction between the two. Hay identifies three broad positions on this issue, framed in terms of 
whether, or the extent to which, ideas should be accorded a causal role in political analysis, 
independent of material factors (2002: 205-208). These are idealism, including postmodernism 
and some forms of interpretivism; materialism, including rational choice theorists and realists; 
and constructivism, including constructivists and critical realists. Idealism and materialism both 
imply a relatively simple relationship between the ideational and the material, respectively 
identifying ideas and material factors as dominant. These are analogous to the simpler positions 
on structure and agency, discussed above. Critical realism and constructivism both rest on a 
dialectical understanding of the relationship, with a further distinction between ‘thin’ 
constructivism and critical realism which ‘prioritise material factors and causal logics’, and 
‘thick’ constructivism which ‘prioritises ideational factors and constitutive logics’ (Hay, 2002: 
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206). The significance (or lack of) accorded to ideas in political analysis, and within sub-sets of 
these positions, varies widely and remains contested. 
 
Diagram 2.1: Structure, strategy and agency in the strategic-relational approach 
 
Source: Hay (2002: 131) 
 
Traditionally, the study of non-material factors such as ideas as a factor in understanding 
political action has received comparatively little attention within politics as a discipline. Partly, 
this is due to the materialist perception that ideas are ‘epiphenomenal’ (Berman, 1998: 16): they 
are simply the consequence of material factors which can be observed and analysed separately. 
Berman (1998: 17) cites Marx as the most famous proponent of this belief; more recent examples 
include Goldstein and Keohane (1993) and North (1990). This represents a softening of an 
‘aggressive and assertive’ behaviouralist stance (Farr, 1995: 202), based on a rigidly positivist 
account of political science in which ‘the material circumscribes the realm of the real’: hence, 
there is no distinction between appearance and reality (Hay, 2002: 207). Despite this softening, 
both approaches suggest that since it is essentially the material that is the cause of political 
outcomes (whether directly or through influencing actors’ ideas), ideas are not worth studying in 
their own right (Blythe, 1997). This is linked to methodological concerns, similarly connected to 
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a positivist approach to studying politics, which is that: ‘political scientists prefer to study things 
they can see, measure, and count, and ideas seem the opposite – vague, amorphous and 
constantly evolving’ (Berman, 1998: 16, see also Converse, 1964). Finally, there is a concern 
that an over-emphasis on the significance of ideas in explaining events leads to a form of 
voluntarism or idealism: indeed, this was a charge that Jessop was keen to refute in framing the 
SRA (1990: 265-266; see also Hay, 2002: 208). 
 
It is worth briefly exploring the accusation of voluntarism and idealism in ideas-focused 
approaches to political analysis in more depth. This is not a charge that has been made of the 
SRA as much as it has of  interpretivist theory: specifically, the approach associated with Mark 
Bevir and Rod Rhodes (2005). Critical realists including Marsh (2009) and McAnulla (2006) 
contend that in rejecting the idea of a ‘real’ structural realm separable from the ideational, such  
approaches  imply that there is little to prevent actors from acting exactly as they wish, leading to 
an idealistic account of political action. The interpretivist approach explicitly rejects the concept 
of structure itself on the basis that it is excessively rigid (Bevir and Rhodes, 2005: 175-176). As 
Hay points out, this is something of a misreading of interpretivism. The concept of ‘situated 
agency’ within Bevir and Rhodes’ work implies an appreciation of the extent to which actors’ 
ideas, and hence their actions, are embedded in ideational contexts or ‘traditions’. Hence they are 
subject to considerable constraint (Hay, 2011: 177-178). The SRA, despite also placing great 
emphasis on the importance of ideas in understanding action, provides a fuller response to such 
criticisms and is therefore better insulated from them. This is due to its self-conscious 
accommodation with the analytical utility of the concept of structure and, crucially, the way that 
beliefs develop and acquire resonance within particular institutional contexts (Hay, 2011: 179-
180). This is situated alongside an understanding of the significance of ideational contexts, 
effectively and clearly linking the development of beliefs to institutions external to actors 
themselves. Of course, this is not fundamentally incompatible with an interpretivist approach: 
however, it is developed much more fully within the SRA. 
 
As with the relationship between structure and agency, Hay suggests that the relationship 
between the material and the ideational is dialectical (Hay 2002: 101).  Thus, ‘just as structures 
and agents do not exist in isolation, so too the material and the ideational are complexly 
interwoven and mutually interdependent’ (Hay, 2001). Moreover, dealing with questions of the 
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material and ideational necessitates dealing with structure and agency, and vice-versa. This 
relates to the point raised above, concerning how actors formulate strategic actions. Hay warns 
against assuming that ‘strategic actors have a fairly direct and unmediated access to the contours 
of the terrain they inhabit, such that they can effectively “read off” the likely consequences of 
their actions’, finding this to be a ‘most dubious premise, akin to the perfect information 
assumption much beloved of neoclassical economists and many rational choice theorists’ (2002: 
209). This tendency can be found within some of the literature relevant to this thesis, notably 
Bulpitt’s ‘statecraft’ account of Thatcherism (1986) which rather over-estimates the extent of 
knowledge of the consequences of actions held by the politicians involved (Stevens, 2002; 
Buller, 1999). As long as one rejects this premise then it implies a central role for ideas within 
the structure-agency relationship. The issue of contingent interpretation and re-interpretation of 
context in pursuit of goals (as opposed to forming a ‘grand plan’ and then enacting it regardless 
of intervening events) becomes central to enabling action.  
 
The SRA offers a way of bringing this together, such that ideas ‘provide the point of mediation 
between actors and their environment’. Therefore, Hay argues that ideas must be accorded an 
independent causal role in explaining political outcomes (2002: 210). It is important to restate 
here that Hay is not asserting that ideas are ‘independent’ or separable from material factors 
ontologically, but that they are not epiphenomenal. In later work, Hay clarifies that he does not 
suggest that ideas assert an effect ‘in isolation from, or independently of, other material factors’, 
rather, they are ‘not reducible to such material factors’ (Hay, 2004: 144, 162). In other words, 
ideas and their effects are worthy of investigation in their own right if we are to explain 
outcomes. As with structure and agency, Hay is here arguing for the analytical utility of 
separating ideas and material factors in explaining outcomes. 
 
Before continuing, it is worth noting that there is perhaps an issue in claiming that ideational and 
material factors are only separable analytically, yet awarding one an ‘independent causal role’ at 
the expense of the other. Analogously, Hay’s own reasoning suggests that any claim for an 
‘independent’ role for structural or agential factors would appear suspect within a theory that 
emphasises the dialectical relationship between the two. This assertion therefore moves away 
from the dialectical approach that Hay purports to illustrate, towards a more uni-directional 
analysis of the relationship between the ideational and the material. In turn, this suggests more 
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than an analytical separation between the two sets of factors – which is not compatible even with 
Hay’s clarification on this point, outlined above. Marsh (2009) suggests that a solution to this 
might be to similarly allocate a separate causal role to material factors, but this again would 
harden the distinction between the two and move away from the ontological position 
underpinning the SRA. As discussed below, it is tenable to argue for the analytical priority of 
ideational factors in understanding outcomes, but extending this into claiming a causal role 
independent of the material appears theoretically inconsistent.  
 
Hay argues that interrogating the ideas and assumptions underpinning strategic action is essential 
to understanding political behaviour, since ‘actors behave the way they do because they hold 
certain views about the social and political environment they inhabit’. This is an argument for 
the analytical priority of ideas in understanding outcomes. As indicated above, the important 
point here is that such views cannot be reduced simply to context or assumed interests: they are 
prior, in that they shape actors’ understanding and interpretation and provide a point of access to 
a ‘densely structured context’, as well as a means through which actors’ continually re-negotiate 
and adjust to changes in context which may be outside of their direct control (Hay, 2002: 213). 
This underpins the claim that ideas play a causal role in determining action, and the analytical 
emphasis on ideational over material factors in understanding change in much of Hay’s empirical 
work (2009c; 1999; 1996). Ultimately: 
 
How actors behave – the strategies they consider in the first place, the strategies they 
discount, the strategies they deploy in the final instance and the policies they formulate – 
reflect their understanding of the context in which they find themselves. Moreover, that 
understanding may eliminate a whole range of realistic alternatives and may, in fact, 
prove in time to have been informed by a systematic misrepresentation of the context in 
question. (Hay, 2002: 211) 
 
It therefore makes sense to claim that if we wish to understand political actions, looking at 
ideational factors and the way that they continually inform, shape and re-shape these actions (or 
strategies) is the key. Empirically, this is also borne out in the observation that policy change is 
often preceded by changes in the ideas informing policy (Hay 2002: 166; Hall, 1993). Changes 
(or the lack of changes) in actors’ ideas and their interpretations of given governing challenges or 
policy problems are dialectically related to the possibility of change in material circumstances, 
shaping the outcomes resulting from such and thus altering context itself, via strategic action. 
45 
  
 
Importantly, forming a strategic plan is not necessarily synonymous with actually achieving 
ones’ goals at the outset. It is almost unfeasible that any plan would account for all of the 
complex challenges and barriers that actors will encounter along the way. These in themselves 
may prompt both reassessment of strategy and perhaps reassessment of the goals themselves. 
 
Moreover, as the passage quoted above suggests, such ideational change has something of a 
cumulative nature, even if the material impact of it and indeed the level of ideational 
development itself at any one point in time is understood as modest and incremental (Hay, 2002: 
163). Strategic development does not take place anew at clearly defined points in time, although 
there certainly may be events that lend themselves to promoting strategic re-assessment. 
However, even this occurs within the context of what has come before, which will already have 
served to embed (or de-legitimise) certain ways of approaching or understanding problems. As 
discussed above, this in turn impacts on a densely structured, strategically selective context, 
rendering some actions more feasible than others to particular actors. This does not discount the 
possibility of more fast-paced, intense change, such as that in periods of ‘crisis’ (Hay 2009a; 
1999; 1996). However, it also draws our attention to the slower-paced, less dramatic process of 
ideational change that takes place between these moments and the way that this can contribute, 
cumulatively, to shaping future understandings and interpretations of context.  
 
At this point, it is useful to summarise what the SRA tells us, and does not tell us about the role 
of ideas in political life. The SRA provides a convincing theoretical rationale for claiming that 
‘ideas matter’ in understanding political outcomes. It does so by identifying ideational factors as 
the condition for action. These provide a point of access to context. They are a condition of 
formulating strategic actions, and hence are central to understanding these actions and the 
outcomes that result from them. Through this, the SRA can also direct our attention towards the 
process of change. It provides a basis for the more specific claim that changes in approaches to 
challenges or policy problems are informed by the ideas preceding these, thus indicating that 
ideational factors are a central area for analysis in understanding change and development. 
Conversely, this suggests that when analysing decisions or apparent change, it is possible to trace 
these back to actors’ ideas. 
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What the SRA does not accomplish quite so effectively is explaining how these changes in the 
ideas informing action take place. In other words, it explains what ideas do but has little to say 
on what they are and therefore how they are constituted (Freeden, 1996: 47). Understanding this 
involves taking a step back from considering the role of ideas in outcomes, considering instead 
how ideational change itself occurs as precursor to this. This is surely an important step in fully 
theorising the relationship between ideas and political life, yet it is not one that Hay addresses in 
any great detail in either Political Analysis or his later work. This is perhaps due to the tendency 
to focus on ideational factors as having an independent causal role, which informs and drives his 
later analyses of the impact of these. It is addressed to some extent in his work around crisis, 
highlighted above, but the process of slow-paced ideational change – of ideological development 
without the pressured context of crisis - is largely unexplored. This is curious given Hay’s 
insistence that such change should not be neglected, and forms an important element of our 
understanding of outcomes (2002: 156-163). Accordingly, the next section of this chapter begins 
to address this, outlining a means through which this ideational change can be theorised and 
mapped. 
 
2.3 Theorising ideational change 
A central point of the SRA is that ideas do not develop on a level separate from ‘reality’: they are 
embedded in context via the concept of strategic action. One implication of this is that ideas held 
by actors are interconnected: since actors cannot exist independently of context, and context is 
constituted by actors’ collective strategic actions, so their ideas and strategies will overlap and 
combine in a multitude of ideational locations in pursuit of a range of varied goals. Even within 
an institution such as a political party, whose historical and institutional characteristics shape the 
goals and perspectives of its existing members, a number of overlapping goals and priorities will 
co-exist. These might include, for example, individual-level priorities such as attaining a cabinet 
post and running ones’ own department successfully, short-term strategic issues such as 
constructing a winning electoral strategy, responding to external pressures or ‘events’ and the 
effect of these on agendas, and considering how these fit within longer-term issues, including 
policy programmes and constructing an enduringly successful ‘statecraft’ (Bulpitt, 1986). Within 
the study of party politics, the extent of complexity of context suggests that looking at one or 
more of these issues in isolation from each other will not lead to satisfactory explanations or 
understandings of outcomes, nor of the ideas underpinning these. Rather, it points towards 
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considering ideas collectively, as they develop in relation to context. One way of accomplishing 
this is through considering ‘ideologies’ as collections or clusters of interconnected ideas, which 
can support a range of different purposes. 
 
 ‘Ideology’ is a contested concept with a wide range of possible useful interpretations, not all of 
which are compatible with one another. A number of these interpretations point towards a 
pejorative definition of the term. Ideologies are commonly conceived as closed, totalitarian ways 
of thinking, impractical and unsuitable as guides for political action owing to the inflexibility 
resulting from this (Freeden, 2003: 1-2; 2006a). As such, ideologies might be understood as 
somewhat divorced from everyday life (Minogue, 1993): an ill-suited attempt to impose an 
abstract, rigid blueprint or plan over a constantly changing and nuanced reality. Within such an 
outlook, no one would readily describe their own thinking as ideological because ideologies are 
then readily conceptualised as biased or unyielding. As such, ‘opponents have ideologies, 
whereas “we” are characterized by principles, pragmatism or common sense’ (Eatwell, 1999: 2). 
This has become the ‘everyday’ understanding of ideology, and it is the way that the term is 
commonly deployed in political argument. However, as should be clear from the preceding 
discussion, this is not a particularly useful or accurate way of theorizing ideologies or the role of 
ideas in understanding political action.5 
 
This then leads to into the question of what ideology is, and what it is not. Theoretical studies of 
ideology often broadly concur with the SRA, in suggesting that the practical antipathy towards 
the concept of ideology obscures what is an important factor in understanding political action 
and outcomes (Eagleton, 1991; McLellan, 1995; Freeden, 1996, 2003; Eatwell, 1999). This is on 
the basis that the rigid, doctrinaire conception of ideology outlined above is far too narrow. 
Along similar lines to Eatwell, above, Eagleton suggests that the common usage of the term 
‘ideology’ is a means of dismissing the viewpoints of political opponents as stemming from a 
‘schematic, inflexible way of seeing the world’, tinged with a hint of fanaticism. This is set 
against one’s own ‘modest, piecemeal, pragmatic wisdom’ (Eagleton, 1991: 4-5). What the 
‘everyday’ conception fails to take into account is the centrality of ideas and preconceptions in 
                                                 
5 The characterisation of ideologies as rigid and dogmatic, however, is important to understanding the Conservative 
relationship with the concept of ideology. This is discussed further in Chapter 3. 
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informing action, as well as the interaction between theoretical assumptions and ideas, and 
policy practice and outcomes. This means that the content of ideas may evolve as they are tested 
against reality. The main point here is that ideologies, even while suggesting some structuring of 
beliefs, need not be understood as dogmatic or fixed. Rather they are flexible, evolving systems 
of thought that cannot exist independently of either the social, economic and political context in 
which they are deployed by political actors, or of actors themselves.  
 
Michael Freeden offers a fuller understanding of ideology that is counter to the pejorative 
perception, suggesting that ideologies are far more varied and flexible configurations of ideas 
than is suggested in the common usage. For Freeden, ideologies are: ‘those systems of political 
thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or unintended, through which individuals and groups construct 
an understanding of the political world they, or those who preoccupy their thoughts, inhabit, and 
then act on that understanding’ (1996: 3). This suggests that ideologies are inherently action-
focused: indeed, the systems of beliefs embodied in them are presented as a necessary condition 
of action. It also, as noted above, draws our attention to the interconnectedness of ideas, actors 
and contexts, and in doing so emphasises the role of actors in interpreting, re-interpreting and 
applying ideas. On this basis, the understanding of ideologies deployed by Freeden, and the 
significance of ideational factors as theorised by Hay overlap considerably and appear consistent 
with one another. However, if the notion that ideologies can be defined by rigidity and the 
presence of specific, clearly defined means and ends is being discarded, then there needs to be 
another way of identifying an ideology as such. Otherwise it is not much more than a loose 
gathering of perhaps vaguely connected, but perhaps more or less random ideas. This ceases to 
have much analytical value in terms of understanding the relationship between ideas at different 
points in time and the way that these impact on outcomes, and hence is of little use in 
understanding the process of ideational change and outcomes. 
 
Freeden’s major contribution to the study of ideologies is to argue that political ideologies 
display a recognisable structure or ‘morphology’ (1996). This aspect of definition is in addition 
to more commonly cited attributes. These include political ideology as the ideas, beliefs and 
opinions of a significant social group which seeks to compete over plans for public policy, 
reflecting both their socially constructed and political nature (Freeden, 2003: 25-32; McLellan, 
1995). Freeden proposes that the structure of any ideology consists of a core of concepts, 
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surrounded by adjacent and peripheral concepts. The arrangement of these concepts, and their 
relative significance, denotes the ideological family to which any particular manifestation of 
ideology belongs. Freeden uses the analogy of furniture in a room, which Seawright paraphrases, 
suggesting that: ‘if on entering the room we see that tradition, order and authority are elaborately 
presented while equality is hidden under the bed then, for Freeden, we are looking at a version of 
a Conservative room’ (2010: 29). The precise nature of Conservative morphology is discussed in 
greater detail in the following chapter. 
 
Freeden suggests that all ideologies contain interpretations of the main political concepts – 
liberty, equality, rights, justice, power and democracy – somewhere within their morphologies. 
Within these concepts there are a range of sub-concepts and categories. Therefore Freeden 
proposes that the concept is the individual unit of analysis in any study of ideology. Importantly, 
these concepts do not have fixed and immutable meanings. There may well be a common, 
broadly understood and accepted meaning attached to each concept at a particular point in time 
but this does not constitute the only possible meaning: it is historically, culturally and 
contextually contingent. Concepts and the sub-categories that compose them are therefore 
essentially contestable, with each concept acquiring meaning through the way in which it is 
understood in relation to others within its ideological family (1996: 4).  
 
Ideological families can be therefore be identified by their core concepts, ‘without which a 
particular ideology simply would not continue to be that ideology’ (Freeden, 2003: 11). Freeden 
does allow that more complex ideologies are more likely to be able to shift elements of their 
cores outwards in response to contextual change. However, it is unlikely that they could dispense 
with them altogether and still remain identifiable as such (1996: 83). Some ideologies have 
features that cannot be removed from their cores, otherwise they cease to be recognisable as 
examples of a particular ideological family. Returning to the furniture analogy, there are certain 
pieces of furniture in certain rooms that indicate the sort of room that we are looking at. Washing 
facilities signify a bathroom, for example. If these were removed entirely, it would be difficult to 
say that the room was still a ‘bathroom’. Examples of such central pieces of ideological 
‘furniture’ include liberty as a core concept of liberalism, or equality as a core concept of 
socialism (1996: 84). However, this does not entail that the meaning or decontestation of the core 
concepts is fixed. Analogously, we might strip out the bath and replace it with a shower – 
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perhaps due to some emerging concern with conserving water or saving money - which would 
alter the appearance but not the central purpose of the bathroom. Freeden proposes that like 
concepts elsewhere in the morphology, ‘the core concepts of an ideology are non-specific, 
allowing for diverse interpretations to be attached to them through adjacent and peripheral 
concepts’ (1996: 77). Therefore it is possible to find various ‘types’ within the same ideological 
family, as the outer layers of adjacent and peripheral concepts are shifted inwards and outwards, 
bearing on each other and the core and affecting the overall character of the ideology. 
 
Adjacent concepts are essential in ‘fleshing out’ core concepts. The central core concepts have 
no meaning on their own and no implications for political action: without adjacent concepts, they 
remain ‘barren’ notions. Peripheral concepts then add a ‘vital gloss’ to core concepts (Freeden, 
1996: 68). These are the ‘more specific, detailed, concretized, and often ephemeral concepts, 
ideas and opinions that flesh out the main body of an ideological entity’ (Freeden, 2003: 3). 
Freeden further divides peripheral concepts into two categories: the perimeter and the margin. 
 
The perimeter ‘reflects the fact that core and adjacent concepts are located in historical, 
geographical and cultural contexts’. Perimeter concepts are essential in maintaining the practical 
relevance of an ideology, because: ‘for an ideology to relate to, and emerge from, those contexts, 
indeed to avoid being couched at levels of generality that have no relevance to social and 
political worlds, it must conceive of, assimilate, and attempt to shape “real world events”’ (1996: 
79). The marginal concepts’ importance to the core of the ideology at any given point in time is 
emotionally and intellectually insubstantial; however, this does not preclude such concepts from 
assuming greater importance in the future, or having done so in the past, depending on 
circumstance (1996: 78). This is because the position of concepts within the structure of an 
ideology is not fixed, aside from within the core. Concepts may travel from a more central to a 
marginal position, and vice-versa. They may end up pushed out because they are inimical to the 
survival of the ideology – such as nationalisation as an element of socialism in Britain. Equally, 
they may be pulled inwards because other ideologies have forced them onto the political agenda, 
necessitating an accommodation and response from strategically-orientated actors.  
 
This suggests that if we want to analyse change in ideas and the extent to which this change is 
either superficial or more substantive, it is with the outer layers of concepts that we need to be 
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begin, since these are where such changes are likely to become evident. This is discussed further 
in the following section. However, prior to this it is necessary to further elucidate how concepts 
are understood and, crucially, how they relate to both one another other and the context in which 
they exist. 
 
Given the contested nature of ideological concepts, an ideology is therefore further defined as a 
configuration of decontested meanings of different political concepts. Its identity is determined 
by the ‘rotation of each participating concept through a range of meanings held vis-à-vis the 
similarly held, or decontested meanings of every other concept’.6 This is affected by the 
‘location secured by a political concept within the ideological framework’ (Freeden, 1996: 83): 
core concepts, for example, exert a greater influence on adjacent concepts than do peripheral 
concepts, which are in turn unlikely to affect any significant alteration on the core even though 
they may form a contingently important part of the perimeter. This can account for the stability 
of ideological cores whilst still allowing for a significant degree of variation between different 
manifestations of ideological families. Further, while the meaning of a concept may be 
decontested within an ideology or family of ideologies at a particular time, this does not mean 
that the decontested meaning becomes immutable outside of the ideological framework. As 
McAnulla suggests, ‘similarities in language may obscure quite different philosophies’ (2010: 
306). Therefore, while opposing ideologies can appear to use the same concepts and language, 
on closer investigation it may become clear that they have attached different interpretations and 
meanings to these.  
 
Consequentially, we should not assume that the arrival of a ‘new’ concept (or even a few new 
concepts), likely on the periphery, is evidence in itself of substantive ideological change, even if 
it seems to form a substantial part of a party’s contemporary agenda. Neither, therefore, is this 
necessarily indicative of a shift in strategy or the understanding of a problem. Indeed, if the 
broader ideological structure that a concept is defined in relation to remains fundamentally 
unaltered then such change is unlikely, but this in itself is instructive in helping us to 
understanding subsequent decisions and outcomes. What is required to understand the outcomes 
resulting from such an apparent shift in ideas is a much more detailed consideration of the 
                                                 
6
 See also Bevir (2000) on the ‘spill-over effect’ of ideological concepts. 
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decontestation of these concepts, their relationship to broader ideological perspectives, and the 
extent of ideational change that they entail and enact. This, in turn, aids in our understanding and 
analysis of the outcomes associated with this process. 
 
As Hay’s account makes clear, the relationship between ‘ideology’ as an input and ‘policy’ as an 
output is complex. Certainly, it cannot be conceived as linear, with the latter read off as a direct 
consequence of the former, in part because of the multitude of different strategic ideational 
concerns and pressures that feed into formulating the final ‘product’. In fairness this is outside of 
the remit of Freeden’s work, and we would not necessarily expect to find such an account here. 
What Freeden’s understanding of ideologies can do is contribute to filling the ‘gap’ in the SRA, 
which is the theory of how ideational change occurs within a given context or period of time. We 
can infer from the SRA that it is unlikely that all ideational developments are of the same 
significance and magnitude. However, by omitting a discussion of the process of ideational 
change, Hay does not provide us with a basis for distinguishing between those shifts that do 
produce significant changes in context and those that do not. This omission also then leaves 
ideologies curiously detached from their context, as it provides little in the way of theoretical 
illumination regarding the process of continuity and the shaping effects of previous ideas, 
outcomes and learning processes on present strategies, despite an acknowledgement that the 
impact of these ideational factors is cumulative. Without an adequate conception of ideational 
change itself, the extent to which the SRA can provide a comprehensive means of analysing 
ideologies is limited. Freeden addresses this effectively, within a theory of political ideologies 
that exhibits many similarities with the SRA in its treatment of ideas and their significance in 
informing action. As such, the following section discusses the integration of the two approaches 
as the theoretical basis for this thesis. 
 
2.4 Application to analysing Conservative welfare politics 
The subject of this thesis is Conservative Party ideology under the leadership of David Cameron 
between 2005 and 2015, analysed via a study of the party’s approach to welfare policy. The 
Conservative approach to social policy has been widely identified as one of the central 
components of the ‘modernisation’ strategy through which Cameron aimed to decontaminate the 
Conservative brand. This would take place through ‘changing their image, altering their rhetoric, 
and adopting a more socially inclusive approach’ (Heppell, 2014: 155). A strong initial emphasis 
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on broad social issues, including poverty and an apparently new concern with ‘social justice’, 
has continued into government, and working-age welfare has been one of the most prolific policy 
arenas through which these have been developed.  
 
Yet since 2005 the context in which these issues are situated has altered significantly, perhaps 
most so in relation to the financial crisis of late 2007, and the subsequent Conservative move into 
government with the Liberal Democrats. The direction of policy has perhaps not been what some 
early analyses might have anticipated (Dorey, 2007). This has engendered a broad-ranging 
debate on how far the Conservative Party has substantively ‘modernised’ ideologically, usually 
in comparison to its Thatcherite past. Within this, a number of analyses raise questions regarding 
the extent to which the policies implemented in government reflect the Party’s apparent shift in 
perspectives on these issues, or conversely indicate a lack of ideational development despite a 
rapidly shifting context (see Chapter 3). With this in mind, the central objective of this thesis is 
to consider the extent and nature of ideational change within the party since 2005, as well as the 
principal drivers of this, particularly given the emergence of some apparently antithetical early 
policy effects emerging from this supposedly modernised approach. In doing so, I combine the 
SRA with Freeden’s morphological theory of ideologies. 
 
The SRA directs us to view actors as rational, although not in the narrow sense that they are 
solely motivated by self-interest. It also rejects the idea that action can be boiled down to a clear 
set of separable, hierarchical goals - personal progression always taking precedence over the 
collective advancement of the party, for example (Hay, 2009b: 895). The personal pursuit of 
ministerial office cannot be separated from the imperatives of winning elections and good party 
management, which equally cannot be separated from more immediate policy objectives such as 
reducing public spending, alleviating poverty, or nurturing economic growth. All of these goals – 
and more – co-exist, with their significance varying temporally and between actors. 
Understanding the politics of welfare within the Conservative Party requires investigating the 
densely structured context in which this is situated and, crucially, actors’ interpretations of this. 
This comprises not just the policy area itself but broader issues, particularly those around a more 
instrumental concern with electoral appeal which is intrinsic to modernisation. This, then, directs 
our attention towards different aspects of context, which are explored in Chapters 4 to 7 of this 
thesis. 
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It is worth re-emphasising that it is the issue of actors’ interpretation of context that is central 
within the SRA as an analytical tool: politicians, in developing an approach to welfare, or any 
other area of concern, do not have unmediated access to and knowledge of the context in which 
they find themselves acting. While the context itself will render certain courses of action more 
favourable than others (increasing welfare spending in a time of increasingly stretched public 
spending may be untenable, for example, even if one might feel inclined to do so in other 
circumstances), actors rely on their own ideas as points of access to context in determining what 
is feasible, desirable and possible. Thus in understanding the development of Conservative 
welfare policy it is necessary to look at the ideas and perspectives of those closely involved in it. 
These contain important clues as to the understanding of issues around the policy area, and hence 
explanatory value for the policy solutions selected and implemented. 
 
In considering ideological change in relation to a specific policy area, the empirical element of 
this thesis is very much grounded in the reality of Cameron’s Conservative Party: how it has 
negotiated the changing context and, beyond this, what we can ascertain from this regarding the 
substantive extent and drivers of change and its relationship with conservative ideology. As 
discussed, the SRA does not really provide a means of adequately theorising this. Drawing on 
Freeden, it is suggested that change occurs, or becomes evident, at the perimeters of ideologies. 
It is here that ‘the interchange between an idea and a practice’ takes place, with the perimeter 
forming ‘the fluid area where an ideological component is detailed enough to be translated into a 
practice, or where a practice is sufficiently regular and non-trivial to carry consequential 
ideological messages’ (2003: 3-4). The concepts here, therefore, provide the crucial link between 
broader perspectives and tenets, and the real-life context in which political parties operate and 
within which ideas are applied, tested and (re)developed (Atkins, 2010: 410). Consequentially, 
indications of possible ideational change (however minor or major) are likely to appear via the 
concepts deployed at the perimeter which relate directly to the policy area itself. These may, or 
may not, denote change at the inner layers of adjacent concepts and the core.  
 
This, then, suggests a starting point for analysing ideational change within the Conservative 
Party: it is necessary to identify the concepts informing the Party’s approach to welfare policy 
and the meanings and purposes attached to these, in relation to one another. This in itself might 
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be quite helpful in understanding ideational change in some ways, even without considering the 
relationship of these concepts to the broader ideological morphology. Deploying ‘new’ concepts, 
or more accurately attempting to redefine existing ones in such a way that they fit with the wider 
ideological structure, might indicate that those within the party (and its leadership, in particular) 
perceive a change in the strategic context that they face and are attempting to adapt to this. We 
might investigate this, for example, through considering the Conservative Party’s apparently 
renewed concern with poverty or the shift towards ‘compassionate’ or ‘liberal’ Conservatism, 
considering how these concepts are decontested in relation to one another, and to more enduring 
aspects of Conservative ideology. By examining the ideas informing such a perception of change 
and the purposes towards which this is orientated, it is possible to begin to analyse the drivers of 
change. Drawing on the SRA, we can then start to form a picture of the ideational factors 
informing the PCP’s welfare politics. However, by breaking the ‘whole’ of Conservative 
ideology down into its component parts, as Freeden does, we can also begin to consider the 
substantive extent of change indicated by these identified concepts. This allows us not just to 
observe whether change has occurred, but to understand what sort of change we are looking at, 
and why.  
 
If ideologies are conceived as monolithic, it might be tempting to view the consistent 
deployment of a ‘new’ or redefined concept as evidence of ideational change. Freeden concurs, 
after all, that change happens at the perimeter, when practices pertaining to core and adjacent 
concepts are ‘endorsed, challenged or re-negotiated’ (2003: 5). However, not all peripheral 
concepts enact substantive change on the wider structure and character of an ideology. This leads 
to uncertainty in distinguishing between substantive ideational change and the instrumental role 
of ideas: for example, in ‘framing’ or justifying policy (Blyth, 2001; Béland, 2007) or providing 
a broadly rhetorical sense of purpose and direction in terms of electoral appeal (Bulpitt, 1986). 
To overcome this, further consideration of how change can be theorised is necessary. The SRA 
suggests that contemporary ideas do not develop in a vacuum, unrelated to the ideas that 
preceded them, as does Freeden’s morphological theory owing to its emphasis on relatively 
stable cores and the temporal shifting of concepts. In providing a contemporary ‘point of access’ 
to context, actors must draw on former ideas and experiences, constructing strategies in relation 
to the beliefs and understandings of issues embedded in these. This suggests that to understand 
the extent of change, our analysis needs to look back from the period of time in question (as well 
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as forward in considering the solutions proposed, discussed below), considering how these 
peripheral concepts relate to the broader structure of Conservative ideology. 
 
Through considering the way that contemporary action orientated beliefs are framed or 
warranted by previous ideological systems (Moss and O’Laughlin, 2005), and placing the 
decontestation of contemporary concepts in the context of their relationship to more enduring 
ideas, it possible to situate Cameron’s Conservative Party’s ideology within the broader context 
of post-war Conservatism. This, then, can tell us what sort of ‘Conservative’ party we are 
looking at: ‘how much’ change has occurred and in which areas. Consequentially, this 
significantly improves our understanding of outcomes and the likely durability of change. As 
such, alongside identifying and analysing Cameron’s Conservatives’ usage of peripheral 
concepts, it is necessary to consider how these relate to broader Conservative ideological 
traditions, interrogating the extent to which they subvert or re-constitute the character of these. 
Essentially, this indicates the extent of change at the deeper core and adjacent levels, exploring 
the strategic considerations that have informed the adoption and deployment of particular 
peripheral concepts within the contemporary party. In forming an important part of the 
institutional context within which policy solutions are implemented, these perform a powerful 
shaping role on contemporary decision making, both constraining (or de-legitimising) or 
enabling (legitimising) certain course of actions.  
 
Concurrently, however, the SRA reminds us of the need to avoid the assumption that outcomes 
can be understood as a direct result of actors’ reading or understanding of a single task or 
priority: in this case, the need to construct a ‘conservative’ approach to perceived problems 
related directly to the welfare system. The perimeter concepts will pertain quite directly to this 
policy area, because perimeter concepts form a link between broader ideological perspectives 
and practice. However, ideas are not static: they may shift in importance, or evolve as they are 
incorporated into other elements of strategy, and they may be re-interpreted or transformed both 
in relation to this and developments in the context in which they exist. This is particularly 
important to bear in mind with regard to the translation of ideas into policy because there is an 
inevitably messy ‘translation’ process between the two, and strategies may be re-interpreted even 
as their policy manifestations are still being implemented. Moreover, the development of policy 
will be limited by what is considered feasible or desirable with the institutional and electoral 
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context. Hence, it is ‘not possible to explain policy practice and outcomes from ideological 
discourse alone’ (Moss and O’Laughlin, 2005: 180), as stopping with the two research areas 
above might suggest. In short, the translation of ideas around welfare into policy cannot be 
considered in isolation from the day-to-day business of party politics. 
 
An account of the ideas and motivations underpinning the Conservative approach to welfare 
policy can give us some indication of the sorts of policies that we might expect to see introduced, 
the problems that might be emphasised, and ways that these problems might be understood. 
However, at this distance from the core, the amount of competing considerations and goals are 
likely to engender tensions within the approach. Ostensibly slight differences of emphasis on 
different concepts can have a significant influence on policies. For example, shorter-term 
considerations such as appearing ‘tough’ on benefit claimants because this plays well with the 
electorate might not sit easily alongside more substantive reform of the benefit system intended 
to produce behavioural change. Equally, wider priorities such as the need to reduce spending 
might serve to expose tensions on the purpose and impact of welfare spending itself, again 
leading to slightly differing solutions to identified problems even if the broad nature of the 
‘issue’ is relatively uncontentious. These unresolved issues exist within the broader structure of 
ideas, but they become visible (and perhaps problematic) when they move from an ideational to 
a practical level. The outcomes reached here – which ideas are emphasised, and which become 
more marginal - have an impact beyond the party itself. This is because policy development 
tends to exhibit a level of path-dependency (Hay, 2002: 148-150) and the decisions of one 
government contribute to shaping both the context and the understanding of problems and goals 
that follows from this.  
 
This indicates that we need to consider the deployment of concepts within policy itself. This 
requires analysing policy outcomes in detail in relation to the key concepts identified, 
considering how these are used and emphasised in relation to one another, and in pursuit of what 
strategic goals. The SRA is useful here as an analytical device which is capable of accounting for 
the complex, overlapping and perhaps contradictory influences on this process. This further adds 
to the understanding of the extent to which ideational change has occurred: we might, for 
example, identify that concepts that would appear to indicate change have only been utilised in a 
very limited fashion, suggesting that substantive change has not taken place. As such, a final 
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research area pertains to the extent to which Conservative ideas on welfare have been 
implemented in policy, and how these ideas have been deployed in relation to competing 
strategic motivations. 
 
Although the main focus of this thesis is Conservative ideology and the development of ideas, it 
is far from being an abstract project. It considers the development of Conservative ideology 
within a specific policy area, illustrating the role of actors’ ideas in driving political outcomes, 
mediated via the concept of strategic actions in pursuit of particular goals. In doing so, it adds to 
the understanding of the character and identity of David Cameron’s Conservative Party, thus 
providing a basis for understanding future developments. The application of the SRA to this area 
allows consideration of a range of motivations, thus embodying an approach which is able to 
take into account both the politics and policy aspects of the development of welfare policy under 
Cameron and the interactions between these. Within this, Freeden’s morphological approach to 
ideologies is used to inform the analysis of different levels of change, and the significance of this 
to broader Conservative ideology, thus allowing an assessment of how substantive and 
significant any change identified can be said to be. This allows for the development of a nuanced 
account of ideational change within the Conservative Party, not solely at the level of abstract 
ideas or outcomes, but taking into account both and thereby providing a comprehensive answer 
to the question of where Cameron’s party sits within the broader traditions of Conservatism. 
Moreover, this analysis can inform our understanding of the wider situation of British party 
politics regarding the mediating role of ideas in parties’ interactions with institutional context, 
and how context contributes to shaping goals and strategies. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid out the theoretical approach for this PhD, and the way that it will be applied 
to exploring the ideology of the Conservative Party, in relation to the development of welfare 
policy between 2005 and 2015. The approach combines Hay’s SRA with Freeden’s 
morphological understanding of ideologies, as a means of both mapping ideological 
development and ascertaining the broader extent, and nature of, ideational change. The SRA 
supports a central role for ideas in explaining political outcomes by utilising two key concepts: 
strategically selective contexts and strategic action. The idea of context as ‘strategically 
selective’ implies that certain courses of action appear more viable and realistic than others 
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within particular contexts (thus rejecting the notion of absolute agency): accordingly, as context 
changes, so may the course of action perceived as most suitable. ‘Strategic action’ refers to the 
idea that actors formulate plans or strategies in pursuit of certain goals, without having perfect 
knowledge of the context in which they find themselves acting: hence, this is how actors 
negotiate the terrain of their environment and thus play a part in shaping and re-shaping that 
environment. The perspective that actors cannot assume perfect knowledge of context or the 
results of their action is central in understanding the importance of ideas within the SRA. It is 
this which separates the SRA from highly intentionalist accounts of the political process which 
have sometimes characterised studies of the Conservative Party (Bulpitt, 1986).  
 
The SRA also therefore suggests that actors’ points of entry into strategic action are the ideas or 
ideological assumptions that they hold about what is possible, feasible and desirable in relation 
to the issue at hand (which, inevitably, will only form one part of a complex contextual terrain). 
Interrogating these ideas and their relationship with political context is of central importance to 
understanding political decision making. What the SRA does not do is effectively map the way 
in which ideologies themselves shift and change in relation to context: by not examining what 
ideational systems are, it leaves this under-explored. This, then, is where Freeden’s approach can 
be combined with the strong explanation of the role of ideas in the SRA, drawing our attention to 
the internal means through which ideologies are composed and re-configured in relation to the 
perception of alterations in the strategic context. This then provides us with a strategy for 
analysing ideational development, considering this in relation to the central concepts that are 
deployed by the party in the time period under consideration, and the way that these relate to 
previous varieties of Conservatism. Combined, the two approaches offer a fuller means of 
understanding not just the role of ideas in outcomes, but the process of ideational development 
itself, firmly linked with the reality in which a political party exists.  
 
The chapter also explored further the central research questions outlined in Chapter 1. These 
relate to the key concepts informing the Conservative Party’s approach to welfare, and how these 
are decontestated in relation to one another; the way that these concepts relate to the wider 
structure of conservative ideology and the extent to which they reflect, subvert or re-constitute 
previous traditions, and the strategic application of these ideas in policy, alongside a 
consideration of the implications of this for the character of the Conservatives’ conservatism. 
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These questions are derived from the Freeden/SRA framework, and drive the analysis of 
Chapters 4 to 7 of this thesis. To answer these fully, however, it is clearly necessary to first 
consider how previous ‘types’ of Conservatism, and the broader category of ‘conservatism’ as an 
ideology might be understood. This, then, is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Conservatives, ideology and welfare state since 1945 
 
We must have an ideology…The other side have an ideology that they can test their policies 
against, we must have one as well. 
 
Margaret Thatcher (quoted in Heppell 2014: 72) 
 
Mrs Thatcher was unique among British prime ministers in gaining the dubious accolade of 
having an ‘ism’, because none of her predecessors were so wedded to a set of abstract ideas. 
 
Ian Gilmour MP (1992: 269) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Under David Cameron’s leadership, the Conservative Party has embarked on a process of reform 
of the welfare system, comprising significant cuts to spending and the re-structuring of several 
key benefits. It has been claimed that this approach is motived by ‘ideology’. In the debate 
following George Osborne’s first spending review, Labour’s former shadow Chancellor Alan 
Johnson accused the Conservatives of carrying out spending cuts in accordance with their 
‘ideological objective[s]’ (HC Hansard, 20 October 2010). Similarly, Labour’s Ian Lavery MP 
claimed that the Conservative approach to welfare reform was emblematic of ‘an ideological 
crusade to shrink the state’ (HC Hansard, 3 April 2014). Disputing these charges, Conservatives 
have argued that their welfare reforms are driven by pragmatism and a willingness to make 
difficult, but necessary decisions in the national interest. For example, in relation to spending, 
Cameron stated: ‘we are not doing this because we want to; there is no ideological zeal in doing 
this. We are doing this because we have to’ (HC Hansard, 20 October 2010). His is supposedly 
‘a government led by people with a practical desire to sort out this country's problems, not by 
ideology’ (Cameron, 2010a). This represents the continuation of a long-standing (although, with 
respect to Thatcherism, not entirely consistent) claim by the Conservative Party, and one 
associated with conservatism more broadly: being ‘free’ from ideological constraints, 
Conservative leaderships are able to choose between policy options on the basis of ‘what works’ 
in relation to the area of policy under consideration. This implies a neutral, objective approach to 
policy-making, which is isolated from other more political interests, including party management 
and electoral imperatives.  
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Considered in relation to the theoretical framework set out in the former chapter, this claim is 
suspect, both with respect to Cameron’s Conservative Party and for previous Conservative 
leaderships. For the purposes of political argument, it conveys an image of the Conservatives as 
practical and realistic in comparison to a supposedly dangerously idealistic Labour opposition. 
However this misrepresents the fundamental role that ideas and ideological systems play in 
influencing political action and ultimately in shaping context. The SRA proposes that without 
ideas, politicians have no way of deciding what constitutes desirable and necessary goals, much 
less how to go about formulating means of reaching these, since all of these decisions are related 
to the on-going interpretation and re-interpretation of political context. The rejection of ideology 
by Conservatives (Thatcherism notwithstanding) has usually been based on a very limited 
conception thereof, adopted in part as a weapon against the more explicitly ideological character 
of its main opposition in the immediate post-war years. By use the SRA concerning the role of 
ideas in explaining outcomes and broadening our understanding of what constitutes an ideology 
to the more flexible conception proposed by Freeden, it becomes tenable both to view the 
Conservatives as an ideological party and to analyse its ideology through considering its actions. 
 
The first task of this chapter, therefore, is to identify the ideological ‘core’ of Conservatism: 
essentially, what makes the Conservative Party ‘conservative’. While a significant body of 
literature is now dedicated to exploring this, it remained one of the central challenges in 
analysing Conservatism at least up until towards the end of the Thatcher years. This is because 
the Conservative Party has appeared to adopt a number of very varied strategies and approaches 
to the major social, political and economic challenges that it has faced. The core therefore 
appears to be slippery and insubstantial, to the point that it is possible to conclude that it simply 
does not exist: Conservatism is perhaps better understood as an instinct or disposition, as many 
Conservatives have themselves preferred to suggest.  
 
Following Freeden, the chapter proposes that this is because conservatism has a very limited core 
in comparison to progressive ideologies such as liberalism or socialism, which allows 
Conservative parties great flexibility in their governing strategies while still potentially falling 
under the umbrella of ‘conservatism’. Conservatives have therefore been well placed to respond 
to, and exploit, significant changes in strategic context. All three of the manifestations of 
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Conservatism under consideration (One Nation, Thatcherism and ‘Cameronism’) share this 
ideological core – this is what makes them ‘conservative’ – but the location of adjacent and 
peripheral concepts around it varies due to these differences in context. This then forms a basis 
for discussing the contemporary decontestation of relevant adjacent and peripheral concepts 
around this core in Chapter 4, and for analysing the way that these relate to previous 
Conservative decontestations. 
 
The second section of the chapter therefore considers the ideological changes and continuities 
between One Nation Conservatism and Thatcherism, which represents the Conservative Party’s 
most conscious accommodation of ideology. It is argued that the two have more in common than 
is often suggested, not least by Conservatives themselves. Where they do differ significantly in 
relation to welfare, and social issues more broadly, is in their respective perceptions of the 
desirability of an interventionist state and perceptions of the proper limitations of this. However, 
it is emphasised that the difference is not so much a sharp dividing line but a drift towards 
supporting a more limited state, framed with reference to maintaining its authority and protecting 
individual freedoms, and maintaining a morally upstanding society. This is influenced by 
developments in the mid-1960s to late-1970s, which shook Conservative perceptions of the 
state’s ability to maintain social order and promote economic prosperity. Of course, the extent of 
this drift was not unanimously supported by the entire PCP. There remained some Conservatives 
who were far less hostile to the state than the Thatcherite faction. However, unsurprisingly it was 
this latter faction that increasingly dominated the PCP under Thatcher’s leadership.  
 
This chapter makes sense of this development by considering it in relation to the context in 
which it occurred. It emphasises that the Party’s turn towards what become known as 
‘Thatcherism’ was not an abrupt shift. Rather, following the SRA understanding of change, it 
represented a process of strategic learning resulting from the perceived failure of One Nation 
Conservatism to adequately address new social and economic challenges, some of which were 
perceived to have been brought about by the actions and decisions of One Nation Conservatives 
with regard to social policy. The chapter then identifies elements of the shift that may continue to 
bear on the Party’s thinking, notably the sharp rhetorical rejection of One Nation Conservatism 
by leading Thatcherites and the on-going implications of this for the state’s role in welfare 
provision.  
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Overall the empirical chapters of this thesis argue that the developments of the Thatcher years 
prompted an approach to welfare that the Conservatives have built on in both opposition and 
government since 2005, particular concerning the proper role of the state. However, this was 
only beginning to take place in policy terms under Thatcher. While some major welfare reforms 
were implemented shortly prior to her leaving office, social security was very much an area of 
unfinished business for both Thatcher’s and John Major’s governments. Accordingly the second 
section of this chapter identifies some of the key ideas informing policy directions and the way 
that these were expressed, highlighting particularly the reasons for rejecting a ‘One Nation’, 
more statist approach to welfare provision. This rejection and Conservative Party’s shift towards 
Thatcherism meant that a state-led approach to welfare policy ceased to be part of the 
strategically selective landscape in which the Party advanced ideas and formulated policy. In 
turn this helps to explain the dominance of Thatcherite thinking on welfare in Cameron’s PCP, 
the lack of a strong One Nation alternative and the challenges (both cognitive and practical) 
inherent in moving away from Thatcherism, discussed in the forthcoming chapters.  
 
Finally, as the third section of the chapter illustrates, the topic of the continuing influence of 
Thatcherite Conservatism, in particular, over the PCP has formed a major part of the academic 
literature and debate on the Conservative party since Thatcher herself left office. This has also 
been something that the Conservative Party itself has had to contend with, through the long 
process of ‘modernisation’. The discussion in this section informs the analysis of the character of 
Conservative ideology under David Cameron’s leadership in subsequent chapters, while also 
situating the contribution of this thesis within the wider literature on British Conservatism. 
 
3.2 Conservatives and ideology: defining the core 
 ‘Thatcherism’, as it came to be known, represented something of a departure for the 
Conservative Party from its usual political style, owing to the acceptance by the leadership of the 
significance of ideological motivations (Hall, 1983; O’Shea, 1984; Gamble, 1994). This is not 
least because Thatcher herself stressed the need for an ideology (cited in Heppell, 2014: 72) or 
'grand plan' (albeit one informed by 'familiar common sense', rather than abstract political 
theory) to counter the prevailing ideas of the post-war consensus (Thatcher, 1993: 5). Even 
despite this, there is still evidence of a broad popular unwillingness to grant Thatcher’s politics 
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the status of a sophisticated political ideology, as illustrated in Bale’s (2015) analysis of media 
coverage following her death in 2013. Prior to this, the Conservative Party usually sought to 
deny that it is motivated by ideology – and the internal acceptance of the Conservatives as ‘an 
ideological party’ remains contentious (Gamble, 1996). Conservatives have ‘historically been 
reluctant to provide blueprints of the good society’, and this means that there is ‘no agreed, 
definitive statement of conservative ideology’ (Page, 2010a: 119). This rejection of ideology, 
identified with ‘blueprints’, dogmatism and the promotion of vested interests, is characteristic of 
both One Nation Conservatism (see, for example, Gilmour, 1992: 30-33) and of the critique of 
New Labour made by Cameron’s Conservatives.  
 
In place of ideology, pre-Thatcherite Conservatives often preferred to claim that they took a 
more pragmatic approach to politics, working with the grain of human nature and a ‘slowly 
evolving social order, rather than coercive schemes designed by unrepresentative groups or those 
with special interests’ (Page, 2010a: 119-120). The Labour Party has historically been more 
comfortable with such a conception of ideology as a force for radical action. If it were not, it 
could not have hoped to effect social change, since social democracy (and progressive ideologies 
more broadly) relies on the assumption that ‘human reason and will are sufficiently powerful for 
us to be able to shape history in accordance with whatever ideals we may feel inspired to adopt’ 
(O’Sullivan, 1999: 52). Conservatives tended to reject this assumption and were therefore often 
suspicious of such manifestations of ideology (O’Sullivan, 1999: 52-53). However, the rejection 
of this particular conception and understanding of ideology – in relation to both the particular 
character of social democratic ideology and a misrepresentation of ideology as dogmatism - does 
not equate to an absence of ideology in itself, nor indicate the irrelevance of ideational factors in 
determining the Conservative Party’s practical negotiation of the context in which it operates. 
 
A central task, therefore, is to identify the ‘core’ of Conservatism. One might start by looking at 
the word itself: as ‘liberalism’ suggests something about that ideology’s prioritisation of liberty, 
perhaps the same could be said of conservatism. Andrew Vincent observes that there is a 
‘perennial debate on the relation between the ordinary and technical uses’ of the term 
‘conservative’ (1995: 56-7). The former, unsurprisingly, emphasises the importance of 
‘conserving’ and resisting social change. This might initially appear attractive due to 
Conservatives’ often cautious approach to disruptive social change. However, it ultimately 
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proves to be at odds with the claims of the Conservative Party to provide a pragmatic and 
flexible approach to governing, as well as the Party’s apparent willingness to adjust to differing 
social and economic circumstances. As an illustration of quite significant shifts over a very 
limited time frame, for example, Green (2002: 172-191) discusses the shifts in Macmillan’s pre- 
and post-war political economies, indicating a willingness on behalf of the Party to adapt. 
Maintaining a staunch and rigid defence of existing institutions or ideas is dogmatic and 
inflexible in itself. Despite being occasionally portrayed as ‘stuck in the past’ by its opponents, 
the Conservative Party in Britain has not sought to tear up existing institutions simply for the 
purpose of restoring previous order or regime for its own sake. As such, this everyday usage is 
unhelpful: it ‘gives no indication about where a study of conservatism should begin, or about 
who should be included in it, or excluded from it’ (O’Sullivan, 1976: ch.1).  
 
A second approach involves identifying core tenets from different manifestations of 
Conservatism. A representative example of this approach is given by Seldon and Snowdon 
(2001) - who, as Garnett (2003: 110) notes, ‘unusually for those who write on this 
subject…Have no obvious axe to grind’. Seldon and Snowdon propose that there are seven core 
tenets of British Conservatism that have ‘consistently influenced Conservative thinkers and 
statesmen since the eighteenth century’ (2001: 18). These are: ‘a belief in the imperfection of 
human nature and the limits to the power of reason’; a belief in organic society and orderly 
change; a stable social order and framework of liberty; a limited role for the state; maintaining a 
prosperous economy; respect for property; and support for ‘The Nation’, conceived in terms of 
national unity and harmony. These are backed up largely through reference to Michael Oakeshott 
and Edmund Burke, whose significance to conservatism is returned to in the discussion below. 
Others identify similar prominent features, with ‘the nation’ frequently given primacy 
(Seawright, 2010; Garnett, 2003; Lynch, 2003).  
 
Still others prefer to identify conservative ‘dispositions’ rather than core concepts or beliefs, 
again moving away somewhat from identifying Conservatism as an ideology. These might 
include a focus on the family or community, the importance of personal freedom supported by 
responsibility, and a commitment to inequality over equality (Oakeshott, 1975; Norton, 1996). 
Without a focus on the broader concepts underpinning conservative ‘dispositions’, however, 
their identification appears almost arbitrary: we have little idea why these dispositions are 
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preferred, what is supposed to be achieved through them, or what particular approaches they 
might entail. Actors of most political persuasions believe that families matter, for example, but 
their precise views on how they matter and where they fit within the broader social and political 
structure are formulated with reference to a number of other considerations. This is not to 
suggest that the writers who take this approach have not considered such issues (Norton [2008: 
235], for example, clearly acknowledges this), but it indicates the importance of explicitly 
placing such ‘dispositions’ within a broader ideological framework. It is this that ‘fills out’ the 
character of such beliefs. Without this, conservatism risks being presented as lacking deeper 
principles and purpose, which is surely a claim that few would be keen to see attributed to their 
actions and ideas. 
 
Moreover, some of the supposedly ‘core’ tenets of conservatism fit much more easily with some 
Conservative ideologies than others (Garnett, 2003). A belief in ‘organic society and orderly 
change’ and limits to the power of reason is evident in Burke’s rejection of revolutionary ideas in 
general for the harm that they might cause to the institutions of civil society (2009 [1790]). It is 
also famously embodied in Oakeshott’s perspective: that ‘to be a conservative is to prefer the 
known to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried’; that ‘the man of conservative 
temperament believes that a known good is not lightly to be surrendered for an unknown better’ 
and that disruption to traditional institutions by government entails ‘certain loss and possible 
gain’ (1962: 168ff). These beliefs are fairly easily linked from Burke, to Oakeshott, to the 
characterisation of One Nation Conservatism as a cautious, pragmatic approach to politics: not 
resisting change, but working with the grain of developments, and protecting social institutions. 
They are not so easily linked with the Thatcher governments, which pushed through some of the 
most wide-ranging reforms to the state in post-war British politics. Similarly, while an emphasis 
on a small, strong state was characteristic of Thatcherite Conservatism, it cannot be said to have 
been such a priority for early One Nation Conservatives (Dorey and Garnett, 2014: 2-3). Other 
supposedly ‘core’ tenets seem so ubiquitous as to hardly be identifiable with conservatism and 
Conservatives at all: what government, for example, would not want to maintain a prosperous 
economy? 
 
One way of explaining this is to posit that either One Nation Conservatism or Thatcherite 
Conservatism is not a ‘true’ manifestation of conservative ideology at all, instead representing an 
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ideological aberration to some other tradition. This explanation has been employed by 
Conservative politicians of both sides. The argument put forward by Thatcher and her supporters 
is that One Nation Conservatism represented acquiescence to Labour’s ‘socialist’ ideology. 
Thatcher described the Conservative ‘wets’ as ‘political calculators who see the task of 
Conservatives as retreating gracefully before the Left’s inevitable advance’. Therefore, for them 
to support the fiscal, economic and trade union reforms of her first government would be 
tantamount to admitting that their whole political lives had been founded on the ‘gigantic lie’ 
that ‘positive Tory reform’ would be neither practical nor popular (1993: 104-5). According to 
Thatcher, in their quest for power, which was pragmatic largely in terms of self-interest, One 
Nation Conservatives abandoned conservatism. 
 
Meanwhile, supporters of One Nation Conservatism regarded Thatcherism as ‘an alien import 
into the Conservative tradition’ (Evans, 2009: 103). Evans (1998: 19-21) discusses Macmillan’s 
reservations regarding the direction in which Thatcher was leading the Party, including concerns 
about dogmatism in economic policy and divisiveness that undermined the ethos of ‘one nation’ 
and social harmony. Ian Gilmour, who served in Edward Heath’s Cabinet and briefly in 
Thatcher’s, criticised Thatcher for ‘inserting into Conservative policy an ideological, if not 
religious, fervour and a dogmatic tone that had been previously lacking’ (Gilmour 1992: 6, 269-
274). This view tends to suggest that ultimately Thatcher’s approach was to the detriment of both 
British society and British conservatism itself (Garnett and Gilmour, 1997; Gray, 1995).  
 
However, that both periods have been attacked as betrayals - often by those seeking to legitimate 
the authenticity of their own ideas within the Conservative Party (Gamble, 1994: 147-148) - 
serves as an indication that the accuracy of these claims needs to be investigated further. From 
the theoretical perspective of this thesis, these claims are also problematic. If ideas and 
ideologies only exist insofar as they are constituted by actors, then there is an irreducible 
relationship between ‘conservatism’ as an ideology and the political ideas of those who call 
themselves ‘Conservatives’ (Norton, 2008). As such, a theory of conservatism that can account 
for these (and many other) variations is required. 
 
Noting the ‘extraordinary variety of “core” concepts’ that have been ascribed to Conservatism, 
Freeden suggests that conservative ideology actually has a far more limited core (1996: 337). 
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Many of those concepts which have been assigned to the core would be better described as 
adjacent or peripheral concepts. This is not because they are insignificant in understanding 
Conservative perspectives or actions. Rather it is due to the varied levels of importance and 
meaning assigned to them at various historical points, which precludes them from being 
identified as part of the core. It is proposed that there are three key ideas at the core of 
conservatism broadly understood, which can be used to explain the variation between the One 
Nation and Thatcherite manifestations of Conservative Party ideology.  
 
The first, based on a reading of Oakeshott, is not a ‘defence of the status quo’, but a belief in 
‘social order and organic change’ that works from experimental knowledge of human behaviour. 
Conservatism is therefore not an attempt to eliminate change (as implied in the everyday usage), 
but to render it ‘safe’ (Freeden, 1996: 332). This leaves the problem of what constitutes ‘safe’, 
acceptable change. Conservatives, after all, have not always been reticent in leading change, as 
in the 1980s.  
 
Freeden proposes that a second core component of conservatism is therefore how it legitimates 
change, while also de-legitimating changes that Conservatives view as dangerous. This cannot be 
removed from the core, because it is essential to resolving the issue of what constitutes 
acceptable change. Freeden suggests that this is manifested as an appeal to the ‘extra-human 
origins of the social order’ (1996: 334). These might be religious, historical (as in the belief in a 
natural hierarchy or paternalism) or scientific, for example. What Conservatives are suspicious 
of – and here, Thatcher’s ideas can be identified somewhat with Burke’s – is ‘grand schemes’ 
that are designed and implemented by government and are devoid of ‘natural’ justifications. 
Through this aspect, the Thatcherite appeal to supposed ‘scientific’ economic laws that govern 
markets form an acceptable justification for Conservatives to seek to bring about change, while 
also serving to circumscribe the role of the state. These changes would move away from the 
managed economy, perceived as an artificial construct, thus negating its negative impact on 
social order, exemplified in the increasing industrial unrest of the late 1970s. 
 
Finally, Freeden suggests that Conservatism is essentially a reactive ideology, attaining ‘self-
awareness when exposed by its ideological opponents, rather than at its own behest, and 
[reacting] to them in a looking-glass manner’ (1996: 337).  This third, non-substantive concept is 
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the ‘mirror-image characteristic’. In rejecting what they believe to be the ‘universal, abstract and 
systematic theories’ of their rivals on the basis that their effects cannot be known, Conservatives 
are impelled in turn to suggest alternatives. Thus ‘when conservatism perceives change as 
unproblematic it remains intellectually dormant, and its principles and theoretical stances are 
only elicited when it is forced to mirror its opponents arguments’ (1996: 337). For Freeden, the 
concept of an ‘enemy’ is a key element of conservative ideology, and the particular character of 
this enemy as it is identified by Conservatives is a significant factor in explaining its resulting 
strategy and policy direction. Where some process or movement is seen to threaten social order, 
Conservatism moves to work against this. What is perceived as a major threat will almost 
inevitably change over time. This, therefore, is crucial in understanding the Conservative Party’s 
shift towards Thatcherism, manifested in a shift towards a strongly articulated ideological stance, 
and the distancing from ‘consensus’ politics which was identified as the source of disorder. 
Investigating the identification of principal ‘enemies’ provides an explanation for the apparent 
dissonance between the One Nation and Thatcherite forms of Conservatism, while allowing both 
to still be considered forms of conservative ideology. 
 
Establishing an understanding of the core of conservative ideology means that there is now a 
basis from which to explore how concepts around this have been decontested in the process of 
relating the ideology to contemporary circumstances, resulting in different manifestations of 
‘conservatism’. These are explored in relation to One Nation and Thatcherism below, and 
subsequently in relation to Cameron’s leadership in Chapter 4. 
 
3.3 One Nation Conservatism, Thatcherism and the state 
Interpretations of One Nation Conservatism in relation to Thatcherism can be split into three 
broad camps. The first two, outlined above, refer to the betrayal of ‘true’ Conservatism by one 
group or the other. This section will suggest that neither of these views is completely accurate. A 
third interpretation is that there are considerable continuities between One Nation Conservatism 
and Thatcherism, and these are articulated more or less forcefully in response to differing 
governing contexts. The SRA draws attention to how shifts in context, which may not be within 
the control of Conservative Party, will serve to make certain policy responses appear more or 
less appropriate. Simultaneously they will give rise to different concerns regarding threats to 
social order, with the adjacent concepts of the Conservative ideology reconsidered and re-
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arranged accordingly. This reflects a process of continual re-adjustment to the effects of a party’s 
decisions (and those of its rivals) on political context, entailing strategic learning and the 
rejection or modification of existing or former strategies. Such changes in context and its 
interpretation can explain the apparent disjuncture between the two manifestations, particularly 
with regard to perspectives on the ideological acceptability of an interventionist welfare state. 
 
‘One Nation’ Conservatism characterises the political ideas and approach to governing of the 
dominant faction in the Conservative Party from the 1950s, up until at least the election of the 
Heath government in 1970.7 The Thatcher governments conclusively brought this dominance to 
an end, precipitating the decline of One Nation Conservatism within the PCP (Dorey and 
Garnett, 2014). The name is derived from Disraeli’s novel Sybil (1845) which identified the 
existence of ‘two nations’ in Britain – the rich and the poor – ‘between whom there is no 
intercourse and no sympathy’ (cited in Seawright, 2005: 71). Disraeli went on to argue that the 
task of Conservatives was to unite these groups (Evans and Taylor, 1996: 7). Smith (1967) 
expresses considerable doubt about the extent to which this vision was translated into policy 
under Disraeli’s governments. Nonetheless, it remained an important strand in modern 
Conservative ideology, contributing to creating what Seawright refers to as the ‘One Nation 
myth’ that heavily influenced the Party in the 1950s (2005: 70-71).  
 
In the post-war Conservative Party, the term is closely associated with the One Nation Group of 
Conservative MPs, formed in 1950. This group comprised several MPs who would later go on to 
high-ranking positions with the Party, causing Gamble to characterise it as an ‘educational forum 
for future leaders’ (1974: 258). Bochel notes that the number of future Cabinet members within 
the One Nation Group may have retrospectively helped to reinforce an impression of its 
influence within the PCP (2010: 124). Interestingly, given the opprobrium that would later be 
heaped on the tradition by Thatcher’s supporters, these figures included those who would come 
to be more associated with the Thatcherite turn and the New Right. Enoch Powell was a 
founding member, while Keith Joseph was a later recruit to the Group. These members sat 
alongside those now more readily associated with the One Nation tradition, such as Iain Macleod 
or Ian Gilmour. A full list of members up until 2003 reveals that this ideological divergence has 
                                                 
7 The Heath government might be viewed as a transition between the two traditions: see Seldon and Ball (1996).  
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been a feature of the group throughout its history: the One Nation Group was not, and has never, 
been characterised by an absence of opposing factions drawn from within the Conservative Party 
(Seawright, 2005: 73).  
 
The breadth of membership of the One Nation Group might serve as a reason to avoid using it as 
way of investigating the ideas and perspectives underpinning the broader tradition of One Nation 
Conservatism. As Dorey and Garnett observe: ‘even the founder members of the group disagreed 
on key issues’. Moreover, the appeal of One Nation Conservatism was ‘considerably wider than 
the membership of a single and relatively small coterie’, as the Group represented (2014: 1-2). 
Here it is suggested that the ideological diversity of individual members, combined into 
publications that were all ‘collective compromises’, is exactly what makes these a useful tool for 
beginning to uncover the priorities and concerns of a range of Conservative members at the 
height of One Nation Conservatism’s influence (Seawright, 2005: 76, Walsha, 2000: 189-190). 
They are ‘artefacts of their time’, detailing a Conservative response to the ‘expectations and 
realities of the post-war period, including the need for economic reconstruction and the 
popularity of many parts of the welfare state’ (Bochel, 2010: 132). Since the character of 
Conservative ideology is understood as highly contingent and dependent on the circumstances in 
which the Party finds itself, such artefacts may prove highly valuable in illuminating its primary 
concerns. This approach is taken by both Seawright (2010; 2005) and Walsha (2000) in their 
studies of post-war One Nation Conservatism. While recognising that the publications of the 
group were not necessarily a basis for the leadership’s approach to social policy (although they 
certainly intended to be so), they are nonetheless useful sources in shading in the wider party 
approach on such issues. 
 
The One Nation Group published a number of pamphlets before Thatcher’s election as leader, 
including three in the 1950s: One Nation, Change is our Ally and The Responsible Society. These 
aimed to provide an ‘underpinning rationale’ and theoretical unity to the ‘hitherto piecemeal 
nature of Conservative social policy making’ (Walsha, 2000: 191). Despite noting contradictory 
accounts for the formation of the Group, Walsha states that all of these are linked via the 
‘recognition of the ineptitude of the Conservative frontbench when dealing with the Atlee 
government in matters of social policy’ (2000: 188). This was an area which fell more naturally 
to Labour than the Conservatives, owing to Labour’s concern with egalitarianism and social 
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justice. Reviving a Disraelian concern with uniting the ‘two nations’ provided an opportunity to 
influence the development of the post-war welfare state along the lines of a ‘Tory paternalist’ 
conception of Conservatism (Brigden, 2000: 85), thus wresting some control (and, given the 
popularity of the welfare state, some potential voters) from Labour. 
 
The Conservative leaderships of the 1950s showed a ‘positive accommodation with state 
activity’ that certainly went beyond anything displayed by the Thatcher governments, or by 
subsequent Conservative leaderships (Page 2010b: 120). In terms of social security policy for 
working people, this including strong support for the reforms introduced by the Atlee 
government. The Party initially ‘took every opportunity’ to remind voters of its role in initiating 
the bulk of the new legislation through its involvement in the wartime Coalition and, while 
newer MPs might have been disposed to ‘sharper questioning’ of the welfare state, there was no 
impetus to reject it entirely (Raison, 1990: 32). Partly this might be understood in electoral 
terms, but there was also an acceptance that the interventionist state could be a force for good. It 
provided a means of elevating the condition of the poor for moral reasons, and securing the 
benefits that this could bring in terms of social harmony (Dorey, 2015; Hickson, 2009; Freeden, 
1996: 386). This support was based on paternalism, underpinning the idea that the well-off and 
more able in society had a duty to assist the less well-off and less-able (Raison, 1990: 27). This 
emphasis caused Greenleaf (1983) to suggest that the One Nation tradition that embodied these 
ideas is reflective of a kind of Conservative collectivism, owing to the sense of social duty 
implied.8 Thus, the welfare state was an electorally popular vehicle that One Nation 
Conservatives believed could help to fulfil these ideals, but Conservative support for it was 
premised on a very different ideological basis to that of the Labour Party. 
 
As discussed further in Chapter 4, the beliefs that underpinned Conservative support for welfare 
are not, and were never, egalitarian. Rather, they were justified with reference to a conception of 
hierarchy as a legitimate system of social order, while recognising that within this there were 
limits to the extent of inequality than was sustainable (Dorey, 2015; 2010). Hence, as the 
examples given above suggest, One Nation Conservatism did not constitute a ‘shining example 
                                                 
8 This tendency towards collectivism is also one of the reasons cited by Hayek in his postscript to The Constitution 
of Liberty, as to ‘Why I am not a Conservative’ (Hayek, 1960: 343-356), indicating an area of tension between One 
Nation Conservatism and some of the ideas underpinning Thatcherism. 
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of the acceptance of an enlarged and active state’ for its own sake, and the One Nation Group 
was not ‘putting forward a case for a Conservative/socialist compromise’ (Walsha, 2000: 190-
192; Dorey, 2002). Although there were those in the Party who could be termed ‘welfare 
enthusiasts’, there was also a significant element that was concerned about the effect of the 
welfare state in society and critical of Labour’s ‘untrammelled support’ for it (Walsha, 2000: 
192). Support for the welfare state was conditional on it not over-reaching from the maintenance 
of social order into what Conservatives saw as damaging social engineering.  
 
As such, solutions began to be advocated during the 1950s including greater targeting, means-
testing and tighter control of welfare expenditure (One Nation Group, 1954). These are reflective 
of a belief that the welfare state should provide a minimum standard, beyond which individuals 
could rise ‘as far as their industry, their thrift, their ability and their genius may take them’ 
(Macleod and Maude, 1950: 9). Conservative support for social security, and the concern with 
elevating the condition of the poor, was therefore underpinned by a conviction that the welfare 
state must not undermine or discourage these attributes, which were essential for maintaining 
economic prosperity (Page, 2007: 52). This suggests an acceptance even amongst Conservatives 
that provisionally supported the welfare system that over-extension might have adverse moral 
consequences. Notably, as Raison (1990: 38) identifies in an 1954 speech by Rab Butler, the 
Party was beginning to articulate worries that a ‘Socialist’, universalist approach to welfare 
provision, including housing, was imposing unreasonable burdens on ‘tax payers and rate 
payers’. This suggests a nascent concern with the proper balance of the relationship between 
individuals and the state. This is explored further below in relation to the concept of 
responsibility, but at this point such arguments were also couched in terms of the concept of 
‘freedom’. For example, then-Minister for Education Lord Hailsham argued that ‘it is an 
essential condition of a free society that a man may make his own provision, rather than be 
compelled to use state services’ (Raison, 1990: 47). Alongside this, the cost of social security 
was increasingly becoming a real concern for Conservatives. Despite these criticisms, however, 
there was scant real policy change on social security for the Conservatives under either the 
Churchill or Macmillan governments (Raison, 1990: 56). 
 
Initially, therefore, Thatcherite policy on the welfare state looks to be a considerable distance 
from those characterising One Nation Conservatism. The Thatcher administrations made a 
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number of reforms which proved beyond doubt that the supposed ‘post-war consensus’ around 
welfare had reached its end (Farrall and Hay, 2014). However, although the Thatcher 
governments may have brought about new policy direction, the ideas and interpretations 
underpinning this had developed much more gradually. The main policy focus was on reducing 
spending, in accordance with the economic situation that the first Thatcher administration found 
itself facing. Within a wider programme of public sector reform, social security was targeted for 
major budget reductions and reform primarily during the second term, culminating in the Social 
Security Act (1986). Achieving the desired reductions proved challenging due to the combined 
impact of an aging population and high unemployment. However, despite these circumstances 
and the transfer of some of the housing budget into social security, social security spending 
increased more slowly in the 1980s than in the previous period of Labour government (Hill and 
Walker, 2014). 
 
This was accomplished through a number of measures introduced in the 1986 Act which sought 
to devalue  and reduce social security payments. These included changes to up-rating rules, cuts 
to contribution-based benefits, increased conditionality, and restrictions on eligibility. There 
were also moves to increase means-testing for some benefits, indicating a significant 
development in the debate over the merits of universal and means-tested benefits that had been 
on-going in the PCP since the mid-1950s (Raison, 1990: 48). The green paper preceding the act 
also expressed concerns about the value of out-of-work benefits compared to wages and the need 
to maintain a gap between the two, the complexity of the benefit system, and the amount of 
‘churning’ within it whereby people were paying tax and receiving means-tested benefits 
simultaneously (Raison, 1990: 134). The Conservatives also introduced a number of active 
labour market policies.9 The direction of reform would prove significant in influencing both the 
Blair and Cameron governments (see Chapters 1 and 4), illustrating both the importance of 
placing policy reforms into historical context, and the rather path-dependent nature of policy 
development in this area. This is brought into view particularly sharply by comparing the very 
similar goals of the reforms introduced by the Conservatives in Coalition (see Chapters 6 and 7), 
with those of the Thatcher governments outlined below. 
                                                 
9
 These programmes included the Youth Training Scheme, Job Training Scheme, Community Programme, 
Enterprise Allowance Scheme and JobClubs (Conservative Party, 1987). 
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Accompanying these reforms, the ideological attack on the welfare state intensified under 
Thatcher (Page, 2007: 80). As noted, concerns about the malign influence of welfare provision 
had been growing since the 1950s and 1960s within the Conservative Party (Green, 2002; 
Rasion, 1990). The notion of a ‘crisis’ in welfare spending began to take hold as the economic 
situation declined in the mid-1970s, and Thatcher ‘addressed the task of dealing with the so-
called crisis with very much more enthusiasm than her predecessors’ (Hill, 1993: 129). However 
the ideas advanced as justification for the Conservative approach to dealing with this went 
further than a critique of government spending. Thatcherism extended this into an ideological re-
appraisal of the relationship between state, economy, society and individuals. In endorsing this 
critique, the Conservative Party under Thatcher’s leadership turned away from paternalist, 
collectivist Conservatism in relation to welfare policy, moving towards a more neo-liberal or 
libertarian-influenced model (Page, 2007; Green, 2002; Hill, 1993). Despite this, the party 
remained distinctly conservative at its core given the concerns that it mobilised in relation to: the 
adaptation was a means to ultimately conservative ends concerning the maintenance of order. 
Moreover, the principles underpinning the attack were reflective of a socially conservative 
concern with the morality of welfare support, emphasising the negative effect that this might 
have on the moral fabric of the nation. 
 
The diagnosis of social and economic malaise is summarised in Thatcher’s claim that ‘the great 
mistake of the last few years has been for the government to provide or to legislate for almost 
everything’. While this might have been advisable in the immediate post-war reconstruction, 
these policies had ‘gone far further than was ever intended or advisable’ (1988). In proposing 
this, Thatcher was echoing perspectives which had been developing amongst some party 
members for some time before she took the leadership. For example, Enoch Powell had been 
calling for ‘less government’ (1970) in some policy areas since the late 1960s.10 Partly, this was 
justified with reference to maintaining economic prosperity (1968a). However it also reflected a 
belief that the state had become invasive, with its role extended far beyond managing ‘those 
                                                 
10 Welfare provision was actually one of the areas that Powell singled out as a proper function of the state: for 
example, providing for ‘security in old age, retirement or affliction’ (1970). The perspectives of the Thatcher 
governments had clearly moved some distance from this, exemplified in their pensions policy (Bridgen, 2000) 
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functions in society which the citizens must not or cannot try to perform for themselves’ (Powell, 
1970; 1968b). 
 
A first consequence of this extension of state responsibilities was what Thatcherite 
Conservatives saw as an unacceptable tax burden on British citizens. This was presented as 
antithetical to economic and, ultimately, political freedom. This reflected a prioritisation of 
freedom or liberty, conceived in a negative sense as an adjacent concept within this form of 
Conservatism (Hayek, 1960). The reduction of this burden was the first justification for rolling 
back the welfare state. As Thatcher stated after reforms were underway: ‘every tax-paying 
individual in this country now pays about £40 a week to social security alone’. Those citizens 
who wanted increased social security were not asking ‘the government’ for money; they were 
asking ‘their neighbour’ (1988), thereby impinging on them. This suggests that there is no such 
thing as ‘government money’ – only taxation taken from citizens – and that framing this 
otherwise is an act of subterfuge by the state. A broad failure to connect the two had led to a 
spiralling number of competing demands on the state which it was ill-equipped to manage, 
thereby contributing to social and economic instability. Reining in the expectations on, and of, 
the state was essential to resolving this.  
 
A second consequence, connected to the first, was that despite the Conservatives’ best efforts to 
roll back the state, Thatcher stated that her government was still finding that people were ‘not out 
of the way of expecting governments to do things for them’ (1988). Similarly, she claimed: ‘I 
think we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to 
understand “I have a problem, it is the Government's job to cope with it!”’; concluding, 
famously: ‘and so they are casting their problems on society, and what is society? There is no 
such thing!’ (Thatcher, 1987). This theory suggests that the interventionist state has undermined 
individual responsibility and self-reliance, ultimately to the detriment of communities and of the 
connections between people. This emphasis on self-reliance, entailing hard work in order to fulfil 
individual responsibility, was an important part of the moral agenda of Thatcherism (Letwin, 
1992). The obligation to work rather than expect ‘a living from the state’ was framed in these 
terms. Accordingly, Thatcher put forward the perspective that ‘life is a reciprocal business. If 
you expect your neighbour to help you when you are in difficulties, you must in return expect to 
keep yourself when you are able to do so’ (Thatcher, 1988).  
78 
  
 
 
Therefore in addition to the underpinning justification that ‘sound money’ and economic 
prosperity were key to social prosperity, this moral argument added another reason for rolling 
back the welfare state which could be deployed even in better economic times. It is related to the 
idea that dependency on the state is damaging to both individual character and, extending from 
this, to society. This invokes a concept of individual responsibility which gave a moral thread to 
the reforms, strongly arguing that the present social security system was stifling ‘incentive, 
opportunity and responsibility’ and thus encouraging what came to be termed ‘dependency 
culture’ (Raison, 1990: 134-136). The rise of the dependency narrative is a central feature of the 
Thatcherite approach to welfare (Taylor-Gooby, 2014; Deacon, 2000), leading to a conception of 
welfare spending as waste rather than social investment due to the undesirable behaviour that it 
encourages amongst claimants (Hayton and McEnhill, 2014: 107). Through this, responsibility is 
decontested on an individual basis, as opposed to the more paternalist ideal of the stronger 
members of society supporting the weak. As explored further in Chapter 4, this is an idea which 
strongly took hold in the PCP. The decontestation of this concept has major implications for the 
development of welfare policy since it renders a number of policy options ideologically 
untenable. 
 
Social policy was secondary to the economic task that the Thatcher governments faced. Even 
after Thatcher had been Prime Minister for eleven years, the fundamental transformation of the 
welfare state that might have been expected to accompany the rhetoric was not evident. Hill and 
Walker (2014) suggest that this was partly because the first half of Thatcher’s time in power was 
characterised by residualisation rather than reform: what change that did take place was more a 
consequence of lack of policy innovation, stretching the resources of the welfare state further and 
further. In the second half, policy reforms were made, but largely failed to achieve their goals of 
reducing welfare spending and ultimately ‘shrinking’ the welfare system. However, the strong 
emphasis on responsibility, obligation and the moral virtue inherent in providing for oneself – 
the idea of ‘remoralising’ welfare support (Taylor-Gooby, 2014; Letwin, 1992) – was 
nonetheless a key element of Thatcherism throughout. This reflected a conservative desire to 
promote a return to reliance on organic institutions, over the artificial, over-extended structures 
of the welfare state. A strong alternative emphasis on concepts of individual responsibility and 
self-sufficiency were then necessary to support this. 
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Viewed in this way, Thatcher’s perspectives on society were not quite as coldly individualistic as 
they have been portrayed as being.11 Neither, through the emphasis on morality and how this 
feeds into social order, did they depart substantially from a socially conservative perspective: 
there was still a strong concern with reining in change and re-asserting a more ‘natural’, self-
reliant approach to welfare as a means of improving social relations (Freeden, 1996: 385). 
Rather, under Thatcher the Conservative Party attempted to set out ‘a political philosophy that 
goes beyond the State and the individual, and begins to express in human terms the complex 
network of reciprocal rights and duties in an orderly society’ (Conservative Party, 1976: 17). The 
emphasis on duty and reciprocity is significant, qualified with the belief that individuals should 
make trenchant efforts to support themselves. The key deviation from the post-war settlement, 
and from early One Nation Conservatism, is the perception of the extent to which support 
provided welfare state can co-exist with these alternative sources. Thatcherism views this 
relationship as zero-sum (Corbett and Walker, 2013), identifying the welfare system as a source 
of moral degeneracy. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, developing this aspect of Conservative 
ideology has remained a considerable concern for the Conservatives under David Cameron. 
 
How, then, can the apparent shift in outlook and policy that occurred between the early post-war 
Conservative and Thatcher administrations be explained in reference to the core concepts of 
conservatism outlined above? It should be noted here that the centrality of ideology in explaining 
and understanding the Conservative Party’s turn towards Thatcherism is not universally agreed. 
Some accounts emphasise it heavily (Hall, 1983; Durham, 1989; Green, 2002), while others 
suggest different interpretations. For example, Jim Bulpitt (1986) understands Thatcherism as a 
re-assertion of Conservative Party statecraft, leaving little room for ideology aside from where it 
crosses over with rhetoric. Andrew Gamble (1994: 141) also suggests that Thatcherism can best 
be analysed as statecraft: ‘in which ideas and principles are subordinated to political calculation, 
the pursuit of office and the management of power’, but allows a more expansive role for 
ideology than Bulpitt. David Coates (1989) suggests that it is a context-specific response to 
                                                 
11 Gilmour (1992: 272), for example, describes the Thatcherite view of society: ‘they saw people as living in a 
condition reminiscent of Hobbes’s state of nature, locked into a relentless competition for material resources, and 
growing every day more solitary, nasty, brutish and rich...Much as socialists forgot the individual, the New Right 
were determined to forget society’.  
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economic decline; although it might be argued that this is not incompatible with its ideological 
elements. Anthony King (1975) and Peter Riddell (1989a) characterise Thatcherism as a ‘way of 
doing’ politics; Riddell (1989b) has also emphasised the extent to which this is based heavily on 
the personal values and experiences of Thatcher herself, a characterisation which is 
unsurprisingly supported by her biographers (Campbell, 2000). It is probably accurate to claim 
that Thatcherism’s apparently ‘chameleon-like’ character is due to its existence as a complex, 
dynamic process, and to suggest that different accounts reflect differences of interpretive 
emphasis (Kerr and Marsh, 1999: 168). 
 
The first point to note is that the emergence of what has been understood as ‘Thatcherism’ 
retrospectively is not necessarily concurrent with Thatcher’s election as Prime Minister in 1979, 
or even as Conservative leader in 1975. Although Thatcher served in Heath’s cabinet, her 
rhetorical antipathy towards the interventionist state was remarkably consistent: since 1968 she 
had been publicly arguing that it must be rolled back, contrasting the ‘free society with the 
horrors of socialism’ (Durham, 1989: 63). Similar claims can be made of other key figures, 
including Keith Joseph (1976) and, as discussed, there were indications of discontent within the 
Party much earlier. Those who supported Thatcher’s leadership bid could have had little doubt 
about the direction in which she would seek to take the Conservative Party. The PCP was 
arguably moving towards a less collectivist stance under Heath (Lowe, 1996): Thatcher’s victory 
in 1975 illustrated conclusively that the Party wanted to continue down this path (Evans, 2009: 
107). Hence, as Green (2002) suggests, the idea that Thatcherism represented the hijacking of a 
previously unified ‘One Nation’ party that was opposed to substantial change by a peculiarly 
ideological individual or small group is untenable. Although Thatcher re-invigorated the Party’s 
approach, the perspectives on state provision that came to the fore under her leadership were not 
unique to her and her immediate circle. It is possible to trace the development of these ideas 
within the wider Conservative Party, and to conclude that the stirrings of what became known as 
‘Thatcherism’ were present in the PCP during the period in which One Nation Conservatism was 
ascendant. Ideologically, there was much about Thatcherism that represented continuity. The 
changes that came about as a result of her leadership represented the culmination of an iterative 
process of learning that suggested to Conservatives, by the late 1970s, that previously supported 
strategies for managing the economy and society had been exhausted. 
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Particularly notable is the growing suspicion evident within the PCP of the detrimental effects on 
society of the expansion of the state. In relation to welfare, this was marked by an increasing 
concern regarding the relationship between concepts of responsibility and welfare dependency. 
Raison (1990: 185-187) places great emphasis on the former of these, suggesting that it was 
important enough in shaping policy directions to be elevated to adjacent concept status under 
Thatcher. Dependency was presented as undermining individual responsibility and thus 
legitimating a range of choices that were deemed detrimental to an acceptable social order. This 
this includes, for example, the strong emphasis on discouraging single parenthood which was 
consistently presented as a source of social breakdown (Raison, 1990: 186).  
 
Moreover, the welfare state apparatus was perceived as having become overloaded through 
continual attempts by politicians to use it to improve the social conditions of some individuals 
relative to others: a purpose for which, for many Conservatives, it had never been intended. 
Rather than providing a minimum standard of living, welfare provision had tipped into social 
engineering to which Conservatives were ideologically opposed, with concurrent effects on 
individual morality. The concept of state authority was also challenged, as the extension of such 
programmes produced ‘the mobilisation of pressure from below for state policies and 
programmes to correct inequalities and disadvantage’, as well as giving rise to new expectations 
about entitlements and rights (Gamble, 1994: 12-13; King, 1975). As tensions grew in the mid- 
to late-1970s and social unrest became more of a reality, the Conservative ideological response 
was to ‘direct the mirror-image at the spectre of a paternalist, bureaucratic, and artificially 
manipulative state’ (Freeden, 1996: 385). In its place, Conservatives invoked a more limited 
conception of the state which was obliged to ‘do more to help individuals to help themselves, 
and families to look after their own’ (Conservative Party, 1979). Through this, expectations on 
the state could be managed via a re-assertion of citizens’ responsibilities, offering a means for 
the authority of the state to be restored. 
 
Hence, Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett’s claim that attitudes to the welfare state constitute a clear 
dividing line between ‘One Nation’ and ‘Thatcherite’ Conservatives does not seem to be entirely 
accurate (1997: 48-9). While it was possible to claim in the 1950s that One Nation Conservatives 
took ‘genuine pride’ in the creation of the welfare state, as the decades wore on this seemed to 
be giving way to more suspicion regarding its effects on society. It might be reasonable to claim 
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that the leadership’s attitude remained ostensibly positive for some time longer than that of the 
lower ranks of the PCP. Green (2002: 219) supports this argument, noting that there is ‘evidence 
of deep-seated hostility’ within the Conservative party towards the extension of the welfare state 
‘from the publication of the Beveridge report in 1942, through the post-war labour reform 
legislation, to the development and impact of state intervention in the economic and social 
spheres’. In part, the lack of leadership action on this was likely to be because, for much of the 
post-war period up until Thatcher’s era, the time was not right to challenge this extremely 
popular element of the post-war consensus and there was little obvious justification for doing so. 
That the Conservatives went into the 1964 election proposing little in the way of change to the 
welfare system, despite growing evidence of dissatisfaction within the wider PCP is an 
illustration of how powerful a constraint strategic selectivity can impose on decision-making. 
Conservative concerns about the welfare state’s impact on society and the economy could 
scarcely have been missed by the leadership at this point. However, it was only after losing the 
1964 election and later returning to government that the Party felt able to build on this (Raison, 
1990: 61). 
  
Returning to the previous discussion of Freeden’s conception of Conservative ideology, the idea 
of ‘the enemy’ is useful in explaining (and, given that Conservatives are in theory averse to 
unnecessary change, excusing) the apparent radicalism of the Thatcher governments. To recap, 
conservatism is understood as a reactive ideology. Its principles are articulated in response to 
alternative, competing ideologies that threaten its core beliefs: notably, an interest in maintaining 
social order. Therefore when this interest is not threatened, conservatism experiences a sort of 
ideological inertia (Freeden, 1996: 323). It is when an identifiable ‘enemy’ emerges that the 
Conservative Party begins to articulate its beliefs: this is the function of the ‘mirror-image’ 
characteristic, whereby Conservatism is defined largely by what it is standing opposite, 
mentioned above (1996: 324). In the 1970s, this ‘enemy’ was the welfare state, which had been 
allowed to extend by such a margin that it had completely overshadowed any kind of ‘natural’ 
order or ‘organic’ social bonds, undermining both its own authority and the goals that it had been 
intended to acheive. With the enemy understood in this way, radical Thatcherite reforms can be 
viewed as ‘an act of power-wielding’, intended to bring to a halt the ‘dangerous by-products of 
the welfare state’ (Freeden, 1996: 387). The implication was that while such actions were not 
desirable, they were necessary if the trajectory of constant expansion was to be arrested, and a 
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social order based on self-reliance was to be re-introduced. Thatcher’s reforms represented a 
‘judicious but ephemeral’ use of the state in returning society to a more acceptable order 
(Freeden, 1996: 387). It is the presence of this concern within the core of the ideology that makes 
it possible to understand Thatcherism as being as much a manifestation of conservative ideology 
as One Nation Conservatism. 
 
3.4 After Thatcher: contemporary analyses of Conservatives and conservatism 
Thatcherism proved to be a catalyst for a wealth of literature on the Conservative Party,12 which 
had previously been somewhat neglected within academia, evident in the relative scarcity of 
literature on the One Nation period. Unfortunately, the period shortly after Thatcher left office 
initially suffered a similar relative neglect. Major’s time in office might reasonably be conceived 
as a broad continuation and consolidation of Thatcherite policies, but lacking the personal flair 
that marked Thatcher’s premiership. With hindsight, Major’s leadership proves revealing in 
terms of what followed for the Conservatives, but it was perhaps not the most obvious area of 
interest at the time. In contrast, the response of the Labour party and the rise of New Labour 
provoked a flurry of academic analyses, many of which maintained the focus on Thatcherism by 
focusing, in whole or in part, on the relationship between the two (Driver and Martell, 2006; 
Heffernan, 2000). 
 
The literature on the Conservatives in opposition, however, and the emergent body of work on 
the Conservatives in Coalition government, is more plentiful. Much of this is covered in detail in 
later chapters, particularly where it concerns the 1997 to 2005 opposition period and the 
Conservatives’ negotiation of the Thatcherite legacy prior to electing Cameron as leader, and 
interpretations of Cameron’s party’s ideological leanings. Therefore this is not discussed in any 
great detail here. However, it is worth briefly outlining the main features of contemporary 
analyses of Conservatism and welfare policy here. This is in order to indicate where this thesis 
sits within the wider literature on the Conservative Party since 2005, defining its contribution to 
this. Existing work can be divided into two broad categories. 
 
                                                 
12
 See, for example, Bulpitt (1986), Evans and Taylor (1996), Gamble (1994), Hall (1983), Jessop et al. (1988), 
Kavanagh and Seldon (1989), King (1975), O’Shea (1984), Riddell (1989b). 
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The first approaches the Conservative Party’s perspectives on welfare from a social policy 
analytical perspective. Conservative social policy has generally been under-researched in 
comparison to Labour’s. This is a further consequence of the focus on Thatcherism within the 
academic literature. As discussed above, economic rather than social policy appeared to be the 
main motivation of the Thatcher governments, and where the two overlap (for example, around 
unemployment), the focus was on economic rather than social policy-based solutions. However, 
a notable recent contribution on this topic is Hugh Bochel’s (2011) edited volume. Chapters 
within this consider the relationship between Cameron’s Conservatives and New Labour 
(Bochel, 2011), as well as between One Nation Conservatism and Thatcherism (Page, 2011). On 
welfare specifically, Stephen McKay and Karen Rowlingson (2011) consider welfare-to-work 
policy and Alan Deacon and Ruth Patrick (2011) examine social security policy under 
Cameron’s leadership. The LSE’s Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion’s Social Policy in 
a Cold Climate series rovides comprehensive analysis of the impact of the Coalition, led by Ruth 
Lupton (2015). Ruth Lister and Fran Bennett (2010) also make a notable contribution, crossing 
over somewhat more into analysis of the politics of welfare than some of the studies discussed 
here. Overall, however, literature within this grouping approaches the welfare policies of the 
Conservative Party with the aim of analysing their effects or, given that these policies are in their 
early stages, their likely impact: as such, the extent of political analysis in them is quite limited. 
There is also a large amount of non-academic work that proceeds along similar lines, including 
analyses produced by various think-tanks and charities (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
 
Deacon and Patrick, framing their analysis in relation to the 2010 election, note that the highly 
politically charged environment of election campaigning is ‘not conducive to a measured debate 
about the detail of policy’ (2011: 161). Hence they propose that considering policies separately 
from such an environment is necessary. They are undoubtedly correct for the purposes of their 
own task, but this speaks to the different goals of social policy analysis in comparison to this 
research. Policy analysis has been primarily concerned with the effects after implementation: this 
thesis, on the other hand, seeks to understand the process of development and outcomes, 
including why some strategies have been selected over others despite apparently confused or 
contradictory outcomes, or a lack of firm evidence. As such, to fulfil the goals of this research, it 
is not possible to separate policy from the political context in which it is conceived. While 
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covering similar topics, the social policy approach therefore does not provide satisfactory 
answers to these questions, and does not generally seek to do so in any great depth. 
 
A second category of academic literature approaches the Conservative Party under Cameron 
from a political analytical angle, with varied focus and perspectives on ideological development 
and the significance of this in understanding the present position of the party. Some of this takes 
a much longer-term approach, bringing a political analytical perspective to bear on a period 
previously characterised academically by a more historical focus.13 This includes Tim Bale, 
whose analysis of the Thatcher to Cameron period (2010) is complemented by a further book on 
the earlier part of the post-war period (2012), and Timothy Heppell (2014). Others, such as 
Simon Lee and Matt Beech (2009), Peter King (2011) and Peter Dorey, Mark Garnett and 
Andrew Denham (2011), focus more closely on Cameron’s leadership and what this means for 
the Conservatives and Conservatism. Further edited collections examine the move into Coalition 
government and its consequences for both parties along a range of dimensions (Beech and Lee, 
2015; 2011; Heppell and Seawright, 2012). Chapters within these by Simon Lee (2009), Stephen 
Driver (2009) and Richard Hayton (2012b) all address welfare policy directly although, as with 
the social policy literature outlined above, these are limited in scope owing to the time of 
publication. A somewhat more comprehensive analysis is offered by Robert Page (2015). 
Finally, a number of journal articles discuss aspects of Conservative modernisation in relation to 
ideological change and development, several of which relate this to social policy (Bale, 2009; 
2008; Dorey, 2007; Evans, 2010; 2008; Griffiths, 2014; Hayton and McEnhill, 2015; Kerr, 
Byrne and Foster, 2011; Smith, 2010). 
 
Much of this literature shares an over-riding concern with the question at the centre of this thesis, 
concerning what kind of ‘conservatism’ (if any at all) is embodied in the Conservative Party 
under David Cameron. Several contributions, particularly those focusing on the opposition years, 
interpret the ‘modernisation’ of social policy under Cameron as either a move away from social 
conservatism, towards a form of liberalism (Beech, 2011; Marquand, 2008) or a softening of the 
strongly moralistic approaches of the Thatcher years (Dorey, 2007). Others emphasise the 
continued emphasis on social conservatism within Cameronite social ideology (Griffiths, 2014; 
                                                 
13
 Notable contributors to this include Ball (1998), Blake (1998), Seldon and Ball (1994) and Ramsden (1998). 
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Hayton, 2012a; 2012b). It is within this sub-field of the political analytical approach that this 
thesis sits. 
 
This is an emerging area of study, and the research presented here offers an initial assessment of 
the development of Conservative ideology over Cameron’s entire time as leader of the 
opposition and first term in government. However, other assessments covering the same time 
period and beyond will emerge in time: as such, this novel aspect is not the sole contribution of 
this thesis. As discussed in the previous chapter, changes in policy are often preceded by changes 
or developments in ideology: this is the rationale for focusing on a particular policy area in this 
thesis. A number of the publications discussed here do address this policy area and others, either 
as elements within a much wider time period in the case of Bale and Heppell, or directly in the 
case of the chapters by Lee, Driver and Hayton and several journal articles. It is, however, 
difficult to carry out an in-depth analysis of the process of change through policy in either 
format. In the case of Bale and Heppell, seeking to give a broader overview, this is not really the 
main focus of the work. In the case of the shorter pieces, the depth of analysis is necessarily 
limited by time, resources and space available, increasing the need to either focus on a few 
aspects of policy in depth or to give a broader overview of the policy area. By producing a 
detailed and distinctive analysis of an entire policy area, the ideas underpinning this and the 
‘issues-within-issues’ in terms of welfare reform, this research complements and extends the 
existing political analytical literature, providing a nuanced analysis of ideational change in the 
Conservative Party and the extent to which this is borne out in policy. By extension, it could also 
prove useful to those conducting social policy-focused analysis, through exploring the pressures, 
perspectives and goals that Conservatives consider when formulating policy. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Conservatives have often been wary of conferring the collection of ideas, beliefs and 
perspectives that have guided their political actions with the status of ‘an ideology’. Ideologies 
have been conceived variously as too rigid, irrelevant or radical to be applied to the governing 
approach of the Conservative Party. Instead, members have often preferred to see this as based 
on flexibility, pragmatism and a concern for preserving institutions and practices whose value in 
maintaining the social fabric and structure of society is proven. Against such a backdrop, the 
radical approach of the Thatcher governments and their embrace of the concept of ideology 
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appears to be an aberration. In recent years, the Conservative Party has once again returned to 
the claim that it is free from ideological constraints under Cameron’s leadership. This has 
prompted some speculation that Cameron was moving the Party back towards One Nation 
Conservatism (Page, 2010). As returned to below, the SRA conceptualisation of how policy 
strategies progress, with reference to on-going strategically selectivity buttressed by both party 
ideologies and the path-dependency associated with policy, suggests that this would be 
challenging given the Conservative Party’s recent, Thatcherite past and the continued influence 
of Thatcherite perspectives on welfare policy-making. 
 
Further, making the assumption of a return to One Nation on the basis of a commitment (or lack 
of) to ideology only holds so long as the Conservative rejection of ideology is accepted. This 
chapter and the preceding one has argued that it should not be, as it is based on an unrealistically 
rigid conception of what an ideology is and how ideologies influence political behaviour. 
Ideologies are not blueprints for action that their adherents cannot stray from: rather, their 
implications will shift and adjust according to context and circumstances. Moreover, actors play 
an active role in constituting and re-constituting these concepts, and the wider ideas resulting 
from them. This means that in different contexts ideologies can appear remarkably fluid, as long 
as the core remains consistent. In the case of conservatism, the core consists of a concern with 
preserving social order and rendering change ‘safe’, a mirror-image directed at whatever 
Conservatives feel is the greatest threat to the preservation of that order, and the use of an extra-
human justification to legitimate the Conservative alternative. These features are present in both 
One Nation Conservatism, Thatcherism and Cameron’s Conservatism, rendering all three 
manifestations of conservatism. The variation can be explained by the different contexts within 
which each exists, leading to a varying configuration of adjacent and peripheral concepts around 
the core. 
 
Stemming from this, the chapter also argues that the One Nation Conservatism and Thatcherism 
cannot be viewed as completely distinct in practice. On perspectives on welfare, there is 
considerable continuity between the two, reflected in increasing concerns about the effect of an 
expansive, interventionist welfare state on social and individual morality and, ultimately, order. 
Concern over welfare dependency emerges as a theme in both periods, although this was far 
more strongly articulated under Thatcher. The major area of discontinuity is in perspectives on 
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the role of the state, which underwent a marked transformation between the high point of One 
Nation Conservatism and the ascendancy of Thatcherism. The critique of the interventionist 
welfare state continued to intensify under Thatcher’s leadership. Conservatives who did not 
subscribe to this view of the state were marginalised under Thatcher, thus altering the balance of 
the PCP against One Nation Tories (Heppell and Hill, 2008). This informs a number of key 
issues around welfare policy, including considerations on the role and nature of poverty in 
British society, the merits of equality and inequality, the question of dependency and, ultimately, 
what is considered to be an appropriate or ‘successful’ approach to welfare provision.  
 
Given this, any subsequent discussion of the ideological leanings of the Party under Cameron 
must take into account the attitudes displayed, implicitly or explicitly, towards the possibility of 
a positive interventionist role for the state in the provision of welfare support and the impact of 
such support on individuals. Using the SRA as a framework it can be argued that such thinking, 
alongside the limited reforms introduced by the Thatcher governments, will exert an influence on 
the nature of the strategically selective context within which Cameron’s Party has formulated its 
approach to welfare provision. This is significant firstly in policy terms. The influence of 
Thatcherism with regard to tackling dependency and encouraging responsible behaviour was 
visible in New Labour’s welfare reforms, which themselves shaped the contours of the context 
within which the Conservative Party attempted to ‘modernise’ in opposition, and the policy 
landscape surrounding the Coalition’s reform programme. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly given that Conservative reform of social security was very much a work in progress 
when the Party left office in 1997, Conservative thinking on and interpretations welfare will have 
been influenced by the strategies pursued in this period. The continued academic interest in the 
relationship between the contemporary PCP and Thatcherism supports this: it was, after all, the 
most recent period of ‘successful’ government that the Party had experienced when Cameron 
was elected as leader. Such legacies include the strength of belief that these approaches offered a 
viable means of tackling Conservative concerns, and their potential instrumental value in 
returning the Conservatives to power based on past successes. Given that Conservative 
perceptions of the strategically selective context that the party faced will have leaned towards 
Thatcherite solutions, a substantial move away from these would prove challenging for 
Cameron.  
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The chapter also situated the present research within the context of the contemporary literature 
on the Conservatives and conservatism, welfare policy and the Coalition, particularly with 
respect to the relationship with Thatcherism. It is intended that the detailed policy aspect of this 
research can enrich its political analytical dimension, and the conclusions drawn from this 
regarding the Conservative Party and the current character of British Conservatism (Chapter 4). 
Conversely, its appreciation of party politics and electoral strategy (Chapter 5) and the 
significance and nature of Conservative ideas on welfare as an explanatory factor should also 
enhance the understanding of policy outcomes, and the trajectory of policy that the Coalition has 
followed (Chapters 6 and 7). The application of the SRA to this topic, as discussed, suggests that 
we would expect to see reforms taking place within a Thatcherite framework of hostility towards 
the interventionist welfare state. However this does not discount the possibility of policy 
innovation within this framework, in response to the contemporary challenges facing the welfare 
system. This, then, is the subject of the subsequent chapter. 
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  Chapter 4 
Conservative welfare politics under David Cameron: key concepts 
 
So, let this be our vision: A country not just back in the black but back in business. A big society. 
A prouder people. And we know the values that are going to get us there. Responsibility. Real 
fairness. Compassion. 
 
David Cameron (2011a) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
David Cameron was elected as Conservative leader on 6th December 2005, beating David Davis, 
Liam Fox and Kenneth Clarke. At least initially, his success was interpreted as a triumph of the 
centre of the Conservative Party over its right-wing, represented by Davis and Fox, or a victory 
of the ‘modernisers’ over the Thatcherite traditionalists (Bale, 2008; Evans, 2008; Heppell, 
2008a). However, Cameron attracted support from across the Party, even if only for some 
members because of his perceived popular appeal (Denham and Dorey, 2006: 36). The scale of 
his victory was considerable: in the final all-Party ballot, he received 134,446 votes to Davis’ 
64,398 (Denham and O’Hara, 2007: 419).14 This was, perhaps, evidence of the Party’s 
acquiescence to the idea that it needed to ‘change to win’ after losing three general elections and 
spending eight years in opposition (see Chapter 5). Inevitably the question of how Cameron 
would seek to negotiate the Party’s ideological past arose after his victory: in particular, the 
relationship with Thatcherism and the PCP’s many Thatcherite MPs. In spite of Cameron’s 
victory, the PCP remained strongly Thatcherite; both economically ‘dry’, and socially 
conservative (Heppell, 2013). As a ‘centrist’ Conservative, Cameron was in a minority. He owed 
his position to a Conservative Party which still felt strongly attached to Thatcherism, even if 
parts of it had acknowledged that this might be electorally damaging (Heppell and Hill, 2009). 
Could Cameron’s victory really herald ‘the final exorcism of the spectre of Thatcherism which 
[had] haunted the party since 1990’ (Denham and Dorey, 2006: 41)? Clearly, even if this was 
                                                 
14 Denham and O’Hara (2007: 419-420) point out, however, that in the two previous ballots of PCP Members, ‘a 
majority of the Party’s 198 MPs voted – twice – for a right wing candidate [either Fox or Davis]’. Ten of these MPs 
then supported Cameron in the final ballot, but ‘only when the option of voting for Fox no longer existed’. This 
suggests that Cameron’s mandate over the PCP may not have been as strong as it initially appeared.  
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what Cameron intended, the relationship with Thatcherism needed to be managed with some 
care. 
 
The ascent of a new leader in the wake of a third election defeat might reasonably be expected to 
bring about significant change within the Conservative Party, with both of these events identified 
in the literature on party changes as potentially significant drivers (Harmel and Janda, 1994: 266-
296). However, as Chapter 5 discusses in more detail, the Conservatives after 1997 had proven 
remarkably resistant to such change. The evidence cited above regarding the continued 
prevalence of Thatcherite policy perspectives should serve as a note of caution against assuming 
that Cameron would move the Party away from this. The SRA proves helpful in aiding our 
understanding of why this is so since it leads us to view Cameron and the Conservative Party not 
as unconstrained agents, but as actors within a particular context that brings a number of 
influences to bear on the possibility of change and the path that this might take. Ideas are 
positioned as central to this, since ultimately the evaluation and selection of policy strategies is a 
result of actors’ ideological perceptions of what is possible and desirable within a particular 
social, economic and political context. As Buckler and Dolowitz (2012: 579-581) suggest, 
‘established ideological blueprints’ are likely to exert a considerable effect on the ‘scope of 
positioning’ available to a party, functioning as a major structural constraint for any would-be 
reformist leader. 
 
Thus this chapter focuses on a major on-going element of the strategically selective context that 
Cameron entered as leader in 2005. This is existence of bases of support within the Party for 
particular ideas and ways of approaching policy, adapted in an attempt to allow the Conservative 
Party to respond effectively to contemporary (and often externally-shaped) context. The 
assessment of party ideology contained begins to explore how Conservative thinking applied to 
this area has sought to respond to challenges such as the position of the New Labour government 
and the move into Coalition, while maintaining an authentically ‘Conservative’ perspective. In 
this way, examining the decontestation of central concepts in relation to their application to 
policy challenges provides an illustration of the mediating role of ideas between actors and 
political life. 
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Moreover, the SRA emphasises the cumulative nature of change and the extent to which strategic 
decisions rely in part on received wisdoms of ‘what works’ with relation to both policy and 
electoral strategy (discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Significantly, Hay states that these wisdoms 
and perceptions may turn out, in time, to have ‘systematically misrepresented’ what is required 
to fix a particular policy problem (2002: 211). Nonetheless, such ideas exert a significant impact 
on context as they are translated into policy actions, which then form a part of the policy 
landscape around welfare and frame future thinking and debate on the topic. The effect is a form 
of path-dependency, in which the ideas and actions of one government or administration have 
real implications for those following it. As such the decontestation of the concepts discussed in 
this chapter can be understood as precursors to policy change, developing after the Conservatives 
moved into government in 2010. In turn this impacts on the selective nature of the policy, 
political and economic context that is inhabited by both the PCP and other parties around it, 
serving to begin to embed certain ways of approaching policy problems while de-legitimising 
others.  
 
Chapter 3 suggested that it is not possible to draw a clear line between One Nation and 
Thatcherite Conservatism; the two traditions are best viewed as a continuum, although it is 
possible to make an analytical distinction based on their respective attitudes towards the 
interventionist welfare state. In the immediate post-war years, Conservative leaderships initially 
supported the welfare state as a means of maintaining social order and elevating the condition of 
the poor, two mutually supportive objectives. Thatcher’s supporters, in contrast, saw the over-
extension of the state that resulted from this as a source of disorder and decline. In Freeden’s 
terms, the extended state had become the ‘enemy’. This chapter considers four key concepts in 
Conservative welfare policy under Cameron: poverty (and welfare dependency), responsibility, 
compassion and fairness. It analyses the meaning that members of the PCP attach to these 
concepts and the extent to which these ideas are reflected by the leadership. The ideas are 
understood in relation to each other, with reference to One Nation and Thatcherite Conservatism, 
and to the specific circumstances in which the Party has found itself governing. Particular 
attention is paid to underlying perspectives and assumptions about the proper role of the state, 
since it is proposed that this is the key difference between One Nation and Thatcherite 
Conservatism.  
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The chapter suggests that as far as welfare policy is concerned, hostility towards the 
interventionist welfare system has become deeply embedded in the Conservative Party’s 
ideological outlook. It exerts a considerable hold over the PCP, exemplified in the widespread 
belief in the problem of ‘welfare dependency’, caused by what Conservatives perceive to be an 
overly generous and insufficiently challenging welfare system. It also underpins, in a more subtle 
form, the ideas emerging from the Party relating to the extension of the role of civil society 
organisations in providing welfare services. This hostility to the interventionist state is reflected 
in both the language of the leadership and their policy choices. Insofar as on-going state 
intervention is acceptable, this is largely limited to an authoritative, enforcing role. This reflects 
the extent to which Thatcherite perspectives have become embedded in the ideas informing 
Conservative approaches to the policy area and suggests that they will continue to exert a strong 
influence on Conservative strategic learning, 
 
As such, speculation that Cameron’s leadership might turn away from Thatcherism in this area 
has proven to be misjudged. The Party is struggling to develop an approach to social policy that 
can address both the challenging economic circumstances in which it finds itself in government, 
and the recognition that parts of the Thatcherite approach to welfare were less than adequate. 
However, it is doing so while heavily constrained by the anti-state ideology of Thatcherism.  
 
4.2 Poverty and welfare dependency 
Poverty is usually understood as either absolute, defined in relation to a basic standard of living, 
or relative – defined in relation to the wealth of others in society. Dorey (2010) and Hickson 
(2009) suggest that Thatcherite and One Nation Conservative social policies differ due to the 
concept of poverty that each uses. Thatcherism uses an absolute concept. Therefore Thatcherite 
welfare policy focused on the provision of a minimal safety net to meet minimal needs, defined 
at an individual level. Inequalities and the desire to better oneself were understood as crucial 
human motivations (Conservative Party, 1987): hence, anything beyond minimal provision 
would discourage these motivations, inhibiting self-sufficiency. This was accompanied by the 
theory that as long as the economy was growing, wealth would ‘trickle down’ from top to 
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bottom, effectively alleviating poverty without the need for government intervention.15 The 
extension of the welfare state to address poverty was therefore not only ideologically 
undesirable, but practically unnecessary as long as the markets were operating freely.  
 
In contrast, One Nation Conservatives initially embraced a relative concept. Unlike for social 
democrats, this was not due to a concern with egalitarianism. Rather it was a result of the 
perceived moral imperative of elevating the condition of the poor. This was in part owing to the 
social disruption that might occur should inequality become too great, and also so as to provide a 
Conservative counter to the disruption of the ‘natural’ hierarchy that might occur under more 
egalitarian schemes (Garnett, 2009; Hickson, 2009). Correspondingly, One Nation Conservatives 
saw a greater role for the state in managing poverty. The welfare state was conditionally 
supported as long as it played a positive role in preserving social order, of which levels of 
inequality were a part. One Nation Conservatism can therefore be characterised as a defence of 
existing inequality or ‘bounded’ inequality (Dorey, 2010; Hickson, 2009). Thatcherism, owing to 
the dismissal of relative poverty, renders increased inequality unproblematic, and any attempt to 
decrease it simply unnecessary and damaging. 
 
The Conservative Party initially appeared to have moved towards a relative conception of 
poverty under Cameron’s leadership. In a section on ‘economic dependency’ in the Social 
Justice Policy Group’s (SJPG) policy review, Duncan Smith stated that Conservatives needed to 
understand that ‘all forms of poverty, absolute and relative, must be dealt with’ (SJPG, 2006a: 
3). Launched by Cameron in 2006, the policy review drew extensively on New Labour’s 
language of social exclusion and the ‘social dislocation’ that poverty could cause, suggesting 
adherence to a relative concept. In the same year, Cameron appeared resolute in his conviction 
that Conservatives had misunderstood the nature of poverty in the 1980s. He stated: ‘we need to 
think of poverty in relative terms’, and ‘the Conservative Party recognises, will measure and will 
act on relative poverty’ (2006a). These announcements are an example of Cameron’s attempt to 
capitalize on the momentum gathered by his leadership campaign. Newly elected and garnering 
higher approval ratings than both his predecessors and, frequently, Tony Blair (Ipsos MORI, 
                                                 
15
 Even early in Thatcher’s time as a leader there were significant doubts over the efficacy of ‘trickle down’ as a 
means of reducing poverty: see Thornton et al., 1978 and Arndt, 1983.  
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2015a), Cameron was in a strong position to signal a departure from previous Conservative 
ideological mainstays. Reflecting this, the Conservatives also voted for the Child Poverty Act, 
which received Royal Assent in March 2010. This enshrined in law New Labour’s goals of 
eliminating child poverty by 2020, placing a duty on future Secretaries of State to meet four 
income-related relatively poverty targets in each subsequent year (Child Poverty Unit, 2010).  
 
The apparent shift towards relativity led Hickson to suggest that Cameron’s leadership heralded 
a revival of One Nation Conservatism, albeit one that is tinged with a ‘Thatcherite influence’ 
(2009: 360). However closer examination of the Party’s conception of poverty reveals that it 
differs from the One Nation Conservative conception of ‘bounded inequality’, based primarily 
around alleviating material deprivation (Dorey, 2010: 50). The Party also rejects large parts of 
New Labour’s somewhat redistributionist approach. Under Cameron, the Conservative Party 
began to develop and act upon a concept of poverty that does not fit easily within either a 
conventional ‘absolute’ or ‘relative’ understanding.  
 
Cameron’s Conservatives are far less accepting than One Nation Conservatives, Thatcherites, or 
New Labour of the centrality of income in poverty definitions. In government, Cameron 
appointed Labour’s Frank Field to chair the Review on Poverty and Life Chances which would 
‘examine the case for reform to poverty measures, in particular for the inclusion of non-financial 
elements’. In doing so, it would shed light on ‘the real causes of poverty’ (Cabinet Office, 2010: 
5). Chris Grayling, then Minister for Employment, remarked that Labour: ‘always talked about 
poverty simply in terms of money and seldom demonstrated a clear understanding of the far 
deeper problems that can leave so many people struggling’ (HC Hansard, 10 June 2010). Duncan 
Smith, returning to a theme articulated while he was still leader of the Party (2001), criticised 
income-related relative poverty targets and suggested that it is not enough to simply lift families 
above a ‘narrow’ 60% relative poverty threshold: ‘there must be some kind of change in their 
life, or they will risk slipping back’ (2012a). For Cameron’s Conservatives, the source of income 
matters. Duncan Smith holds a longstanding belief that ‘while income is important, we should be 
clear that the source of that income can have very different effects’ (2012a). Specifically: 
‘whether a person is working or in receipt of benefits matters, for the absence of work and 
subsequent benefit dependency are themselves a form of social exclusion’ (SJPG, 2006b: 18). 
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New Labour’s spending on welfare is therefore criticised on the basis that ‘they didn’t see the 
need to accompany real growth in support with a sense of getting people into work’ (Guto Bebb 
MP, private interview). Perceived weak work incentives in the welfare system and a lack of 
conditionality, combined with more extensive welfare support, had allowed ‘cultures of 
dependency’ to develop through which poverty is transmitted inter-generationally. Conversely, if 
parents work this ‘decreases the likelihood of future generations living in poverty and dependent 
on benefits’ and also ‘has the potential to increase their wage levels’ (SJPG, 2007a: 6). Duncan 
Smith linked this to the problem of poor social mobility amongst children born into poverty, 
claiming: ‘we’re trying to look at what are the causes of breakdown: not just money, but also the 
way that people live their lives’ (2006). Similarly, Grayling told the House: ‘children are already 
having their life chances and opportunities damaged by growing up in households and 
communities in which no one is working. That is what we are seeking to change’ (HC Hansard, 1 
February 2012a). In this understanding, poverty ceases to be caused by either low income (an 
absolute conception) or economic inequality (a relative conception): rather, dependency on the 
state is the root of the problem. As such, despite early moves to indicate a departure from 
Thatcherite perspectives, there was much in the detail for Thatcherite Conservatives to support. 
This allowed the leadership to maintain ideological authenticity, while simultaneously 
burnishing the ‘compassionate’ credentials that it had focused on developing in opposition. 
 
The idea that tackling welfare dependency is the key to managing poverty has significant 
implications for the Conservative perception of the role of the welfare system. Dependency on 
the state is, in itself, a form of poverty in the Conservative understanding. An acceptable system, 
therefore, is not necessarily one that adequately supports those who depend on it relative to the 
rest of society. Rather, it is one that is structured in such a way that it enables or pushes 
claimants away from its support as quickly and sustainably as possible. These two objectives – 
of supporting and enabling – would not be mutually exclusive, were it not for the Conservative 
perspective that generous support ‘traps’ claimants within the system and thereby perpetuates 
‘dependency poverty’. This idea has been widely articulated by the leadership. Duncan Smith’s 
assertions that Conservative reforms would bring about ‘the end of welfare as a trap’ and enable 
people to ‘get out of the web of dependency’ (2011a) are similar to comments by Cameron 
(2012), Osborne (HC Hansard, 26 March 2014) and Grayling (2010a). It is also widely shared 
across the PCP, as examples from the debates around the Welfare Reform Act (2012) and 
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Welfare Benefits Up-rating Bill (2013) (HC Hansard, 9 March 2011 and 8 January 2013a) and 
the statements of Conservative MPs, including Stuart Andrew, Guto Bebb, Robert Buckland, 
Philip Davies and Neil Carmichael (private interviews), illustrate. 
 
The view of welfare as a poverty trap is not confined to one ideological wing of the Party, even 
though it might be more easily identified with the Thatcherite tendency. Andrew, Buckland and 
Carmichael, for example, all self-identify as more centrist Conservatives.16 This illustrates how 
widespread the view of welfare provision as something to be avoided is across the Party, 
although the language it is expressed in differs (Buckland spoke about ‘the enabling agenda’ 
which would contribute to ‘getting people off dependency’, while Davies was concerned that the 
welfare state had ‘created an underclass of people who were never going to be in work’ [private 
interviews]). Wider attitudinal research on the Conservative Party under Cameron supports the 
contention that this perspective on the role of the welfare state is widespread. Post-2005 
Conservative MPs are more likely than their predecessors to believe that the state has an active 
role to play in ending dependency (Bochel and Defty, 2007: 7-9); however, the 2010 cohort in 
particular appear to often believe that ‘too much’ welfare stifles individual responsibility and 
initiative, encouraging unnecessarily dependent behaviour (Bochel and Defty, 2012). As 
Buckland observed (private interview):  
 
It’s interesting, because [Iain Duncan Smith] is perhaps more associated with a more 
right-wing tradition. It reminds me why, as Conservatives, we’ve probably got more in 
common than we’ve got against each other, which is why people like me can readily 
embrace what he’s doing and see it as part of a wider Tory tradition about not trying to 
do things for or to people, but trying to do things with people. 
 
This analysis of poverty and its causes is a version of the right-wing welfare dependency 
argument (Murray, 1984). Its clearest ideological heritage in Britain lies in the Thatcher 
government. Being out of work in this analysis is blamed on some level of individual choice. 
There are two main ways of understanding this. Firstly, as a deliberate decision to rely on 
welfare instead of working, suggesting moral turpitude: one senior backbencher who had served 
                                                 
16 Heppell’s (2013: 354) classification suggests that this self-identification is not out of step with the perspectives of 
the MPs concerned: Buckland is classified as ‘agnostic’ on social issues, while Carmichael and Andrew are both 
‘liberals’. 
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under Thatcher felt, for example, that ‘there is clearly fraud, and these people know much better 
how to play the system than people like you and me’. Claimants were ‘taking advantage of a 
system that is far too benign’ (private interview). Alternatively, in a more rational understanding, 
people might have become trapped due to generous benefit levels and unclear returns from 
working. As Grayling explained to the House: ‘If we are paying for people to live in a part of 
town that they could not afford to live in if they were in work, we are trapping them in a way that 
will prevent them from getting back to work’ (HC Hansard, 1 February 2012a). Despite these 
differences, the fundamental claim that poverty is not caused by absolute low income or 
inequality, but by dependency on the state, is similar in both cases. Being out of work, or not 
working enough hours, is equated with a choice that has been enabled by the system itself, rather 
than being a symptom of broader social disadvantage. In such an argument, the welfare state is 
viewed as more hindrance than help. 
 
The rejection of an exclusive conception of poverty as absolute sets the Conservatives under 
Cameron’s leadership somewhat apart from Thatcherism. However, it does not follow from this 
that the Party is returning to One Nation Conservatism. The Conservatives have begun to 
elucidate a concept of ‘relative poverty’ which minimises the role of income and economic 
inequality. However, economic inequality underpins conventional conceptions of relative 
poverty (Townsend, 1979: 31), including that of One Nation Conservatives. The Conservatives 
appear to believe that this should be heavily supplemented, at least, with indicators based on 
lifestyle ‘choices’ understood in either  moral or rational terms. It is therefore more accurate to 
say that the Party is attempting to move onto new ground. However, the ideas driving this 
redefinition, including the welfare dependency thesis and the idea of welfare as a trap, owe their 
political heritage to Thatcherism. Such arguments perceive an over-extended state mitigating 
against people making the right choices at an individual level. Through these arguments, two 
closely related further key concepts are brought into play: ‘responsibility’ and ‘compassion’. 
 
4.3 Responsibility 
The previous section outlined the Conservative belief that dependency on the state is a form of 
poverty. This section considers Conservative ideas on the causes of this dependency more 
closely. It is proposed that an extensive welfare system in which the state takes the role of a 
provider of both services and incomes undermines personal and social responsibility. This lack 
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of responsibility then leads people to remain dependent on the state, rather than supporting 
themselves and their communities. In turn, the proper role of the state is re-framed as an 
authority figure, enforcing responsible behaviour. 
 
The idea that a lack of responsibility is at the root of Britain’s problems is outlined in the 
Conservative narrative of the ‘broken’ or ‘atomised’ society (Cameron, 2009a). In his first 
speech as leader, Cameron identified a number of symptoms of the broken society, including 
welfare dependency (2005b). He proposed ‘two simple principles’ that would underpin efforts to 
fix these problems: ‘trusting people, and sharing responsibility’. ‘Responsibility’ was repeatedly 
invoked as a panacea for social ills over the following months (Cameron, 2006b; 2006c; 2006d; 
2007a; 2007b). These speeches were precursors to the central theme of the 2010 general election 
campaign, the ‘Big Society’, and the emphasis on responsibility underpinning this has continued 
as the Party moved into government (Cameron, cited in Price, 2010; Cameron, 2011b; 2011c). 
Even as the Big Society theme has floundered, encouraging responsible behaviour through 
welfare reform has remained a central goal, largely because of its importance in ensuring 
fairness. 
 
The literature devoted to fleshing out the Conservative conception of responsibility contains 
clear critiques of both the extension of the state under New Labour and the individualism of the 
Thatcher years. Examples of this are offered by Phillip Blond, founder of the centre-right think-
tank ResPublica; Danny Krugar, Cameron’s former policy advisor and Jesse Norman MP, 
elected in 2010. All three are critical of the effects of a large, centralised state; Norman’s critique 
is the most succinct. Under New Labour, the state had ‘a direct relationship with all British 
citizens and residents’, such that ‘almost all [would] contribute to taxation and a majority 
[would] receive some form of financial support’ (2006: 10). British society was therefore ‘over-
wedded’ to the state (2006: 17). This led to the development of an ‘enterprise society’ whereby 
the function of government is to achieve particular social objectives. In respect of welfare, this 
meant addressing poverty and inequality. In such an enterprise society, government can ‘never 
rest easy, for nothing is ever as good as it could be, and so there will always be scope for state 
intervention to improve it’ (2006: 38-9). The primary responsibility of citizens within such a 
state is to contribute to achieving the overall goal through paying taxes. Norman contends that 
this prioritisation of ‘vertical’ responsibility overwhelms the ‘horizontal’ connections between 
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people that sustain civil society. Practically, this leads to the ‘crowding out’ of civil society 
organisations (Corbett and Walker, 2013). The Conservative argument draws on the idea that 
these are not only more effective in providing welfare services (SJPG, 2007b), but essential in 
maintaining the sense of mutuality and social responsibility that underpins a strong, cohesive 
society. 
 
For Blond and Krugar, individualism as well as the state shares some of the blame for the decline 
of civil society. Blond contends that it is modern liberal beliefs in the ‘social primacy of the 
individual and their right to choose’ which have contributed to a situation where civic and social 
responsibilities and obedience to social norms – including the decision to work – have become 
subordinate (2009: 76-77). He identifies Thatcherite economic beliefs within this: by ‘endorsing 
an extreme individualism’, Thatcherism is accused of having unwittingly ‘undermined and 
destroyed the very associative traditions that are the only protection against the state’ (2009: 
126). For Krugar, while the Conservatives achieved some impressive results with the economy in 
the 1980s, the decade also saw a trend of ‘social desertification’, whereby ‘hundreds’ of local 
institutions, the family and civil society were eroded ‘by the cult of individual freedom’ (2007: 
2-3). The lack of social responsibility is therefore understood as being as much a problem of 
individualism as it is a result of the expansive state, since the former has undermined the civil 
society organisations that protect against the latter. Norman interprets the Thatcherite social 
legacy somewhat differently. Thatcher’s ‘selective retrenchment’ of the state is framed as a vital 
precursor to bringing about the Big Society and greater emphasis on personal and social 
responsibility, but Norman maintains that Britain was still under a ‘statist consensus’ under 
Thatcher and New Labour (Corbett and Walker, 2013: 457; Norman, 2006: 8-10). This implies 
that there was more to achieve in this respect than Thatcher managed. 
 
Cameron has drawn heavily on some of these ideas in outlining the Party’s conception of 
responsibility. He has suggested that the cause of the broken society is the welfare state. 
Speaking on the Big Society in 2009, he argued that up until around the late 1960s, the 
expansion of the welfare state had been ‘not only well-intentioned…but generally successful’. 
However, even in this period, ‘some state extensions helped to tackle poverty, [while] others 
were less effective’ (2009b). What determined their success was the emphasis on personal 
responsibility and mutuality, as some reforms tackled poverty ‘while encouraging responsibility 
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and local pride [while] at the same time, others undermined these virtues’. Skipping over the 
1980s, Cameron then stated that Blair and Brown presided over the most significant extension of 
the welfare state since the post-war years. New Labour had dramatically increased welfare 
spending, but this had failed to have the intended effect on poverty and deprivation, illustrated by 
the Conservative critique of New Labour’s income-based concept of relative poverty. This led 
Cameron to pose a number of questions concerning the state’s role in tackling poverty and 
inequality: 
 
How is it possible for the state to spend so much money, to devote so much energy, to 
fighting poverty – only for poverty and inequality to win the fight?  Within that broad 
question, however, lies a more nuanced and perhaps more interesting one. Not so much: 
‘why has the state failed to tackle poverty?’ but: ‘why has the state more recently failed 
to tackle poverty?’ We know that for a long period of time, up until the late 1960s, the 
state was broadly effective at tackling poverty and reducing inequality. So why did the 
state start becoming broadly ineffective? (2009) 
 
The answer is that an extended state had undermined the sense of responsibility felt by 
individuals to support themselves, their families and their communities. It thereby undermined 
the institutions of social support which were integral to society. Cameron highlighted the malign 
influence of a welfare state conceived in a time when ‘there was an ethos, a culture to our 
country – of self-improvement, of mutuality, of responsibility’. This had given way to a ‘culture 
of entitlement’ to state support, in which there is ‘less expectation to take 
responsibility…Because today the state is ever-present: either doing it for you, or telling you 
how to do it, or making sure you’re doing it their way’ (2009). The welfare state has therefore 
directly contributed to social breakdown and the development of a ‘something for nothing’ 
society in which individuals have little regard for their social responsibilities, including the 
moral responsibility to work.  
 
Cameron therefore defined the Conservative conception of ‘responsibility’ in opposition to 
another implicit interpretation, which is similar to Norman’s ‘enterprise society’. The ‘big state’ 
that is the object of criticism is not self-funding. Its systems, including welfare provision, are 
partially funded by individual tax payments. The cruder end of Conservative rhetoric states that 
welfare recipients are not making a ‘fair’ contribution to this. However, as Norman notes, almost 
all citizens will contribute to the state though taxation and a high proportion will also receive 
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some sort of financial support in return through the welfare system (2006: 10). Paying taxes 
could therefore be understood as the fulfilment of responsibility in the relationship between the 
individual and the state. However, Cameron, following Blond, Krugar and Norman, also claims 
that this neglects the question of individuals’ responsibilities towards each other; towards civil 
society. This is the central understanding of ‘responsibility’ as it applies to welfare within the 
Big Society (Kisby, 2010: 486). 
 
It follows from this that the state needs to withdraw, creating space for civil society to flourish. 
This is a key theme of the Big Society. For Conservatives, the responsibility to pay taxes and 
receive support in return (a ‘New Labour’ conception) sits uneasily alongside the responsibility 
to support oneself and provide support to one another in the Big Society. Owing to the belief in 
welfare dependency inhibiting self-sufficiency, the state/individual and individual/society 
relationships must be conceived with a zero-sum mentality. The prioritisation of ‘responsibility’ 
as moral obligation leaves little room for state welfare provision, since if the state does not 
withdraw then this moral responsibility will continue to be undermined.  
 
Given the attitude to the state inherent in this view, it is unsurprising that a number of analyses 
suggest that the Big Society narrative, with the conceptualisation of what ‘responsibility’ is 
within it, reflects the ideology of a Conservative Party that is still heavily influenced by 
Thatcherism (Corbett and Walker, 2013; Williams, 2012; Scott, 2011; Kisby, 2010; Smith, 
2010). The concern with ‘hollowing out’ the state is not easily reconciled with One Nation 
Conservatism. There is evidence of drawing on different ideological strands within the Big 
Society narrative – for example, the Burkean conception of ‘little platoons’, as Norman suggests, 
in invoking a stronger role for civil society. As far as this applies to welfare, however, the 
emphasis has largely been on the ‘vigorous values’ of moral responsibility to work and self-
sufficiency (Letwin, 1992), over an emphasis on community support and engagement. The 
narrative, not dissimilar to Thatcher’s statement, is that individuals are responsible for managing 
their own welfare needs wherever possible: the cost of this should not fall to society to pick up. 
 
In addition to this, there is also the question of the extent to which the Conservative Party has 
engaged with the criticisms of the effect of Thatcherite policies on responsibility and mutuality 
in British society, and hence in driving dependency on the welfare state, put forward on the 
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centre-right by Krugar and Blond (see above). Cameron has been generally unwilling to engage 
with these criticisms: for example, he simply avoided the issue in his ‘Big Society’ speech, cited 
at the beginning of this section, jumping from the late 1960s to 1997. Garnett (2009: 110-111) 
notes that Cameron has criticised Thatcher’s supporters for having ‘lost sight’ of the effects that 
her economic policies were having on society. Yet this is not a criticism of Thatcherite ideas on 
society per se: it is a criticism of their application and of a failure to keep pace with change. The 
leadership’s failure to engage with this aspect of the Thatcher legacy supports the idea that 
despite significant rhetorical differences, the Conservatives under Cameron are not so much 
rejecting Thatcher’s approach to social policy, as much as asserting that ‘things have moved on 
since Margaret Thatcher’s “magnificent achievements”’ (Bale, 2008: 283; see also Bale, 2009; 
Evans, 2008; 2010; Lee, 2009). The Party would preserve what it saw as the best of Thatcher’s 
achievements – rescuing the economy and ushering in a free-market economic consensus – while 
also turning its attention to the social problems which Thatcherism (and New Labour) had failed 
to resolve. Crucially in the modern Conservative conception, as suggested in Cameron’s Hugo 
Young speech (2009b) these were problems that existed before Thatcherism, not because of. The 
solution is a more careful and thorough application of Thatcherite ideas on how the state can 
promote self-sufficiency which had been somewhat neglected during the 1980s owing to the 
Thatcher governments’ economic priorities. This application is discussed further in the following 
section, on ‘compassion’. As such, in this conception, Cameron’s party strongly echoes the 
concerns and prescriptions of the New Right. 
 
4.4 Compassion 
Perhaps more than any of the other three concepts, the Conservative use of the concept of 
‘compassion’ within welfare policy is controversial.  A criticism of the notions of responsibility 
and poverty outlined above is that they are ‘essentially punitive’ and ‘[betray] classic signs of 
“blaming the victim”’ (Lister and Bennett, 2010: 102). The claim that the welfare state 
encourages irresponsibility means that individual claimants are also framed as irresponsible. 
Although some leading Conservatives, such as Duncan Smith, tend to prefer to imply that it is 
‘the system’ that traps people in dependency, it is easy to equate this insufficient drive to remove 
oneself, and hence with personal failings.  A similar criticism can be made of the narratives 
around fairness outlined below. George Osborne has aligned the Conservatives with ‘the shift 
worker, leaving home in the dark hours of the early morning’, contrasted with ‘the closed blinds 
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of their next door neighbour sleeping off a life on benefits’, again implying that laziness and 
individual choice is a factor. This is then used to legitimate increasingly conditional and coercive 
policies (Mabbett, 2013). 
 
For some, these issues have proven difficult to reconcile with the idea of ‘compassionate 
conservatism’, which has been declared ‘dead’ more than once during Cameron’s leadership. It 
is often cited as a casualty of the move into government and subsequent decision to elevate 
reducing public spending over all other priorities (Wright, 2012; Stewart, 2012; Clegg, cited in 
Mason, 2013), and some Conservative MPs have also expressed discomfort with the Party’s 
rhetoric on welfare claimants (Buckland, private interview; Vickers, cited in Mason, 2012; 
Wollaston, cited in Eaton, 2013). This critique intensified in government, since a more 
instrumental approach to welfare and public spending appears to have overwhelmed some of the 
‘softer’, more community-focused aspects of the Party’s approach. These proved challenging to 
implement alongside substantial budget reductions, resulting in a stronger emphasis on 
individual responsibilities (Corbett and Walker, 2013; Williams, 2012). This reflects the 
challenges of shifting between opposition and government and the extent to which this may 
inhibit the implementation of less developed and embedded ideas. However, leading 
Conservatives have continued to assert that the Conservative welfare agenda is focused around a 
concept of compassion that is defined in opposition to Labour’s (Cameron, 2011a; Duncan 
Smith, 2014; 2013; 2011b). As such it is claimed that this concept is congruent with the policies 
and goals of the Coalition’s welfare reforms.  
 
‘Compassion’ as a component of British Conservative welfare policy is relatively under-
explored, although some of the broader literature on the ideological outlook of Cameron’s party 
touches upon this (Hayton, 2012b; Beech, 2009; Driver, 2009; Dorey, 2007). There is somewhat 
more literature that looks at compassionate conservatism in America, of which welfare policy 
was a key part (Béland and Wadden, 2007). The criticisms made of American compassionate 
conservatism are very similar to those made of its British incarnation;17 specifically, regarding 
whether ‘compassionate conservatism’ can be called ‘compassionate’ at all and, if so, how it can 
                                                 
17
 A comprehensive comparison between British and American compassionate Conservatism is outside of the scope 
of this chapter: however, discussions of the context and content of the American incarnation are provided by Ashbee 
(2000) and Teles (2011).  
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remain ‘conservative’ (Pilbeam, 2010). This provides a starting point for understanding what 
‘compassion’ might mean to Conservatives. Pilbeam (2010: 252) suggests that there is a ‘world 
of difference’ between what compassion means in every day usage, and what it means within 
conservatism. ‘Compassionate conservatism’ can therefore be understood not as an attempt to 
tack a ‘conventional’ understanding of compassion onto conservatism, but as an attempt to 
redefine compassion such that it fits with other concepts in Conservative ideology. There are 
therefore two interrelated tasks here, which arise because of the way that concepts are 
understood relationally within ideologies. Conservatives must propose not only a ‘compassionate 
Conservatism’ that is concerned with issues not conventionally associated with Conservatives, 
but also define ‘Conservative compassion’ (Montgomerie, 2004: 9-14).  
 
The Conservative concept of compassion is developed from the critique of New Labour’s 
poverty and social exclusion strategy. Conservatives contend that New Labour’s goals of 
resolving poverty and thereby improving social justice were not lacking compassion in 
themselves; the problem is that New Labour equated ‘compassion’ with ‘pouring money into 
projects so they are seen to be doing something’ (Duncan Smith 2012b; see also Osborne, 
2010a). The suggestion is that this allowed New Labour to seem compassionate. For example, 
John Penrose suggested: ‘everyone had assumed [before the financial crisis] that the state had a 
monopoly on compassion and a monopoly on virtue’ (private interview). However this was not 
backed up by results, as the SJPG’s research has sought to illustrate. Pilbeam points out that 
Charles Murray argued that this was precisely why being ‘compassionate’ was a poor basis for 
public policy (see Murray, 1992). Within such a conception, ‘compassion equates to a relatively 
straightforward idea of giving, in the sense of bestowing more resources or more protections 
upon the poor and the needy’ (Pilbeam, 2010: 261). Usually, these resources are bestowed by the 
state, in line with an egalitarian conception of fairness. This sits uneasily with Conservatives 
who are suspicious of state intervention because it necessitates the acceptance of a more statist 
approach to provision. This throws up the prospect of the over-extended state disrupting the 
‘natural’ social order. It is also very problematic in a time when cutting spending is a priority. 
 
The key contribution of American compassionate conservatives to this debate is the suggestion 
that this assumption is based on a misreading of what ‘compassion’ is. The current dominant 
concept is ‘corrupt’ (Olasky, 1992: 5). Olasky, an advisor to George W. Bush, argued that 
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contemporary approaches to resolving poverty were split between arguing that ‘the free market 
itself solves all problems of poverty’ and a more conventional approach that emphasises 
government intervention. Neither is adequate, since both ignore the ‘crucial role of truly 
compassionate individuals and groups in the long fight against poverty’ (1992: 4). For Olasky, 
the roots of the concept of compassion are embodied in the values of church groups, whose 
better-off members provided ‘hard-headed but warm-hearted’ support to those in poverty, prior 
to the introduction of a modern welfare state with an emphasis on cash transfers (1992: 8). For 
these groups, compassion was not simply ‘giving’, but providing personal support or ‘suffering 
with’ those in poverty (Pilbeam, 2010). As such, while an emphasis on giving cash and 
egalitarianism paradoxically created a society in which the better-off are able to lead lives 
increasingly separated from those in poverty, an emphasis on this community aspect of providing 
poverty relief could lead to a more integrated society. This would then help to resolve issues 
resulting from social dislocation.  
 
Norman insists that British compassionate Conservatism is ‘entirely different from the 
compassionate conservatism of George W. Bush’ (2006: 3). However, it is difficult not to see 
similarities in the ideas behind the two. One Conservative backbench MP suggested that within 
conservatism, compassion is ‘not the compassion of pity, it’s the compassion of fellow feeling 
and institutional identities. It’s the feeling of being joined together in society’, and: ‘it focuses on 
the idea of empowering individuals and empowering institutions that lie between the state and 
the individual’ (private interview). Cameron echoes Olasky’s suspicion of the state’s ability to 
provide any useful sort of compassion, criticising Gordon Brown’s approach to poverty by 
stating that it was ‘straight out of the big government textbook’, relying too much on ‘the state 
handing out means-tested benefits on a vast scale […] The state running programmes to get 
people into work […] The state developing ever more complex rules, processes and initiatives, 
but still leaving people and families behind’ (2006e). He went on to criticise ‘big bureaucracies’ 
which ‘terrify’ people, without ‘reaching out a helping hand’ to them. The CSJ and Duncan 
Smith have strongly advocated the role of civil society and voluntary organisations delivering 
welfare services (SJPG, 2007b). This is justified through a similar line of reasoning to the 
American claim. It is via these groups that the ‘human element’ of compassion is reintroduced 
into the system. The emphasis on responsibility suggests that it is ultimately this human element 
that will ‘mend our broken society’ (Conservative Party, 2010: iii).  
107 
  
 
 
This concept of compassion has implications for welfare claimants. The critique of the welfare 
system leads easily down the ‘welfare dependency’ route, and the main potential policy 
implications are greater conditionality in the receipt of benefits, and limiting benefit payments. 
Both of these can be framed as ‘compassionate’ according to the Conservative understanding. 
This is firstly simply because ‘if the state is the means we use to pay for our health, welfare and 
education, then we can expect it to take an interest in how we are doing’ (Norman, 2006: 61). It 
is an example of how Conservatives seek to reassert the responsibilities of claimants in their 
relationships with the state. However, it is also because in this conception it is not compassionate 
to allow people to remain claiming benefits ‘without any checks or balances’ against it (Streeter, 
private interview). Encouraging (or pushing) claimants away from the welfare system is framed 
as a matter of social justice.  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this part of the ‘compassionate conservatism’ narrative is popular with 
the right of the Party. For example, Davies stated that ‘keeping people trapped on a benefit 
system that they can’t get out of because if they do they’re risking too much, is not 
compassionate in my opinion’ (private interview).  A fellow senior backbencher on the right 
emphasised that compassionate conservatism ‘is a conservatism whose compassion is to 
understand the need, the desirability, of taking people off welfare. They can stand on their own 
two feet’ (private interview). These perspectives have been echoed by those at the top of the 
Party: for example, Duncan Smith compared reforming welfare to struggling against slavery, 
speaking of helping claimants to ‘break free’ (cited in Holehouse, 2014), ensuring that no one is 
‘written off’ to indefinite welfare dependency (Duncan Smith, 2011b).  
 
There is significant overlap between the usage and understanding of concepts of ‘responsibility’ 
and ‘compassion’. The idea that it is compassionate to get people to ‘stand on their own two feet’ 
relates to the positive outcomes associated with self-sufficiency, defined as responsible 
behaviour.. In this sense, through the broad view that indefinite state support is not positive or 
desirable, and through supporting an ideal of self-sufficiency and independence, ‘compassion’ 
also falls towards the Thatcherite end of the spectrum. However, compassion also implies a more 
active role for the both the state, and wider society, in moving people towards independence than 
is envisaged in a straightforward ‘rolling back’ approach. It is not assumed that the withdrawal 
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of the state will necessarily force people into independence. Rather, there is a place within this 
conception for a welfare system that places significant expectations and conditions on those who 
receive support from it. The emphasis on compassion could be understood as the more 
thoughtful application of Thatcherite ideas on the moral obligation towards self-sufficiency, as 
well as helping to further define the proper boundaries of what Conservatives believe that state 
should, and should not, provide. The individual freedom of claimants is viewed as subordinate to 
their responsibilities to fulfil their moral obligations to society, notably working and supporting 
themselves. The state therefore has an on-going role to play in ensuring that claimants are doing 
their best to meet these obligations. The role that the state should play is discussed further in the 
following section. 
 
4.5 Fairness 
‘Real fairness’ is the final key value underpinning the Conservative approach to welfare. 
Following 2008’s Unfair Britain (Conservative Party, 2008a), fairness became a central theme in 
the 2010 Conservative manifesto. The Party claimed it would create ‘a welfare system that is fair 
and firm’ (Conservative Party, 2010: 16); that their economic policy would be ‘founded on a 
determination that wealth and opportunity must be more fairly distributed’, and that they ‘would 
not allow the poorest people in Britain to pay for the mistakes of some of the richest’ 
(Conservative Party, 2010: viii). A concern with ‘fairness’ was ubiquitous in the three major 
parties’ 2010 manifestos: Labour promised ‘a future fair for all’ (Labour Party, 2010), while the 
Liberal Democrats pledged to introduce ‘fair taxes’, ‘a fair chance for every child’, ‘a fair future; 
creating jobs by making Britain greener’ and ‘a fair deal by cleaning up politics’ (Liberal 
Democrats, 2010). The Conservative concept of fairness can be understood in relation to its ideas 
on poverty, responsibility and compassion.  
 
There are two main ways that the idea of ‘fairness’ in welfare delivery can be interpreted. Firstly, 
there is a needs-based conception, suggesting that the purpose of the welfare system is to support 
those who are unable to support themselves. A fair system is one which looks after vulnerable 
people, or those designated ‘in need’ of support. In such an understanding there may be an 
implicit concern with egalitarianism and relativity, encompassed in the idea that there is a level 
beneath which living standards should not be allowed to fall. There is a duty on the state to 
maintain this, and a duty on those who are capable of supporting themselves to do so. Secondly, 
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there is a desert-based conception where support from the state is contingent on building up 
entitlements, usually operationalised through a contribution-based system: for example, social 
security payments provide protection against unemployment. In this conception ‘fairness’ is 
based on earned entitlement (getting ‘something for something’) or being otherwise designated 
as entitled to support (for example, through disability). An unconditional needs-based approach 
is highly problematic from a welfare dependency perspective, because a central claim of this is 
that unconditional systems beget dependency through undermining self-reliance and 
responsibility. In contrast, a contribution-based approach initially looks like it might provide a 
good fit with Conservative ideas on welfare. It would reward and incentivise work as a 
responsible behaviour. However, there are major issues which mean that a fully contributory 
approach is incompatible with other key Conservative ideas on the proper size and form of the 
welfare state.  
 
Conservatives define fairness principally in opposition to New Labour, whose conception is 
characterised as needs-based and concerned with achieving greater equality in terms of income 
(Conservative Party 2008a: 2). Conservatives argue that this measurement is too narrow. They 
found common ground with their coalition partners on this: Nick Clegg claimed that the 
Coalition’s understanding of fairness is ‘a more complex concept […] than has been prevalent in 
policy-making in recent years. According to the narrower model used by the previous 
government, greater fairness is measured by snapshot comparisons of income alone’ (Clegg, 
2011). The critique of fairness therefore begins from a similar place to the critique of New 
Labour’s relative poverty measures. These are linked through the assertion that, even on this 
narrow definition, New Labour has not made substantial progress towards meeting its targets 
(Conservative Party, 2008a: 2-5), necessitating a change of approach. There are two lines of 
argument here. In the first, Conservatives contend that in focusing on ensuring ‘fairness’ for 
claimants (conceived in terms of boosting incomes), New Labour neglected to ensure that the 
system was also fair to those who fund it. In the second, Conservatives contend that the focus on 
incomes rather than more holistic measures to address dependency is unfair to claimants 
themselves. This links fairness with compassion. Together, these arguments make up the claim 
that Labour has only attempted to deliver a ‘phony fairness’, in comparison to the Conservatives’ 
‘real fairness’ (Cameron, 2011a). 
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Reflecting the first argument, Duncan Smith stated that there are two imperatives driving 
Conservative welfare reform: ensuring ‘fairness for the jobseeker’ as well as ‘fairness for the 
taxpayer’ (2011a). He stated: ‘I will always fight for fairness for people who have fallen on hard 
times. I will always fight for fairness for the very vulnerable. But fairness must be a two-way 
street. I’m determined that people who pay their taxes into this welfare state get a fair deal too’ 
(2010).  Similarly, Grayling claimed that the Welfare Reform Act would ‘deliver fairness to 
claimants, and the taxpayers who fund the system’ (HC Hansard, 1 February 2012a), and linked 
fairness to the ‘payment by results’ aspect of the Work Programme, stating: ‘not only will this be 
fairer to those receiving help, it will also be fairer to the taxpayer as it will be paid for by long-
term results’ (2010b). This argument is delivered through the narrative of ‘something for 
nothing’ for those who are dependent on welfare, and ‘nothing for something’ for those who 
fund them. 
 
The rhetoric on the divide between ‘benefit claimants’ who receive ‘something for nothing’ and 
the ‘taxpayers’ or ‘hardworking people’ who fund them typically draws a sharp line between the 
two.18 The Conservatives then position themselves on the side of ‘the people who told [us] they 
were sick of going out to work knowing their neighbours were on benefits, but had no intention 
of getting a job’ (Cameron, 2011a), or ‘the family on average wages living in houses they can 
only just afford…[Who] see their taxes go to pay for an unemployed family living in a house 
costing £100,000 in rent’ (Duncan Smith, 2010). Duncan Smith continued: 
 
Most people in this country don’t wake up early in the dark and the cold, and head to 
their job in order for the state to take their money and waste it. They don’t slump, 
exhausted in their chair after work, just to see their taxes spent on people who can work 
but won’t. 
 
Although this is undoubtedly an important element of the Party’s electoral positioning (see 
following chapter), there are deeper ideas here which illuminate the concept of fairness, and the 
importance of responsibility in delivering this to taxpayers. Conservatives claim that those who 
do meet their responsibilities by working and supporting themselves are not adequately rewarded 
and recognised for this. In contrast, an unconditional needs-based conception of fairness has led 
                                                 
18 In practice, this line is much less clear, as Hills (2015) illustrates. 
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to the state supporting those who have behaved irresponsibly. This encourages further 
irresponsible behaviour. As such, Cameron stated: ‘for too long, we’ve lived in an upside down 
world where people who do the right thing, the responsible thing, are taxed and punished, 
whereas those who do the wrong thing are rewarded’ (2011b). Delivering ‘fairness for the 
taxpayer’ is therefore equated not with egalitarianism, but with reward for effort. It is a desert-
based concept, suggesting that support from the welfare state should not be considered an 
automatic entitlement, but something that must be earned through meeting social responsibilities. 
 
The second line of argument focuses on delivering fairness to claimants. The Party has 
advocated moving towards a conception of fairness that is congruent with their understanding of 
poverty and compassion, claiming that fairness is not delivered through greater income transfers 
but through delivering greater support to those in need. The first consequence of this is the 
critique of the state programmes delivering support, which are charged with being inefficient and 
ineffective. This is then related to arguments around responsibility and compassion which 
suggest that ‘top down’ state programmes are inherently ill-suited to providing this support, so 
the solution is a greater transfer of powers to organisations outside of the state.  
 
A second consequence is a critique of conditionality within the welfare system. This is where the 
‘active state’ implied in the conception of compassion comes in.  Conservatives have been keen 
to emphasise that they will continue to support claimants who are ‘very vulnerable’, ‘in the 
greatest need’ (Duncan Smith, 2010) or ‘genuinely disabled’ (Cameron, 2012a), but have 
claimed that the system is doing others a great disservice. New Labour’s approach, it is 
suggested, allowed the ‘hard to help […] to wither away’ thus failing to ‘help individuals make 
the most of their lives’ (Grayling, 2010b), and the benefit system at present has left claimants 
‘effectively institutionalised’ (Freud, 2013). The criticism of New Labour is therefore not as 
straightforward as it initially seemed: it is not a criticism of needs-based welfare as such, rather it 
is a criticism of unconditional, or insufficiently conditional, needs-based welfare. A sufficiently 
conditional approach, focused on providing intensive practical support for those ‘in need’ is 
acceptable, since it is framed as the most responsible and compassionate way of moving 
claimants out of dependency. This, in turn, would deliver fairness or ‘social justice’ to claimants, 
while also reducing the economic burden on the taxpayer. 
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It can therefore be seen that there are two conceptions of fairness operating within the 
Conservative Party. The first, ‘fairness for taxpayers’, suggests that fairness is based on desert. It 
is unfair to taxpayers to have to support those who are not contributing to the system, while 
receiving inadequate recompense themselves. This concept focuses on the cost of welfare, as 
well as the assertion of a moral responsibility to work. It seems to lead logically towards a more 
contribution-based system. The second, ‘fairness for claimants’, is focused more on the 
behavioural impact of the welfare system. This conception suggests that a needs-based approach 
could be viable as long as the welfare system is sufficiently conditional so as to promote a sense 
of mutuality. Support is dependent on claimants ‘[following] through on their side of the 
bargain’ with regard to looking for work (Conservative Party, 2009: 12). This would help protect 
against, or discourage dependency. 
 
However, there is a tension between advocating a more contributory and a more needs-based 
approach. As one group of new MPs, dubbed the ‘New New Right’ (Lakin, 2014) note in 
relation to a needs-based system, ‘the more we support the poor, the harder it is to remain fair to 
those who have remained in work’. However, they also note that contributory systems, whilst 
seeming to address this imbalance, are both expensive and represent an undesirable extension of 
state welfare provision (Kwarteng et al., 2011: 84). Kayte Lawton, a Senior Research Fellow for 
the IPPR, noted that the Conservatives have ‘a real split’ between the majority ‘traditional 
Conservative view of residualising and means-testing, and it’s just for the vulnerable, and other 
people can make their own private arrangements’ and ‘a minority of people who think 
contributory benefits are important’ (private interview). Labour Work and Pensions select 
committee member Sheila Gilmour similarly suspected that ‘a lot of people in the Government, 
and a lot of the Government backbenchers, see [welfare] provision as being very much a safety 
net, very much being there for those who they would say are “most in need”’ (private interview). 
Committee Chair Dame Anne Begg concurred with this view (private interview).  
 
Some Conservatives have expressed support for a contributory approach. Penrose suggested that 
one of the main problems with the welfare system as it relates to both fairness and supporting 
responsibility is: ‘we have effectively – and not just in the last Labour government, but over 
several generations – got away from anything to do with the contributory principle’ (private 
interview). However, as the evidence above suggests, this seems to be very much a minority 
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view. In any case, it would require an extremely ambitious reform programme at a time when the 
Conservatives are already enacting a significant set of reforms that emphasise not contribution, 
but need. In government therefore the leadership has taken a needs-based approach to ensuring 
fairness, simultaneously increasing conditionality and seeking to limit who is perceived as being 
‘in need’. Explaining how the leadership has arrived at this resolution requires considering all 
four of the key ideas driving policy in relation to one another, while also bearing in mind the 
practicalities of institutional reform. 
 
4.6 The same old Tories? 
Interpretations of the relationship between the ideology of Cameron’s Conservative Party and 
past Conservative traditions vary. One possibility is that Cameron’s leadership represents a sharp 
break with Thatcherism and, perhaps, with conservatism itself. For Beech (2011: 268; 2015), the 
approach to social issues by the Conservatives under Cameron ‘can be accurately summarized as 
a social liberal outlook’, reflecting a departure from social conservatism. Given that economic 
liberalism is a feature of Thatcherism, this would leave the Party ‘conservative’ in name only. 
Dorey (2007: 139) partially concurs: Cameron aimed to rebrand the Party as ‘more socially 
liberal and inclusive in its ideological orientation and policies’, although a ‘conservative’ outlook 
is maintained through a focus on ‘compassionate’, ‘progressive’ or ‘liberal’ conservatism. 
Moreover, Dorey offers a number of areas in which Cameron apologised for Thatcher’s policies, 
including using Scottish citizens as ‘guinea pigs’ for the Poll Tax and the treatment of public 
sector workers, as well as examples of rhetorical departures. Cameron’s remark that ‘there is 
such a thing as society; it’s just not the same thing as the state’ is a notable example, which is 
interpreted as rejecting Thatcher’s infamous statement (2007: 142-145). Garnett (2009) similarly 
detects in Cameron’s party some regret for the effects of Thatcherism. Bale (2008) and Evans 
(2009; 2008) further suggest that Cameron attempted to move on from Thatcherism, without 
explicitly repudiating it. In all of these accounts, there is a suggestion that, in some way, 
Cameron sought to ‘draw a line’ (whether ideologically substantive or not) under the Thatcher 
years. 
 
Some of Cameron’s backbenchers have agreed with this broad characterisation. Robert 
Buckland, Vice-President of the Tory Reform Group which seeks to promote the values of One 
Nation Conservatism within the Party, stated that he believes that the leadership and ‘most of the 
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cabinet’ share a commitment to One Nation ideals.19 Cameron’s leadership, he suggested, 
‘allowed the Conservative Party to return to one of the strongest themes on which it evolved, 
which was to elevate the condition of the people […] We’re going back to that rich theme within 
the Party’ (private interview). Andrew Tyrie (2006) speculated that One Nation Conservatism 
might be recast under Cameron, given his early indications of the direction in which he wanted 
to lead the Party. Kwasi Kwarteng referred to the association between One Nation Conservatism, 
pragmatism and the acceptance of a conception of social hierarchy in legitimating political 
leaders, chiming with Dorey’s conception of One Nation and stating that Cameron is ‘very much 
an old Tory pragmatist, by his schooling and his background. I think frankly, in terms of his 
outlook, he’s very much part of that old established class’ (private interview). Outside of the 
parliamentary party, Blond (2012) suggested that in 2005 it looked like Cameron would move 
the Conservatives away from the ‘reductive market liberalism’ that he suggested had 
characterised Thatcherite policy, towards a ‘new one nation approach to Britain’s problems’. 
 
However, the leadership has also sought to emphasise its Thatcherite credentials. In response to 
criticism from Lord Tebbit that the Conservatives under Cameron were abandoning Thatcherism, 
George Osborne stated that ‘of course we are successors of the Thatcher inheritance’. He 
qualified this by claiming that ‘I don't think in the 21st century you can win a general election 
simply by playing the old tunes of the 1980s…Margaret Thatcher had the answers for her time; 
David Cameron has the answers for his time’ (cited in Sylvester and Thomson, 2007). Cameron 
expressed an ambition to be ‘as radical a social reformer as Margaret Thatcher was an economic 
reformer’, pledging to ‘mend Britain’s broken society’ just as Thatcher had mended the ‘broken 
economy’ in the 1980s (quoted in Jones, 2008). While the leadership was undoubtedly mindful 
of the need to retain the support of ideologically Thatcherite members and supporters, there 
seems to be more than political expediency at play here. As discussed, both the problems that 
Cameron’s Conservatives (and Cameron himself) have identified with regard to welfare and the 
state, and the proposed solutions, owed much to the New Right. Given Cameron’s own political 
background (Evans, 2010) and his conviction that the Conservatives had won the ‘battle of ideas’ 
                                                 
19
 Beech (2009: 21) refutes this, arguing that ‘despite the continued activities of the Tory Reform Group, One Nation 
Conservatism is not a force in the parliamentary Conservative Party’. 
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during the 1980s, exemplified in the existence of New Labour (see Chapter 5), it would have 
been a strange move to then seek to dispense with those ideas entirely. 
 
In some respects, the Conservative approach to welfare appears to draw more on New Labour’s 
legacy than on Thatcherism. As Chapter 1 makes clear, New Labour’s approach was not, in 
practice, wholly focused on income transfer without any conditions attached. Degrees of 
conditionality in the receipt of welfare and more ‘holistic’ programmes aimed at reducing social 
exclusion were introduced during New Labour’s time in office. In turn, a number of Coalition 
reforms build on these, particularly with regard to ‘welfare to work’ (Deacon and Patrick, 2011). 
This reflects the extent to which party policies and approaches are shaped by contemporary 
trajectories and understandings as well as more fundamental beliefs, exhibiting a level of path-
dependency. Supporting this, aspects of New Labour’s approach also drew substantially on 
Thatcherism. Those that did have largely remained in place since the Conservatives have moved 
back into government, albeit often in more intensified forms: for example, in the emphasis on 
engagement in paid work as an ideal and a moral obligation. Those that did not, such as a 
concern with redistribution (however veiled under New Labour) have been attacked by the 
Conservatives. This is on the basis that these aspects keep people in poverty, discourage 
responsible behaviour, and thereby perpetuate a system that is unfair, uncompassionate, and 
damaging to society. Most significantly, New Labour continued to envisage a significant on-
going role for the state in supporting the delivery of welfare policy and relieving poverty through 
income transfers, even as there was an increased reliance on private sector provision of services. 
Reflecting a deep hostility towards such intervention, the Conservative Party has argued strongly 
against this. 
 
In Freeden’s terms, therefore, the Conservative ‘mirror’ continues to pick up the supposedly 
statist ideological character of the opposition as the main threat to social order. As such, the 
Conservative approach to welfare policy is focused on this. Hostility to the interventionist state is 
what links together all four of the concepts discussed in this chapter. The central claim in 
contemporary Conservative welfare ideology is that dependence on the state is a form of poverty. 
Resolving this, by moving claimants from ‘dependence’ to ‘independence’, is the main policy 
goal. The key problem for governments to address is therefore not income poverty, but welfare 
dependency. This is presented in opposition to Labour who, Conservatives argue, were happy to 
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make claimants more and more reliant on the state in the pursuit of equality (a core concept in 
democratic socialism) and to be seen to be doing something. However much the Conservative 
leadership claimed in the early years to be concerned with relative poverty, this should not be 
mistaken for an egalitarian approach to welfare. The aim is to move as many people as possible 
off dependency on the state. While this is to be achieved partially by ‘making work pay’, as 
detailed in Chapter 6, this is intended as an incentive rather than a device to ensure equality. 
 
Ending dependency is the key goal because Conservatives propose that it is dependency itself 
that has led to social breakdown. Generous welfare systems encourage individuals to look to the 
state, rather than to each other, their families, friends and communities, in times of difficulty. 
This contributes to a breakdown of personal and social responsibility. Individuals do not expect 
support from their communities, so communities become less accustomed to providing that 
support. Social ties are then weakened. Implied within this is the suggestion that without the 
state, there would be a more organic society providing this support: what Duncan Smith (2001) 
and the SJPG (2006b: 14) have referred to as ‘the welfare society’. Owing to this breakdown, 
reliance on the state becomes more normalised and more extensive. This becomes a cycle, during 
which other organisations such as voluntary and civil society organisations are ‘crowded out’ 
through widespread dependence on the state. As such, along with the decline in responsibility 
comes a failure of compassion: because they do not use these organisations, people are less 
likely to join them, and so what Conservatives claim as ‘real compassion’ suffers a decline. 
Despite all of New Labour’s best intentions, Conservatives claim that the extension of the 
welfare state has led to these negative consequences. The final claim is that this is not fair to 
anyone: those ‘trapped’ within the system or those who fulfil their obligation towards self-
sufficiency who, in a system that the Conservatives portray as obsessed with income transfers, 
have to pay for them.  
 
This is an illustration of an attempt to portray the social change brought about by the welfare 
state as un-natural and enforced, rather than ‘safe’ as conservatism allows for. In many respects, 
this is not dissimilar to Thatcherism. Having identified the welfare state as a key threat to social 
order (and later, economic prosperity), the Conservative Party then puts forward an acceptable 
alternative. This alternative (the ‘welfare society’ or ‘Big Society’) is the extra-human device 
that the Conservative Party uses to legitimate its goal of rolling back state welfare provision. The 
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narration of social breakdown owing to an overextended welfare state contains within it a desire 
to return to an implicitly tried-and-tested model of community provision that has been 
overwhelmed by the state itself. It is only through the state’s withdrawal that the Big Society can 
flourish, halting the process of social and economic decline.  
 
Interestingly, this might imply a shift away from the individualist rhetoric that characterised 
Thatcherism and an attempt to reintroduce something of a collectivist conception of society, via 
an emphasis on mutuality (Ellis, 2009). Freeden proposes that Thatcherite individualism was a 
reaction against the perceived collectivism that characterised One Nation Conservatism’s 
conception of society and the role of government in relation to this. Thus collectivism was 
pushed away from adjacent concept status, and individualism brought inwards (1996: 388).  If it 
can be accepted that New Labour drew substantially on Thatcherism in its approach to welfare 
policy, then it might be proposed that collectivism is no longer a threat. Instead, the atomisation 
of society has become a key problem for social order. This appears to have opened up a practical 
space for the promotion of broader social obligations within Conservatism, providing a route 
through which Thatcherite ideas on self-sufficiency might be developed. 
 
The hostility of the current Conservative leadership towards the interventionist welfare state 
severely limits the options open to it in developing welfare policy.  As discussed in the final 
section on fairness, a minority of Conservatives have expressed an interest in a more 
contributory system. However, such a system is incompatible with the ideology of the leadership 
and much of the PCP. Within an outlook that is so convinced in its opposition to the expansive 
state, there is no room for expanding the welfare state further through an extension of social 
insurance. This would also extend dependency. Therefore, the broader social problems 
associated with individuals looking to the state for support would continue. It would also be a 
difficult sell electorally and, as explored in Chapter 5, the perception of failure to win the 2010 
election outright combined with the financial pressures that the Coalition faced seemed to leave 
the Conservatives less disposed to experiment with innovative welfare policies. The already 
limited support for the idea within the Party combined with these factors, will have served to 
render implementing a more contributory system a very unlikely possibility, and the direction of 
the Coalition’s reforms will further entrench this. Instead the Conservatives have opted for 
Universal Credit which, although encompassing a variety of means-tested benefits, is less crude 
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than a simple needs-based approach. Instead, it attempts to reward claimants for moving into 
work or increasing their hours, thus rewarding responsible behaviour whilst also reflecting a 
somewhat novel aspect of rational (as opposed to purely moral) thinking on the causes of 
dependency. 
 
However, ensuring that the system is fair to those who ‘play by the rules’ whilst also keeping a 
lid on spending is challenging. The Party has attempted to make the system ‘fairer’ though both 
extending the sanctions regime attached to several working-age benefits, tightening up 
eligibility, and introducing various caps and other limitations (see Chapters 6 and 7). Essentially, 
the focus has been on penalising those who are deemed to be receiving ‘something for nothing’, 
rather than providing extra rewards to those who are getting ‘nothing for something’. This also 
plays into the concept of compassion, since an active state which pushes claimants to support 
themselves is framed as a compassionate state. While this may be partly a result of spending 
restrictions, it is also reflective of the Party’s determination to avoid increasing dependency. 
Given this set of priorities, it is difficult to see what else the Party could have advocated. 
Considering the extent to which Thatcherite attitudes to the state appear to be embedded in the 
PCP, it is equally difficult to see how the approach might develop in a different direction in 
future.  
 
Finally, although the policy impact of the financial crisis will be examined in the following 
chapters, it is worth considering here whether this can be said to have had an impact on the 
Party’s ideas on welfare provision. The emphasis on the Big Society has waned since the 2010 
election. Instead, the dominant narrative has been the need to cut the spending deficit, with the 
crisis framed as one of public spending. Cuts to the DWP’s budget were inevitable. For example, 
Stuart Andrew felt that changes were ‘absolutely long overdue: we haven’t got the money to 
carry on the way that we have been, and that’s a big problem’ (private interview). MPs have 
been keen to emphasise that these cuts are not solely a result of the changed financial context. 
Kwarteng claimed that ‘we had a problem with spending even before the crisis. For us at the end 
of that period in 2007 to essentially sign up to Labour’s spending plans for another four years, I 
thought that was a mistake’ (private interview). The financial crisis ‘sharpened’ and ‘gave great 
emergency’ to the need for welfare reform (Penrose, private interview). However, the ideas and 
arguments underpinning this have been remarkably consistent throughout. 
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The concepts discussed in this chapter together provide a broad rationale for a long-term 
Conservative approach to welfare based around the moral turpitude encouraged by, and the 
unjust consequences of a particular type of welfare system that is identified with New Labour. 
However the arguments used to immediately prioritise cutting welfare spending are closely 
related to these. On poverty, cutting the value of or entitlement to benefits saves money, but it 
should also encourage independence and reduce the attractiveness of welfare dependency. For 
example, Kwarteng’s claim regarding problematic spending is extended in Britannia Unchained, 
where the authors claim that high spending undermines both the principle of ‘sound money’ and 
the importance of hard work and belief in delayed gratification (Kwarteng et al., 2010: 68-85). 
On responsibility, government spending is presented as irresponsible in itself. Duncan Smith 
accused Labour of spending money ‘like drunks on a Friday night’ in the belief that spending 
alone could resolve society’s ills (HC Hansard, 14 June 2010). This is something that the 
Conservatives were arguing against well before the crisis (although it did not prevent them 
voting to uphold Labour’s spending plans in 2007, as noted above). On fairness, ideas on need 
and ‘something for nothing’ resurface in justifying cuts. The recession drew attention to the idea 
that, as one 2010 intake backbencher explained: ‘a lot more people were becoming eligible for 
benefits, at a time when benefits were not being targeted on those that needed them but were 
increasingly paid to people who did not need them’ (private interview); welfare started to ‘breed 
resentment’ because ‘when your household income is being squeezed you do notice where other 
money is going’ (Andrew, private interview). On compassion, the need to cut spending simply 
added extra urgency to the existing impetus. This forced the Party to confront the idea that 
‘there’s no money to be compassionate with, so we’ve got to find other ways to be 
compassionate [...] There are many ways to be compassionate other than spending large wodges 
of taxpayers’ dosh’ (Penrose, private interview).  
 
Despite the congruency of arguments used to justify both cuts and longer-term reform, there are 
clearly some differences of opinion within the Party regarding the balance of these priorities in 
practice. McKay and Rowlingson (2011) identify a tension between those who view deficit 
reduction as the primary motive for welfare reform, and those who view lower spending as a 
longer-term consequence of welfare reform. The former group includes MPs such as Kwarteng, 
who suggested that Universal Credit ‘could be a problem’ because it would not bring an 
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immediate fiscal saving (private interview). Unsurprisingly, as civil servants attested to, this is 
the main motivation of the Treasury. The former group is more focused around Duncan Smith’s 
approach at the DWP. Despite this tension, the ‘enemy’ of both groups remains the same: it is 
the expansion of the state and its effect on individual behaviour, society, and the economy. This 
common enemy is essential in explaining the consistency in approach since 2005, and the lack of 
ideological variation from Thatcherite ideas within the PCP and its leadership. Owing to this, the 
‘cutters’ versus ‘reformers’ characterisation of the Conservative Party’s approach to welfare 
under Cameron reflects not so much a schism within the Party as a fairly minor crack. Both 
groups agree on the need for some cuts: the ‘reformers’, however, supplement this with a 
concern with how the system could dis-incentivise the ‘choice’ of not working, while ‘cutters’ 
focus on moral explanations for dependency. There is a difference here but it is not a major one 
in ideological terms, and the emphasis on different understandings is likely to reflect different 
priorities and contextual pressures. Ultimately, both groups are moving towards a similar vision 
of the relationship between state, society and individual.   
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 discussed the utility of looking at what the Conservative Party perceives to be the 
principal threats to social order as a means of understanding the shifts in its outlook and policies. 
It suggested that the key difference between One Nation Conservatism and Thatcherite 
Conservatism is the source of the perceived threat, and that this has a significant impact on 
conservatism’s ideological structure and Conservative political strategy. One Nation 
Conservatives were more accepting of the idea of a large and active state to rebuild the nation’s 
infrastructure and maintain order following World War II, and were able to effectively 
incorporate this into to Party’s electoral appeal. By the time the first Thatcher government came 
to power it was this expansive state itself that had come to be considered the ‘enemy’, since its 
repeated failures in meeting its ever-growing obligations threatened to undermine its 
authoritative role in maintaining order (Freeden, 1996: 388; King, 1975). One Nation 
Conservatives therefore accepted expansion insofar as it was perceived to be instrumental in 
managing change in the post-war years. The welfare state was a means of rendering change in 
this period ‘safe’, preventing the top and bottom of society from becoming too dislocated, thus 
playing an important role mitigating against social disorder. When it was perceived that the state 
was becoming over-extended and threatened to drag the country into collapse, the Conservative 
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Party began to move towards what became known as Thatcherism. Supporting the state had 
become strategically disadvantageous. Because they had never been fully ideologically 
committed to it in the first instance, Conservatives were well placed to shift away from One 
Nation ideas. Concurrently, the effect of the extended state on individual morality began to be 
emphasised. 
 
In relation to the theoretical framework guiding this thesis, Freeden suggests that such perceived 
‘enemies’ (as the interventionist state constitutes) are a central part of the explanation for why 
the Conservative Party shifts and changes ideologically. This in turn indicates that perceptions of 
such enemies are a crucial element of the strategically selective context proposed in the SRA. 
The character of these serves to shut down or enable particular approaches and outlooks and, 
when the Party moved into government, the policy options that relate to these. This chapter has 
suggested that the main actors in the explicit process of developing a strategy are those at the top 
of the Party, specifically in the DWP and the leadership. However, in examining the bases of 
support for particular ideas within the PCP more broadly, it has also drawn attention to how this 
wider group of actors can play a role in legitimating or de-legitimating change, particularly in 
interpreting the decisions of the leadership in a way that is amenable to their concerns and 
perspectives as conservatives. Central to this process has been the perception of the 
interventionist state as ‘the enemy’, which has been shown to act as a powerful structural 
constraint on Conservative approaches to welfare. What is perhaps most striking about this is the 
way that a One Nation emphasis on the state has been pushed out of the Party, to the extent that 
there is now little in the way of disagreement about the path the Conservatives should take in 
relation to this significant policy area. This suggests that path dependency is an important factor 
in ideological development as well as policy change. This is to be expected, since the SRA 
suggests that policy change is preceded by ideological change. However, it supports the need 
identified in Chapter 2 to pay greater attention to ideological change itself, exploring how some 
ideas acquire enough resonance to drive change while others are more likely to be downplayed. 
Institutional bases of support are an important factor in this. 
 
What is illustrated by Conservative ideas on the concepts discussed in this chapter is that in some 
respects little has changed in the Conservative Party since the 1980s. In Freeden’s terms, the 
principal ‘enemy’ or threat to social order is still the interventionist state, as it was for 
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Thatcherites, and supporting this is seen as an ideological and strategic liability. This is 
consistent whether applied to the early years of Cameron’s leadership in opposition, where an 
overextended welfare state was accused of having ‘broken’ society, or the Party’s time in 
Government where public spending has been framed as the cause of the economic instability. 
Antipathy to the expansion of the state owing to the negative social and economic consequences 
of this is what links concepts of poverty, responsibility, fairness and compassion together, and it 
is this which has determined the trajectory of the Party’s approach to welfare, discussed in the 
following chapters. The welfare state is no longer seen as something that could bring about 
positive outcomes in this area; generous benefits and state-led welfare provision are viewed as 
largely negative by ‘centrist’ Conservatives and right-wingers alike. As far as welfare is 
concerned, One Nation Conservatism no longer offers a significant alternative view of the state 
within the PCP.  
 
There is evidence of the development of ideas within the PCP on the role of civil society, and 
how this might offer an alternative to state provision while almost demonstrating how the 
Conservatives have ‘moved on’ from Thatcherism. The leadership has struggled to convert these 
into a workable policy agenda, despite seemingly genuine interest in the idea from both Cameron 
and Duncan Smith. Owing to the overwhelming emphasis on sound finances following the move 
into government, the result has been the somewhat fanciful proposition that if the state 
withdraws from providing support, civil society organisations will simply move in to take over 
its role. These appear to draw on a Burkean tradition, and this strand might be described as the 
accommodation of One Nation ideas within the constraints of Thatcherite anti-statism. Equally, 
however, it could be seen as the development of Thatcherite social policy, which emphasised 
self-sufficiency and the importance of family support as well as the moral obligation to work. 
 
Thatcher’s social policy was under-developed owing to the focus on economic matters, and there 
was plenty of room for Cameron’s Conservatives to expand on this. This further underscores the 
difficulty, and inadvisability, of attempting to draw a clear divide between Thatcherism and One 
Nation. Although the attitude to the welfare state differs markedly at different points within each 
tradition, there are common themes, notably around the effect of the welfare system on 
individual morality and social cohesion, running through both (and into Cameron’s leadership) 
concerning order and managing change. This emphasis is ultimately what gathers all three 
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examples (Thatcherism, One Nation and ‘Cameronism’) within the conservative ideological 
family. 
  
At first glance, the claim that Conservative welfare policy is driven by principles of fairness, 
responsibility and compassion seems somewhat trite. It would be a strange move for a Party to 
claim that it wanted to introduce a system that was unfair, lacking in compassion and supportive 
of irresponsible behaviour. This chapter has sought to explain the Conservative decontestation of 
these concepts under David Cameron’s leadership, as a basis for understanding the strategic 
decision-making processes that follow on from these. It is proposed that the Party has 
constructed a reasonably ideologically coherent agenda for welfare based around these four 
principles, as long as the decontestation of each concept is accepted. However, translating ideas 
in practice is challenging. The goal of constructing an approach to welfare as a discreet policy 
area does not stand separately from other strategic priorities within political life. One important 
influence on this is the place of the policy area within electoral strategy, which may require a 
significantly different approach from the more policy-focused aspect, in turn impacting on ideas 
around this and altering the overall direction of party strategy and dominant ideology. This is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Hardworking people and benefit dependents: Welfare and electoral 
strategy 
 
Where is the fairness, we ask, for the shift-worker, leaving home in the dark hours of the early 
morning, who looks up at the closed blinds of their next door neighbour sleeping off a life on 
benefits? When we say we're all in this together, we speak for that worker. We speak for all 
those who want to work hard and get on. 
 
George Osborne (2012a) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter considered the ideological character of David Cameron’s Conservative 
Party through exploring four central concepts that underpin its approach to welfare. It suggested 
that despite the somewhat increased prominence of a more comprehensive and nuanced approach 
to social policy under the ‘modernisation’ banner, in many ways the party has failed to move on 
from the core features of Thatcherite Conservatism. This is particularly notable with regard to 
moralistic explanations of poverty, construed as ‘welfare dependency’. This continues to exert a 
strong effect on the Party’s thinking on welfare, with consequences for the sorts of policies and 
approaches that it is willing and ideologically able to adopt. Policy, however, is not solely a 
matter of resolving the problems associated with a particular policy area: it also has a more 
instrumental value, with policies and issues framed in such a way that they convey a particular 
message about the party and its priorities. This leads us towards looking at electoral strategy: the 
question of how the Conservative Party has deployed its ideological perspectives on welfare 
policy in enhancing its electoral appeal, both in opposition and in government.  
 
A premise of this chapter (and the subsequent two) is that while in some ways Liberal Democrat 
and Conservative approaches to welfare are quite similar, Coalition welfare policy has been led 
by the Conservatives. The capacity of the Liberal Democrats to exert influence on this area has 
been quite limited, and as the senior coalition partner the Conservative Party is well placed to use 
this to its own advantage (McEnhill, 2015). It is also important to note that several major 
announcements on this area have been made not by the DWP Ministerial team, but by the 
Chancellor. This not only emphasises the extent to which reform has become enmeshed with 
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austerity, but also suggests the perceived strategic importance of the policy area given that 
George Osborne was Cameron’s Head of Strategy in the 2010 and 2015 elections. It is 
significant that these reforms have been ‘framed’ initially by the individual within the PCP who 
is ultimately responsible for expanding its electoral appeal. 
 
A central concern of the chapter is establishing why and how welfare policy went from being a 
peripheral issue in a broader campaign to re-invigorate the Conservative Party’s brand in the 
general election of 2010, to constituting a key battleground in its own right in 2015. The chapter 
suggests that there are two main events informing this shift, thus contributing to explaining the 
direction that the agenda has taken. These are the economic downturn following the banking 
crisis in late 2007 and the result of the 2010 general election. Importantly, it is not the objective 
election result itself which led to change: 2010 could be classified either as a ‘victory’ for the 
Conservatives in entering government as part of a Coalition, or a partial defeat in the failure to 
win a majority. Rather as the SRA leads us to understand, the way that Conservatives interpreted 
the result is of central importance. A significant part of the PCP interpreted the 2010 result as 
indicative of Conservative electoral weaknesses going into the election that were primarily 
focused on ‘modernisation’, rather than as an indication that the Party had failed to change 
enough (Bale, 2010). Similarly the crisis was interpreted and narrated as one of public spending 
and a bloated state requiring severe spending cuts, which dovetailed with moral arguments for 
cutting the DWP’s budget. This was far from the only possible interpretation but reflected a 
determination not to ‘waste a good crisis’ (Penrose, private interview) in pursing change. 
 
The increased centrality of welfare therefore reflects a process of strategic learning within 
changing context, and these events feed into the attempt to translate ideas developed in 
opposition into practice within the context of coalition government. Overall, the Conservatives 
have tended to fall back on the more moralistic aspects of their thinking on welfare with regard 
to individual claimants, lessening the more society-focused aspects that were developing in 
opposition. This reflects the ease with which the former is integrated with electorate perspectives 
on the welfare system, and the difficulty of implementing ‘newer’, more innovative ideas within 
this strategically selective context. 
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In the short-term, the Conservative Party’s strategic use of welfare policy appears undeniably 
effective. Polling shows that welfare reform is one of the Coalition’s most popular agendas. This 
is particularly marked amongst working and lower-middle class voters in the North and the 
Scotland, where the Conservative Party is electorally weak. The Party has effectively gauged the 
public mood on welfare and identified that this may be one area where ‘detoxification’ of the 
Conservative brand is not needed. Further, the continued hardening of attitudes towards some 
benefit claimants (particularly the unemployed) since the Coalition came in may suggest that 
rather than simply reflecting public opinion on this topic, the Conservative Party is helping to 
shape perspectives on the effectiveness of the welfare system and the perceived futility of 
welfare spending. This contributes to a trajectory of ideational and policy development 
emphasising harsher approaches to some of those who draw on welfare support. Additional 
evidence that the Conservatives were setting the agenda on welfare mid-way through the 
Coalition’s first term can be found by looking at the Labour response. This has often been to 
mimic that language of the Conservatives on welfare, leading to pledges to be more ‘tough’ on 
claimants than the Conservatives (Reeves, quoted in Helm, 2013). Consequentially, Conservative 
MPs rightly saw the approach to welfare policy as one of the Party’s greatest electoral strengths 
heading into 2015, and may feel vindicated by the election result. 
 
In concluding remarks the chapter introduces some doubts regarding the extent to which such a 
position is sustainable in the longer term. Its effectiveness as an element of strategy depends not 
just on its immediate electoral appeal, but on the extent to which it can contribute to shaping and 
reinforcing wider societal perspectives in such a way that it reduces expectations of welfare 
support. As subsequent chapters explore, this requires that many less well-off voters, who are 
unlikely to recognise themselves in the portrayal of the undeserving ‘welfare dependent’ that the 
Conservatives have used to justify cuts, also accept that their entitlements will be lower. The 
combination of welfare reform with cuts to public spending will end up adversely affecting these 
voters, whom the Conservative Party needs to reach out to if it is to win a second majority (see 
Chapter 7). Longer term, therefore, the strategic use of ‘welfare as waste’ relies on a number of 
assumptions. It draws on a lack of knowledge amongst the electorate about the benefit system 
and sources of spending, which might become increasingly untenable as the cuts begin to take 
their full effect. Beyond this, continued support requires an understanding of, and agreement 
with, aspects of Conservative ideology regarding the extended state that go beyond a perception 
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of the need to cut spending to ‘undeserving’ categories of claimants and towards an acceptance 
of one’s own income falling, at least in the short to medium-term. In other words, success relates 
to the extent to which the Conservatives can achieve ideological hegemony in this area. As cuts 
to in-work benefits begin to be felt during the 2015 to 2020 parliament, the Party may find itself 
struggling on this dimension. 
 
5.2 The long shadow of Thatcherism: 1997-2005 
Historically, the Conservative Party’s ability to adjust its electoral and governing strategy to the 
conditions of the time and quickly regain power after losing elections has been one of its 
strongest qualities. However, the 1997 general election saw the Conservatives poll 9.6 million 
votes, gathering 30.7 per cent of the total vote and winning just 165 seats. This was its lowest 
number of individual votes since 1929, its lowest vote share since 1832, and its lowest number of 
seats since 1906 (Lee, 2009: 3). In 2001, the Conservatives received fewer votes – 8.36 million – 
on a lower turnout, increasing its vote share to 31.7 per cent but only winning one additional 
seat. In 2005, the Conservatives won 198 seats with 32.4 per cent of the vote, although it 
garnered slightly fewer individual votes than in 1997, at 8.78 million. Additionally, the Party’s 
electoral base became strongly regionalised. In 1997 it lost its six remaining seats in Wales, 
winning back just three in 2005. In Scotland, its electoral decline since the 1960s continued. The 
party lost all of its seats in 1997, and regained just one over the following thirteen years (Tetteh, 
2008). The ‘north-south divide’ of seats for the two main parties reflects a continuation of a trend 
evident since the 1983 general election, with the Conservatives particularly poorly represented 
amongst C2DE (lower middle and working class) voters in the urban North of England and 
Scotland (Johnston et al., 2001: 205). 
 
Further, the Conservatives were perceived as a sectional party. Shortly before Cameron took the 
leadership, one poll identified that the group which the Conservative Party was seen as least 
likely to represent and act in the interests of was ‘the poor’, followed by ‘the working class’ and 
‘Trade Unionists’. In contrast, it was seen as most likely to represent ‘the rich’ and ‘big business’ 
(YouGov, 2005, cited in Quinn, 2008: 191). This also reflected a continuation of a trend 
developing since the 1980s: the Conservative Party was seen to mostly represent people who 
were like itself, as Figure 5.1 (below) shows. Voters perceived the PCP as quite different in 
character and constitution from the majority of the nation, and often prone to hostility (or at the 
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very least, disinterest) towards those from different backgrounds (Ashcroft, 2012: 25-28; Quinn, 
2008: 191-193). 
 
Labour tended to be perceived more positively on these points, although not excessively so 
(Ipsos MORI, 2014b). New Labour’s victory in 1997 can be partially attributed to the context in 
which the election was fought, and the conventional wisdom that it is not oppositions that win 
elections, but governments that lose them. Labour faced a long-serving, beleaguered 
Conservative government (Heppell, 2008b). John Major had presided over the ERM economic 
crisis in 1992, and the ensuing recession. The economy was improving in 1997, but ultimately it 
was New Labour that reaped the rewards of this in terms of scope for increased public spending 
and rising living conditions for the majority of citizens (Pattie, 2001). It cannot be ignored that as 
far as theories of issue voting hold true, the Conservatives had fallen behind Labour in terms of 
voter perceptions on the key issue of the economy following the ERM crisis, and remained there 
for several years despite fluctuations in perceptions of Labour’s competency (see Figure 5.2) 
Major was widely portrayed as weak and ineffectual (not least by Conservative MPs themselves, 
in comparison with Margaret Thatcher), and led a party that had been dogged by allegations of 
sleaze and impropriety (Bale, 2010: 48-61).  
 
Chart 5.1: Conservative Party image, 1983-2006 
Source: Ipsos MORI, 2014a 
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Yet looking beyond this, the failure to respond effectively to New Labour after the election 
indicated a more fundamental problem with the Conservative Party’s electoral strategy in 
opposition. Theresa May’s 2002 speech to the party conference encapsulated the most 
fundamental of these problems: the Conservatives were seen by too many as ‘the nasty party’. 
She suggested that its fortunes would only be revived by ‘avoiding behaviour and attitudes that 
play into the hands of our opponents: no more glib moralising, no more hypocritical finger-
wagging’. The Party needed to represent ‘the whole of Britain, not merely some mythical place 
called “Middle England”, and it needed to speak to voter concerns regarding protecting public 
services and vulnerable people (May, 2002). The observation that voters rejected policies that 
they otherwise would have supported when they were revealed to be Conservative policies 
(Green, 2010: 669) reinforced the central contentions of May’s speech. Some within the Party 
recognised the need to change far earlier than others. Early attempts at ideational and rhetorical 
renewal appeared in David Willett’s vision of ‘civic Conservatism’ (1994). Later, Gary Streeter 
MP published an edited volume on ‘compassionate Conservatism’ (2002) with contributions 
from a number of sitting MPs, including Duncan Smith and Oliver Letwin. This was driven by 
the recognition that that as early as 1992, voter concerns over the party’s ability to represent the 
full range of social classes provided an explanation for support switching from the Conservatives 
to New Labour: perhaps even more so than economic perceptions and considerations of the 
Thatcher and Major governments’ records (Evans, 1999: 150). 
 
Chart 5.2: Best party on the economy, 1990 – 2010  
 
Source: Ipsos MORI, 2014c 
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There were attempts by Cameron’s predecessors to turn the Party in a more electorally fruitful 
direction. Michael Howard’s leadership has been characterised as a last-ditch attempt to hold 
together a deeply divided party (Bale, 2010: 195), which in itself is clearly important: 
concurrently, however, there was little, if any movement away from a traditional Thatcherite 
position (Hayton, 2012a: 55-56). Hague and Duncan Smith had both attempted to overhaul the 
Party’s image. However, Hague showed ‘little enthusiasm for or understanding of’ 
modernisation as an element of strategy (Bale 2010: 20), and attempts to shape a more inclusive 
Party image were abandoned when they did not lead to immediate gains in the polls (Driver 
2009: 85). Duncan Smith’s belief in the need to refashion the Conservatives as a party 
committed to social justice was more strongly felt, later finding expression through founding the 
Centre for Social Justice and contributing to shaping the welfare reform agenda. However, 
Duncan Smith’s success in bringing the party along with him was limited by his own poor 
leadership skills (Hayton and Heppell, 2010) and he was replaced in 2003, having never fought 
an election. The PCP as a whole struggled to learn from successive electoral defeats, with 
ideology constituting a significant barrier to this (Hayton, 2012a). There was a wide perception 
in the PCP that the electorate had been ‘tricked’ by New Labour: all that was needed was for 
Conservatives to hold out on their beliefs, and eventually support would return (Bale, 2010: 72-
73). Thus election campaigns in 2001 and 2005 were largely negative, based on issues that the 
Conservatives ‘owned’ including law and order and immigration. This was a rather timid and 
limiting core-vote electoral strategy that precluded the opportunity to reach out to disillusioned 
former and potential new Conservative voters, as New Labour had successfully done in 1997 
(Green, 2010).  
 
When Howard announced his intention to stand down in 2005, it had become apparent that the 
Party faced greater difficulties than could be remedied by providing a fresh face as leader. 
Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard had all faced apparently intractable problems regarding the 
Party’s image amongst voters, and in convincing sceptical Members of the need for, and 
electoral value of change (Hayton, 2012a; Cowley and Green, 2005: 12). Analyses of 
Conservative voting behaviour in leadership elections between 1975 and 2001 suggest that 
ideology played a key role in the selection of leaders and, post-Thatcher, the winning candidates 
were always those who were identified with Thatcherite ideology (Heppell and Hill, 2008; 2010; 
Cowley and Garry, 1998; Cowley, 1997). Cameron, elected on a platform of needing to ‘change 
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and modernise our culture and attitudes and identity’ (2005a) appeared to transcend such 
ideological divisions. Despite being situated on the party’s socially liberal wing (as opposed to 
the Thatcherite socially conservative wing), he attracted support from both wings of the Party. 
Ideologically the PCP did remain largely committed to Thatcherism (Heppell, 2013). However, 
Cameron’s election as leader suggested that ‘in 2005, electability mattered more than ideological 
acceptability’ (Heppell and Hill, 2009: 399). 
 
5.3 Responding to New Labour: modernisation and ‘detoxification’ under Cameron 
On winning the leadership, Cameron contended that Conservative fortunes could only be revived 
through offering ‘a modern and compassionate conservatism which is right for our times and our 
country’ (2005b). This signalled an accommodation with some of the ‘modernising’ ideas that 
had been developing within and around the PCP. The contention that the Conservatives needed 
to ‘change to win’ is best viewed as the culmination of a process rather than a new direction for 
the party, analogous to Blair taking the Labour leadership following the struggles of the 1980s. 
However, New Labour’s strategy involved ideological adaptation to the Thatcher inheritance, 
and this resulted in a substantive change in its policy programme. As Quinn (2008) has shown, 
Conservative policies were not extremely right-wing in opposition after 1997: they were close to 
New Labour on many issues. This is true of welfare in particular, reflecting the Thatcherite 
influence on New Labour (Hayton and McEnhill, 2014; Hayton, 2012b). However, the 
Conservatives were perceived as ‘fairly right wing’ by a majority of voters, who placed 
themselves (and Tony Blair) in the centre of the political spectrum (Quinn, 2008: 180-181). This 
confirmed that the major problem for the Conservatives was their public image, which Cameron 
aimed to remedy by focusing on issues not traditionally associated with Conservatism, allowing 
it to project a softer, more inclusive identity (Heppell, 2014; Dorey, 2007). 
 
Cameron’s awareness of the ubiquity of a Thatcherite influence on British public policy led him 
to claim that far from having lost the ‘battle of ideas’, the Conservatives had actually won, 
illustrated by the existence of New Labour. He set out this thesis during a speech at the Centre 
for Policy Studies (2006e): 
 
Tony Blair's victory in [1997] created a problem for the Conservative Party. It was not 
the same sort of problem that Old Labour had faced. It was not a problem that arose from 
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the failure of our ideas. It was, on the contrary, a problem that arose from the triumph of 
our ideas. There was in truth nothing fundamentally new about the New Labour analysis 
except that the party offering it was Labour. 
 
Cameron claimed that both Thatcher and Major had become increasingly concerned that a 
section of society had become excluded from economic prosperity, and had attempted ‘to tackle 
the problems of an underclass of people left behind’. New Labour agreed with the Conservatives 
on this broad goal and Blair had effectively articulated a focus on ‘social justice and economic 
efficiency’, placing this at the centre of New Labour’s governing programme. Therefore the 
ideological and electoral dilemma for the Conservatives was that the old ‘enemy’ of state 
socialism had disappeared, replaced with an opposition that was much more like the 
Conservative Party itself (even if New Labour was still perceived as far too ‘statist’ in its 
methods). In response, rather than ‘highlighting the different prescriptions that arose from our 
different values and principles, we ended up focusing on those areas where we didn't agree’ 
(2006e). The Conservatives emphasised their right-wing credentials on core issues such as tax 
cuts, a tough approach to law and order, immigration and Europe. Cameron strongly articulated 
that this had been a strategic error in terms of how it came across to the electorate. This was 
evident in the three election defeats that the party suffered. Of these, Howard’s, which was 
fought on a traditionally Thatcherite platform against a Labour opposition that was not as strong 
as it had once been, brought perhaps the clearest indication of the tactical and strategic paucity of 
such an approach (Seldon and Snowden, 2005). Thus some re-evaluation was required. 
 
Those who felt that these core policy areas were important often rated Conservative competency 
on them highly, particularly as Labour’s time in power wore on (Ipsos MORI, 2014d; 2014e; 
2014f; 2014g). However, between 1997 and 2006 – with the exception of immigration and 
asylum - they were not usually as salient as issues such as public services, on which Labour held 
a lead (see Figure 5.3). Additionally, although Labour also emphasised their ‘tough’ credentials 
on some of the more salient of these issues (notably crime, law and order and immigration), this 
was set against a broader perception of the party as caring and concerned with social justice: 
lacking this, the Conservatives ‘risked appearing merely angry’ (Quinn, 2008: 192). Thus, after 
outlining New Labour’s record in government, Cameron concluded that: ‘“social justice and 
economic efficiency” are the common ground of British politics. We have to find the means of 
succeeding where the government has failed’ (2006e). The task was to first convince voters that 
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the Conservatives shared these goals, and then to go about highlighting an appealing 
Conservative alternative to reaching them. 
 
Resolving the issue of the Party’s relationship with Thatcherism was pivotal to the process of 
change and ‘detoxification’. For the modernisers, ‘Thatcherite social conservatism created a 
negative image which reinforced an impression that [Conservatives] were socially intolerant’ 
(Heppell, 2013: 341). The question of whether detoxification constituted an ideological shift 
within Cameron’s Conservative Party has been addressed in the previous chapter, suggesting that 
modernisation has not fundamentally challenged the Thatcherite inheritance. Here, the focus is 
how this process fed into the Party’s electoral appeal: essentially, how a convincing impression 
of change could be conveyed in the absence of substantive ideological change. This necessitated 
a careful balancing act. In ‘preparing the ground’ for renewal, the leadership made ‘a concerted 
attempt to shift public perceptions of the Tories’ via ‘a set of often symbolic rhetorical and 
policy shifts’ (Kenny, 2009, cited in Bochel, 2011: 9). Cameron’s early speeches as leader can be 
read as an attempt to distance the Party from its Thatcherite past, which some Conservatives saw 
as problematic. For example, Lord Tebbit warned that ‘attacks on Thatcherism echoing those 
from New Labour...are not likely to endear Mr Cameron to his grass roots’ (2006; see also  
Chapter 1). However, such voices were largely silenced at the time due to the immediate boost 
that Cameron’s leadership provided in polls that had stubbornly refused to budge for his 
predecessors, even if he remained somewhat more popular than the party as a whole (Ipsos 
MORI, 2013).  
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, Cameron’s early leadership was characterised by renewed 
focus on non-traditional Conservative policy areas, one of which was ‘society’. Considered in 
relation to electoral strategy, this was an attempt to re-position the party in order to renew its 
appeal, which was carried out within the constraints imposed by previous ideological blueprints: 
notably Thatcherism, but also with some reference to the older One Nation strand as means of 
authenticating the position (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2012). Cameron’s strategy was not so much 
to apologise for Thatcherism as to suggest that ‘that was then, and this is now’ (Bale, 2009: 227; 
Evans, 2010; 2008). What worked in the 1980s, prioritising economic recovery against a divided, 
increasingly left-wing opposition would not work in 2005 against a government operating in an 
apparently successful economic context, which had accepted many of the tenets of Thatcherism 
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and yet managed to use the Conservative Party’s ‘uncaring’ image against it. Instead, the 
apparent resolution of the economic argument opened up the space within which the 
Conservatives could begin to develop a fuller approach to social issues. This took the form of an 
extension of Thatcherite ideas, rather than their repudiation.  
 
There are two main factors in understanding the decision to focus on social issues and critiquing 
New Labour’s social policies. The first relates to modernisation, or the relevance of the 
Conservative Party to contemporary society. The Conservatives lagged behind Labour in almost 
all areas of social policy whilst in opposition, although Labour’s lead in most areas narrowed as 
their time in power went on. As Gary Streeter put it: ‘I just felt that my party was unelectable. 
We really needed to transform ourselves in social policy’ (private interview). Lacking a wider 
narrative, the Party’s previous attempts to address this had seemed hollow. Robert Buckland  
commented that: ‘social issues had been not quite side-lined, but mentally side-lined by the party 
into the “too difficult” bracket. They were seen very much as questions of politics rather than 
policy: if we do a certain thing on welfare, then that will furnish our centrist credentials’ (private 
interview). Similarly, Conor Burns claimed that ‘in all my years knocking on doors’ the 
complaint he had heard most from voters was that ‘they weren’t voting Conservative because 
they didn’t think that we had a lot of credible policies in those years’ (private interview).  
 
Chart 5.3: Issue saliency, 1997-2005 
 
Source: Ipsos MORI, 2014h 
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At this point, welfare policy was not the main focus of the Conservative critique. Pensions and 
social security were a reasonable low saliency issue during New Labour’s time in government – 
although, it should be noted, not as low saliency as some of the issues that the Conservatives had 
chosen to concentrate on, such as tax cuts (see Figure 5.3). However as John Penrose 
commented, although welfare had ‘historically not been very important’ it did have some 
saliency ‘insofar as it goes to underline brand values and preconceptions about the different 
parties’ (private interview). As such despite its broader lack of saliency, welfare policy and the 
issues connected to it, notably poverty, formed part of the attempt to construct a substantive 
policy agenda around social issues. This fed into the overarching narrative of the purpose of 
modern Conservatism, which had seemed to be missing from the Party’s previous years in 
opposition in favour of a narrower and inconsistent focus on individual issues (Taylor, 2005). 
Drawing on the work of the CSJ and the SJPG, this was a narrative about poverty, social justice 
and social mobility, utilising some of the inclusive language of New Labour but proposing more 
distinctively Conservative solutions to the elements of reform that the Party disagreed with. 
 
The second factor in explaining the focus on social policy concerns a more negative impetus, 
based on the state of the economy. Labour’s lead on voter perceptions of economic competency 
during the 2005 election was 18.2 percentage points. While not nearly as high as it had been in 
previous years, this was nonetheless a considerable lead. Green and Hobolt (2008: 464-465) 
point out that the economy was a low-saliency issue in 2005: only 5.7 per cent of respondents 
named it as the most important issue facing the country. However, they suggest that ‘the low 
salience rating may underestimate the wider significance of the economy to the vote choice’ and 
elsewhere the evidence on the importance of evaluations of the prospective and respective 
economy in influencing voter choice is extensive (Clarke et al., 2004). Cowley and Green (2005) 
suggest that Labour’s fairly consistent lead on this issue caused the Conservatives to tacitly 
acknowledge that they could not win the 2005 general election. Instead, the Party positioned 
itself almost as a protest vote through which voters could ‘send a message’ to an increasingly 
unpopular Prime Minister. As can be seen in Chart 5.2, above, Labour was quite consistently 
identified as the party most capable of managing the economy after perceptions of Conservative 
competency dropped in 1992. Moreover, even when Labour’s ratings suffered a decline, the 
Conservatives appeared unable to capitalise on this. 
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On social issues, Labour was correctly perceived as more vulnerable. Charts 5.4 and 5.5 show 
perceptions of competency on two key social policy areas: heath, and education (comparable 
figures for social security as a whole are not available for this period). Labour lost ground on 
these key areas between 1997 and 2005. On health, Labour’s lead fell from a high of 54 points in 
1995, to an average of 12.5 points in 2005 (Ipsos MORI, 2014i). On education, Labour led by 48 
points in 1998; by 2004 this had been cut to four points, although it subsequently temporarily 
recovered somewhat (Ipsos MORI, 2014j). There was a pattern of sustained decline in the 
electorate’s faith in Labour to deliver on social issues. As such, the decision to concentrate on 
these could be viewed as much in terms of electoral manoeuvring, as in terms of the pursuit of 
more substantive policy goals. In comparison to the failure to make up much ground on Labour’s 
economic competency ratings in opposition, the Conservatives did appear to be making some 
limited gains on social policy. In addition, as Figure 5.3 shows, some of the issues in this area 
were highly salient. As such, the case for focusing on social policy, particularly in light of the 
weaknesses of the core vote strategy and the need to remedy the ‘nasty party’ image problem, 
was far stronger when Cameron took the leadership than it had been in previous years. 
 
Chart 5.4: Best party on Health (all naming issue as important), 1995-2005 
 
Source: Ipsos MORI, 2014i. Nb. Data not available for 2002. 
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Chart 5.5: Best party on Education (all naming issue as important), 1995-2005 
Source: Ipsos MORI, 2014j. Nb. Data not available for 2002. 
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undergone some significant changes in government in relation to the weaknesses identified in its 
2010 general election strategy. One of the most striking of these changes is the promotion of 
welfare policy, from a peripheral issue to the broader narrative of social change to a key policy 
area in its own right, used as a vehicle for expressing Conservative perspectives and ideas about 
the relationship between state, society and individual. Here, it is possible to identify a shift 
towards more clearly Thatcherite-inspired rhetoric, although many of the ideas underpinning the 
approach have remained quite consistent in light of this. This section suggests that this is the 
result of both the practical failings of the pre-election Big Society narrative, and the perceived 
viability of such an approach in terms of electoral gains once the opportunity to convert ideas 
into real policy presented itself. 
 
In opposition, Cameron had introduced the narrative of Britain’s ‘broken society’: ‘the linked 
problems that blight so many of our communities’ (Cameron, 2005b), including family 
breakdown, drug and alcohol addiction, worklessness, educational failure and personal debt. The 
leadership worked from the critique of New Labour’s social exclusion policies developed by the 
SJPG. They proposed measures that they claimed would facilitate an increase in personal 
responsibility leading to a more ‘responsible society’, and a shift away from reliance on the 
welfare state towards a ‘welfare society’ with the family as the key unit of social support (SJPG, 
2007a). Linked to this, there would also be a greater emphasis and reliance on the voluntary 
sector and social enterprises to facilitate moving away from reliance on state-led programmes 
(SJPG, 2007b). In 2009, Cameron coined the phrase ‘Big Society’ to summarise this, claiming 
that this could replace ‘big government’ (2009b). This became the central theme of the 
Conservative election campaign, with the 2010 manifesto claiming that ‘we need fundamental 
change: from big government that presumes to know best, to Big Society that trusts in the people 
for ideas and innovation’ (Conservative Party, 2010: viii). In ideational terms, the Big Society 
was an expression of both responsibility and, connected to this, compassion. However, the 
difficulties experienced in communicating the idea are illustrative of the challenges in using 
rather abstract ideological notions as the foundation of electoral strategy. The Big Society was 
not articulated in such a way that it appeared relevant to voters’ present situations: while the 
concepts themselves were not necessarily discordant with wider public views, the way in which 
they were presented was broadly ineffective. 
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As an element of strategy, the Big Society struggled to gain traction with voters. The Party’s 
main appeal in 2010 was David Cameron himself. He was consistently shown to be more ‘liked’ 
than his Party but, in what was widely perceived as a game-changing moment during the 2010 
campaign following the leadership debates, not as much of a draw as Nick Clegg was for the 
Liberal Democrats (Green, 2010). A report by the influential Conservative Home website on the 
reasons for the Conservative Party’s failure to win a majority in 2010 complained that the Big 
Society ‘wasn't even poll-tested until the middle of April. When it was tested it received a 
thumbs down’. However, more fundamentally: ‘the Big Society is a big idea requiring much 
explanation - and in any event isn't a voter-friendly “retail offer”’ (Conservative Home, 2010: 
13).  
 
This meant that while some voters liked the ideas when they were explained to them, few felt 
that their understanding of the concept was strong (YouGov/The Sun, 2011). Others felt that it 
was little more than a ‘stunt’ deployed to win an election, or worse, a cover for the spending cuts 
that would emerge after the election (Lindsey and Bulloch, 2013: 8-9). The Conservative Home 
report indicates that Cameron’s Director of Strategy, Steve Hilton, had pressed the leadership to 
place ‘more weight on the Big Society than a testing election campaign could bear’, particularly 
given the relatively novel ideas contained within the narrative (2010: 13). Defending the idea, 
Hilton ‘thought it was ridiculous to test such a fundamental party belief’, telling colleagues that 
‘it is what the Party is about, it is what you believe’ (cited in Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 260). 
However, 71 per cent of the 109 Conservative candidates interviewed agreed with Conservative 
Home’s conclusion that ‘the Big Society agenda is an exciting governing philosophy but it 
should never have been put at the heart of the Tory election campaign’ (Conservative Home, 
2010: 36). Some MPs suggested that, instead, the focus on the economy should have been much 
stronger after 2008 (private interviews). However, Conservative Home notes that this focus was 
not achieved until George Osborne moved into Conservative Campaign Headquarters (2010: 7). 
 
Conservative Home’s editor, Tim Montgomerie, also criticised the Party for running a campaign 
that was ‘much grander than specific. We had, for example, lots on the Big Society but few retail 
policy pledges’ (2011). Perhaps as a result of this vagueness, the Party was seen as opportunistic 
and prone to ‘jumping on bandwagons’ (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 259) Lord Ashcroft 
identified similar flaws. He claimed that ‘going into the election, many voters had little clear idea 
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of what we stood for or what we intended to do in government’ (quoted in Alderson, 2010). 
Connected to this lack of comprehension about what the Party would do in government were 
doubts about the extent to which the re-branding exercise had been successful, or worthwhile 
given the election result. The Party was still widely disliked or not trusted by a number of 
groups, including public sector workers and ethnic minorities and the urban poor, particularly in 
London and the North of England. It was still perceived as a sectional party, more likely to act in 
the interests of the well-off (Ashcroft, 2010; 2012), and its vote remained strongly regionalised, 
failing to add to its sole MP in Scotland.  
 
Welfare policy was an important issue in the 2015 general election. This was quite a change 
from 2010, where it barely featured explicitly in any of the parties’ manifestos. To some extent, 
reforming the welfare state has been seen by the Conservatives as a means of demonstrating their 
competency and ability to follow through on plans in government. Whilst pointing out that there 
is a broader purpose to reform than contributing to election strategy, Philip Davies MP suggested 
in 2012 that it might fit into Conservative electoral strategy in this way. He stated: ‘[Iain Duncan 
Smith] is probably one of a small band of Ministers who is deemed to be a success in his job. 
Given that, selling the changes that we’ve made in the DWP will be one of the things that the 
Government points to when it’s saying what a good job it’s done over the last five years’ (private 
interview). Duncan Smith’s detailed policy work prior to being appointed Secretary of State and 
longer-term ambitions with regard to Universal Credit were seen as helpful by MPs, in that this 
could be an example of a Conservative minister leading and (hopefully) implementing a new 
policy effectively. This could add to the perception of party competency and, if the 
Conservatives could market Universal Credit effectively, provide evidence for the notion that the 
Party was concerned with supporting lower-paid and more vulnerable people. However, there are 
many caveats to this usage, and the difficulty of implementing Universal Credit may render this 
less of a viable strategy than it might once have appeared to be. 
 
Arguably of much more electoral utility to the Party has been the raft of legislation that was 
announced and developed after the election, leading up to 2013: what Guto Bebb MP referred to 
as ‘the crude part of the spectrum in terms of the actual policies’ (private interview), discussed in 
Chapter 7 of this thesis. This includes the benefit cap and up-rating measures, as well as 
adjustments to housing benefit for social housing tenants. Beyond this, there have also been 
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proposals to cut or limit housing benefit and Jobseeker’s Allowance for under 25s or under 21s, 
and the limited introduction of stringent ‘work for the dole’ schemes. These policies began to 
emerge after the Emergency Budget in 2010, where Osborne claimed that ‘we need to put the 
whole welfare system on a more sustainable and affordable footing’. They have been linked to 
both the austerity and welfare reform agendas, as discussed in the subsequent policy chapters. 
They tend to reflect a less ambitious programme ideologically than is contained with the Big 
Society, falling back on moralising and retrenchment as the central policy instrument supporting 
this. 
 
Unusually, despite these initiatives relating primarily to the DWP, it has often been the 
Chancellor who has announced them. Phillip Blond claimed that this is the result of a ‘long 
warfare between people like Steve Hilton and myself, and the Treasury’, in which after the 
general election ‘Osborne achieved ascendency very quickly’ (private interview). It is significant 
that Osborne is also Cameron’s Head of Strategy: if Osborne rather than Duncan Smith is 
announcing the policies then he also has the opportunity to determine the initial ‘framing’ of 
them, lending credence to the idea that as well as falling into welfare reform these are intended 
to form key elements of the Party’s electoral appeal. The following sections explore the themes 
and messages used to justify and sell these policies to the electorate, and how the use of these 
seeks to address the weaknesses identified in the Conservative Party’s 2010 campaign. 
 
5.5 Welfare and public spending: ‘Labour’s debt crisis’ 
In 2007, the Conservative Party pledged to maintain Labour’s spending for three years should 
they win a majority in an upcoming election. This tied into detoxification: the pledge was 
intended to quell voter fears that the Conservatives could not be trusted with the public services 
and would simply cut them, particularly given their emerging critique of ‘big government’. 
Osborne claimed that as a result: ‘the charge from our opponents that we will cut services 
becomes transparently false’ (quoted in BBC News, 2007). Support for the pledge was far from 
unanimous, particularly in light of the financial crisis in late 2007 and the prospect of recession. 
Polling by Conservative Home revealed that 64 per cent of Conservative grassroots members felt 
that the pledge was a poor decision (2008). Kwasi Kwarteng MP commented that: ‘I was very 
despondent when we signed up to Labour’s spending when you could see that from 2003 to 2006 
the economy was growing every year, quite strongly…And yet we were running deficits of three 
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per cent. That was utterly irresponsible’ (private interview). Whilst Kwarteng framed his 
remarks in terms of fiscal policy, John Redwood, who led Cameron’s Policy Review Group on 
Economic Competitiveness took a more electorally focused stance on the issue. He claimed that: 
‘we have reached the limits and in my view we have got to make economies…The British people 
are well ahead of the politicians on this and know that the money is not being spent wisely’ 
(quoted in Kite, 2008). 
 
The pledge was dropped in late 2008. This marked a shift in Conservative economic policy, and 
the introduction of a new element of electoral strategy that moved beyond the need to detoxify 
the Conservative brand. The financial crisis of September 2007 and the ensuing economic 
downturn is important in understanding this. The crisis left Labour far more vulnerable on the 
issue of economic competency, with voter faith in their ability to manage the economy 
effectively declining as the 2010 election approached (see Chart 5.2, above). The Conservative 
strategy was to narrate the economic difficulties, which resulted in a soaring government deficit, 
as a consequence of Labour’s (specifically Gordon Brown’s) public spending. Cameron claimed 
that during the years of growth, Labour had ‘failed to fix the roof when the sun was shining’, 
thus Brown had created a ‘debt crisis’ that had left Britain ‘running on empty’ (quoted in 
Russell, 2008). Spending would need to be pared back because ‘we need to recognise that we 
cannot go on the way we are’ (Cameron, quoted in BBC News, 2008). The Conservative 
manifesto in 2010 downplayed the need for austerity, framing savings in terms of improved 
efficiency and better outcomes (Conservative Party 2010: 5). The imperative of saving money 
was presented as a ‘needs must’ argument: it was supposedly the only way that the British 
economy could be repaired. However, the nature of the critique of Labour was highly 
ideological. It focused on the damaging effects of high public spending - not only on the 
economy but in undermining society through ‘throwing money’ at problems – and advocated 
greater reliance on the private and voluntary sectors as a solution, as outlined in the previous 
chapter. This was tied to a more practical critique, presenting spending as wasteful since good 
outcomes were not being achieved. This argument gathered pace in government, as the extent of 
budget reductions became clearer in the 2010 Emergency Budget. 
 
Simply attacking Labour’s economic record had not proven particularly electorally fruitful for 
the Conservatives prior to 2010, resulting in the perception that a failure to construct an 
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economic narrative that resonated with voters had been a factor in the failure to win a majority 
(Conservative Home, 2010: 12). Although voters felt increasingly negative about their own 
economic prospects (YouGov/Daily Telegraph, 2009) they remained unconvinced that the 
Conservatives would have done a better job than Labour in handling the crisis – or that they 
would have done anything differently. Right up until the election, almost a third believed that 
neither party was well equipped to handle the economy effectively (Ashcroft, 2010: 38-9). 
Although the need for cuts was broadly accepted, voters seemed unsure of what this would mean 
in practice and had little awareness of the scale of the deficit. Drawing on polling evidence, 
Ashcroft argued that that many people could not comprehend the sums involved. As such, they 
were ‘prone to overestimate the potential savings to be made from cutting things they 
disapproved of’. Specifically, Ashcroft identified ‘clamping down on MPs’ expenses’; ‘banning 
bonuses in newly state-owned banks’; ‘sorting out the ubiquitous public sector waste’, and 
‘dealing with scroungers’ as preferred solutions (2010: 39-41). 
 
In no policy area has the argument for cuts based on the wastefulness and inefficacy of public 
spending been as marked as it has been for welfare. The DWP is the highest spending 
department in government (HM Treasury, 2013a: 21). In any attempt to reduce spending it 
would have been a target for cuts. However this, combined with the fact that the Conservatives 
had spent several years building up a critique of Labour’s supposedly wasteful and ineffective 
approach to welfare quite apart from the pressures of the economic downturn, has meant that a 
critique of welfare spending has formed a central part of Conservative electoral strategy since 
2010. This combines with the public preference for ‘dealing with scroungers’ and the perception 
that fraud is widespread (Clery, Lee and Kunz, 2013), providing a clear means of illustrating 
Conservative ideas on the negative effects of an extended state. 
 
The concept of welfare dependency remains important in Conservative welfare ideology whether 
it is utilised in the ‘modern’ sense of the welfare system itself ‘trapping’ people in dependency 
(and therefore in poverty), or in the more aggressive moral rhetoric of ‘scroungers’ who are 
playing the system and show no interest in moving into work. Contradicting the DWPs official 
figures, which suggest that the amount of money lost to fraud is quite low (DWP, 2014a: 2), a 
number of Conservative MPs have indicated their belief that there are significant numbers of 
claimants who are ‘playing the system’ to some extent. The former Minister for Employment, 
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Chris Grayling, twice referred to unemployed people who ‘mostly sit at home playing computer 
games all day’ (2012a; 2007). Philip Davies MP was concerned to ‘sort out the ones who 
genuinely should be on Incapacity Benefit from those who are swinging the lead in order to get 
more benefits and less scrutiny of their activities’ (private interview). A senior backbencher 
recounted an anecdote from a sub-postmaster who had seen ‘people hobbling in to collect their 
benefits, and the apparent transformation as they walk out, money in hand’, and that: ‘someone 
was telling me recently how a woman was leaving the health centre on her crutches looking 
pained, until she gets to her open-top sports car, throws the crutches in the back, jumps in the 
front seat and off she goes’ (private interview). The supposed growth in fraud and dependency 
has fused with the imperative of cutting spending to form a further line of attack against Labour, 
who are blamed for encouraging this dependency through a misplaced sense of compassion. This 
failed to deter people from claiming benefits, or work hard enough to detect and punish those 
who were ‘playing the system’. 
 
The persistence of this view within the PCP combines and resonates with longer-term trends in 
attitudes towards the welfare state. Despite Cameron’s perceived centrist tendencies, 
Conservative grassroots members tend to be ‘culturally conservative’ or authoritarian (Bale and 
Webb, 2014: 7-9). This is consistent with the morality-based perspectives on welfare that senior 
Conservatives have espoused (Hayton and McEnhill, 2014), which underpin the sorts of views 
discussed above. Specifically, Conservative members were very approving of the element of 
welfare policy (re-assessing disability benefit claimants) that Bale and Webb polled them on 
(2014: 5). Conservative voters are also significantly more likely that Labour voters to believe 
that benefits are ‘too high and [discourage] work’; to exhibit declining sympathy towards groups 
such as the unemployed who are viewed as ‘undeserving of support’, and to exhibit scepticism 
regarding the extent to which it is the government’s job to ameliorate social and economic 
disadvantage (Taylor-Gooby and Taylor, 2015). Significantly, these concerns have also been 
increasing amongst Labour voters, indicating the potential for this issue to bring extra support for 
the Conservatives in addition to appealing to grassroots members and existing supporters (Clery, 
Lee and Kunz, 2013; Clery, 2012).  
 
This resulted in the potential for welfare policy to be utilised in such a way in government that it 
achieved ‘cut-through in electoral terms in a way that it hadn’t in previous years’ (Penrose, 
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private interview). This was an emotive subject, which could be used to offer an easily 
understandable (if not accurate) moral argument for significant spending cuts to welfare. Gary 
Streeter suggested that whilst in 2005 calling for spending reductions on welfare would have 
been unpopular and damaging to the Party’s image, in 2010 to 2015: ‘the whole mood is 
completely changed…The Party had to respond to that changed mood and become more robust’. 
The public could ‘see what was happening, they were already changing their own point of view 
on the cost of welfare’ (private interview). Stuart Andrew, who won his seat from Labour in a 
marginal constituency in Yorkshire in 2010, commented that during the campaign (private 
interview): 
 
Time and again, the two issues that were cited were either immigration, or more 
prevalent, welfare. There was real frustration that people who were working felt – and 
it’s not always accurate – that those who weren’t working were having an easy life 
without any checks and balances against it […] People’s finances were being squeezed, 
and when your household income is being squeezed you do notice where other money is 
going.  
 
All of this is not to suggest that the Party would not have undertaken welfare reform were it not 
for the financial crisis: the overwhelming consensus amongst MPs of both parties is that reform 
of the welfare system is something that Duncan Smith, at least, regarded as a moral imperative 
(private interviews). Moreover, the strategy of linking the economic ‘debt crisis’ narrative with 
welfare reform does have downsides. Robert Buckland lamented: ‘I suppose it was unfortunate 
that the agenda on benefit change which I believe would have happened anyway, has become 
enmeshed with austerity’, suggesting that this might have caused some voters to question the 
extent of the Conservative Party’s commitment to long-term reform over shorter-term budget 
savings. John Stevenson, also representing a marginal constituency in the North of England, 
suggested that reform would actually ‘have been easier to have implemented if there had been 
money to oil the wheels […] The need to save money would not have been as great and therefore 
we could have taken more time with it’. However, in linking the need to make cuts with the 
‘broken society’ and the economic downturn, the Conservative leadership was able to add an 
layer of justification to the agenda on welfare. This sought, in line with Conservative ideological 
perspectives, to reduce the role of the state for reasons connected both to spending (for those 
who prioritised the need for cuts) and the types of outcomes achieved (for those more concerned 
with reform). As a result of this, the strategy has relevance even if the economy improves 
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because there are two strands to it: one based on economic efficiency and one on social justice, 
with the former positioned as a precursor to enabling the latter. This then presents Labour with 
an even greater challenge than persuading voters that austerity on the scale the Coalition has 
pursued is not justified: it also needs to address the charges from the Conservatives of welfare 
state failure, and the extent to which this may have encouraged fraud and dependency. 
 
5.6 Fairness, dependency and responsibility 
The Conservative Party identified the political capital to be made from being seen to be tough on 
‘wasteful’ welfare spending, using this as a method of attack against Labour. However this is not 
the extent of its strategic use of welfare policy. There has also been a broader moral narrative, 
which draws on socially conservative conceptions of the effect of the welfare system on 
individual morality in relation to unemployment, and the way that this might act as an affront to 
those who are in work. This has been an increasingly important part of the Conservative electoral 
narrative, and there is some evidence that such conservative views are prevalent amongst the 
wider electorate. However, there may be a limit to the extent to which such a negative strategy is 
viable. It relies quite heavily on assumptions about levels of fraud and the reasons for high 
welfare spending that depend, in part, on the lack of knowledge of the welfare system that is 
characteristic of many voters. These are quite inconsistent with reality, and how the 
Conservatives negotiate this disjuncture may prove to be critical.  
 
Polling has revealed a number of these inconsistencies. Respondents to a poll by YouGov for the 
Trades Union Congress thought that 41 per cent of the welfare budget goes to unemployed 
people: in fact, it is three per cent (TUC, 2013). Respondents also believed that around 30 per 
cent of welfare payments are claimed fraudulently, but the DWP’s own figures put payments lost 
to fraud in 2012/13 at just 0.7 per cent (2014a: 2); similarly, the 2015 British Social Attitudes 
Survey indicates that since the late 1980s, 30 to 40 per cent of people believe that ‘most people 
on the dole are fiddling in one way or another’ (Taylor-Gooby and Taylor, 2015). Voters are also 
prone to over-estimating the level at which benefits are paid and the extent to which claimants 
would be better off in work (YouGov\TUC, 2013: 2-3), and to believing that benefits either 
encourage laziness, or disincentivise working because of this (Clery, Lee and Kunz, 2013). This 
feeds into Lord Ashcroft’s observations, outlined above, regarding the amount that could be 
saved by cutting welfare spending and who would be affected by this, and supports the idea that 
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socially conservative perspectives on welfare are quite widespread. However, while voters might 
well be attracted to such ideas, these do not stand up to the reality of benefit spending and it do 
not accurately reflect where the cuts will be felt (see Chapter 7). Moreover, if the Conservative 
leadership was only to focus on this negative use of welfare policy in its electoral strategy, this 
would undermine its longer-term ambitions regarding Universal Credit. If all that is needed is to 
cut benefits and force claimants back to work, then implementing such a complex reform seems 
unnecessary. 
 
There is, of course, a practical acknowledgement at the policy level that cutting benefits alone is 
not sufficient to address the reasons why people draw on welfare. This partly drives the 
implementation of policies and programmes such as Universal Credit and the Work Programme. 
The more positive utility of the Conservative’s welfare reforms to its electoral appeal is in 
illustrating its commitment to ‘fairness’. Fairness, defined in relation to deservingness, has been 
an integral theme in Conservative discussion on welfare since Cameron took the leadership, 
discussed in the previous chapter. This was linked in with the broader critique of the big state, as 
Osborne argued: ‘at the root of the Left’s failure on fairness in government is a stubbornly-held 
but severely mistaken belief, best expressed in Gordon Brown’s assertion that “only the state can 
guarantee fairness”’ (2008). Iain Duncan Smith continued this theme at the 2010 party 
conference, arguing that it was unfair that the state should take money from people in work, and 
transfer it to people who ‘refuse’ to work (2010). Similarly, Cameron has claimed that ‘we’re 
building a system that matches effort with reward…Instead of a system that rewards those who 
make no effort’ (2011b) and expressed a desire to build ‘a society where fairness is real. Not a 
free-for-all that lets people do as they wish, but an expectation that all will play their part. Where 
you get out what you put in’ (quoted in Montgomerie, 2012).  
 
On the basis of ensuring fairness for individuals, the Party has therefore proposed that its welfare 
reforms have a broader moral purpose than cutting the deficit. In part, this draws on the 
perceived need to tackle widespread abuse of the system. However there is also a more positive 
ideal of fairness, understood in terms of rewarding those who ‘work hard’ and ‘do the right 
thing’. Fair treatment from the government is the reward for those who exercise personal 
responsibility. For example, Universal Credit is intended to offer clearer incentives to work and 
to encourage claimants to take on more work if this is possible, by smoothing the rate at which 
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they lose top-up benefits income if they do so. This helps to build up a longer-term narrative 
around the Conservative approach to social policy which can be sustained separately from the 
austerity agenda: indeed, as is illustrated in the former chapter, much of this narrative was built 
up before austerity in public spending was a concern. Through this the Conservative Party seeks 
to identify itself with those who are perceived as deserving of state support, albeit viewing this as 
a transitional step towards complete economic independence from the state. This encompasses a 
broad category of people who are perceive themselves as ‘hardworking families’, ‘strivers’ or 
‘ordinary people just trying to get on in life’ (O’Brien and Wells, 2012: 44-45).  
 
These are the voters amongst whom the Conservative Party still has an image problem, 
particularly amongst urban voters in the North of England and to an even greater extent, 
Scotland. Lord Ashcroft’s analysis in relation to the 2010 general election (quoted in O’Brien 
and Wells, 2012: 21) suggested that: 
 
The biggest barrier, which was not overcome by election day and remains in place for 
most of [those who considered voting Conservative, but did not], is the perception (which 
Tories are sick of hearing about but is real nonetheless) that the Conservative Party is for 
the rich, not for people like them. 
 
This is problematic. It contradicts the ideational ambitions of a Party which has positioned itself 
in relation to Labour as the party that is above acting for sectional interests and which claims it 
will govern in the best interests of the nation as a whole (Crines, 2013). More immediately, it has 
impeded the Conservatives’ electoral prospects, and will continue to do so if left unresolved. To 
this end, both the Blue Collar Conservative Group and the Conservative Renewal group have 
been established to look at how the Party can better appeal to working class voters and lower-
middle class voters, on the basis that many of the social and political views held by this 
demographic are not incompatible with Conservatism. Stevenson, one of the founders of the 
Blue Collar group, recognised that: ‘the reality for the Conservative Party is that winning in the 
North is not an optional extra or a bonus; it is the only way we will construct another 
Conservative majority government in our lifetime’ (2013). Conservative MPs see their approach 
to ensuring fairness within the welfare system as an important way of working around this. Guto 
Bebb MP claimed that welfare reform was ‘all about the Conservative Party reaching out to 
elements of society who’ve always felt that we were nothing to do with them’ (private 
149 
  
 
interview), appealing to those identified by Ashcroft as ‘Considerers’ (2011) by showing how 
the Conservatives are able to speak to their concerns. 
 
Implementing longer-term reforms, such as Universal Credit, is ambitious and challenging. 
Whilst this may eventually bring rewards for lower-paid workers, it is difficult for the 
Conservative Party to express these in concrete terms in the short-term (see Chapter 7). What has 
been easier electorally since 2010 has been to link fairness through welfare reform with the 
cruder ‘cutting’ policies. As one backbench MP put it: ‘the overwhelming view about what 
people do not want is for others to be receiving benefits to which they are not entitled. That 
offends their sense of social justice’ (private interview).  
 
For example, in relation to the benefit cap, polling for YouGov (2012) showed that in the North 
and Scotland, 51 per cent and 53 per cent of respondents respectively wanted the government to 
impose a lower limit than the initial £26,000 per annum (just 14 and 15 per cent respectively 
wanted the cap raised). Support amongst C2DE voters for a lower level was slightly less than it 
was for ABC1s (50 per cent and 52 per cent respectively), but still significant, particularly given 
that many of the C2DE voters will be in receipt of some state benefits themselves. Support for 
specific policies increased in the North compared to South: the benefits cap, the up-rating limits 
and changes to child benefits were all at least as popular in the North and Scotland as they were 
in the Party’s southern base (excluding London). Of these, the cap was by far the most popular 
policy, with 75 per cent supporting it in the North and 82 per cent in Scotland (YouGov/Sunday 
Times, 2013). This is likely to reflect the difference in the cost of living between the North and 
Scotland and the South. One backbencher claimed that: ‘it’s extremely popular, and it gets more 
popular the further North you go – in many parts of the country, people probably think that the 
benefits cap is set too high’ (private interview). Similarly, Stevenson stated that ‘the £26,000 cap 
to a Northerner seems extortionate. They come to my surgeries and say “£26,000! We don’t earn 
anywhere near that!”’ (private interview). In response to these concerns, some party members 
stated that they would like to see a regional cap, whilst others have advocated a lower overall 
rate (Skidmore, quoted in Hardman, 2012). Cameron has pledged to immediately lower the cap 
should the Conservatives win in 2015 (Dominiczak, 2015). 
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This strategy seeks to exploit and amplify existing weaknesses in Labour’s brand, while placing 
the Conservatives on the side of the aforementioned ‘hardworking’ majority. The concept of 
fairness used to justify these policies and Universal Credit is one of desert and reward for effort. 
The Conservative Party presents this as a response to its characterisation of Labour’s conception 
of fairness, which it claims is concerned with equality of outcome over meritocracy. Therefore it 
is potentially unfair towards those who do work hard, because they do not receive a reasonable 
reward and recognition for this. This portrayal became more pertinent as Labour was seen to 
shift to the left under Ed Miliband’s leadership, as the implication is that a more egalitarian 
approach to welfare policy would entail redistribution and more of the ‘wrong’ people receiving 
the benefits of this. It is too early to tell, as yet, whether this was a factor in Labour’s poor 
electoral performance in 2015 but Conservatives clearly believe that it had the potential to be so. 
Labour is already wary of being labelled, not necessarily accurately, as the ‘benefits party’. 
Duncan Smith noted: ‘it’s quite clear that the vast majority of the public back what we’re doing. 
Where Labour gets their biggest negatives is when they’re associated with welfare, i.e. they want 
more of it’ (quoted in Gimson, 2013). Moreover, it is not just Conservative supporters who view 
Labour negatively in relation to benefits. The decline in support for greater welfare spending has 
been most marked since the 1980s amongst Labour voters. These voters are also increasingly 
likely to explain poverty as an individual (rather than a social) problem (Clery, Lee and Kunz, 
2013), and as such they may be disposed to arguments that focus on fair reward and desert. 
Given this, attempting to align the Conservative Party with these voters’ feelings about welfare 
appears to offer an easy electoral win. 
 
5.7 The 2015 Election 
The topic of welfare reform came up frequently during the lead-up to the 2015 general election. 
Cameron gave a speech in February 2015 suggesting that a majority Conservative government 
would seek to offer more of the same on welfare, returning to key themes discussed in this 
chapter (quoted in le Duc, 2015; see also Conclusion). In his final budget, Osborne (2015) 
announced that the Conservatives would seek to cut a further £12 billion from the welfare budget 
in the next parliament. Treasury minister David Gauke MP then stated that – aside from savings 
of up to £3 billion from freezing working age benefits – the Conservatives would not set out how 
this would be achieved prior to the general election (Mason, 2015). Subsequently, leaked DWP 
documents suggested that the Government was exploring options including restricting Carer’s 
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Allowance, altering the contributory element of ESA, transferring responsibility for Statutory 
Maternity Pay to employers, taxing DLA and PIP, limiting Child Benefit to the first two 
children, and introducing regional benefit caps alongside a confirmed pledge to reduce the 
£26,000 cap to £23,0000 (Buchanan, 2015). Under criticism from Labour and numerous 
disability charities, a spokesperson for Duncan Smith stated that speculation was ‘ill-informed 
and inaccurate’ and that it was ‘wrong and misleading to suggest that any of this is part of our 
plan’ (quoted in Buchanan, 2015). Further details of the plan were not forthcoming. 
 
The Conservatives managed to win 25 additional seats in 2015, gaining the majority that had 
eluded them in 2010. Addressing the 2010 result, Bale (2011: 396-397) suggested that the 
Conservative Party ‘did not fail to win outright because it modernised and moved into the centre. 
It failed because, for some voters at least, that process had not gone far enough’, singling out 
public services as a particularly important issue. We might therefore ask whether this result 
suggests that the ‘detoxification’ strategy carried out under Cameron’s leadership is now 
complete. Has the Conservative Party managed to rid itself of its ‘nasty party’ image? 
 
Table 5.1: Polling on key issues 
Issue Avg. Labour lead, May 2014 – May 2015 
Economy -14.8% 
Unemployment -1.8% 
Welfare benefits 0.6% 
Education 3.4% 
Housing 8.7% 
NHS 12.2% 
Source: YouGov, 2015a 
 
There are reasons to be cautious about inferring this from the victory. There was a paucity of 
credible alternatives in 2015: Labour weaknesses and the collapse in support for the Liberal 
Democrats both aided the Conservatives, while UKIP did not split the Conservative vote on the 
scale that might have been anticipated. Cameron himself was consistently personally preferred to 
Ed Miliband (Ipsos MORI, 2015b: 2-3), although the extent of this approval had fallen slightly 
since 2010 (Ipsos MORI, 2010: 3). Moreover, the Party maintained a strong lead on perceptions 
of economic competency, with Labour trailing by an average of 14.8 percentage points in the 
year preceding the election (YouGov, 2015a: 19; see Table 5.1, above). There were also clear 
indications that the economy itself was recovering (OECD, 2015) and, as the senior partner in 
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the Coalition, the Conservatives were well placed to take credit for this. Beyond this, voter 
perceptions of the Conservative Party offer a much more mixed picture. 
 
Polling prior to the election indicated that ‘decontamination’ of the Conservative brand is far 
from complete. Social issues were expected to play a large part in the result. Four of the ten 
issues perceived as the most important facing Britain in the months leading up to the election 
(unemployment, poverty, housing and low pay) were connected to welfare policy, and Ipsos 
MORI noted that the eighteen per cent who identified ‘poverty and inequality’ marked the 
highest ever percentage to name this issue. A further two – education and the NHS – were 
prominent in the Conservative modernisation agenda throughout the 2005 to 2015 period, with 
the NHS perceived as most important (see Chart 5.6). On these kinds of issues, the 
Conservatives struggled to maintain a clear lead over Labour if, indeed, they were able to attain 
one at all (see Table 5.1). 
 
Moreover, although voters expressed a preference for Cameron, they were less convinced of the 
virtues of Conservative policies and by the party overall: precisely the opposite situation to that 
faced by Miliband (Ipsos MORI, 2015b: 2-3, 5). Perhaps most tellingly, YouGov suggested that 
over the entire parliament, between 44 and 52 per cent of voters felt that the Conservative Party 
‘appeal[s] to one section of society rather than the whole country’ (2015b: 22-24), and that while 
its ability to ‘take tough and unpopular decisions’ was perceived by up to 62 per cent of voters, 
only 20 to 25 per cent felt that its ‘heart is in the right place’ in doing so (2015b: 7-9, 16-18). 
Similar issues emerged in Ipsos MORI’s polling: since 2006, although the Conservatives can be 
encouraged by an increase in the number of people who believe it ‘looks after the interests of 
people like me’, the party is also more readily conceived as ‘extreme’ and ‘out of date’ (see 
Table 5.2). 
 
There were signs in the short campaign that the Conservatives remained sensitive to these 
perceptions, and were taking steps to address them. The manifesto failed to focus on welfare 
savings beyond the pledge on the benefit cap, which Labour had also pledged to retain (Labour 
Party, 2015: 47). Instead, the section on welfare promised an expansion of childcare and tax 
changes. Far more attention was given to public services – notably, the NHS – and housing, 
through a pledge to extend the ‘right to buy’ to housing association tenants (Conservative Party, 
153 
  
 
2015: 37-47, 51-53).  Even the Big Society enjoyed a brief revival (2015: 45). Overall, the 
Conservative short campaign around social issues aimed to strike quite a different tone to much 
of the party’s time in government, playing down issues such as welfare reform that had been 
prominent in preceding years in favour of emphasising the Conservative Party’s ‘softer’ image. 
This shift, while clearly connected to the electoral cycle itself, is indicative of a broader concern 
amongst those responsible for the Party’s electoral fortunes. Fear of being perceived as the ‘nasty 
party’, it appears, remains strong, and with good reason. 
 
Chart 5.6: Issues facing Britain, February 2015 
 
Source: Ipsos MORI, 2015c 
 
Table 5.2: Conservative Party image, 2006 - 2014 
 Looks after the interests of 
people like me 
Extreme Out of date 
September 2006 22 6 22 
May 2010 32 7 25 
September 2014 35 23 48 
Source: Ipsos MORI, 2014a 
 
However, with regard to welfare this appears likely to be a short-term, tactical shift rather than a 
wider shift in strategy. Although the Conservatives have been short on details, there has been no 
suggestion that they will not try to achieve the £12 billion of welfare cuts. The election victory is 
undoubtedly a high point in what has been a difficult period for the party and it masks the fact 
that ‘modernisation’ has brought some significant tensions to the surface, nowhere more clearly 
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than in the bitter disputes over same-sex marriage (Hayton and McEnhill, 2015). The up-coming 
referendum on Europe also threatens to unearth old tensions. As an area of policy that the PCP 
can broadly agree on and one which is perceived as strategically advantageous, welfare policy 
looks set to continue down the path set by the Coalition, unimpeded by the Liberal Democrats. It 
would be highly surprising if the Conservatives did not seek to make further, significant cuts.  
 
These will be extremely difficult to make without affecting benefits paid to working people. 
Welfare is only one issue that contributes to voter perceptions of parties. However, there is 
significant potential here for the Conservatives to further cement their ‘nasty party’ image rather 
than mitigate against it, which may have implications for the longer-term exploitation of welfare 
policy in party competition with Labour. In the short-term, this appears fruitful for the 
Conservatives. The harsh tone struck on welfare issues over the Coalition’s term of government 
may not have visibly damaged the Party’s chances of re-election, but the reality of the scale of 
cuts that are proposed could do so, especially if the concurrent benefits of any economic 
recovery are not seen to be evenly shared. That this takes place within a much wider framework 
of reform is likely to only increase the overall challenges faced, especially as there is little 
evidence outside of the welfare system that the British electorate has widely accepted the idea of 
a permanently more limited state (Ashbee, 2015: 176). The Conservatives should therefore be 
very careful in maintaining a reputation for economic competency above all else: it may turn out 
to be the case that against a more effective opposition and with voters’ memories of the previous 
Labour government fading, this is not enough to sustain them in office. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The Conservative Party’s strategic use of welfare policy as an element of its electoral appeal has 
shifted significantly since 2005. When Cameron took the leadership, the Party’s approach to 
welfare was just one element of a broader process of detoxification, aiming to present a more 
caring and socially inclusive image. This was based both on what it perceived as weaknesses in 
the Labour brand, and the economic context which meant that attacking Labour’s record on 
economic management would have been futile. Further, not being in government, the extent to 
which the Conservatives could offer concrete illustrations of ideas through policies was 
necessarily limited. Accordingly the broader narrative assumed greater significance. Since 
forming the Coalition government in 2010, welfare reform, comprising both the long-term goal 
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of introducing Universal Credit and the more immediate cutting measures, has become a central 
component of the Conservative Party’s electoral strategy. Connected to this, ‘detoxifying’ has 
appeared to be less of a priority for the Conservatives in this area, with the PCP falling back on 
more recognisably Thatcherite perspectives. There are two developments that are pivotal to 
understanding this.  
 
The first is the financial crisis of late 2007. This led to the identification of austerity to eliminate 
the public spending deficit as the Coalition’s first priority (HM Government, 2010: 7). As the 
single biggest area of public spending, the Treasury would have looked to the DWP to cut 
spending in any such exercise. However, the prioritisation of welfare policy as a part of electoral 
strategy goes beyond this perceived necessity, as the critique of spending and measures launched 
on the back of the austerity programme are clear reflections of a fairly consistent Conservative 
Party ideology on the welfare state. As such, the role of the financial crisis reflects Hay’s 
contention that ideas are analytically prior to material circumstances in understanding political 
actions and developments. Even if there was widespread agreement between parties heading 
towards the 2010 election that cuts needed to be made that was precipitated by the crisis, the 
Conservatives nonetheless pursued an approach that was consistent with the Party’s broader 
ideological perspectives on the proper relationship between state, society and individual, seeking 
to limit the direct remit of the interventionist state.  
 
The second event is the existence of the Coalition itself, a result of the failure of the 
Conservative Party to win an overall majority in 2010. The perceived reasons for this and the 
extent to which these can be remedied through a focus on providing ‘fairness’ through the 
welfare state, whilst also tapping into longer-term trends regarding welfare spending, led the 
Party to identify welfare policy as being of particular instrumental value in 2015. Moreover, the 
move into government provided a significant change in context which necessitates a re-
evaluation of strategy, opening up options that were not previously available to the party 
regarding attaching ideas and concepts to policy. Simultaneously, therefore, the 2010 election 
result (while clearly disappointing) provided both a justification for a change of strategy, and the 
means through which this could be put into practice. Combined with the interpretation of the 
crisis and the opportunity for reform brought about by this, a context which was highly selective 
towards welfare retrenchment had emerged. This further calls into question Hay’s claim that 
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ideas exert an effect on context ‘independently’ of material circumstances. In explaining the 
changing role of welfare policy it has proven necessary to explicitly examine the interplay 
between the two, recognising that ‘events’ hold the possibility of prompting ideational re-
assessment even if we continue to accept that it is actors’ interpretations of these that will direct 
their eventual actions. 
 
To some extent, the negative strategy deployed by some elements of the Party in speaking to 
public concerns about fraud and dependency is quite effective. The more immediate reforms 
have been generally well received. The ‘success’ of this element of strategy may be best 
illustrated by the Labour response to it. Labour has struggled to carve out a distinctive position, 
whilst also refuting the Conservative accusation that it is the ‘party of benefits’. Liam Byrne, the 
former shadow Secretary of State for Work and Pensions has occasionally used language about 
claimants that is at least as punitive as anything that has come from the Conservative Party: for 
example, contrasting ‘Britain’s shirkers’ with ‘Britain’s strivers’ and claiming that Labour lost 
the 2010 election because too many potential supporters ‘felt that too often we were for shirkers 
not workers’ (quoted in Jowitt, 2013). This suggests that the strategic advantage that Labour 
once had over the Conservatives in drawing on their more socially caring image has been at least 
somewhat ceded: it is now the Conservative Party that is setting the agenda on welfare policy, 
and striking an increasingly harsh tone. The more positive part of the strategy, aligning the 
Conservative Party with ‘hardworking families’ is intended to address weaknesses in the party’s 
appeal, as well as exploiting weaknesses in the Labour party’s brand.  
 
Measures that are intended to address the gaps in the Conservative electoral constituency are 
proving broadly popular, tapping into widespread beliefs that benefits are too high and 
discourage work, or encourage laziness, and hence that spending needs to be restrained. These 
beliefs are closely aligned with Conservative perceptions of the individualised nature of poverty, 
which in turn provides an impetus for further reform in this area. However, the Conservatives 
may need to tread carefully if they wish to expand electoral support while pursuing the current 
programme of reductions, especially while ‘quality of life’ issues form a significant part of the 
political agenda.  
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Ultimately, the Coalition’s reforms, and future Conservative plans, will end up cutting support to 
the low-paid ‘strivers’ that the Conservatives aim to appeal to, and such a strategy may not 
reflect well on them in the longer-term. Low-paid supporters might have to accept that their own 
incomes will fall, along with the incomes of those viewed as less deserving of support. 
Additionally, even if individuals are not personally affected, cuts to groups such as disabled 
people and the working poor tend to be less popular overall, with such groups often viewed as 
deserving of support (Clery, 2012; YouGov/TUC, 2012). Thus while it seems quite easy to 
gather support around appeals to fairness and connected concepts, the longer-term success of this 
strategy could require the Conservatives to achieve more than just superficial electoral buy-in 
with this concept, accepting the wider logic of a conservative ideological approach to welfare. 
This could prove more challenging, especially because the Conservatives have chosen to heavily 
prioritise short-term tactics over longer-term strategy in promoting their working-age welfare 
reforms, emphasising a view of the welfare state that is quite far from reality in terms of who 
claims, and why. 
 
A complementary strategy relies on re-structuring the welfare system in such a way that existing 
spending is directed towards more ‘deserving’ claimants – which could, simultaneously, assist in 
re-defining what ‘deserving’ means. This is effectively the process of ideological decontestation 
at work in ‘real life’ politics: success here depends on the Conservative Party’s ability to present 
its own interpretations of particular concepts surrounding welfare as being ‘correct’, re-
formulating common understandings of fairness, compassion and so on in a Conservative 
ideological image. The reforms of the 2010 to 2015 period, and the way that these are 
implemented, are of vital importance to this effort. These are the subject of the next two 
chapters.  
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Chapter 6 
Policy I: Universal Credit and the Work Programme 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The move into coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in 2010 provided the 
Conservative Party with the opportunity to put its ideas on welfare policy into practice. Although 
welfare had not formed a central part of the Party’s electoral message leading up to the election, 
a number of Conservatives had been occupied with developing the Party’s working-age welfare 
policy during opposition. In contrast, the Liberal Democrats had preferred to concentrate on 
pensioner policy (Liberal Democrats, 2010: 52-53). This divergence was reflected in the 
allocation of ministerial posts within the Department for Work and Pensions. Cameron appointed 
Iain Duncan Smith as Secretary of State, recognising the substantial work that he had undertaken 
related to poverty whilst on the backbenches. Chris Grayling and Maria Miller were initially 
selected as Minister for Employment and Minister for Disabled People respectively, whilst Nick 
Clegg chose Steve Webb as Minister for Pensions, reflecting both Liberal Democrat policy 
priorities and his substantial expertise on welfare. Given this division of labour, it is suggested 
here that the Conservatives have led on working-age welfare policy development (McEnhill, 
2015). 
 
At this point, it is helpful to clarify why the focus of this chapter and the subsequent one is on the 
Conservative role in policy-making as opposed to a more detailed examination of other groups 
feeding into the policy process. The analytical focus on the Conservatives here is a result of the 
research questions of this thesis. However, these embody an implicit perspective on policy-
making, and the wider question of where power lies in the British political system. Some theories 
of policy development, notably Rhodes’s ‘differentiated polity’ model, stress the plurality of 
actors involved in the process. Rhodes captures this relationship using the concept of policy 
networks, suggesting that rather than the Prime Minister and government deciding policy, it 
emerges from ‘the deliberations of discrete, organised, closed networks of policy actors’, with 
power relatively decentralised, ‘although ministers and departments are important players’ 
(Rhodes, 2003: 8). If this were the case in this policy area, it would necessitate a much wider 
focus on the ideas of other actors within the welfare policy network.  
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Challenging this, Marsh, Richards and Smith advocate an asymmetric power model. This 
suggests that the key actors in policy-making in Britain are still within the core executive, and 
that government ‘is the dominant partner’ in policy-making (2001: 234-235). Interviews for this 
project with those seeking to influence the policy process – for example, think-tanks and 
charities – suggested, in line with Marsh, Richards and Smith’s findings, that the government 
had significant sway over the terms of engagement, particularly with regard to consultation. 
MPs, civil servants and external actors alike also stressed the continued importance of 
government ministers in shaping policy development. This is not to discount the importance of 
policy networks per se, or to claim that departments are entirely autonomous, but it does imply 
that an asymmetric power model offers a more accurate characterisation of the role of 
government in this policy area. This, in turn, justifies the focus in these chapters on the ideas and 
beliefs of Conservative actors and the actions of the relevant departments – notably, the DWP 
and the Treasury, the latter of which is increasingly concerned with policy initiatives around 
welfare (Marsh, Richards and Smith, 2001: 129-130).  
 
With this said, Duncan Smith’s appointment as Secretary of State was significant because he 
brought with him plans for a sweeping re-structure of the welfare system, in the form of 
Universal Credit. This was the centrepiece of the policy work that the Centre for Social Justice 
(CSJ) had been developing since 2004. Universal Credit is the amalgamation of several separate 
benefits into one payment, as a means of bringing about greater clarity for claimants regarding 
the effects on their income of moving into work or increasing their working hours. While still 
viewing claiming benefits as a matter of choice, this reflects a rational, as opposed to a solely 
moral approach to countering this, which is quite novel for the Conservatives. This was added on 
to existing plans to reform the welfare-to-work programmes introduced by New Labour by 
implementing a new ‘Work Programme’ and an extended range of ‘work experience’ schemes. 
This was a policy area that Grayling had taken a keen interest in developing in opposition, as a 
means of achieving better results for ‘hard to help’ claimants by utilising the expertise of 
voluntary, community and private organisations in preference to state-led support. Together, 
these policies represent the crystallisation of the renewed Conservative ideas on poverty that had 
been developing over the years in opposition.  
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This chapter considers how effectively the Conservative Party has translated concepts of poverty, 
responsibility, fairness and compassion into these policies. Chapter 4 suggested that taken 
together, these four concepts form the basis of a coherent theoretical rationale for welfare 
reform, providing a set of goals to be fulfilled that relate to both the behaviour of individual 
claimants and, consequentially, the well-being of the broader society. However, the process of 
translating ideas into policy does not end at the point of policy introduction. In order to fully 
analyse and evaluate the process of translation from abstract ideas into policy it is important to 
examine not only policy rationales, intentions and stated goals, but also outcomes: how different 
policy instruments function together as a whole, and which concepts are prioritised or 
downplayed in their delivery and implementation. Putting together a coherent theoretical 
rationale is arguably the easier part of constructing an approach to a particular policy area: the 
bigger challenges lie around difficult decisions and adjustments that must be made during and 
after implementation. Therefore if the aim is to understand the nuanced aspects of Conservative 
ideology that feed into policy-making, consideration of this on-going stage is required. This is 
also important in understanding the longer-term implications of Coalition reforms in this policy 
area. Ultimately it is the impact of policy that will shape the policy context for both the majority 
Conservative administration and future governments. 
 
This chapter suggests that plans for both policies fit fairly well with the four key concepts, and 
there are a number of common or complementary strands between the two. Both are founded on 
an individualised account of poverty. This is expressed as ‘welfare dependency’, implying that 
poverty is something that can be effectively tackled by addressing the perceived weaknesses and 
poor decisions of individual benefit claimants. Stemming from this, both contain a strong 
emphasis on responsibility decontested as self-sufficiency, through a focus on engagement in 
paid work as both a social and individual moral obligation. Both embody notions of fairness, 
operationalised via greater conditionality for claimants. This relates to the concern that claimants 
should not be seen to be getting ‘something for nothing’, but are also entitled to receive support 
in moving back into work. Finally, the Work Programme in particular exhibits a concern with 
conservative ‘compassion’. This is exemplified in the enhanced work requirements placed on 
(sometimes reluctant) claimants, and the attempt to develop a stronger civil society by utilising 
diverse organisations, which meet with the conception of compassionate values, as service 
161 
  
 
providers. This should support goals around the Big Society focused on nurturing civil society as 
an alternative to central state provision, beginning to allow state provision to be withdrawn. 
 
Inevitably, the development and implementation process for both policies has thrown up 
challenges. It is mediated firstly by the existence and character of current institutions, systems 
and expectations. These may serve to shut down numerous possible approaches to particular 
policy issues, both in ideological and administrative terms. Secondly there is a need to maintain 
an electoral appeal alongside tackling policy problems. Depending on how these problems are 
framed and what outcomes are sought, these two strategic priorities may require different 
solutions, leading to tension and perhaps either sub-optimal policy or weak electoral strategies. 
Thirdly there is the pressure introduced by external challenges and interpretations of these: 
notably, here, the economy. The strategically selective context in which policy is made is 
therefore densely structured, rendering incremental change preferable to radicalism due to the 
risk of failure and requiring on-going compromise between different aims and goals.  
 
Universal Credit, the Work Programme and the measures discussed in the subsequent chapter are 
therefore all best regarded as inevitably imperfect attempts to bring to life the afore-discussed 
Conservative ideas on welfare, balancing these with more immediate pressures and resolving 
inter-Party disagreements on the best means of implementation. In practice these policies cannot 
be reasonably portrayed as seamless or comprehensive manifestations of Conservative welfare 
ideology. However this is not a problem from the perspective of studying the Party’s ideology. 
The outcomes of the process of implementation, including the particular elements of ideological 
concepts that are emphasised and explanations as to why other elements have been downplayed, 
can tell us a lot about both the Party’s priorities and the balance of power within it. Accordingly, 
such understandings inform discussion of the likely future trajectory of policy through shaping 
the strategically selective context that all future administrations will have to negotiate. 
 
The central argument of the chapter is that the ideational innovation of both reforms has been 
undermined, or has significant potential to be undermined, by the identified need to cut the 
public spending deficit as the ‘most urgent task’ facing the Coalition (HM Government, 2010: 
7), and the subsequent cuts to come under the Conservative majority. The DWP will see its 
budget cut by £20 billion by the end of 2014/15 (NAO, 2011: 5), and the Conservatives have 
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announced plans to cut a further £12 billion in the 2015 to 2020 parliament (Osborne, 2015). 
While the austerity measures discussed in the following chapter arguably play a bigger part in 
electoral positioning than the policies discussed here, there is nonetheless an effect on these 
policies given the broader framing of spending on welfare as ‘waste’ rather than investment that 
is inherent in the austerity-focused strand of policy. This places additional pressures on the 
prospects for future development of Universal Credit and the Work Programme, limiting the 
opportunities for the Conservative Party to advance its approach to the welfare state beyond 
retrenchment, and stunting the overall progress of ideological development. 
 
6.2 Universal Credit 
Universal Credit is the Coalition government’s flagship welfare reform. It will replace six 
separate ‘legacy benefits’: Income Support, income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), 
income-based Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), Housing Benefit, Child Tax Credit 
and Working Tax Credit. Universal Credit consists of a basic payment (the ‘standard 
allowance’), alongside additional ‘elements’ for (un)employment, housing, disability, caring and 
children/childcare (DWP, 2010a: 2-3). The standard allowance and elements are all means-
tested. A number of other benefits, including the Personal Independence Payment (PIP – 
formerly Disability Living Allowance), Child Benefit, Carer’s Allowance, contribution-based 
JSA and contribution-based ESA are not included in Universal Credit. These will continue to 
exist as separate benefits, albeit with the latter two administered using the same systems as 
Universal Credit.20 Reform will mean that the higher-rate contributory benefits will ‘only be paid 
for a fixed period to facilitate a transition back to work’ (DWP, 2010b: 32; DWP, 2012a), after 
which former recipients will wholly rely on Universal Credit. In theory, Universal Credit should 
make the claiming process easier for claimants in terms of how changes in employment 
circumstances will affect their income, thereby helping to ‘incentivise’ moves into work or 
increasing hours. This suggests a predominantly rational understanding of dependency, rather 
than one based on claimants’ moral failings. However, as will be discussed, the two are not 
entirely separable. 
                                                 
20
 This means that income gained from contribution-based JSA and ESA will be taken into account when calculating 
a households’ entitlement to Universal Credit. Therefore the level of payment received via Universal Credit will 
potentially be affected by the receipt of these benefits (DWP, 2010a: 23).  
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This reflects the partial resolution of tensions over fairness and the impact on responsibility of 
contributory versus means-tested benefits discussed in Chapter 4. It confirms that it is unlikely 
that the Conservatives will opt to make a strong case for the extension of the former type of 
benefit. A consequence of this ‘non-decision’ may be to limit the options available to a future 
Labour government, through moving provision further from a contributory basis. Instead, 
‘fairness’ will be delivered via Universal Credit as a means-tested system which attempts to 
ensure that claimants are unable to get ‘something for nothing’. This necessitates a strong 
emphasis on claimants both being designated ‘in need’ of financial support, and meeting defined 
conditions as a requisite for receipt of the benefit (DWP, 2010a: 65). This then also promotes 
responsible behaviour which, within both Universal Credit and the Work Programme, is 
synonymous with engaging in or taking steps to engage in paid work (Deacon and Patrick, 2011: 
171). This embodiment of ‘responsibility’ is prioritised above almost all other means of social 
and economic engagement, with only some people with caring duties excused from Universal 
Credit’s work-related conditions (DWP, 2010a: 24). 
 
Operating alongside the Work Programme, Universal Credit can be understood as part of an 
‘activating’ welfare system in which the emphasis is on providing support and opportunities for 
claimants to enable them to move from dependency to independence (Houston and Lindsay, 
2010: 136). Activating systems take a primarily supply-side approach to moving benefit 
claimants into work. In addition to addressing the individual shortcomings that might prevent 
individuals from accessing the labour market (which is the main role of the Work Programme), 
part of this kind of approach involves focusing on the attitudes of individuals with respect to 
work. In Universal Credit, this takes the form of identifying the perceived disincentives within 
the structures of the welfare system that negate against people making the decision to move into 
work. These include the rates at which benefits are withdrawn when a claimant moves into work, 
and the diminishing returns or financial uncertainty that might be associated with working more 
hours. Such factors, the argument goes, might contribute to claimants forming the belief that they 
are ‘better off on benefits’ (Osborne, 2013a), thus discouraging them from seeking work. As 
such, part of the Universal Credit approach is to seek to produce attitudinal and hence 
behavioural change through reforming the structure of benefit payments. 
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Conceptually, such an approach is congruent with Conservative ideas on the behavioural causes 
of dependency, and hence of poverty. The root of the problem of reliance on the welfare system 
in this analysis is located at the level of individual decision-making, enabled by a system that has 
prioritised improving material well-being over rewarding constructive behaviour. However, the 
existence of structures within the British welfare system which might mitigate against working 
have been broadly identified both within and beyond the PCP. This is discussed further below in 
relation to benefit simplification. What identifies the ideas underpinning Universal Credit as 
distinctly Conservative and heavily influenced by Thatcherism, however, is that reforming the 
system so that the weak incentives and conditionality within it are ameliorated is posited as a 
‘magic bullet’ for ending dependency. For example, the SJPG’s Economic dependency report 
focuses extensively on various individual level barriers to work such as ‘benefit traps’ and high 
withdrawal rates (SJPG, 2006a: 79-88) but fails to propose any measures that address structural 
issues, such as low pay or a lack of jobs. Conservative interventions on welfare reform, such as 
those discussed below, are equally light on such problems, while strongly emphasising the 
centrality of individual choice in perpetuating poverty. Consequentially, Universal Credit leaves 
the problem of weaknesses in the labour market itself unaddressed. Within this understanding, 
supply-side interventions focused on individuals are not part of the solution to moving claimants 
away from state support; they are the solution. 
 
Analyses of the British labour market routinely suggest that tackling supply-side issues is only 
part of the challenge in boosting employment. Significant demand-side barriers to work include a 
lack of demand for labour, lack of suitable jobs or poor pay (Goulden 2010; Crisp et al. 2009a). 
Lack of opportunities for in-work progression also form an important part of explanations for 
persistent material poverty (Schmuecker, 2014). For disabled claimants the barriers to work are 
potentially even higher, compounding the extent to which their employment difficulties can be 
addressed through supply-side interventions.21 Drawing on this, a number of studies that suggest 
that widespread ‘dependency’ as Conservatives often define it (in terms of a conscious aversion 
                                                 
21 Supply-side interventions for disability benefit claimants are reflective of an individualist approach to disability; 
while a full discussion of the implications of this approach are outside the remit of this chapter, these issues are 
returned to in the section on DLA/PIP reforms in the following chapter. See also Grover and Piggott (2010). 
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to working) does not exist: it is factors other than this that tend to lead to long-term 
unemployment (Esser, 2009; Walker with Howard, 2000; Dean and Taylor-Gooby, 1992).  
 
These dovetail with analyses concerning the effectiveness of the specific strategies employed 
within Universal Credit. International evidence on whether conditionality operationalized via 
sanctioning is an effective means of bringing about behavioural change, in what circumstances, 
and at what social costs, does not engender straightforward conclusions (Lee, Slack and Lewis, 
2004; van den Berg, 2002; Cherlin et al. 2002); similarly, the extent to which changes in 
marginal tax rates impact on work incentives varies between different demographics of 
unemployed and employed people (Adam, Brewer and Shepherd, 2006). This evidence suggests 
that viewing unemployment purely in individualistic terms (either rationally or morally) is 
unrealistic: hence, the extent to which ‘dependency’ can be overcome by the sorts of 
interventions used in Universal Credit is potentially more limited than Conservatives have 
proposed. As Katie Schmuecker, Poverty Team manager for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
summarised: ‘our research shows that these [attitudinal and behavioural] things do matter, but 
they’re probably not the things that matter most’ (private interview).  
 
Much of the PCP appears to simply not accept this, having already identified worklessness as a 
matter of choice which has been enabled by an insufficiently demanding welfare system and 
payments that are perceived as overly generous, thus dis-incentivising work. Conservative MPs 
provided a number of examples of this thinking during the second reading of the Welfare Reform 
Act (2012) (HC Hansard, 9 March 2011). Paul Uppal spoke of former friends who would: ‘tell 
me to my face that they envisaged that the rest of their life would be on benefits, and they were 
quite happy to live that way’. Sajid Javid claimed: ‘in short, many people have come to see 
welfare as a career option’. The idea of the welfare system as ‘some sort of life choice’ 
(Cameron, quoted in Hope and Mason, 2013) is also a recurrent piece of rhetoric by those at the 
top of the Party (Hayton and McEnhill, 2014). Such an interpretation reinforces the need to focus 
on the individuals who are within the welfare system in ending this ‘culture of dependency’ (Priti 
Patel, HC Hansard, 9 March 2011), rather than considering broader structural inequalities. This 
understanding of dependency and poverty as individualised problems has clear implications for 
policy, which are crystallised in the design and strategies of Universal Credit and the Work 
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Programme. These strategies and the ideas underpinning them are discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
As mentioned above, there has been considerable interest in reform to simplify the welfare 
system since before the Coalition came to power. Dame Anne Begg, former Labour Chair of the 
Work and Pensions Select Committee, commented that the single working-age benefit had long 
been the ‘Holy Grail of welfare reform’ across all parties (private interview). A review 
commissioned by Gordon Brown’s government reported that ‘there has been a growing interest 
in recent years in the complexity of the British social security system’ (Sainsbury and Weston, 
2009: 6). Analyses for think-tanks from the IPPR (Sainsbury and Stanley, 2007) to the Centre for 
Policy Studies (Martin, 2009) have suggested that re-structuring welfare payments into one 
single payment might pay great dividends in terms of removing the uncertainty associated with 
moving into work or altering working hours. The Work and Pensions Select Committee has also 
tentatively endorsed the idea (2007). Ultimately, as one senior former civil servant suggested: 
‘the Universal Credit-type approach is the sort of thing which young researchers at the IFS, and 
indeed the Treasury and the DWP like to kick around, and have been doing so for the last 
twenty-five years’ (private interview).  
 
However, this particular manifestation was developed by the CSJ’s Economic Dependency 
Working Group (EDWG) in its report Dynamic Benefits (EDWG, 2009). Peter King, an 
academic and advisor to the EDWG, suggested that it constituted ‘the hard labour for welfare 
reform, sort of sub-let from the Conservative Party’ (private interview). Catherine Haddon, 
author of a research project for the Institute for Government (2012) on policy-making in 
opposition from 2005-2010 corroborated this, confirming that as well as providing an important 
research resource, ‘ideologically, [the CSJ] was hugely important’. Haddon commented that the 
exact nature of the relationship between the Conservative Party – specifically Duncan Smith – 
and the CSJ was unclear in terms of ‘who influenced who’ (private interview), a point that was 
similarly put by two senior civil servants (private interviews). Nonetheless, given the close 
relationship, it is unsurprising that the CSJ’s work on the single benefit suggests ideas that are 
congruent with Conservative perspectives on welfare.  
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Principal amongst these, and signifying the innovation of the CSJ’s approach in contrast to the 
others cited above, is the extent to which Dynamic Benefits focuses on the importance of the 
source of an individual or family’s income, rather than the amount. It claims that: ‘a system that 
penalises work, and focuses on how much income people have, without distinguishing between 
earnings from work and income from benefits, merely considers the symptoms of dependency 
and poverty’ (EDWG, 2009: 16). The report goes on to correlate simply being in work (and 
being in a particular family situation) with good social outcomes. Referencing the SJPG’s own 
research, it states that: ‘there is a well-established body of evidence that two parent families with 
at least one working member generally produce the best overall long-term outcomes for the 
whole household’ (EDWG, 2009: 19). Consequentially, the report argues that work must be 
incentivised through offering lower Participation Tax Rates and lower Marginal Tax Rates, as 
the levels at which these are set currently disincentivise employment (EDWG, 2009: 18-20). 
Implementing a system in which there is a clear financial advantage to moving into work or 
improving one hours is then linked with broader social issues. Engagement with work is 
presented as central to resolving a range of problems which the CSJ suggests result from 
dependency on the state, including social exclusion, poor health, low educational attainment, and 
low levels of social mobility (SJPG, 2006a: 13-14).  
 
As well as offering an evidence base which can support Conservative scepticism towards the 
interventionist state, this analysis also ties in more specifically with the Conservative critique of 
the impact of receipt of unconditional, or insufficiently conditional, means-tested benefits on 
individual responsibility. Lack of money is cast as the symptom of poverty, but trying to address 
this through cash transfers merely perpetuates a cycle of irresponsible decision making which 
renders the recipient increasingly reliant on the state. This is because it implicitly rewards the 
decision not to work, in turn ‘trapping’ the recipient within a lifestyle to which they are able to 
become accustomed due to the receipt of unearned income (Grayling, HC Hansard, 1 February 
2012a: see also Chapter 4). The responsible choice of going back to work therefore comes to 
represent hardship. The emphasis on incentives therefore acknowledges that it is unfair to expect 
claimants to take this route (see below). This is also linked with the over-arching perspective that 
poverty cannot be sustainably tackled without changing behaviour (Duncan Smith, 2012a). 
Altering incentives is then a necessary step. Without this, the fundamental building block of 
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responsible behaviour amongst claimants, which enables a fair system to flourish, will not and 
cannot be realised.  
 
While Dynamic Benefits focuses on the incentivising element of Universal Credit, in 
implementation these ideas have also been linked to greater conditionality. Conditionality is 
significantly extended within Universal Credit compared to the previous system. It applies not 
only to JSA claimants or those claiming the full employment element, but also to those in work 
who may be required to ‘increase their earnings to the equivalent of 35 hours per week at 
National Minimum Wage’ (Work and Pensions Select Committee, 2014a: 5-6). It remains 
unclear how in-work conditionality will be applied in practice, but ideally it would encourage 
progression in work (HC Hansard, 11 September 2012). It is therefore justified on the basis that 
it is supportive in enabling claimants to move towards complete independence, and as a means of 
improving improve social mobility, with the attendant societal benefits that Conservatives have 
proposed that this brings (Tarr and Finn, 2012: 52). Conditionality is also extended to disabled 
people in the ESA Work-Related Activity Group (see DWP, 2012b), again on the basis that the 
appropriate application of this can provide positive outcomes in moving those disabled people 
designated as closest to the labour market back into work (DWP, 2012c: 6; Gregg, 2008). 
 
The extended emphasis on conditionality for those out of work or in low-paid work reflects the 
Conservative complaint that New Labour did too little to tie receipt of benefits to making 
responsible decisions (Duncan Smith, HC Hansard, 31 March 2014). For many households, 
therefore, ‘dependency on out-of-work benefits has been replaced by dependency on tax credits’, 
with disincentives trapping people within the tax credit system (SJPG 2006a: 12). Extra 
conditionality can therefore also be tied in with a Conservative concept of compassion, which is 
coercive of individuals in the pursuit of eventually positive social and individual outcomes. This 
is discussed further in the second section of this chapter, in relation to conditionality within the 
Work Programme. 
 
The ideas underpinning Universal Credit offer part of a very rational solution for discouraging 
dependency, which fits well with some Conservative MPs’ perceptions of the rationality of 
claimant decision-making in claiming working-age benefits. This rational understanding of 
claimant behaviour underpinned the CSJ’s approach to the topic as far as claimants are 
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concerned. Corin Taylor, a member of the group that worked on Dynamic Benefits, stated that 
‘there were very poor work incentives…You see people making very rational decisions not to 
work’ (private interview). Deven Ghelani, a CSJ researcher, similarly suggested that without 
appropriate incentives: ‘it becomes very difficult to moralise over “you need to do this, you need 
to do that to get this job, you need to…” It becomes a very antagonistic relationship because 
their response is “why?”’ (private interview). Dynamic Benefits offers a similar awareness of the 
difficulties of imploring people to work without offering adequate recompense: 
 
We must also recognise that few of those out of work would look upon work as a moral 
choice, rather than a practical one. For them, employment and career progression above 
all has to pay and if we understand that this is part of what motivates those already in 
work, why do we seem to expect something altogether different of benefit claimants? 
(EDWG, 2009: 6-7) 
 
This still very much follows an individualistic understanding of poverty and benefit receipt. 
However, rather than falling back solely on moral exhortations to work and an emphasis on 
claimants’ moral failings, it introduces something that is innovative in policy terms for the 
Conservatives in this area, emphasising how the system itself needs to work for claimants. This 
is somewhat different from the Conservative approach of the 1980s, which assumed that limiting 
and de-valuing benefits would be enough to force claimants into self-sufficiency (Mabbett, 2013: 
43), and from much of the rest of the Party’s contemporary thinking on welfare. Via the 
proposed incentive structure there is a recognition of the need to make work more attractive to 
claimants, in addition to making not working, or not working enough, sufficiently unattractive. 
Hence it is with some justification that Lord Freud claimed that Universal Credit is concerned 
with ‘redefining the contract between claimants and the welfare state’ (quoted in DWP, 2014b), 
at least as far as the Conservative Party is concerned. It suggests the extension of economic 
liberal logic into social policy. Here, further indicating that there has been some ideological 
development in this area, the Conservatives found significant common ground with the Liberal 
Democrats around the idea of ‘making work pay’ (Clegg, quoted in Stratton, 2010). 
 
The linking of conditionality with incentives in Universal Credit, alongside the support offered 
through the Work Programme, then opens up the space within which the moral argument for 
engaging in work as a matter of fairness can be advanced more convincingly since the practical 
barriers, according to Conservative thinking, will have been removed. The rationality of this 
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approach, which could be interpreted as a shift away from social conservatism, therefore permits 
the re-assertion of traditionally conservative moral perspectives. It can therefore be understood 
as a means to an end, rather than a wholesale ideological shift. Ideologically this is reflective of a 
strand of Conservatism that has a slightly different understanding of human behaviour within the 
relationship between state, society and individual than has been expressed in welfare policy in 
recent decades, as well as a sharper perception of the need to adapt to New Labour’s changes. 
While still seeking to limit the direct relationship between individuals and the state, and to roll 
back state intervention as its ultimate goal, this strand takes a rather more long-term approach to 
doing so. This is duel-pronged, emphasising both individual responsibility and the importance of 
incentives.  
 
A potential problem is that such long-term strategies will inevitably be affected by more 
immediate pressures and concerns. Universal Credit represents an up-front cost within a 
department that has been extensively targeted for expenditure cuts since 2010, for both political 
and economic purposes. The DWP expects to spend £2.4 billion implementing Universal Credit, 
up to April 2023 (Public Accounts Committee 2013: 5). The DWP impact assessment estimated 
that when implemented, Universal Credit would cost an extra £2.3 billion owing to changes in 
entitlement rules and increased take-up. However, this would be offset by £2.2 billion saved 
from reduced fraud and error. It remarks: ‘in the longer term, reduced complexity has the 
potential to lead to savings of more than £0.2 billion a year in administrative costs’. These 
calculations do not allow for potential savings resulting from behavioural change, which are a 
key intention of the policy (DWP 2012d: 5). During the Public Bill Committee stage of the 
Welfare Reform Act, Mike Brewer of the IFS remarked that Universal Credit has ‘the potential’ 
to bring about such change as it should remove ‘pinch points’ in the welfare system around 
moving in and out of work (HC Hansard, 22 March 2011); however, this is contradicted by some 
other evidence regarding the effects of incentives and sanctions, cited above. Regardless of its 
capacity to bring about future savings and the possible realisation of Conservative ideological 
goals, Universal Credit’s implementation must be considered within its immediate economic and 
political context. 
 
The decision to attempt to implement Universal Credit appears unusual given its cost, 
challenging nature, and the fact that it was entirely absent from pre-election Conservative 
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literature on welfare policy. Duncan Smith’s appointment was instrumental in its introduction, as 
senior civil servants confirmed (private interviews). In Frank Field’s words: ‘IDS made the 
Universal Credit a programme to be implemented. It would never have happened without him. It 
would have been squashed by the Treasury on the grounds that they’ve never done an IT scheme 
that works’ (private interview). Cameron’s decision in this respect could be understood partially 
in terms of party management. One 2010 intake MP remarked that for the right of the 
Conservative Party,  it was ‘certainly a source of comfort […] to have one of their own in such a 
position’, particularly given some scepticism of Cameron’s leadership on the Party’s socially 
conservative wing. Others found it ‘immensely reassuring’ that ‘there was a central moral thread 
to [welfare reform], rather than just slash and burn’ (Penrose, private interview) feeling that this 
buttressed the Conservative Party’s claim to not just being about ‘pounds, shillings and pence 
and the economy’ (Streeter, private interview). However, Duncan Smith brought with him a 
clear plan from the CSJ. In return for the money being made available for implementation, he 
then acceded to severe welfare cuts, which would see the welfare budget fall by £20 billion in 
2014/15 (NAO, 2011: 5). Duncan Smith was retained in the welfare brief in Cameron’s new 
cabinet in 2015, and it must be assumed that there Universal Credit roll-out will continue. 
Further cuts are also to come. 
 
Reservations from the Treasury over the project resulted in clashes between Duncan Smith and 
Osborne, with Osborne reportedly claiming that Duncan Smith ‘[opposed] every cut’ that he 
sought to make (d’Ancona, 2013: 90). Most of these, and the emerging tensions between 
austerity and Universal Credit, are discussed in the following chapter. However, there are two 
issues which merit further discussion here. These are the Treasury’s announcement that 
claimants will be required to wait for seven days before claiming unemployment benefits, and 
the effect of austerity on the Universal Credit single taper.   
 
The ‘seven-day’ policy was announced by Osborne and justified with reference to the 
importance of being in work and making every effort to look for work. He stated: ‘those first few 
days should be spent looking for work, not looking to sign on. We’re doing these things because 
we know they help people stay off benefits and help those on benefits get back into work faster’ 
(2013b). Where claimants are eligible for Universal Credit, the seven-day wait will apply to the 
entire award including the housing element. This will result in an average loss of £153 per 
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household; far higher than the amount lost in the existing three-day waiting period for JSA only 
(Kennedy, 2013: 8). Although it is one of the less eye-catching elements of benefit reforms, this 
is significant. It cuts across the rationale behind Universal Credit regarding taking some of the 
financial uncertainty and risk out of moving into work.  
 
The importance of the cost implications behind this decision cannot be ignored, especially given 
the conditions that already apply to new JSA claims that prevent those who find themselves 
‘voluntarily’ workless from claiming (see below). This move is expected to save approximately 
£350 million per year (BBC News, 2013a). This is reflective of a more instrumental, immediate 
approach to tackling welfare spending than the longer-term agenda that appears to drive Duncan 
Smith’s reforms. As Kwasi Kwarteng put it: ‘we can get into a moral argument [about cutting 
welfare spending] but I would suggest that now, given where we are, it’s almost irrelevant’. He 
continued: ‘The point is that we’re still borrowing £120 billion a year, and the welfare bill is the 
largest slice of the pie so we’ve got to deal with that and stop borrowing this money’ (private 
interview). Similarly, Richard Graham MP told the house that ‘compassion is incredibly 
important, but money matters in this game, because there is no social justice in bankrupting the 
public finances’ (HC Hansard, 30 June 2014). In such a perspective, sound public finances are 
elevated above the moral imperative in a way that significantly contradicts the goals of Universal 
Credit. 
 
Such a move can also be tied in with some elements of ideological and electoral concerns, at 
least from a short-term perspective, as they apply to non-claimants. This relates to being seen to 
offer a system that is ‘fair’ to those who fund it by cutting down opportunities for people to ‘play 
the system’ (Hoban, 2012). The people who will be affected by the seven-day requirement are 
those who the Conservatives characterise as ‘perpetual jobseekers’ (Conservative Party, 2009: 
10). This group cycle in and out of work and poverty, thus avoiding the more onerous conditions 
placed on long-term unemployed people but still being in receipt of benefits. If receipt is 
understood in terms of choice then ostensibly the seven-day wait would discourage this. 
However, such circumstances are often less through personal choice than because the work that 
these claimants are engaged in is insecure and badly paid (Shildrick et al., 2010). Additionally, 
there are already restrictions on newly unemployed claimants’ entitlement to aim unemployment 
benefits. JSA is not usually immediately available to those who have left their jobs voluntarily, 
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nor to those who have been sacked. In fact, the waiting period for such claimants is much longer 
than seven days.22 Crucially, the claimants that will be affected are those who are behaving as 
Universal Credit intends them to by taking work wherever possible even if the longer-term 
prospects are poor. The central concern here is with constructing an impression of ‘fairness for 
taxpayers’. However, this important element of electoral positioning is accomplished here in 
such a way that it cuts across both the conceptions of fairness and compassion for those within 
the welfare system, and may ultimately discourage moving into work. 
 
Dynamic Benefits proposed a 55 per cent single taper within Universal Credit, arguing that this 
‘represents the best compromise between improving incentives and containing costs’ (EDWG, 
2009: 26). Owing to budget pressures, Universal Credit is being implemented with a 65 per cent 
taper. This will save £2.8 billion per year (Save the Children, 2013: 4). It will also mean that 
approximately 2.8 million households will face higher marginal deduction rates under Universal 
Credit than they would have under the tax credit system, losing an average of £137 per month 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2012d: 5). Lone parent families are at particular risk of 
losing out, compounded by the extra barriers that they face in progressing in work (Brewer and 
DeAngostini, 2013).  
 
Ghelani acknowledged that it was a ‘crying shame’ that the taper was higher than envisaged, but 
that implementing Universal Credit with the lower rate was ‘very difficult to justify right now’ 
due to financial pressures. However, he continued: ‘I think it’s more important to have Universal 
Credit as a system in place and working. What you want is for the next Secretary of State to be 
able to make those sorts of decisions with confidence’ (private interview). His perspective was 
shared by some Conservatives. Guto Bebb stated that the taper was ‘not as generous as it could 
be’; ‘if we have money available at some point in the near future I would like to see that lowered 
[…] I think it’s a step in the right direction, but it’s not going be as revolutionary as I would have 
hoped’ (private interview). Similarly, when questioned on the change by former Shadow 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Douglas Alexander, Duncan Smith replied: ‘the real 
issue here is not that the taper is 65 per cent’. Rather, ‘the taper rate itself involves a decision, 
                                                 
22
 Newly unemployed claimants must show that they have left work ‘for good reason’, or that a dismissal was not 
‘because of the way that [they] behaved’. Failure to do so results in JSA payments being delayed for between 
thirteen weeks and three years (DWP, 2013a: 7-8). 
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which a government of any hue would take, about how to set the balance between what we can 
afford and how much we will be able to give people as they go back into work’. The more 
important concern was the implementation of the system itself (HC Hansard, 11 November 
2010). The levels at which its levers were set could then be adjusted in relation to economic 
context. 
 
Such an argument is somewhat reasonable. Universal Credit should, after all, improve incentives 
for the majority of claimants (Brewer, Browne and Jin, 2011), and the taper rate is not set in 
stone. However, the argument must be further considered against Conservative perceptions of 
the political and economic reality. The direction of travel on welfare policy (and austerity, more 
widely) suggests that it is highly unlikely that either the in-coming Cameron majority 
government, or a future Conservative government will seek to lower the taper. Moreover, as 
discussed in the following chapter, Osborne has announced the intention to find further savings 
after 2015; these savings will impact on people in work, including those claiming Universal 
Credit as they cut across the elements within it (BBC News, 2014). Thus the part of Universal 
Credit that offers a somewhat innovative Conservative approach to welfare policy appears to be 
on increasingly shaky ground. Without this, Universal Credit becomes less ‘carrot’ and more 
‘stick’, relying on conditionality to compel people into work that may be of negligible financial 
benefit.  
 
With a greater reliance on conditionality, and less emphasis on incentives, the implementation of 
this policy therefore begins to rely more on arguments around the moral benefits of working 
which are redolent of unreformed Thatcherism. As with the seven-day requirement, the emphasis 
here is on providing an impression of fairness for the ‘taxpayers’ who fund the welfare system, 
closely related to Conservative electoral strategy. Whilst arguably satisfying the goals of 
producing responsible behaviour amongst claimants (if they are able to find work), this is again 
accomplished at the expense of fairness for low-paid workers who are expected to work simply 
because it is the ‘right’ thing to do. If not altered, this approach will undermine the more 
innovative side of Universal Credit, based on a rational conception of claimant behaviour, 
leaving only a limited, highly conditional welfare ‘safety net’ rather than the enabling system 
that the CSJ, and Duncan Smith, had envisaged. This is further compounded in relation to the 
reforms discussed in Chapter 8. 
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6.3 The Work Programme 
Given the centrality of resolving poverty by promoting self-sufficiency to the Conservative 
Party’s social vision, the implementation of a number of ‘welfare-to-work’ programmes is the 
second key plank in its welfare reforms. These include the flagship Work Programme and a 
number of smaller ‘work experience’ schemes operating alongside this, including Work 
Experience, Mandatory Work Activity, Community Work Placements and Sector-based Work 
Academies. Although there are differences in the structure and purpose of each of these 
programmes, all of their goals are broadly complimentary to those of Universal Credit. While 
Universal Credit should ensure that ‘work pays’ and remove some of the uncertainty associated 
with moving into a job, the welfare-to-work reforms aim to help claimants to develop the skills 
that they need in order to get a job and remain in work (DWP, 2014b). 
 
Work Experience, Mandatory Work Experience, Community Work Placements and Sector-based 
Work Academies serve similar purposes to the Work Programme in terms of promoting paid 
work, but are aimed at different groups and carry different requirements. Participants in the 
former three programmes ‘do not receive a wage but continue to receive benefits and must 
continue to look for permanent work’ (McGuinness, 2014: 3). For Sector-based Work 
Academies, the work-seeking requirement is removed because it is an employer-based 
programme. The main difference between the programmes is the age groups that they are aimed 
at, and participants’ proximity to the labour market. Work Experience is aimed at young people 
aged 18-24 who have been claiming for more than three months, but less than nine (which is the 
point of referral to the full Work Programme). Participation and on-going engagement is 
voluntary.23 Mandatory Work Placements, as its name suggests, is compulsory. It is intended to 
help claimants of any age with very little experience of working to ‘establish the discipline and 
habits of working life’, such as ‘attending on time regularly, carrying out specific tasks and 
working under supervision’ (DWP, 2014c: 6). Community Work Placements is also mandatory, 
aimed at those who have ‘spent a great deal of time’ out of work and ‘whose primary barrier to 
                                                 
23
 Up until February 2012, claimants could be sanctioned if they left the scheme after their first week (DWP 2012e: 
6). This was revised following adverse media attention and subsequent meetings between Grayling and placement 
providers. Claimants now only face sanctions in cases of gross misconduct (Grayling, quoted in Watt, Wintour and 
Malik, 2012). 
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work is a lack of work experience or motivation’ (DWP, 2014d: 3). Finally, Sector-based Work 
Academies offers funding for employers to take an unemployed person on a voluntary 
placement, during which they will be offered pre-employment training, a work placement, and 
an interview for an advertised role at the end. This is aimed at people who are ‘ready for work’, 
but it does not offer a guarantee of getting a job (DWP 2012f: 2). The introduction of these 
schemes represents an increase in conditionality applied to out-of-work benefit claimants, 
although it should be noted that New Labour also had plans to launch a single scheme targeted 
towards similar demographics (Deacon and Patrick, 2012: 326). 
 
The DWP claimed on its launch that the Work Programme represents a ‘revolution in back to 
work support’ (2011a). The Work Programme replaced all of New Labour’s previous welfare-to-
work programmes including the New Deals and Flexible New Deal. Chris Grayling claimed that 
it would ‘tackle the endemic worklessness that has blighted so many of the country’s 
communities for decades’, stating: 
 
We want to establish a deal, where we will do our bit and get people ready for work and 
in exchange we will expect people to take up the work that is available. We are sending 
out a clear message: if you can work, and we can help you find a job, you must work 
(quoted in DWP 2011a). 
 
Despite Conservative claims to the contrary, the Work Programme exhibits considerable 
continuity with New Labour’s welfare-to-work reforms. This is in part due to its heritage. In 
contrast to Universal Credit, the development of the Work Programme stemmed from inside 
Parliament and represented an ‘evolution of what was there before’, according to one civil 
servant (private interview). It drew substantially on Lord Freud’s independent report for the 
DWP (2007). New Labour was initially cautious about Freud’s recommendations, which are 
discussed in greater detail below. However, following James Purnell’s appointment as Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions in 2008, the Labour government subsequently proposed 
implementing several of Freud’s suggested reforms in the form of Flexible New Deal, following 
a set of pilot projects (DWP, 2008). The Conservative Party in opposition also seemed to quickly 
warm to Freud’s recommendations. In January 2008, Cameron and Grayling announced that the 
Conservatives would adopt the recommendations on ‘increased conditionality; more rigorous 
assessments [and] expanded payment by results for the private and voluntary sector’ (Haddon, 
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2012: 4). These proposals went on to form the backbone of the Party’s Get Britain Working 
green paper (2009). 
 
Set against recognition of New Labour’s considerable success on some aspects of welfare-to-
work, the Freud report sought to address the remaining challenges (Freud, 2007: 3). Specifically, 
it investigated ways of supporting the ‘very hardest to help’ or those suffering from multiple 
disadvantages back into work (2007: 43-44).  The central recommendation of the Freud report 
was that the range of welfare-to-work providers should be diversified, giving greater 
responsibility to the private and voluntary sectors. This was justified on the basis that ‘there are 
clear potential gains from…bringing in innovation with a different skill set, and from the 
potential to engage with groups who are often beyond the reach of the welfare state’ (2007: 6). 
These groups should be permitted substantial freedom in structuring and delivering their 
programmes in order to decide ‘what works for them’ and the jobseekers for whom they are 
responsible (2007: 6). This is the ‘black box’ approach, recommended based on evidence from 
the United States and Australian models (2007: 46, 127-128) as well from the UK’s 
‘Employment Zones’ (2007: 56). To counter the high costs of this kind of intensive support and 
to ensure that contractors were achieving adequate results, the report also recommended a shift to 
‘payment by results’ (Freud, 2007: 51-52).  
 
The convergence on this policy issue can be understood by considering the concepts 
underpinning the New Deals and welfare-to-work programmes more broadly, and well as New 
Labour’s framing of its policies. Aspects of New Labour’s approach fit with a market-driven, 
supply-side understanding of the causes of poverty and unemployment (Theodore, 2007). These 
have largely been accepted, retained and accelerated by the Conservatives. Notably, this includes 
the emphasis on the responsibilities of claimants in relation to the state and, implicitly, towards 
society, which both parties have primarily emphasised in terms of independence and self-
sufficiency (Levitas, 2005). There is some ideological overlap here, which reflects the 
relationship between New Labour and Thatcherism.  Other aspects, such New Labour’s 
emphasis on income transfers and a recognition of structural causes of poverty via the National 
Minimum Wage, have been either rejected or played down. These imply conceptions of fairness 
and compassion based around egalitarianism and a conventional perception of social justice 
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(Hayton and McEnhill, 2015). These, then, are incompatible with current Conservative 
decontestations of the same concepts.  
 
Part of the reason why it was possible for the Conservatives to do this was because, either 
through lack of political will or ideological desire, New Labour failed to make a strong, on-going 
case for these latter aspects of reform. The case for such measures was then further hampered by 
the economic downturn and lack of money to sustain high spending on welfare, particularly tax 
credits, which allowed the Conservatives the opportunity to side-line these strategies. 
Consequentially while New Labour’s welfare reforms bore the imprint of Thatcherite ideology, 
there is little in the Conservative approach that reflects an accommodation with social 
democratic values, goal and explanations.  
 
The central aim of the Work Programme and the work experience programmes is addressing 
existing welfare dependency, and preventing its growth. Hence Conservative Party’s welfare 
papers identify two imperatives in support of these. The first is ensuring that ‘those made 
unemployed because of the recession do not become long-term unemployed’. The second, more 
wide-ranging task is ‘to tackle Britain’s long-term structural unemployment and the welfare 
dependency culture’ (Conservative Party, 2009: 10). The elision of ‘structural unemployment’ 
with a welfare dependency ‘culture’ here is significant, in that it suggests that the two identified 
issues have similar causes and solutions. As with the emphasis on welfare as a ‘lifestyle choice’ 
discussed above, this is a further reflection of the idea of dependency as a cause of poverty 
discussed in Chapter 4. This emphasis is the common thread running through Universal Credit 
and welfare-to-work, placing the receipt of benefits within a ‘behavioural and cultural analysis 
which attributes the underlying causes of poverty with the failings of individuals rather than to 
socio-economic factors’ (Lister and Bennett, 2010: 92). It is these failings that welfare-to-work 
policy then seeks to address in terms of barriers to the labour market, providing ‘the key to 
breaking the back of our deeply-ingrained benefits culture’ (Grayling, 2011). The underlying 
identification of the problem as one of individual failings and individual-level barriers to work 
therefore does not break out from the dominant Thatcherite framework. However, the policy 
tools are rather more advanced. 
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In tackling these perceived failings, the Conservative Party is committed to providing ‘proper 
support and intervention for those who require it’ (2009: 12), building on New Labour’s legacy 
in this area. Plans to extend PbR are critical to realising this intention. PbR and the ‘black box’ 
approach are supported not only for cost reasons, but because they will enabled providers to give 
‘tailored support [to] hundreds of thousands of long term benefit claimants, built around their 
needs […] Rather than having to follow a top-down approach dictated by the government’ (DWP 
2010c). This ‘top down’ approach has been a sustained target of Conservative attacks, on the 
basis that it is ‘outmoded and ineffective’ (Grayling, 2011). In its place, the Work Programme 
offers a system in which providers have the freedom to choose ‘what works’ combined with the 
incentive of receiving a higher payment for placing the ‘hardest to help’ claimants (DWP, 2013b: 
4; DWP, 2014e: 6). Grayling remarked that this was ‘specifically designed to chase out best 
practice, to make sure that the best rise to the top’ (2012b), and would bring about 
‘transformational’ change within the welfare system (2010b). Specifically, for people on out-of-
work benefits who ‘could and should be working, and yet every time employment levels rise, 
those people seem to stay stranded on benefits…The Work Programme will change all of that’ 
(Grayling, quoted in DWP, 2010c).  
 
In addition to the diversification of providers which is justified in terms of providing more 
nuanced expertise to help these claimants, the Work Programme and work experience schemes 
also aim to accomplish these goals by extending the reach of welfare-to-work, pulling more 
people under their respective conditionality regimes. One notable group that this applies to is 
former Incapacity Benefit claimants, who may be subject to work-related conditionality and 
sanctions after undergoing Work Capability Assessments during the process of transferral to 
ESA. All current Incapacity Benefit claimants will, in time, be subject to such an assessment 
(DWP, 2011b). Critics of the Work Capability Assessment have argued since its implementation 
in 2008 that it does not take adequate account of disabled people’s barriers to the labour market 
at a social level, and often arrives at the wrong decision as to whether claimants are able to work 
(Anon., 2012). The DWP carries out on-going reviews on this issue, and has implemented 
changes as a result of these. However, the most recent (and final) review into the assessments 
makes clear that claimants still experience considerable anxiety around the experience, 
perceiving it as unfair (Litchfield, 2014: 51), and mistakes are still frequent (Work and Pensions 
Select Committee, 2014b: 5). Accordingly, Labour MPs have argued that the extension of 
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conditionality determined via this method is evidence of a lack of compassion in Coalition 
welfare to work policy (HC Hansard, 1 February 2012b). 
 
Conservatives acknowledge that imposing work-related conditions on these claimants might be 
unpopular with the claimants themselves. However, this is framed as ultimately in the claimants’ 
best interests: hence, drawing these people into welfare-to-work programmes is the 
compassionate course of action. For example, John Stevenson stated: ‘even though it might seem 
like you’re forcing somebody to do something that they don’t want to, actually forcing people to 
go and get a job is a good thing’. He explained: ‘the cure – for health issues, housing issues, 
mental health issues – the cure, invariably, is a job’ (private interview). Similarly, Grayling told 
an anecdote about a women who had been mandated to the Work Programme ‘after 14 years off 
work with chronic depression’. Initially, she was ‘in tears, [she] did not believe that she should 
be there […] she was protesting bitterly’. Eight weeks later, ‘she said that that was the right thing 
to do after all’. He concluded: ‘we will not always get it right, but we are taking some people 
down a path that can be right for them, even if they are reluctant to follow it at first’ (HC 
Hansard, 13 March 2012).  
 
This is based foremost on the Conservative conception of compassion as being ‘firm to be kind’ 
(Stevenson, private interview), reflecting a similar kind of thinking to that informing the 
Universal Credit conditionality regime. It is underpinned by the claim that ‘abandoning’ such 
claimants within the welfare system by transferring money whilst not compelling them to work 
is not compassionate. Rather, it perpetuates dependency and condemns them to poverty 
(Grayling, quoted in DWP, 2011a; Duncan Smith, quoted in Winnett, 2012). Such a system 
would also be unfair to the claimant, as it would prevent them from attaining independence. This 
then links into the ideal of responsibility and the state’s role in constructing a welfare system that 
promotes ‘responsible’ behaviour, principally constructing this as synonymous with engagement 
in work. This is founded on a negative view of claimants as tending towards being disinterested 
in working if other options are available, and hence requiring an extra push towards to 
workplace. Owing to the positive outcomes that Conservatives suggest will be achieved by this, 
the coercive approach from the state towards claimants is justified. 
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There is some acknowledgement that the Work Programme will take time to bed in, and for the 
best providers and approaches to become clear (Grayling, 2012b). However, there is little in the 
Conservative Party literature or speeches that suggests doubt that the approach taken will not 
eventually yield ‘best practice’ that is capable of moving unemployed people – even those with 
complex needs, such as disabilities - back into work. When the problem of unemployment is 
framed in terms of the attitudes of claimants and the benefit system itself, it is logical to believe 
that strong welfare-to-work programmes should prove effective for anybody who wants to move 
into employment. The approach therefore also attempts to establish the conditions within which 
fairness for those who are in employment, and therefore fulfilling their responsibilities, can be 
realised. The rapid expansion of PbR, framed as a means of uncovering ‘best practice’, combined 
with the strong emphasis on unemployment as a choice is central to this. As the labour market 
recovers and successful support strategies begin to emerge, those who do not move into work 
can be construed as having failed to do so through lack of effort or engagement with the services 
provided. This effect is compounded if Universal Credit is in place in terms of work incentives, 
as this should remove a further rational reason why people might not return to work. As long as 
the approach to understanding unemployment fails to acknowledge structural problems with the 
labour market, the behavioural explanation for these people’s continued reliance on the state is 
further reinforced by these policies. 
 
Subsequently, if people have made the ‘choice’ not to work, then Conservative ideas around 
‘fairness for taxpayers’ and supporting responsible behaviour suggest that it is not right that the 
state should continue to support them at the same level as, for example, those in low-paid work. 
Streeter suggested that this issue had become particularly pressing due to the economic 
downturn: greater pressure on incomes meant that working people were increasingly prone to 
look at those claiming out-of-work benefits and think: ‘hang on a minute...And I'm paying for 
that as well!’ (private interview). Stevenson concurred that the downturn had ‘opened up a gap 
for us to say to people who either need the minimum or don’t need welfare: “you’re working 
hard and paying for that”. You only want to pay for it if you see it going to a proper purpose and 
not a lifestyle choice’ (private interview). Brandon Lewis explained that he was concerned about 
‘the injustice of people who do not work and who stay at home having a lifestyle that is similar 
to that of the people who work all those hours’ (HC Hansard, 16 February 2011). All three 
echoed similar comments by Duncan Smith (2010) and Cameron (2011a).  
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This, then, links up with the broader justification for cutting benefits to unemployed claimants 
who are seen to be not fulfilling their responsibilities with regard to looking for work. Based on 
an understanding of benefit dependency as a rational decision, further cutting should help to dis-
incentivise this choice. This is discussed further in the following chapter. It constitutes a step 
towards ensuring that the system is delivering fairness to those who are paying for it, by not 
rewarding the irresponsible decision not to work. The work experience element of the Party’s 
approach to welfare-to-work is also legitimated through emphasis on these priorities, as it is a 
key element in ensuring that claimants are not getting ‘something for nothing’. Given this, it is 
not surprising that Osborne has indicated that the Conservatives are considering extending such 
programmes (2013c). This allows unemployment benefits to be re-framed as ‘pay’ for work 
experience or looking for work rather than an automatic entitlement (Duncan Smith, 2013). This 
reflects the ideological emphasis on fairness as desert, within which only those designated 
‘medically unable’ to work can expect unconditional support from the state (Conservative Party, 
2008b: 22). 
 
Much of the framing of the Work Programme therefore relates to unemployed individuals and 
ensuring a ‘fair’ relationship between contributors and beneficiaries of the welfare system. 
However, of the two flagship policies, its implementation also offers the clearest opportunity for 
the realisation of the broader ideal of the Big Society. Universal Credit is an essentially technical 
policy that primarily aims to reconfigure the relationship between state and individual. The 
state/society relationship is not the primary concern. In contrast, the Work Programme plays a 
direct part in redressing what Conservatives see as the imbalance between state service provision 
and the role of voluntary and civil society organisations (VCSOs). This, in turn, is presented as 
the key to achieving the individual-level outcomes discussed above (Conservative Party, 2008c: 
52-56). Accomplishing this is essential to realising the ideal of a truly compassionate and 
responsible society in which ‘horizontal’, community-level networks provide the primary means 
of social support and assistance, as opposed to the vertical relationship with the state.  
 
Conservatives have acknowledged that this is part of the purpose of the restructuring of welfare-
to-work programmes that Work Programme represents. According to David Cameron, the central 
idea of the Big Society is taking ‘power away from politicians, and giving it to people’ (quoted 
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in Prime Minister’s Office, 2010). Within welfare provision, VCSOs have been identified as the 
main potential recipients of this power. For example, Francis Maude has stated that VCSOs 
should play a key role in the delivery of the Work Programme, estimating that 35 to 40 per cent 
of all Work Programme contracts should go to such groups (HC Hansard, 27 April 2011). This 
preference for organisations outside of the state is supported with reference to an evidence claim, 
based on their records of involvement in providing welfare-to-work services under New Labour 
(Freud, 2007: 56). As overt themes, both the Big Society and ‘compassionate Conservatism’ 
have waned since 2010: however, the ideas underpinning these remained strong within the 
justification and design of the Work Programme.  
 
Grayling has invoked these sorts of arguments, contrasting the top-down approach of the New 
Deals with a ‘grassroots’ approach. For example, he stated that he would like to see the Work 
Programme providers ‘assembling teams of people and organisations whose skills drive down to 
the lowest possible level - in the heart of the local neighbourhood’ (2011). He also claimed that 
the Work Programme would allow ‘those charities and voluntary sector organisations across the 
country with the know-how to help people with real difficulties in their communities get back to 
work…The chance to do just that’. This was in a DWP press release that framed Work 
Programme contracts as ‘a massive boost for the Big Society’ (DWP, 2011c). When questioned 
on his contribution to the Big Society, Duncan Smith claimed: ‘I've created the Work 
Programme, which is all about the voluntary and private sector’ (quoted in Butler, 2011). Thus 
while aspects of the Work Programme outlined above as applied to individuals do not move 
substantially beyond the individual-level analysis of poverty that characterised Thatcherism, this 
aspect appears to represent an opportunity to make a more substantive change. Rather than 
simply rolling back the boundaries of the state, this could be an area of welfare policy that 
facilitates the Conservative goal of ‘[rolling] forwards the frontiers of society’ (Cameron, 2006f). 
In practice, however, many of the contracts within the Work Programmes have been given to the 
private sector rather than community organisations. 
 
Understanding the opportunities for VCSOs to become involved in the Work Programme 
requires a brief summary of the structure of the programme. At the top of the structure are 
eighteen ‘prime providers’, who hold a total of 40 Work Programme contracts between them. 
Primes then use subcontractors to deliver support to claimants: either ‘tier one’ types, who will 
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‘support participants for the whole of their time’ on the Work Programme, or ‘tier two’ types, 
who will deliver specialist interventions to certain types of claimants: for example, those with 
extra needs resulting from disability (McGuinness and Dar, 2014: 15-16). In theory, VCSOs 
could get involved at any level of the programme. However, as the Work Programme is based on 
PbR, it requires primes to have the necessary financial resources to support the required outlay. It 
therefore favours large private companies as prime contractors; this is compounded by the speed 
with which the Work Programme was implemented, which gave the voluntary and community 
sectors little time to develop ways of working around this such as through establishing 
consortiums (NCVO, 2011a: a). Consequentially, fifteen of the primes are private companies, 
one is from the public sector, one is from the voluntary sector, and one is mixed voluntary and 
private (DWP, 2013c). As of September 2013, there are 858 subcontractors working on the forty 
Work Programme contracts, around three-quarters of which are tier two-subcontractors only. 
Approximately 40 per cent of the 858 come from the voluntary sector (McGuinness and Dar, 
2014: 15). 
 
Initially, then, this appears somewhat encouraging: Maude’s goal for the involvement of VCSOs 
is being met, for example. However, underpinning these numbers are several more worrying 
trends that threaten to undermine the possibility of the Big Society being developed through the 
Work Programme. In turn, these may impinge on the realisation of goals outlined above related 
to the programmes capacity to support responsible behaviour amongst claimants.  
 
The structure of the Work Programme, and in particular the way that PbR has been 
operationalised, is widely identified by a number of voluntary and civil service representative 
groups as something that is causing their members significant difficulty. Organisations including 
AVECO (2013), the National Council of Voluntary Organisations (2011a; 2011b) and the 
London Voluntary Service Council (Kerr, 2013) have produced research showing that 
subcontractors are receiving significantly fewer referrals from the Work Programme than 
anticipated. This is resulting in difficulties which ‘directly impact on the financial viability of the 
contract’ (Kerr, 2013: 23; NCVO 2011b: 6-7). Irregular, unpredictable referrals are a potential 
problem for all types of organisations. However, this is arguably ‘a particularly important issue 
for the voluntary sector, which is generally less able to absorb financial losses’ (AVECO/Shaw 
Trust, 2013: 8). This is compounded by a broadly shared feeling amongst voluntary and civil 
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society organisations that primes are not passing on sufficient up-front ‘attachment’ fees to their 
subcontractors (Kerr, 2013: 27; AVECO/Shaw Trust, 2013; 9), which has fuelled subcontractor 
suspicions that the DWP prioritised cost over programme quality in awarding Work Programme 
prime contracts (NVCO, 2011a: 4). Since payment is only made when a participant in the Work 
Programme is moved into sustained employment, this leaves subcontractors struggling to 
provide appropriate support in the meantime.  
 
All of these problems are particularly marked for small, ‘niche’ tier-two providers, who are 
working with people who may be a very long way from being ready to work. In such cases, the 
gap between taking on a Work Programme claimant and receiving a payment for moving them 
into work may be so large that it contributes to rendering the contract unsustainable, even though 
these organisations may make valuable interim progress with their claimants (Kerr, 2013: 28). 
Rather than promoting and supporting them in their role, the structure and funding of Work 
Programme is causing them such difficulty that some will be forced to halt their engagement 
(NVCO, 2011b: 14). This is deeply problematic when related to Conservative promotion of the 
Big Society and the importance of conservative compassion in service delivery, as it is precisely 
these small, niche organisations which are identified as providing the most effective services and 
expertise which are framed as vastly superior to ‘one size fits all’ state support (SJPG, 2007b).  
 
None of these problems are insurmountable; the Work and Pensions Select Committee offers a 
number of possible solutions (2013: 37-8). However owing to the way that the Work Programme 
is funded, tackling those issues related to payments may prove difficult. Welfare-to-work 
programmes would usually be funded from within the Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) – 
the sum of money allocated via the spending review. However, the Work Programme is being 
funded from projected savings in the Department’s larger Annually Managed Expenditure 
(AME) limit – the demand-led element of spending that includes most cash benefits (Haddon, 
2012: 5-6). This is the ‘AME/DEL’ switch. It ‘means that if a provider succeeds in getting 
someone a job for a period, we can use the money which we save in benefit savings (the net 
savings) to reward them, and that of course is big sums of money.’ (Freud, 2009). The shift in 
the balance of spending towards AME also plays into longer-term fiscal plans announced by 
Osborne that would see a cap introduced on this element of spending (Osborne 2014a; Cooke, 
2013).  
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While welcoming ‘the extra resources that the Government has released by using the AME/DEL 
switch mechanism to help people find jobs in a time of constrained public finances’, the Work 
and Pensions Select Committee warned that ‘there is a risk that the expected savings will not be 
realised if too few people gain full time work or if the number falling out of work rises’ (2011: 
57). Given the evidence outlined about regarding the performance of the Work Programme so 
far, in turn this could impact on the viability of the programme and the contractors within it. 
While the Work Programme is now performing comparably to the programmes that it replaced, it 
is not delivering the improvement in outcomes that the DWP had projected (NAO, 2014a: 6-7). 
As such, problems with the current structure of the programme relate not only to the goal of 
developing and nurturing a vibrant civil society sector as an alternative to central state provision, 
but also directly impact on the possibility of achieving the positive outcomes from moving 
people into work that Conservatives have claimed the Work Programme will produce. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that parts of the Conservative Party invested considerable effort in 
developing policy in line with Conservative ideational perspectives on welfare. Both policies 
discussed here contain nods, at least, to each of the four concepts discussed in previous chapters. 
The plans for their implementation comprise a fairly balanced approach to a number of different 
aspects identified within each concept, regarding their implications for claimants, the broader 
society, and the state/society relationship.  
 
However, in practice the implementation of these ideas has been somewhat lacking. Primarily, 
this has been due to the prioritisation of the need to cut public spending once in government 
combined with the perception of the electoral gains to be made from appearing to be taking a 
hard line towards benefit claimants. Lower spending was a longer-term goal of both of the sets of 
reforms discussed here. Its elevation to central, immediate priority has had a considerable effect 
on Universal Credit, and may lead to problems with the Work Programme in time if the 
difficulties identified are not resolved. The main consequence is that the reforms have become 
unbalanced in favour of providing an impression of fairness to non-claimants, as opposed to 
rewarding those who do rely on the welfare system for meeting their responsibilities. This 
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problem is intensified when taken in addition to the austerity-based reforms discussed in the 
subsequent chapter.  
 
The effect on Universal Credit in particular is significant because it is not a cost-neutral 
programme: its major innovation, which is bringing changes in the work incentive structure, 
requires investment. This has been severely curtailed, and it seems unlikely given the 
Conservative Party’s stated future goals on spending that this will be reversed by the incoming 
Conservative government in 2015.  Moreover, the current mood around welfare and spending 
may also inhibit other parties from lowering the taper: as such, Conservative decisions in this 
respect have an impact on the wider strategic context beyond the Party itself. The effect on the 
Work Programme is less clear as yet, although here too problems with funding threaten to 
undermine some of its key objectives, notably those related to the Big Society. The broader 
outcome of this is that while conditionality on claimants has been ratcheted up, the reforms are 
currently failing to balance this with a strong emphasis on fairer and more compassionate 
outcomes for those who are behaving as the reformed system expects them to. As such, while the 
main weight of expectation within the reforms is placed on individual benefit claimants to meet 
their obligations towards the wider society, the central concern in outcomes is in providing a 
system that appears fair to those who do not require support from the welfare system. This marks 
a disjuncture. This could be interpreted in relation to electoral imperatives, but it also reflects a 
return to a socially conservative position regarding the morality of working, and a concurrent 
retreat from the more rational views of behaviour that were inherent in the original conception of 
Universal Credit. 
 
This may have been possible because New Labour emphasised the individual-focused aspects of 
its reforms far more than the social democratic ones. This created a space within which the 
Conservatives could expand the aspects that fit with their own perspectives, in what one analysis 
has referred to as a ‘process of policy leap-frog’ (Lister and Bennett, 2010: 102), whilst side-
lining those that did not. This institutional context is significant in understanding the 
development of supply-side welfare initiatives under the Conservative. It reflects an important 
element of the strategically selective context and can thus enhance understanding of the 
circumstances in which a shift in ideas (as between Labour and the Conservatives) is able to 
drive policy change. There was already a substantial policy infrastructure that fit with 
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Conservative ideas on the attitudinal and behavioural causes of poverty in place under New 
Labour. What was absent was a strong articulation of structural causes to balance this. This has 
been instrumental in buttressing Conservative arguments regarding a lack of individual 
responsibility or the centrality of behavioural factors in explaining worklessness. These are then 
used to legitimate a range of reforms, including those around welfare-to-work, Universal Credit, 
and the austerity measures that are the subject of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 7 
Policy II: Austerity 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Alongside the reforms discussed in the previous chapter, which drew substantially on 
Conservative policy ideas developed in opposition, the Coalition also introduced a further set of 
reforms from 2010 that have been strongly linked to the priority of cutting public spending. The 
aim in this respect was to reduce the DWP’s budget by £20 billion by 2014/15, comprising £2.7 
billion in efficiency savings and £17 billion from pensions and benefits (NAO, 2011: 11). 
Substantial benefit savings from Universal Credit and the Work Programme would not be 
realised in the short-term. Universal Credit aims to induce behavioural change amongst 
claimants to deliver reduced welfare costs, whilst even if payment by results (PbR) within the 
Work Programme works as intended it will take time for the most effective providers and means 
of support provision to become apparent. As such, Kwasi Kwarteng’s view that: ‘I don’t see 
how, in the current climate, you can talk about welfare without talking about deficits, debts and 
the economy’ (private interview) is an accurate reflection of the more immediate pressures on 
the welfare system. This chapter focuses on a set of welfare policies that must be understood as 
closely related to these pressures. It discusses four central reforms: those to Disability Living 
Allowance (now the Personal Independence Payment), the Social Rented Sector Size Criterion 
(better known as the ‘bedroom tax’), the introduction of an overall cap on the amount of cash 
benefits that households can receive per week, and changes to the mechanisms for up-rating 
benefits.  
 
As in the previous chapter, one concern here is to understand how these reforms fit with 
perspectives around poverty and dependency, responsibility, fairness and compassion which 
underpin the Conservative approach to welfare and to consider the extent to which these have 
been realised in implementation. While cutting spending must be viewed as an important 
immediate pressure, Conservatives have subsequently moved to justify reform in relation to 
these ideas. In part this will be because introducing such moral justifications renders cutting a 
significant amount from the welfare budget more palatable, particularly where it affects 
vulnerable groups such as disabled people and children. It also maintains a broader narrative 
190 
  
 
threaded through the entire programme of welfare reform concerning the approach to poverty, 
ensuring responsible behaviour and promoting fairness. This, in turn, coheres with electoral 
strategy, positioning the Conservatives as being on the side of ‘people who work hard and play 
by the rules’ (Cameron, 2013). 
 
Theoretically, all four reforms can be identified with some of the ideas set out in chapter four. At 
root, they all share an individualised notion of the causes of the growth of welfare spending. This 
is justified with reference to the perception of a passive welfare state which allows or attracts 
people to choose not to work, thus contributing to the perpetuation of a ‘dependency culture’ 
which is transmitted inter-generationally and entrenches poverty. The solution to this within all 
four is to incentivise or push claimants towards responsible behaviour, understood as that which 
leads to economic self-sufficiency. This can then also be linked to a Conservative concept of 
compassion, whereby short-term discomfort is an acceptable trade-off for longer-term positive 
outcomes for both the individual and society. As such, there is an underlying logic to this set of 
reforms that is based around a suspicion of the effects of long-term support by the state on 
individuals, and a belief in the inherent and absolute capacity of most individuals to reduce the 
extent to which they require state support.  
 
When considered against the welfare policies discussed in the previous chapter, however, the 
coherence of the entire reform package is less clear. Conservatives have discussed moving away 
from a measurement of poverty based on income, often preferring to talk about poverty in terms 
of lifestyle and irresponsible decision making enabled by the state, of which the condition of 
‘welfare dependency’ is an example. Despite this, Universal Credit maintains an emphasis on 
financial need as a determinant of eligibility for support from the welfare state, albeit whilst 
making this eligibility conditional on engagement with aspects of the Universal Credit and Work 
Programme reforms. It also encompasses, although in a more limited way than initially 
envisaged, a positive commitment to incentive as a driver of behaviour, around ‘making work 
pay’ through increasing returns associated with this. Importantly it is engagement with 
conditionality (in the form of attending meetings, conducting job-searches, attending work 
placements and so on) which determines eligibility: not whether this actually results in a move 
into paid employment, as Duncan Smith has explained (Andrew Marr Show, 2015). 
Concurrently, the longer-term thinking underpinning Universal Credit and the Work Programme 
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positions financial savings through alleviating dependency as a result of changing claimant 
behaviour as a key outcome of an effective welfare system. This suggests some acceptance that 
the state has a positive role to play in facilitating the transition between dependence and 
independence, and an admission that making an exclusively moral case for working is not 
sufficient. 
 
In contrast, the reforms discussed in this chapter alter the relationship between need and financial 
support, and the basis on which that support is provided. They reflect a strand of thinking based 
strongly on desert as a central element of fairness, and hence of entitlement to state support. This 
relates to having a full-time job, or providing demonstrations for why support is otherwise 
required. This leads to a ‘cutting first’ approach, whereby reducing spending is framed as a 
catalyst for reducing dependency. Within this, reliance on the welfare state and self-sufficiency 
cannot co-exist for individuals: the relationship is zero-sum. As well as dovetailing neatly with 
financial pressures, this approach supports the immediate Conservative electoral appeal on 
fairness in a very direct and effective way, and this should not be considered a separate issue in 
understanding the relationship between the two sets of reforms. As this chapter demonstrates, 
this approach contradicts and cuts across much of the thinking behind Universal Credit and the 
Work Programme, suggesting a more negative approach to incentives which is strongly linked to 
morality. Its implementation reveals the dominance of a short-termist approach to welfare 
policy-making that is strongly linked to electoral positioning and the need to make an impact 
within a five-year governing cycle. Beyond this, it is emblematic of a deeply negative view of 
the welfare state, such that even the provision of transitional support for unemployed people 
ultimately undermines self-reliance and individual responsibility, and should hence be urgently 
reduced. 
 
7.2 Disability Living Allowance and the Personal Independence Payment 
Amongst the changes brought in under the Welfare Reform Act (2012) are changes to disability 
benefits. In addition to those related to conditionality in ESA, discussed in the previous chapter, 
Disability Living Allowance has also been a target for reform. DLA is available to disabled 
people who are both in and out of work, and is intended to compensate for some of the extra 
financial costs associated with disability in order to enable independent living (Scope, 2011). It 
is paid depending on recipients’ care and mobility needs, at rates ranging from £21.55 per week 
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to £138.05 per week, with entitlement determined via self-assessment and supporting evidence 
from GPs. In 2012, 3.2 million people claimed DLA, and forecast expenditure for 2011/12 was 
£12.6 billion. It therefore accounted for around six per cent of the DWP’s annual benefit 
expenditure (Browne and Hood, 2012: 5). DLA reform is predicted to reduce this by twenty per 
cent (approximately £2.2 billion) by 2015/16 (DWP, 2012g: 2) and £3 billion by 2018/19 (NAO, 
2014b: 24) as a result of 500,000 fewer people claiming the benefit. 
 
Being non-means tested and non-contributory, DLA seems an obvious target for reform under 
the Conservatives as its structure goes against a number of the ideas outlined in Chapter 4, 
including those on individual responsibility and hence on dependency. However, Conservatives 
have not previously been averse to providing for disabled people in this way, in doing so 
identifying some disabled people as deserving of state support. DLA itself was introduced under 
the Major government in 1992, following a consultation on ‘[enabling] many more disabled 
people to maximise their own potential and their wider contribution to society’ (DSS, 1990: 1). 
Its rationale seemed to fit with individualist aspects of Thatcherism, emphasising disabled 
people’s ‘rights to autonomy and self-determination’ or capacity for ‘choice and control’ 
(Morris, 2011: 3). At that point, far from encouraging dependency, increased spending on 
disability benefits since 1979 owing to greater awareness of their availability was feted as ‘a real 
gain in improving the position of long-term sick and disabled people as a whole’ (DSS, 1990: 
10). DLA was therefore framed as something that would encourage, not inhibit, independence. 
 
Moreover, the ideas underpinning DLA are not incompatible with much of Cameron’s 
Conservatives’ conceptual approach to welfare provision, reflecting the extent to which 
Cameron’s party continues to draw on perspectives that were ascendant in the years when it was 
introduced. Receipt of DLA entrusts disabled people with responsibility for managing their own 
needs. It draws on ‘social model’ thinking on disability in terms of understanding the barriers to 
social inclusion that disabled people experience (see below); however, it is still an individualised 
benefit, as it transfers some responsibility for disabled people’s needs from the state to the 
disabled individual. While casting disabled people as deserving of support in addressing barriers, 
DLA also supports the idea of disabled people as autonomous individuals who are capable of 
realising and managing their own social inclusion, rather than as passive recipients of state 
support. This means that it is theoretically compatible with Conservative ideas on compassion as 
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an active concept, feeding into the prevalent conception of social justice which emphasises 
encouraging independence and opportunity (HM Government, 2012).  Given this, and its 
political heritage, DLA is perhaps not such an obvious target for reform after all. 
 
However, in 2010 plans were announced to replace DLA with a new benefit: the Personal 
Independence Payment (PIP). DLA reform was not trailed before the election and the 
announcement came not from the DWP, but from the Treasury. Osborne claimed that a three-
fold increase in DLA claims and a four-fold increase in cost since introduction was both 
unsustainable financially, and undesirable on a welfare dependency basis. The main sticking 
point was the existing assessment process, which is returned to below. The introduction of a new 
assessment process would ensure that: ‘we can continue to afford paying this important benefit 
to those with the greatest needs, while significantly improving incentives to work for others’ 
(Osborne, 2010a). Conservatives subsequently moved to justify the reforms in moral terms, and 
Cameron claimed that the Government is ‘not cutting money that is going into disability 
benefits’ (HC Hansard, 7 March 2012). However, DWP publications re-iterate Osborne’s 
concern that spending is ‘not sustainable in the long term’ (DWP, 2012a: 1). The cost of DLA 
was clearly a concern.  
 
The announcement was therefore met with some suspicion. Dame Anne Begg remarked that the 
Government ‘got off on the wrong foot’ with DLA reform, ‘inasmuch as they saw it as a revenue 
saving exercise’. With the caveat that she was ‘not sure that Iain Duncan Smith necessarily saw 
it in those terms’, she continued: ‘certainly the Treasury did because it was in that first budget 
[...] completely out of the blue, with a price tag on it’ (private interview). Richard Hawkes, Chief 
Executive of Scope, suggested that reform had ‘been designed to achieve a budget target of the 
reductions that the government talked about in the Comprehensive Spending Review. They said 
there was going to be a 20% reduction, then developed an assessment that will deliver that’ 
(quoted in BBC News, 2013b). Andy Rickell, a former member of Equality 2025,24 similarly 
stated: ‘I’m sure part of the reason why the Conservatives came in to reform DLA was cost 
reasons’. This ‘tainted any reform in this area, because all of the reform in this area is presumed 
                                                 
24
 Equality 2025 was a cross-departmental advisory body established to provide appointed disabled people with a 
direct link to policy-makers. It was closed down in 2013. 
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to be to do with saving money’ (private interview). An emphasis on cost also explains the speed 
of implementation. PIP was implemented without a pilot programme, leading to a backlog of 
claims that has been strongly criticised by the Public Accounts Committee (2014a). One charity 
representative, who contributed to parliamentary scrutiny of welfare reform, suggested that this 
was indicative of an area of policy that ‘hadn’t been given the thought in advance’ that it 
required (private interview), while Public Accounts Committee Chair Margaret Hodge described 
PIP’s implementation as ‘nothing short of a fiasco’ (quoted in Public Accounts Committee, 
2014b). 
 
A former civil servant shed further light on the decision to reform DLA in relation to the DWP’s 
financial pressures, remarking that when the Coalition came in: ‘it was quite noticeable that they 
hadn’t really thought through what their approach around disability equality was going to be’. 
However, ‘there were two things that were very clearly bigger policies issues that had a big 
impact on disabled people’. Alongside reducing the deficit: 
 
There was also Iain Duncan Smith’s view of welfare reform, and that wasn’t really about 
disabled people, it was about creating Universal Credit and addressing what he saw as 
issues around how the benefit system keeps people out of work. 
 
Disability policy itself, however, was ‘a bit of a vacuum’ in 2010 (private interview). This may 
have rendered DLA vulnerable to pressures introduced by these overarching priorities. It was not 
directly related to the Universal Credit plans; out of all of the changes discussed in this chapter, 
DLA reform is the least likely to affect these because it is not included in Universal Credit. It 
also represented a large portion of DWP spending and so was exposed to the immediate financial 
pressures. Finally, the prevalence of indefinite awards and lack of continuous re-assessment 
(DWP, 2011d: 6), built into DLA’s structure as a benefit for people with long-term health 
conditions and disabilities, was vulnerable in relation to the electoral imperative of ensuring 
fairness and spending limited money wisely. If there was a vacuum within this policy area in 
2010, it is these pressures that began to fill it. DLA has been drawn into the wider narrative of 
benefits acting as a barrier to work and perpetuating dependency, doing a disservice to working 
people and preventing greater support from reaching ‘genuinely […] long-term disabled’ people 
(Streeter, private interview). This is presented as contradicting both the ideal of fairness, and 
therefore the Conservatives’ electoral claim to be committed to ensuring this. 
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DLA and PIP are not out-of-work benefits: rather DLA was designed with independence, which 
is not necessarily synonymous with employment, in mind (DSS, 1990). However, the number of 
DLA claimants who are in work is very low. The employment rate for claimants is nine per cent, 
and claimants are much less likely to be in work than disabled people who are not in receipt of 
DLA (Thomas and Griffiths, 2010: 1-2). While claimants are more likely than disabled people 
on average to have impairments that carry the greatest employment disadvantages, they are also 
‘significantly less likely to have a job than other disabled people with a similar level of 
employment disadvantage’ (Thomas and Griffiths, 2010: 2, emphasis in original). Additionally, 
claiming DLA is associated with a trajectory out of work, with some recipients seeing receipt of 
the benefit as ‘proof’ that they are unable to work (Thomas and Griffiths, 2010: 4). Although 
unable to establish a causal link, the DWP’s research therefore states that there is significant 
association between receipt of DLA and lower work expectations, including a potential financial 
disincentive (Thomas and Griffiths, 2010: 3). Within an ideological approach that elevates paid 
work as the embodiment of responsible behaviour and primary means of achieving societal 
fairness, this is a concern. It can be read as suggesting that unreformed DLA discourages people 
who could take paid employment from working. 
 
Before discussing the implications and usage of these findings within PIP, it should be noted that 
they are underpinned by a nuanced body of analysis regarding the relationship between claiming 
DLA and working. A number of complex issues contribute to DLA claimant unemployment 
which go beyond a simple ‘choice’ not to work (Thomas and Griffiths, 2010: 4-5, Adams and 
Oldfield, 2012). There is some acknowledgement of this amongst Conservatives. For example, 
Robert Buckland noted: ‘I still think that we’ve got a long way to go in changing the 
culture…There’s still a long way to go before we change the attitude of employers’. He 
continued: ‘I get so fed up of the debate. It’s always about the benefits system, dependency, 
these people are a problem and how do we deal with the “challenge”. It’s totally the wrong way 
to look at it’ (private interview). There is also evidence of acknowledgement within the DWP’s 
policy. The employment support scheme, Access to Work, is funded by a protected budget of 
£320 million (McVey, 2012) in recognition of the effectiveness of such provision (Sayce, 2011), 
although witnesses to a Work and Pensions Select Committee inquiry on disability equality also 
described Access to Work as the DWP’s ‘best kept secret’ (Work and Pensions Select 
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Committee, 2009: 53) and the DWP has yet to carry out any robust cost-benefit analysis on it. 
All of this alludes to some concern with a social model of disability. This emphasises that it is 
often the structure of society rather than an individual’s impairment which causes ‘disability’, 
and therefore efforts to promote disabled peoples’ integration must also go substantially beyond 
the individual (Grover and Piggott, 2010). 
 
Initial plans for PIP implied further moves in this direction. PIP assessments would be ‘less 
medical’ and ‘not based on the type of impairment individuals have but how these affect their 
everyday lives’. They would be ‘more active and enabling’ by considering ‘what individuals can 
do rather than what they cannot’. PIP would also be ‘more holistic...than the current Disability 
Living Allowance criteria, fairly reflecting the full range of impairment types’ (DWP, 2011e: 4). 
Maria Miller’s foreword to the DLA consultation indicated that social model thinking was 
behind the plans (quoted in DWP, 2010d: 1), and she later reaffirmed the government’s 
commitment to this understanding of disability (HC Hansard, 12 December 2011). However, PIP 
needs to provide financial savings. In implementation these claims have sat uneasily alongside a 
more individualist understanding of the relationship between disability, receipt of benefits, and 
engagement in paid work.  
 
The main departure from DLA is the introduction of a new, periodic re-assessment for 
determining eligibility for PIP. This is the means through which savings will be realised, 
effectively by raising the bar for what constitutes being deserving of support and thus reducing 
eligibility. This has been justified in terms of assessing whether conditions have changed as a 
means of ensuring that funding went to ‘those who need it most’ (Duncan Smith, 2013): disabled 
people who face the ‘greatest challenges in taking part in everyday life’ (DWP, 2013d). This is 
fair entitlement as need viewed through the prism of austerity: the view that ‘when money is 
tight, you absolutely have to cut out anything which is going to people who are not “needy”, or 
even not terribly needy’ (John Penrose, private interview). As such the assessment criteria for 
PIP are necessarily restrictive, retreating from a social understanding of disability, because ‘by 
the time you’ve got to the point of going beyond the medical […] and into the social, you’ve got 
to the stage where actually you’re not going to be assessing people who don’t have those basic 
needs, but have wider needs’ (Rickell, private interview). As such, although the criteria for PIP 
ostensibly deals with ‘need’ this illustrates a conceptual link between fairness as need and 
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fairness as desert. The assessment determines which currently met-needs will continue to be 
identified as deserving of support and which will not, imposing a lower cut-off due to the need to 
save money. 
 
The more restrictive nature of the PIP criteria, and the reduction of permanent awards, feeds into 
Conservative perspectives on dependency and the effect of receipt of benefits on responsible 
behaviour, buttressed by the observation that very few DLA claimants are in work. The reforms 
can therefore also be framed as a measure of compassion towards claimants, as Duncan Smith 
suggested.  Claiming that ‘too often in the past’ the assessment process for DLA would ‘say to 
people…“you are in receipt of a particular benefit and we don’t want to see you again”’, he 
argued that ‘it is right to see people, and wrong to leave them parked for ever on set benefits. 
Seeing them is more humane than inhumane, and that balance is the way that we should go’ (HC 
Hansard, 9 March 2011). Alongside this, there is a clear suspicion that there are a significant 
number DLA claimants who could support themselves without the benefit. Duncan Smith 
suggested that the number of claimants had risen ‘well ahead of any other gauge you might make 
about illness, sickness, disability or, for that matter, general trends in society’, which he 
attributed to the lack of a face-to-face assessment and the prevalence of indefinite awards 
(quoted in Winnett, 2012). This is linked to the suggestion that providing DLA to those who are 
not in the ‘greatest need’ has led to the benefit being used as part of a welfare-sustained 
‘lifestyle’ (see previous chapter). This then renders those who are found ineligible essentially 
undeserving of support, helping to sustain the Conservative electoral narrative of ensuring 
fairness for both non-claimants and those who are in ‘real need’. 
 
Overall, the changes to DLA are consistent with broad Conservative plans for a more conditional 
and work-focused approach to welfare. While neither DLA nor PIP are out-of-work benefits, part 
of the ideological basis of the reform is the idea that providing a substantial sum of money to 
disabled people without sufficient conditionality or checks attached will inhibit work incentives, 
and encourage inactivity. This can be tentatively supported via the DWP research cited above. 
However, it is very likely that the immediate impetus for DLA reform is reducing public 
spending, and this has supported a slightly different approach to reducing reliance on the benefit 
system than that taken in the reforms in the previous chapter.  
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DLA reform is quite a blunt instrument in this respect. It may reduce spending on DLA and 
claimant counts in the short-term. However, even viewed from an individualist perspective it has 
limited capacity to move disabled people into work. As Charles Walker MP observed, allowing 
for the idea that ‘giving people an opportunity to re-engage with their communities and re-
engage with the workforce’ is the right direction of travel, the journey into work for some 
disabled people ‘will be, perhaps, a great deal longer than for others’ (private interview). This is 
compounded by current issues around providers within the Work Programme and the way that 
PbR works in relation to individuals who are a long way from the labour market. Disability 
organisations have expressed concern that restrictions in eligibility for PIP will increase poverty 
levels for disabled people (Disability Alliance, 2011: 9-14; Disability Rights Partnership, 2011), 
yet the decision to implement PIP regardless suggests that this is a price worth paying for both 
being able to reduce immediate spending, and perhaps providing a work incentive (although this 
is by no means a certainty). As such, while the thinking behind Universal Credit perceives flaws 
in the welfare system and proposes altering the system as a means of changing behaviour 
resulting from this, DLA reform, in common with the other reforms discussed in this chapter, 
places a much stronger emphasis on withdrawing aspects of welfare support as a means of 
enforcing individual responsibility. 
 
7.3 The Social Rented Sector Size Criterion 
The rising cost of housing benefit has been another area of concern for the Conservatives since 
moving into government. In 2010 Osborne noted that: ‘spending on housing benefit has risen 
from £14 billion ten years ago to £21 billion today. That is close to a 50 per cent increase over 
and above inflation’. This, he suggested, indicated that ‘costs are completely out of control’ 
(2010a). Similarly Duncan Smith stated: ‘the cost of housing benefit has spiralled completely out 
of control’, supporting ‘crazy excesses…of people on benefits living in houses that those in work 
could not afford’ (quoted in Ramesh, 2011). Cameron has also turned to the idea of an ‘out of 
control’ housing benefit bill (HC Hansard, 27 October 2010; 22 June 2011). Caps on Local 
Housing Allowance and the overall benefit cap form the main strategy for addressing this in 
relation to private sector housing, as discussed below.  However, 68 per cent of housing benefit 
claimants were in the social housing sector in 2011. Sub-market rents and different rules 
applying to benefit entitlement mean that social sector tenants are unlikely to be affected by the 
cap-related changes. On grounds of financial necessity and fairness, the DWP therefore argued 
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that addressing housing benefit levels within the social sector specifically was necessary (DWP, 
2012h: 6-7). The policy intended to achieve this is the Social Rented Sector Size Criterion 
(SRSSC), also known as the ‘under-occupancy penalty’, ‘removal of the spare room subsidy’ or 
‘the bedroom tax’. 
 
The SRSSC was introduced under the Welfare Reform Act (2012). It is intended to ‘[limit] 
social tenants’ entitlement to appropriately sized homes’ (Osborne, 2010a). Working age social 
housing tenants experienced a reduction in housing benefit entitlement from 1 April 2013 if their 
property was deemed too large for their needs. The reduction is fourteen per cent for one ‘spare’ 
bedroom, or 25 per cent for two or more (DWP, 2012h: 6). The DWP estimated that this would 
affect 660,000 tenants, or 31 per cent of working-age housing benefit claimants in the social 
sector at the time of introduction, with 81 per cent of these losing £12 per week on average for 
one bedroom (2012h: 8). There are ‘very limited’ permanent exemptions (Wilson, 2014a: 1), 
although the Government put extra funding into the budget for Discretionary Housing Payments 
(DHPs) from 2013/14 to support implementation. (DWP, 2012i: 11-12). It is estimated that the 
SRSSC will save £465 million per year from 2013/14 to 2015/16, rising to £470 million annually 
thereafter (HM Treasury, 2013b: 67).25 Even at the Government’s best estimate, it is therefore 
projected to save less than half of the annual amount of changes to DLA (NAO, 2014b: 24), and 
less than 5 per cent of the amount saved via changes to up-rating (Cracknell, 2011: iv; DWP, 
2013e: 1). 
  
Despite this, the SRSSC has attracted significant controversy. The National Housing Federation 
(2013a) and Shelter (Webb, 2013) have both offered vocal criticism. Both the Work and 
Pensions (2014c: 20-30) and Scottish Affairs Committees (2014) identified concerns that it is 
causing hardship for vulnerable people. Reflecting these concerns, the Scottish Government 
committed to effectively cancelling the SRSSC by supporting local authorities in granting DHPs 
to all applicants (Scottish Government, 2014). All major parties apart from the Conservatives 
(Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the SNP, Plaid Cymru, the Green Party and UKIP) committed 
to either abolishing or significantly reforming the policy as the 2015 election approached.  
                                                 
25
 These savings may have been over-estimated: Tunstall (2013: 3) suggests that ‘real data available from housing 
organisations since 1st April 2013 does not match key assumptions about claimant behaviour underlying the DWP’s 
model’. This data indicates the possibility of reductions in savings of up to 39 per cent.  
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Criticism has not come solely from those who might be expected to be hostile to the 
Conservatives. Phillip Blond described the SRSSC as: ‘a very stupid policy…It presumes that 
there’s a mass of property out there that people can access and move simply from two bedrooms 
to one bedroom. They just can’t’ (private interview). Conservative MP Andrew Percy told the 
House: ‘on issues such as the bedroom tax and changes to council house tenancies, I think that 
the Government got it wrong’ (HC Hansard, 9 May 2012). He argued that Ministers needed to: 
‘take account of the fact that houses are not only public assets; they are also people’s 
homes…This is not a simple matter to resolve, even though we should encourage an end to 
under-occupancy’ (HC Hansard, 1 February 2012b). Guto Bebb expressed ‘doubts about the 
merits of the bedroom tax’ (private interview), and Angie Bray, then-Conservative MP for 
Ealing Central and Acton, rebelled in the vote on the Affordable Homes Bill which supported 
further exemptions to SRSSC. Public support for the policy has also declined since 
implementation, despite high approval of its underlying principles (DWP, 2013f). The SRSSC 
has been one of the less straightforward elements of Coalition welfare reform. 
 
This is likely to be due to the method of implementation. The immediate motivation for the 
policy was presented by Osborne as restraining housing benefit expenditure. Therefore it applies 
to both new and existing tenancies, in contrast to Universal Credit and PIP which are being 
trialled on new claims before being extended to existing claimants. This created an immediate, 
direct impact on a large number of tenants, heightening controversy. Stuart Andrew, whose 
Pudsey constituency in West Yorkshire is one of the 100 constituencies most affected by the 
SRSSC (National Housing Foundation, 2013b) observed that: ‘everybody who I’ve spoken to, or 
the vast majority, completely believe that cuts are necessary. Where they start to differ is when 
the cuts affect them!’ (private interview). Conservatives justify such an approach as the actions 
of a responsible government, making up for the irresponsibility of the preceding Labour 
government’s spending. Sir Roger Gale MP argued:  
 
There are very few Members of Parliament that are in favour of retrospective legislation, 
because taking something away from somebody is always worse than not giving it to 
them in the first place. There have been occasions where we’ve had to take away things 
from people because we can’t just phase it out by natural wastage. We’ve had to take 
some fairly harsh economic decisions to get the economy that the last government 
bequeathed us back on track. (private interview) 
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Similarly, John Stevenson suggested that the financial situation had made reform harder in some 
ways, identifying the SRSSC as an example of a policy where sound finances might have 
enabled more gradual implementation (private interview). Nonetheless, he and Gale agreed that 
while the financial crisis provided an explanation for the immediacy of the reform, there was 
more to the agenda than this. As Duncan Smith has claimed, the Conservatives are leading on 
welfare reform ‘in the firm belief that it is the right thing to do, not only saving money but 
breaking dependency and restoring the incentive to work’ (HC Hansard, 25 March 2014). Maria 
Miller also stated that work incentives form part of the rationale behind the policy (Welfare 
Reform Bill Deb., 3 May 2011). The SRSSC, implemented alongside DCLG moves to end 
lifelong tenancies in the social sector (DCLG, 2011), is perhaps more significant in relation to 
this than in terms of financial savings. 
 
Supporting this, the Scottish National Party’s Stewart Hosie MP observed:  
 
The extraordinary thing is that the bedroom tax works only if the policy fails. If 
everybody could move to what the Government consider to be a “properly sized 
property”, the housing benefit costs would probably be identical to what they are today—
not one penny would be saved. (HC Hansard, 27 February 2013; see also Orr, 2014). 
 
One goal of the policy is to promote efficient usage of social housing stock by encouraging 
tenants to downsize. However, many tenants have found that there is not suitable local property 
available to downsize into (DWP, 2014f: 59), and the financial savings and benefits in terms of 
incentivising work and responsible spending come from tenants staying in their existing 
properties and making up the shortfall in rent. Moving into a smaller property that fits the size 
criteria, or a private sector property with attendant higher rent would dent or off-set the financial 
savings, while providing no identifiable incentive for recipients to alter spending patterns or 
increase housing income since rental liability would be unchanged. This strongly suggests that 
staying put and paying something closer to the market rent is the preferred outcome. This can 
then be framed as incentivising responsible behaviour, in the form of working more or spending 
less. 
 
Therefore at the root of the policy is a concern with dependency and the way that altering the 
structure of the welfare system might affect the behaviour of those who draw on its resources. If 
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dependency is defined as drawing on the state’s resources on a long-term basis, social housing 
tenants are vulnerable to being perceived as more dependent than many other groups. The 
physical resource of social housing has usually been provided on a permanent basis, although the 
DCLG changes discussed above will alter this. Additionally, social sector rents are lower than 
the market rate. In terms of need, this is necessary because it is targeted towards people with low 
incomes. 29 per cent of social rental households are in relative poverty before housing costs, and 
despite the lower rents, 43 per cent are in poverty after housing costs (Tunstall et al., 2013: 2). 
Social sector tenants make up the majority of housing benefit claimants, and 63 per cent of all 
social sector households claim housing benefit (DWP, 2012h: 7). Finally, approximately 40 per 
cent of social households are workless, compared with seventeen per cent of private tenancies 
and nine per cent of owner-occupied properties (ONS, 2014a: 7). Housing benefit is vulnerable 
because it is not widely supported; politically, it may represent an easy, popular cut, although the 
disquiet over the SRSSC and benefit cap should serve as a note of caution (Cooke and Davies, 
2014: 3). Combined with this, Conservatives view material poverty as a symptom of social 
disadvantage and reliance on the state as a cause. As such social housing tenants present a 
particular challenge in overcoming dependency, which is viewed as being at the root of many 
social problems. While implementation has not proved as smooth as the government would have 
hoped, it is clear to see why a Conservative-led approach to welfare might result in such a policy. 
 
The concern with long-term dependency is also evident in the main strategy for smoothing the 
transition for claimants. This is the use of DHPs to make up shortfalls in rent. The first important 
point from this regarding dependency is that entitlement to support is not a given: DHPs are 
usually only awarded on a temporary basis, and reapplication offers ‘no guarantees for success’ 
(Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 2013: 17). The identification of this as a suitable 
transitional measure therefore reflects similar thinking to that informing the PIP re-assessment 
process, rejecting indefinite support in favour of a more conditional process. This coheres with 
conceptions of the permanent, low-cost tenancy as a manifestation of welfare dependency, 
altering the relationship between the recipient and the state into a less permanent arrangement 
whereby entitlement to support must be repeatedly demonstrated and justified. 
 
The second significant implication is in the identification of groups that are considered entitled 
to some support, and thereby implicitly permitted a level of dependency. DHPs are administered 
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locally. Decisions on awards do not rest with the DWP, and the only official qualifying criteria is 
receipt of housing benefit or the housing element of Universal Credit (DWP, 2014g: 6). 
However, DWP guidance suggests prioritising disabled people in significantly adapted homes 
for DHPs. The additional allocation to DHPs related to the SRSSC of £30 billion reflects £25 
billion to cover the expected impact on disabled people (DWP, 2012i: 11-12; DWP, 2014g: 27-
28), and an additional £5 billion that was intended for foster carers (who were subsequently 
exempted) (Wilson, 2014b: 3). There is therefore usually a requirement to demonstrate need that 
goes beyond financial hardship, particularly in the northern regions where under-occupancy is 
much higher and funds are stretched more thinly (Apps, 2014). The allocation strategy therefore 
necessitates breaking the link between financial need and entitlement to support. This is 
demonstrated in local authority management of DHPs, with support usually only provided when 
additional grounds can be demonstrated and additional conditions met (Work and Pensions 
Select Committee, 2014c: 42-45). Simply not having enough money to make up the increase in 
rent is not usually enough, so the financial aspects of poverty are also somewhat omitted from 
this policy.  This then leads into concepts of fairness, and the circumstances under which support 
is deserved. 
 
The main justification for the imposition of the SRSSC is an appeal to fairness. Immediate 
financial concerns aside, a central argument employed in justifying the policy it is that since 
housing benefit entitlements for private sector tenants are determined ‘with reference to the size 
of the claimant’s household’, similar rules should apply in the social sector where tenants 
‘generally have no restrictions based on the size of accommodation that they occupy’ (DWP, 
2012h: 1). The change is presented as remedying an anachronistic discrepancy which allows 
social housing tenants more favourable conditions than their less ‘dependent’ fellow citizens, 
building on the introduction of the private sector Local Housing Allowance by New Labour as 
part of the Welfare Reform Act (2007). Remedying this by offering greater support to those in 
the private sector would not only constitute an expensive step back from New Labour’s reforms, 
but also an ideologically unacceptable extension of state provision. The solution, therefore, has 
to be limiting support for those in social housing. This is an expression of the idea of fairness as 
desert since it aims to ameliorate a variety of ‘something for nothing’, whereby a group that 
overall contributes less economically receives a far greater return from the welfare system than 
those that contribute more.  
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Reflecting this, arguments from Conservatives regarding the SRSSC have increasingly shifted 
from financial, towards moral justifications. John Redwood accused MPs who pointed out the 
lack of savings from the policy of ‘misunderstanding’ its ‘true nature’, claiming: ‘it is not 
primarily a public spending-cut policy’ (HC Hansard, 27 February 2013). Kwarteng explained 
that the move was ‘an issue of principle - equality between socially provided housing and private 
sector rents. At the moment, there is a discrepancy that the Government - perfectly fairly and 
perfectly wisely - are trying to equalise’ (HC Hansard, 12 November 2013). Similarly, Duncan 
Smith expounded: ‘the rationale for the policy was fairness. The previous government left us 
with the situation where some on housing benefit in the private sector were not allowed to 
occupy houses that had extra rooms, so balancing that is fair’ (HC Hansard, 3 November 2014b). 
Gary Streeter argued that the existing lack of parity was the result of lower rents in the social 
sector, rather than perceiving private rents as excessively high: ‘people in social housing are 
already getting a huge subsidy, so we're just making their benefit situation the same as someone 
in private rented housing. How is that so draconian?’ (private interview). This conception of 
fairness and the need to balance treatment of low-paid working households and workless, or 
partly-working ‘dependent’ households, is common across the wider programme of non-
disability benefit reforms discussed in this chapter. The SRSSC, concerned with establishing 
fairness between two sub-sets of ‘welfare dependent’ groups, can be understood as a precursor to 
enabling this.  
 
To some extent there is a concern with relativity in the framing of the SRSSC, illustrated in the 
perceived need to ensure parity between two groups of claimants. However, the solution offered 
reflects a very individualised conception of poverty and disadvantage. Growth in housing benefit 
is driven structurally by pressures including a lack of housing stock and the failure of wages to 
keep pace with rising market rents in the private sector (Webb, 2012; Cooke and Davies, 2014). 
These pressures are also part of the reason for the disparity between social and private sector 
rental rates. Despite acknowledgement of the need to build more homes (Cameron, 2010b), a 
report by Policy Exchange warns that the Coalition  ‘is in danger of overseeing the lowest total 
number of new homes built as a government since at least before the 1920s’ (Morton, 2012: 6-7).  
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The weight of expectation for ameliorating both the disparity between the public and private 
sectors and the growth of the cost of housing benefit is therefore placed on these ‘most 
dependent’ households, who are deemed to be in entrenched poverty owing to their reliance on 
the state. In turn, this reinforces the promotion of the market as a ‘natural’ or extra-human social 
and economic framework, with state rental levels correspondingly framed as artificially low and 
unjustified owing to the dependency perpetuated by this. The SRSSC suggests that these social 
outcomes can be altered through increasing the responsibilities placed on social sector tenants. 
As such, while the limited financial savings expected to result from the reform fit with the 
priority of cutting welfare spending, the SRSSC also supports the principle that for the majority 
of people who depend on the welfare system, positive change cannot occur without first 
removing some financial support. Implicit within this is the suggestion that the housing benefit in 
the social sector, unreformed, encourages and supports idleness and a lack of impetus to either 
find work, or alter spending patterns. 
 
7.4 The household benefit cap 
The household benefit cap was also introduced as part of the Welfare Reform Act from April 
2013. The cap applies a weekly limit to the total amount that households aged 16 to 64 can 
receive in benefits of £500 per week for couples (with or without children) or single parents 
whose children live with them, or £350 a week for single adults without resident children. Within 
this overall cap are measures intended to address levels of housing benefit payments in the 
private sector, which came into force in April 2011. These include a cap on housing benefit of 
£400 or £280 per week for couples or single people respectively, and the restriction of Local 
Housing Allowance to the 30th percentile of market rates, as opposed to the 50th percentile that 
was used previously (DWP, 2010e: 6-7). The imposition of the 2013 benefit cap layered on top 
of the 2011 housing benefit cap means that households entitled to the highest level of housing 
benefit will then only be eligible to receive a maximum of £100 on top of this, even if their 
entitlement without the cap would have been much higher. 
 
The household benefit cap is aimed at households without any adults in substantial work, as 
receipt of Working Tax Credit exempts households from it. Eligibility for Working Tax Credit 
depends on working a minimum number of hours per week, ranging from sixteen hours for 
single parents and some disabled people, to 30 hours for people aged 25-59 with no children or 
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additional considerations (DWP, 2014h). Exemption is also applied with regard to receipt of 
some other benefits, including DLA/PIP and the support component of ESA. The DWP initially 
estimated that 56,000 households would lose money as a result of the cap (2012j: 10). This was 
subsequently revised down to 40,000 in light of a number of changes, including those to benefit 
up-rating discussed below (DWP, 2013g: 1). This represents approximately one per cent of the 
DWP’s out-of-work caseload (ONS, 2013a: 2). While the cap will not affect very many 
households, those that are affected will see a significant decrease in income, engendering 
potentially very serious consequences. The cap is expected to save £265 million in 2014/15 
(DWP, 2012j: 7), by reducing average household income for those affected by £93 per week 
(DWP, 2012j: 2).  
 
In common with the other changes discussed in this chapter, both the household and housing 
benefit caps were announced by the Treasury. Following the announcement on housing benefit 
in the Emergency Budget (Osborne 2010a), Osborne told the Conservative conference that an 
overall cap on benefits would be introduced. This would ensure that: ‘no family on out-of-work 
benefits will get more than the average family gets by going out to work’ (2010b). The annual 
level of the cap is therefore aligned with median household earnings of £26,000.26 In terms of 
ideas, the cap somewhat supports the aim of ‘making work pay’, although its limited impact 
means it does so in a very uneven way, discussed further below. It also accomplished this in a 
negative sense, through reducing out-of-work benefits rather than increasing returns from work. 
As indicated above, the cap is not one of the biggest money-savers that the Coalition has 
introduced. On the contrary, it saves the least of all of the changes discussed in this chapter 
because it affects so few households. Despite what the involvement of the Treasury might 
suggest, it is therefore difficult to explain the cap fully in terms of fiscal pressures, especially 
given concerns outlined by DCLG that it might generate a net cost to the government due to 
increases in homelessness (Heslop, 2011). A more tenable explanation given the structure of the 
cap is that rather than representing the Treasury in terms of controlling finances, the cap is a 
political move by Osborne, enabled by both his strategist position within the Conservative Party 
and the power vested in the Treasury as a department. 
                                                 
26
 The Children’s Society has argued that this is misleading as it does not take into account the assistance that 
households earning £26,000 would receive through the benefit system. Basing the cap on average household income 
would raise it to £31,500 (quoted in Butler, 2012).  
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The main justification for the cap has been an appeal to fairness. This is used to establish a 
relationship between working and non-working households. For Cameron, the cap is a ‘basic 
issue of fairness’ (2012b), which Grayling explained supports the claim that it is ‘clearly not 
fair…That households on out-of-work benefits should receive a greater income from benefits 
than the average earnings of working households’ (Grayling, HC Hansard, 1 February 2012b). 
This reflects the emphasis within the Conservative approach to as welfare a whole on ensuring 
that those who are not working are prevented from receiving ‘something for nothing’, justified in 
terms of the causes and consequences of irresponsible behaviour. However, it is around the cap 
that these ideas seem to have been expressed most strongly.  
 
The austerity-based elements of the Conservative Party’s approach to welfare policy provide a 
much easier sell electorally than the longer-term programmes such as Universal Credit. Benefits 
paid to unemployed people are particularly vulnerable in this respect compared to those paid to 
some other groups. For example, support for the idea that the government should be responsible 
for providing adequate income for unemployed people was 59% in 2011, compared to 84% for 
disabled people in 2010 (Clery, 2012: 5). Electorally, there is a regional dimension to the cap, 
which affects very few families outside of London and the South East. Support for a lower cap 
becomes slightly higher towards the north of the England, which is where the Conservatives 
urgently needed to win and retain support in 2015 (see Chapter 5). Graham Evans, Conservative 
MP for Weaver Vale in Cheshire, summarised an aspect of the thinking behind this, telling the 
House that his constituents: ‘believe it deeply unfair that people living on low incomes…are 
paying through their taxes for unemployed Londoners to live in multimillion pound houses in 
trendy parts of the capital’ (HC Hansard, 18 July 2011; see also Stevenson in Chapter 5). The 
cap is clearly a potentially very useful policy in the short-term politically, although its longer-
term impact in respect of the concerns raised by DCLG are less clear. 
 
The uneven impact of the cap appears deliberate rather than an oversight, as it works in the 
Conservatives’ favour. Sheila Gilmore, a former Labour member of the Work and Pensions 
Select Committee, suggested that the decline in support for the SRSSC occurred because it 
affected a large number of people across the UK who did not identify themselves, their friends or 
relatives in the image of ‘this scrounger person’ underpinning the justification for reform (private 
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interview). The structure of the cap has enabled the Conservatives to avoid this pitfall: DWP 
research showed that voters considered themselves to know much less about the cap than about 
the SRSSC, but were strongly inclined to support it (DWP, 2013h: 15-16). The Conservatives are 
left with a popular policy as evidence of their willingness to take a hard line on unemployed or 
underemployed benefit claimants, without the attendant fall-out from implementing the policy on 
a nation-wide basis, and having largely brushed over its longer-term implications. 
 
By linking the cap specifically to out-of-work benefits, the Conservatives aim to place 
themselves on the side of ‘hardworking people’, which was the theme of their 2013 conference. 
The cap identifies the Conservatives as ‘the party of ordinary people who are working’ (Sir 
Roger Gale, private interview), supporting ‘the people who…were sick of going out to work 
knowing their neighbours were on benefits – but had no intention of getting a job’ (Cameron, 
2011a). Like the SRSSC, the concern is with people towards the bottom of the income ladder 
and specifically those who are earning very little from working, set against those whose income 
is comprised solely of out-of-work benefits. For example, Gale stated: ‘to anybody earning say, 
£16-18,000 a year, working hard and doing a full day’s work, five or even six days a week, to 
see somebody receiving massive sums in benefits from going out and doing absolutely nothing, 
it’s offensive’ (private interview). Conor Burns similarly claimed: ‘you find very robust views 
amongst the working class about those who they feel are exploiting benefits whilst they’re 
working hard and making a contribution’ (private interview). Within the electoral positioning of 
the cap, therefore, is the ideological claim that the Conservative concept of fairness as desert 
represents ‘real fairness’. 
 
Beyond this in explaining the cap, Conservatives have drawn on arguments which suggest that it  
shares some of the thinking behind Universal Credit in terms of ‘making work pay’. For 
example, Duncan Smith explained that the cap was: 
 
Simply looking to those families who have become static and immobile. There is a 
disincentive against their going to work; the amount of money that they receive is such 
that they could never get it if they went to work. Therefore their incentive to work is non-
existent. (HC Hansard, 11 October 2010)  
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Grayling similarly stated that the cap would ‘remove perverse disincentives to work’ (HC 
Hansard, 9 March 2011), and Miller claimed that it cap would ‘be one of the best ways of 
ensuring that work pays, for families throughout our country’ (HC Hansard, 23 January 2012). 
This is a very similar ideological argument to parts of that behind Universal Credit, in that it 
suggests that paying out high levels of benefits without sufficient work-related conditions 
attached perpetuates dependency by rewarding irresponsible behaviour. This is then both lacking 
in compassion towards those whose lives have become ‘static and immobile’ within the welfare 
system, and unfair to those who are in work. In as far as human behaviour and decision-making 
is understood within it, therefore, the cap supports the basic tenets around the idea of 
‘dependency’ contained in Universal Credit and the Work Programme. It is presented as a policy 
that will fit in with and buttress the effects of Universal Credit incentives, reducing the perceived 
attractiveness of not working. Here, therefore, it is possible to see how more positive incentive 
based arguments link with more negative aspects, based on withdrawing support as a means of 
stimulating activity. 
 
Beyond this rhetorical similarity, however, there are some important differences between 
Universal Credit, the Work Programme, and the cap. Accepting the idea that any of these 
policies will help to tackle poverty and dependency requires accepting the Conservative 
proposition that poverty is a problem experienced at the individual level, and therefore one that 
can be addressed at the individual level. Within this, Universal Credit and the Work Programme 
offer broad-ranging solutions to poverty, albeit on a long-term basis. Despite the similar 
justifications for the cap, it is difficult to make the same claim for it. It is simply not tenable to 
claim that a policy that affects one per cent of the DWP’s out-of-work caseload will encourage 
responsible behaviour across the UK, as Duncan Smith, Miller and Grayling suggest above. 
Owing to the strategic considerations discussed, households affected by the cap are in very 
specific circumstances. They tend to have large numbers of children, live in areas with high rent, 
or both (DWP, 2012j: 7-8). DWP data accurate to January 2014 stated that 60 per cent of 
households affected had between one and four children, while 36 per cent had five or more 
children. 47 per cent of households were in London with a further eleven per cent in the South 
East, and only one of the twenty Local Authorities most affected by the cap was outside London 
(DWP, 2014i: 6-8). Universal Credit and the Work Programme have much wider reach, and are 
consequently much more thoroughgoing reforms of the welfare system. As such, the similarities 
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should not be exaggerated, as the two policies seem to be intended to achieve quite different 
results. 
 
There is also evidence of incoherence between the ideas underpinning Universal Credit and those 
underpinning the cap. The case for the cap is that some families receive overall benefit payments 
that are too high. Yet, the cap, Universal Credit, and the legacy benefits all come from within the 
same system. As Joyce (2012) suggests, if the Government believes that some families are 
entitled to excessive benefits then the best-targeted means of remedying this would be to alter the 
rates for those benefits. Given that Universal Credit presents an opportunity to ‘start from 
scratch’ in this respect, it is unclear what will be gained by ‘layering a cap on top of a system 
that is designed to allow higher payments’. The cap, however, is a much simpler and less 
electorally risky measure, at least when considered in terms of society as a whole rather than its 
impact on individuals, which is returned to below. This points to a triumph of political 
expediency and concern with achieving short-term gains over longer-term thinking. 
 
In addition to the effects of the cap in relation to society and in terms of its utility to the 
Conservatives, it is also important to consider its impact on those households affected by it. The 
£100 per week that can be claimed on top of the maximum permissible housing benefit falls 
considerably short of the relative poverty threshold in 2012/13 for all household types (MacInnes 
et al., 2014: 14), and households affected by the cap stand to lose an average of £93 per week, 
with larger households losing the most. Larger households are more likely to rely on benefits and 
so will be impacted by the range of reforms: despite this, the benefit cap will have a particular 
impact on relative poverty when its effects are isolated (Browne, 2012a: 23; see also Children’s 
Society, 2013). This will be somewhat mitigated in the longer-term by Universal Credit, offering 
a further example of this and the austerity reforms pulling in different directions. This supports 
the suggestion that reforms within this strand of policy reflect a willingness to accept an increase 
in relative poverty as a consequence of enacting a desert-based conception of fairness. 
 
Moreover, the cap disproportionately affects children, suggesting a departure from compassion 
as a key concept in informing welfare policy. The Children’s Society calculated that 140,000 
children will be affected by the policy, compared to 60,000 adults (2013); Action for Children 
suggested a higher figure, of 175,000 children (Rennison, 2013). The impact on children was 
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responsible for Welfare Reform Act defeats in the House of Lords, and it has been criticised as 
‘horrible’ and ‘traumatic’ by Liberal Democrats in the Commons, with reference to possible 
evictions (Sarah Teather, quoted in Helm, 2012). The concept of Conservative compassion 
suggests that some hardship is acceptable, based on the claim that if life on out-of-work benefits 
is comfortable then this will preclude claimants from taking steps towards self-sufficiency and 
better outcomes. This is perhaps tenable when applied to adults, who within an individualised 
conception of poverty are responsible for their situation. Connected to this, the DWP’s research 
has found that the most common response from people affected by the cap is to express a wish to 
move into work (2014j: 7). However, as a report for one of the four pilot boroughs for the cap 
cautions, these claimants are ‘likely to need intensive and personalised support to help them 
respond to the cap and move into employment’ (Davies et al., 2013: 6). In the meantime, the 
impact on children is difficult to understand in relation to even Conservative conceptions 
compassion or fairness. These are connected to a concept of responsible behaviour which 
dependents, by definition, are unable to fulfil. 
 
The presence of this approach within justifications for the cap therefore contributes to a 
significant ideological shift between New Labour and the Conservatives, and in the principles 
underpinning the British welfare system more broadly. While moving towards a more 
conditional approach to welfare provision and sharing some foundational ideas with the cap, 
Universal Credit preserves some commitment to a needs-based conception of fairness via the 
retention of means-testing, and some commitment to a relative conception of poverty via its 
modest redistributive aspect (see below). This supports the idea of the welfare system as a 
‘safety net’, which is popular amongst Conservatives. The cap, however, pulls away from both 
of these conceptions, focusing strongly (although not consistently, given its limited reach) on 
fairness as desert and a behavioural conception of poverty which is linked to being out of work. 
In doing so, it severs the link between entitlement and need for those households who are 
affected by it, again reflecting a ‘cut first’ approach to welfare provision which extends the 
significant power of the Treasury. This shift is no less significant if it is read as being the result 
of electoral positioning, especially given its popularity amongst voters across the political 
spectrum (Taylor-Gooby and Taylor, 2015). It should not be underplayed despite the small 
number of households affected by the cap initially, especially as Conservatives have indicated 
that it will be reduced further should the Party win in 2015 (Cameron, quoted in le Duc, 2015). 
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The importance of this line of policy-making is further reinforced when considered in relation to 
changes to benefit up-rating measures. 
 
7.5 Welfare up-rating changes 
Changes to DLA, the SRSSC and the benefit cap have all been linked to the need to reduce 
public spending. The extent that they will do so effectively and substantially is both varied in 
terms of headline savings, and uncertain in relation to consequential costs that might occur as a 
result of the policies. As mentioned above, DCLG has outlined concerns that the cap’s limited 
savings will be overwhelmed by the need to provide additional support (including homelessness 
provision) to some of those affected (Heslop, 2011), while the Scottish Welfare Reform 
Committee has suggested the same of the SRSSC (2014: 14). However, these policies do not 
need to make much of an impact financially because the Government has introduced other 
changes which will have a far greater and more predictable effect on welfare spending, 
accomplishing much of the long-term heavy lifting in this respect. These are the changes to the 
mechanisms and levels by which cash benefits are up-rated. 
 
The first of these changes alters the mechanism for up-rating of working-age benefits and 
pensions from the Retail Prices Index (RPI), to the Consumer Prices Index (CPI).27 This came 
into effect in April 2011. Inflation measured by CPI tends to be the lower of the two measures 
because CPI excludes some goods and services that are included in RPI, and because different 
methods are used to calculate each rate (ONS, 2013b: 20). Since 1997, RPI has only exceeded 
CPI for one extended period of sixteen months during the financial crisis, and for very short 
periods in 1999 and 2002. Since 1989, RPI has been on average 0.7 percentage points higher 
than CPI (Miller, 2011: 2-3). However, forecasting by the OBR suggests this will increase to 1.4 
percentage points in the long-run future (OBR, 2011: 90). This has a cumulative negative effect 
on the value of benefits: it is estimated that it will save £1.2 billion in 2011/12, rising to £5.8 
billion in 2014/15, and increasing exponentially thereafter (Cracknell, 2011: iv). In addition, the 
Coalition implemented the Welfare Benefits Up-rating Act in 2013, which restricts certain 
working-age benefits, elements of tax credits and Child Benefit to an up-rating of 1 per cent in 
                                                 
27
 Pensions, however, are protected by the ‘triple lock’. This means that they may rise at a different, higher rate than 
working age benefits. 
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2014/15 and 2015/16. This is projected to save approximately an extra £1.1 billion in 2014/15 
and £1.9 billion in 2015/16 (DWP, 2013i: 1). The Conservative electoral victory in 2015 also 
means that all working-age benefits will be frozen for two years up to 2017, saving 
approximately £3 billion (Osborne, 2014b).  
 
Given their centrality to reducing welfare spending, it is unsurprising that these reforms were 
announced by the Treasury. They reflect an immediate concern with reducing spending on 
welfare, framed in terms of achieving fiscal sustainability in the longer-term as opposed to the 
more short-term approach of other reforms discussed in this chapter. Announcing the RPI-CPI 
change, Osborne argued that the growth in welfare spending (including tax credits) from £132 
billion in 2004 to £192 billion in 2014, representing a ‘real terms increase of a staggering 45 per 
cent’ was ‘one reason why there is no money left’. Moreover, not only was welfare spending 
apparently becoming unsustainable, but it had a social cost: leaving ‘an increasing number of our 
fellow citizens trapped on out-of-work benefits for their entire lives’ (2010a). As such, a 
sustainable means of bringing spending down, such as this policy represents, was necessary both 
financially and morally. The 1 per cent up-rating was also justified in terms of delivering 
‘permanent savings each and every year from our country’s welfare bill’ (Osborne, 2012b). 
Duncan Smith similarly claimed that fiscal savings were ‘at the heart of the measure’,  while 
emphasising the wider effects of New Labour’s approach to welfare spending which he argued 
‘delivered poor social outcomes, trapping people in dependency’ (HC Hansard, 8 January 2013). 
 
These are highly effective methods of consistently and predictably reducing welfare spending. 
They are also easier politically than the other policies discussed in this chapter, since their 
impact on individual households is both uniform and gradual. As James Plunkett, the former 
Director of Policy for the Resolution Foundation suggested, the RPI-CPI change ‘means 
skimming small amounts each year from the budgets of lower-income households, in the hope 
that you’ll be out the door before they notice’ (2011). It should also be noted that the framing of 
these policies represents an ideologically-grounded critique of New Labour’s approach to 
welfare, rather than one entirely stemming from economic necessity. The growth of the welfare 
budget under New Labour was not accidental and can be explained with reference to policy 
priorities, including reducing pensioner and child poverty via the extension of tax credits (see 
Chapter 1). As New Labour practised ‘redistribution by stealth’ (Piachaud, 2007), the up-rating 
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changes are reductions by stealth, which reflect a departure from previous policy priorities and a 
re-shaping of the relationship between individuals and the state, in addition to reducing spending.  
 
The way that welfare spending has been framed in relation to up-rating reforms provides an 
indication of the thinking behind this. Beyond the immediate need to restrict spending in 
accordance with the priority of cutting the deficit, the broader argument from Conservatives has 
been that high spending on welfare is wasteful and indicative of an ineffective welfare state. One 
strand of this argument concerns the reach of tax credits. Duncan Smith argued that it was 
‘ridiculous nonsense’ that ‘nine out of 10 families with children were eligible for tax credits, in 
some cases those with more than £70,000 in earnings’, having previously claimed that this was 
indicative of an attempt by Labour to buy votes from higher earners (HC Hansard, 8 January 
2013). The Conservative view on this was neatly summarised by Robert Halfon MP, who 
queried: 
 
Is not the philosophical underpinning of this debate our wish to create a hand-back 
society, not a hand-out society? Is not cutting taxes on lower earners the best way to help 
those on low earnings, rather than recycling their hard-earned money through the benefits 
system? (HC Hansard, 8 January 2013) 
 
This refers to foundational questions about the purpose of the welfare state and the sort of 
relationship that it should have with individuals, which is linked to the ideas discussed in 
Chapter 4 regarding whether extending individuals’ direct relationships with the state has a 
detrimental effect overall on ‘horizontal’ social connections and on independence and self-
sufficiency. It was presented as a negation of Labour MPs’ claims that working people would be 
affected by the bill, suggesting that some of those higher-earners affected should never have 
been eligible for welfare payments in the first place. This is returned to below. 
 
Such questions also emerge in the more prominent strand of argument around up-rating, which 
relates to claimants on out-of-work benefits. Here, high spending is presented as contrary to 
compassion: Osborne claimed ‘we are wasting the talent of millions, and spending billions on it 
in the process’ (2010a). This is the familiar argument that appears throughout justifications for 
reform in this and the previous chapter, that receiving money from the state causes claimants to 
become reliant on that money, encouraging them to remain dependent and therefore in poverty 
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rather than striving for self-sufficiency. This is then linked with irresponsible decision-making, 
including the decision not to work. As Gareth Johnson  explained during the second reading of 
the Up-rating Act: ‘if we allow benefits to be increased by more than salaries, that will increase 
the number of people on benefits who are trapped in poverty and unable to afford to go to work’ 
(HC Hansard, 8 January 2013). In terms of unemployed claimants, therefore, Conservatives have 
attempted to illustrate how reducing benefit levels in the long-term contributes to creating a more 
compassionate system, in which the incentives for self-sufficiency are increased. Lowering the 
income to be gained from out-of-work benefits is identified as a vital part of this process, and up-
rating changes play an important part in this by bringing out-of-work benefit inflation onto a 
lower trajectory than average earnings (Hoode, Johnson and Joyce, 2013). 
 
There is also an appeal to ensuring fairness between working and non-working benefit recipients. 
Here, Johnson’s point above regarding rates of increases in benefits and salaries is important, as 
the appeal is based on the relative financial statuses of out-of-work benefit recipients and low-
paid workers. Duncan Smith explained: ‘the reality is that in the period since the recession, 
payments for those in work have risen by about ten per cent and payments for those on benefits 
have risen by about twenty per cent. We are trying to get a fair settlement back over the next few 
years’. In the same debate, this was echoed by other Conservative Members including Charlie 
Elphicke and Alun Cairnes, leading Julian Sturdy to describe it as the ‘key fact’ in determining 
the debate over the policy (HC, Hansard, 8 January 2013). Similarly, out-of-work benefit 
payments were compared to public sector pay freezes. Jake Berry’s constituent had asked him: 
‘how can you justify putting out-of-work benefits up by 5.2 per cent last year, when I have had a 
pay freeze and I risk my life every day?’ (HC Hansard, 8 January 2013), while Amber Rudd 
asked whether it was not ‘confusing that the Opposition support fixing public sector pay rises at 
one per cent, but not controlling the level by which out-of-work benefits increase?’ (HC 
Hansard, 21 January 2013). This deployment of a desert-based conception of fairness is central 
to justifying up-rating changes as they apply to unemployed people. The changes attempt to 
implement the idea that low-paid workers need to be in a better financial position because this is 
morally correct, in addition to arguments around compassion and responsible behaviour for out-
of-work benefit claimants outlined above. 
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The use of such a concept of fairness for working people and the attendant emphasis on 
individual responsibility in claimants then has an important impact on the connected concept of 
poverty, illustrating how the eventual deconstestations of concepts are linked together. The 
arguments outlined above, regarding the position of low-paid workers vis-à-vis out-of-work 
claimants suggest a concern with relativism, albeit one which is limited to those at bottom of the 
income scale. However, the projected impacts of the up-rating changes do not reflect this: 
instead, these imply a shift away from income as a central measure of poverty and a further 
disconnection of the relationship between need and entitlement to support, as is present in the 
benefit cap. This is supported by projections of the effects of the Up-rating Act on child poverty. 
The IPPR’s analysis states that ‘under the reform scenario, the number of families and 
individuals in relative poverty will increase’, with 200,000 more households earnings less than 
60% of median income by 2017/18 (Thompson, 2013: 4). Esther McVey, the former Minister of 
State for Employment, confirmed this, adding a qualification that the Government ‘strongly 
[believes that] looking at relative income in isolation is not a helpful measure to track progress 
towards our target of eradicating child poverty’ (HC Hansard, 15 January 2013).  
 
The adoption of a policy that will increase relative child poverty in the long run is a further 
departure from New Labour’s priorities. This is rendered acceptable for Conservatives through 
the centrality of fairness as desert in informing policy, with the attendant claim that welfare 
spending for unemployed people is akin to ‘throwing money’ at the problem (David Gauke, HC 
Hansard, 11 December 2012). This rewards undeserving and irresponsible behaviour, hence 
perpetuating both dependency and unfairness. It reflects the belief that the source of income is 
more important than its level in terms of moving people out of poverty in the long-term, thus 
conceptualising poverty as a problem of individual behaviour rather than one of social 
inequality. Thus while under Gordon Brown’s stewardship targeting money towards low-income 
households via the Treasury was a central strategy for alleviating poverty, under Osborne 
removing it again is intended to achieve the same aim. This is possible theoretically because the 
conception of poverty underpinning the two approaches differs, and practically due to the 
amount of power over welfare policy imbued in the Treasury itself through tax credits as a 
mechanism. 
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At this point, it is useful to return to the impact that up-rating changes will have on those in 
work, as well as on out-of-work benefit claimants. While Conservative parliamentary rhetoric 
has focused on unemployed people and this is a politically expedient way of justifying the 
changes, it is not an accurate reflection of those affected. Changes to up-rating also affect 
benefits which would not usually be associated with inactivity. These include the Work-Related 
Activity component of ESA, couple and lone parent elements of Working Tax Credit, the child 
element of Child Tax Credit (and their corresponding elements in Universal Credit), and 
Statutory Sick, Maternity, Paternity and Adoption pay, in addition to more familiar targets such 
as Income Support and JSA (DWP, 2013i: 4).  
 
The impact on those in work is a difficult topic to negotiate electorally. As Chapter 5 showed, 
alongside the issues discussed above regarding the cap and SRSSC, benefit cuts tend to be 
popular when they are perceived as negatively affecting ‘scroungers’ in favour of ‘strivers’. 
They are less so when those affected do not fit neatly within this dichotomy. For some middle 
earners, the impact will be somewhat offset by increases in the tax-free personal allowance, but 
this does not apply to the lowest earners who are already earning too little to pay tax (Browne, 
2012b; Hirsch, 2013: 4-5). The problem is compounded when considered in relation to evidence 
indicating that aside from a small core of long-term unemployed households, there is not a clear 
line between employed and unemployed groups. Job insecurity and casualization at the bottom 
of the income scale means that individuals here often cycle between being in and out of work 
(Shildrick et al., 2010). Of the 200,000 households that will fall into material poverty as a direct 
result of the up-rating changes, approximately half have at least one adult in work (HC Hansard, 
30 January 2013).  
 
This is problematic in relation to a conventional concept of poverty focused on income, even 
though the number of in-work households affected is small. However, it also reinforces that the 
dominant Conservative concept of poverty is one that is focused on behaviour and choices, as it 
has to be in relation to the conceptions of fairness and responsibility that also inform the 
changes. Half of all people who are in material poverty live with a working adult (MacInnes et 
al., 2014: 30-31), but in-work poverty is a particular problem for those belonging to ‘partly 
working’ households, where jobs are part-time or one adult is not working at all (Kenway, 2008: 
16). When challenged on the impact to these families, Duncan Smith argued that ‘the vast 
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majority of people who take part-time work choose to take part-time work’ (HC Hansard, 8 
January 2013). The ONS showed that approximately one in five part-time workers were ‘under-
employed’ between 2000 and 2014, with a higher proportion in ‘elementary’ occupations which 
are low-paid and more likely to require top-ups via the benefit system (2014b: 5-6). This 
perception of individual choice is essential to justifying the effect of up-rating changes on those 
in work. It is related to the idea that individuals should accept responsibility for the 
consequences of their choices. Even if this means dipping below the material poverty line, it is 
not for the state to step in to support part-time workers. Additionally, if poverty is understood 
more in terms of behaviour, then this is less problematic in general. As Stewart Jackson MP 
explained: ‘work is the No. 1 determinant in [...] breaking the cycle of children seeing their 
parents unemployed, living in a half-life of hopelessness and poverty and lacking ambition’ (HC 
Hansard, 8 January 2013). Following this logic, it is the fact that there is a working adult in the 
household that is of most importance to sustainably tackling poverty, rather than the amount that 
they earn. 
 
In leading to increased inequality, the projected outcomes of up-rating changes betray a sense of 
scepticism towards the idea of relative poverty within the Conservative Party. This is evident in 
spite of both the relativistic conception of the relationship between unemployed and low-earners’ 
income statuses, and Conservative claims to accept the idea of relative poverty prior to 2010. 
Curiously, although Duncan Smith’s work with the SJPG was instrumental in pushing forward 
the idea of ‘redefining’ poverty in terms other than income, it is in the strand of policy associated 
with Osborne and the Treasury that these ideas have come to earlier fruition. This perhaps serves 
as a note of caution against exaggerating the ideological differences between this strand and that 
discussed in the former chapter.  
 
However, the long-term approach of Universal Credit and the implications of up-rating changes 
do not sit easily alongside each other. Universal Credit is predicted to have the greatest positive 
impact on relative poverty of all of the Coalition’s reforms. The DWP argued that Universal 
Credit would have a positive impact on income poverty by increasing take-up of benefits, and re-
focusing entitlements on lower income households (2010a: 18-20). This analysis was judged 
‘reasonable’ in a report by the OECD (Pareliussen, 2013: 23). The IFS concurred: Universal 
Credit should reduce relative poverty by 450,000 children and 600,000 working-age adults by 
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2020 (Brewer, Browne and Joyce, 2011: 3). However, a crucial caveat to this analysis is that it 
examines the effects of Universal Credit in isolation. Brewer, Browne and Joyce note that ‘this 
reduction is more than offset by the poverty-increasing impact of the government’s other 
changes to personal taxes and state benefits’, identifying the RPI/CPI shift as the most significant 
of these because it directly impacts on the value of the elements of Universal Credit (2011: 3). 
As a result of these changes, relative child poverty will have risen from 20% to 24% by 2020 
(against a goal of 5% in the Child Poverty Act), which is the highest level since 1999/2000 
(2011: 31). Absolute poverty for households with and without children is also predicted to 
increase more sharply as a result of up-rating changes (2011: 25). The changes to up-rating, 
which limit the level at which the benefits that compose Universal Credit can be paid, illustrate 
how considerable power over the effects of Universal Credit lies not with the DWP but with the 
Treasury. As Dame Anne Begg suggested to the House, this ‘[ties] the Government’s hands on 
the introduction of Universal Credit’ (HC Hansard, 8 January 2013), potentially undermining its 
longer term achievements in favour of an approach which emphasises reducing welfare spending 
as a central priority for ensuring both economic stability, and social change. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Although the reforms discussed in this chapter have been prompted by the economic downturn 
and subsequent identification of the need to cut the public spending deficit, Conservatives have 
made concerted efforts to tie these in with a broader moral narrative around welfare reform 
discussed in the previous chapter. As suggested at the end of Chapter 5, this is central to a 
process of ideological deconstestation as an element of strategy, the success of which will bear 
considerably on the justification and electoral utility of Conservative reforms. 
 
The success of this is varied: while some reforms fit quite clearly with the moral imperatives 
outlined in Chapter 4, others, notably the changes to DLA, have been less easily slotted into the 
wider welfare agenda. Despite this, there is an underlying logic to the changes discussed here, 
again assuming that the basis of Conservative ideology on welfare is accepted. However, the 
centrality of being seen to be both reducing welfare spending, and refocusing this from 
‘undeserving’ to ‘deserving’ claimants has introduced a slight yet significant shift of emphasis 
compared to the thinking underpinning Universal Credit. Universal Credit retains a concern with 
need understood in financial terms despite the reduction in generosity of its taper. Its projected 
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outcomes suggest a limited acceptance of the concept of relative poverty, at least in the short 
term, and some agreement with the idea that within households there is a minimum acceptable 
standard of living that the welfare state should provide as long as claimants are meeting pre-
defined conditions. The SRSSC, the benefit cap and the changes to up-rating all go beyond this, 
severing the link between need and entitlement to benefits for some households and instead 
basing entitlement on desert determined, ostensibly (although not entirely accurately in the case 
of up-rating)  with reference to work status. 
 
This therefore offers an illustration of something of a disagreement between Conservatives 
regarding the solution to the problem of an over-extended welfare state. These differences should 
not be over-stated. Within the context of the economic downturn, all of the reforms discussed in 
this chapter are intended to deliver immediate budget savings to some extent. Some, such as the 
up-rating changes, will do so with a great deal more certainty and consistently in the long-run 
than others, and the levels of saving are variable. All of them to some extent purport to uphold 
the goal of ‘making work pay’ which runs through the longer-term agenda in the previous 
chapter, and all of them understand the issue of unemployment on an individual, rather than a 
social level. As such they are somewhat compatible with Universal Credit and the Work 
Programme, which aim to incentivise and ‘activate’ individuals to move into work, progress in 
work, and develop their skills. The reforms discussed here provide an extra layer of financial 
incentive to work in relation to this, in the negative form of removing support, alongside the 
more positive approach of Universal Credit in aiming to increase returns from work. This comes 
about partly as a result of perceived financial necessity but also as a means of altering the 
relationship between individuals and the state in terms of the need for support and the transfer of 
responsibility.  
 
However, the slightly different approaches between the two strands of policy illustrate some 
strategic differences amongst Conservatives on how such goals are best achieved. Universal 
Credit and the Work Programme aim to deliver savings by reducing dependence in the longer-
term as a result of the behaviour-changing aspects of the policies. The austerity policies, on the 
other hand, suggest that immediate budget reductions will be the catalyst for achieving these 
broader ideological goals related to reducing dependency, enhancing responsibility, and 
promoting fairness. While they are both aiming towards the same goals, this reflects slightly 
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different priorities. The latter strand appears willing to accept increases in income poverty as a 
cost of boosting work incentives, focusing more strongly on a lifestyle-based conception of 
poverty and a corresponding emphasis on fairness as desert for responsible life choices. In turn, 
this strongly emphasises the morality of work. The former strand, despite Duncan Smith’s 
apparent support for moving away from income-based conceptions of poverty, seems less willing 
to accept the very strong individualism of this approach, focusing somewhat less on claimant 
morality and more on rational decision-making (hence retaining a conviction that income 
matters). Ultimately, given the primacy of reducing spending and the extent to which both the 
short and longer term aspects of measures outlined in this chapter cut across the longer-term 
approach embodied in Universal Credit, it seems that the balance of power within Conservative 
welfare policy lies with the short-termist, intensely moral approach. 
 
The extent to which the Coalition has been able to implement such an approach, which will be 
extended by the majority Conservative administration (see Conclusion), also suggests an 
interesting additional dimension to the role of ideas as proposed in the SRA. This necessitates 
referring back to New Labour. New Labour’s welfare reforms comprised some measures which 
were concordant with Conservative ideological perspectives on the potentially detrimental 
effects of welfare provision, notably around increased conditionality for unemployed claimants. 
Alongside this, more quietly, Blair’s governments also implemented a swathe of measures that 
addressed more conventional indicators of and problems associated with deprivation largely 
through tax credits (Piachaud, 2007). These quieter changes are those that Conservatives have 
sought most determinedly to discredit. In considering which parts of context matter in 
determining strategic selectivity, it is therefore necessary to consider not only path dependency 
in policy (with respect to the costs and risks involved in dismantling existing policy 
infrastructure) but path-dependency in ideas as expressed through policy rhetoric. This means 
that what is emphasised publically or alternately played down has implications for the possibility 
of retrenchment or expansion of existing programmes, especially given the strong electoral 
dimension of welfare policy. Interpretation remains central to explaining why particular policies 
are chosen, since the policies addressed in this chapter and the preceding one constitute an 
example of a Conservative-led approach to welfare judging that elements of New Labour’s 
reforms can be dismantled without significant social or electoral cost. However, this is related to 
what has been seen and presented as the most significant and transformative elements of welfare 
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policy in preceding contexts, as well as the reality of the policy landscape itself. The extent to 
which  Conservatives have been able to begin to dismantle  parts of New Labour’s welfare 
reforms, implementing more conservative perspectives in replacement,  is significantly due to 
New Labour’s failure to robustly defend these policies and  thus embed its thinking in the party 
political debate – a major element of selective context - around welfare. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has focused on the Conservative Party in both opposition and government between 
2005 and 2015, exploring the development and usage of its ideas in both contexts and how this is 
affected by the transition between the two. Through analysing the approach to welfare policy it 
aimed to provide a window into the ideological character of the PCP, considering this in relation 
to a number of issues around the broad social, political and electoral context in which it operates. 
This is central to a range of academic and popular debates. It is explicit in political analytical 
discussions of what ‘Cameronism’ itself is, what ‘modernisation’ has entailed, and where this is 
subsequently likely to take the Conservative Party. More implicitly, it is one of a range of 
questions underpinning policy-focused discussions around the goals and likely impacts of key 
policy areas, of which welfare (as a significant aspect of the Coalition’s reform programme) is 
one. In approaching this topic, this thesis constructed and deployed an appropriate theoretical 
framework, combining the Strategic-Relational Approach and a morphological approach to 
ideologies, which informed the analysis throughout. This emphasised the importance of ideas 
and interrogating the process of ideational change and development, as well as providing a basis 
from which such a task might be approached which is sensitive to the political context within 
which change is embedded. 
 
This concluding chapter begins by summarising how the research approach drove and added to 
the understanding of the empirical material of this thesis and what the implications of the 
findings of the thesis are for the theoretical framework, alongside a discussion of the 
framework’s utility for future research. The chapter then re-visits and draws together the overall 
empirical conclusions drawn from the research, relating these to the three research questions set 
out in Chapter 1. These pertain to the ideological character of the Conservative Party under 
David Cameron, the process of party change in this period as borne out in policy decisions, and 
what this study can tell us about British party politics and ideologies more broadly. The chapter 
concludes with a brief discussion of the possible implications of the conclusions drawn here for 
the Conservative Party, the welfare state, and the British political landscape. 
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8.1 Theoretical implications and contribution 
Chapter 2 of this thesis was dedicated to supporting its central theoretical premise: that ideas 
matter in informing and hence in understanding political outcomes and development trajectories. 
Colin Hay’s Strategic-Relational Approach (2002) was introduced as a means of substantiating 
this claim, illustrating how the ideas of actors (in this case, Conservative elites) are instrumental 
in enabling their capacity for strategic action.  
 
The SRA draws attention to two constructions that are essential in understanding political action 
and the transformation of context, or political change. These are ‘strategic actors’, in this case, 
the Conservative Party, oriented in pursuit of particular goals, and the ‘strategically selective 
context’ in which the Party exists and attempt to achieve such goals. In these attempts, actors 
must rely on strategic calculations based on their understanding of the present context and the 
effects of their actions. This therefore necessitates a reliance on ideas and interpretations. 
Moreover, as context will change as a result of both the Party’s actions and those taken by a wide 
range of other, similarly strategically-minded actors strategies – and hence, the ideas informing 
these strategies – cannot be conceived as static and unchanging. This suggests that in 
understanding political decision-making, it is necessary to interrogate the process of ideational 
development informing this and how this relates to contextual developments. The central 
contribution of the SRA to this research is therefore to provide a clear framework for 
understanding and mapping the way in which actors appropriate and navigate the reality of 
political life, balancing pressing realities with longer-term goals and more deeply-held beliefs. 
This is centred on their ideas and interpretations. In turn, acknowledging the constraints on 
actors and effects of changes in material circumstances allows for a holistic appraisal of why the 
Conservative Party has developed as it has ideologically since 2005 which is sensitive to the role 
of historical Conservative perspectives, policy landscape and inheritance and immediate political 
and electoral pressures. 
 
It is possible, of course, to outline developments in Conservative welfare policy since 2005 and 
identify where shifts in policy have occurred without even talking to any Conservative MPs. 
However, by utilising the characterisation of the role of ideas put forward in the SRA, this 
research has taken a more detailed examination of the policy area. A framework eschewing 
analysis of ideas and interpretations in favour of a more behavioural or action-orientated analysis 
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would have struggled to achieve this depth, which is essential to answering the research 
questions of this work fully. Drawing on this, the SRA also led towards the framing of questions 
around particular events that might be clearly identified as bringing about a change in material 
context (see Appendix 2) in order to gain a deeper understanding of how these changes were 
interpreted, and their effects on Conservative thought, than could be gained by simply looking at 
the Party’s actions. The SRA has therefore proven illuminating as a means of allowing 
consideration not only of what the Conservative Party has done but why this was the case.  
 
Overall the conclusions drawn from this research have supported the central claim of the SRA 
regarding the centrality of ideas in decision-making. This thesis has shown that ideas act as a 
filter through which politicians interpret contemporary contexts and events, subsequently 
devising strategies that take these into account as a means of achieving interlinked goals. 
Moreover, it has also provided an illustration of the circumstances through which particular ideas 
acquire and retain resonance and relevance to policy-making, notably through examining the 
shifts between New Labour and Conservative-led policy discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 and the 
lack of implementation of some of the Conservatives’ more innovative ideas. In addition to path 
dependency in policy itself, the empirical chapters of this thesis illustrated the importance of path 
dependency in ideas and interpretations of problems. This applies especially to the perceived 
need for ‘tough’ welfare policies to tackle welfare dependency. This was certainly a feature of 
Thatcherite rhetoric on welfare, if not one that was fully reflected in policy terms. The 
maintenance of this approach by New Labour, while also downplaying its more conventional 
redistributionist elements, appears to have enhanced the possibility of Cameron’s Conservatives 
continuing down a Thatcherite path. This suggests that strategically selective context, which is a 
central component of the decision-making process in the SRA, is shaped not only by what ‘is’ in 
terms of policy, but by what is consciously emphasised and alternately played down by other 
actors. There is no need for a rigid conception of structure to shape political decision-making 
processes: the conscious decisions of others, whether made in pursuit of electoral or policy gain, 
fulfil this function quite effectively. 
 
The SRA convincingly makes a case for the importance of ideas in understanding decision-
making on a smaller scale and political change (or lack of) on a larger one, and directs our 
attention towards examining the interplay between material and ideational changes and 
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developments from the perspective of Conservatives. However, it has less to say about the 
process of change itself: how ideological change occurs. By not addressing this, the SRA leaves 
ideas at once integral to political life and yet at the same time oddly detached from the 
individuals and groups which constitute, deploy and re-constitute them. This problem was 
identified in Chapter 2, and to overcome it a second element was brought into the theoretical 
framework. This is Michael Freeden’s morphological approach to ideologies. Freeden proposes 
that political ideologies have a structure consisting of core, adjacent and peripheral layers, made 
up of individual political concepts. A central point of his analysis is that the meaning of these 
concepts is not fixed: rather, they are defined or ‘decontested’ in relation to one another, within 
the structure of the ideology. This offered a framework for analysing the extent of change within 
Conservative ideology and the extent to which Cameron’s Party’s approach to welfare policy 
subverted or re-shaped that of previous Conservative governments.  
 
Like Hay, Freeden insists that ideas are central in informing action. However, his approach has 
the capacity to distinguish between different sources and levels of change through analysing how 
the decontestation and re-decontestation of concepts occurs, and whether or how this effects 
change on the more stable inner layers of the ideology. This allows for a more detailed 
examination of the process of change itself, enabling the possibility of understanding whether 
change is ideologically substantive and consistent, or largely contingent and pragmatic. As such, 
the framework deployed here addresses a weakness in the SRA which, despite recognising and 
conceptualising the incrementally transformative role of ideas in political life (Hay, 2002: 156-
163), Hay fails to properly address. This relates to the depth of ideological change, the 
consequences of this for policy and, consequentially, the likely endurance of particular policy 
approaches.  
 
The theoretical approach constructed here has proven illuminating as a means of studying 
Cameron’s Conservative Party. In conceptualising the relationship between ideas and context, 
the SRA directs our attention towards a number of different imperatives, influences and 
pressures that political parties have to reconcile in making decisions and formulating strategies. 
Moreover, it combines this with a means of analysing the process and nature of change, getting 
beneath the surface of what might appear to be significant ideological developments in order to 
assess their broader relevance to conservatism and thus accounting for the subtleties of 
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Conservative ideology under Cameron. In doing so the conclusions of the research not only 
confirm that ideas do matter in informing strategy, but provide an illustration of how and why 
they matter, thus adding to our understanding of the role of ideas in political life.  
 
Policy, as a dynamic ‘product’ which reflects the assimilation of a range of different strategic 
considerations, offers a potentially rich source of information about the way in which the party 
proposing it perceives the context in which it exists. It is therefore an interesting focus for 
analysis of this kind, providing a window through which broader processes of ideological change 
can be identified and understood. Aside from its empirical contributions (which are returned to 
below), what the approach of this thesis has also therefore shown is that analysis of policy areas 
need not be considered as only partial or contributory to the broader study of party ideologies. 
Within political analysis, different policy areas are often treated as discretely contributing to a 
‘whole’ picture of party ideologies, implying that the conclusions to be drawn on this topic from 
studying areas individually are perhaps quite limited. By linking the study of a policy area 
closely to wider decision-making and strategy, this thesis has shown that considered in sufficient 
depth, such an approach can stand alone as a means of analysing party ideologies and ideational 
developments. 
 
The research presented here focuses on Conservative elites and one area of social policy. 
However, its theoretical framework has a wider application. This is due to its sensitivity to 
context and changing circumstances, alongside the emphasis on interrogating the patterns of 
thought that shape responses to these circumstances and hence play a role in re-producing 
contextual and institutional peculiarities. As such, the approach outlined here is valuable for 
analysts of political parties in a range of contexts, seeking to understand both the internal 
influences on change within parties and how they relate to the political world around them. 
Moreover, it provides a useful theoretical foundation for the politically-informed analysis of the 
development, refinement and re-development of policy itself in a range of different areas. There 
is significant potential for further research drawing on this approach, particularly as it provides a 
means of interrogating very current processes of change. 
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8.2 Ideational development and political change 
When Cameron was elected as leader in 2005, he faced considerable challenges. The most 
pressing of these was the Conservative legacy of electoral failure following New Labour’s 
victory in 1997. As Chapter 5 discusses he was, if nothing else, granted a mandate for ‘change’ 
by his MPs and wider party members as a means of reversing this (Heppell, 2013; Heppell and 
Hill, 2009). Yet despite this, in many ways little has changed within Conservative Party thinking 
during Cameron’s ten years as leader. Perceiving that its main opposition had become much 
more like the Conservative Party itself, as Cameron outlined early in his leadership (2006a), 
there was not much impetus for radical ideational change as in the period leading up to 
Thatcher’s election. Some analyses of Cameron’s Conservatives have emphasised the PCP’s 
accommodation with liberalism (Garnett, 2013; Beech, 2015, 2011, 2009; Marquand, 2008). 
However, this thesis has demonstrated that in its perspectives on welfare – and the issues 
connected to this, including wider, fundamental questions around individuals, the state and 
society – Cameron’s party has ultimately retained a socially conservative ideology that is 
redolent of Thatcherism. Change has not been as great as Conservative parliamentarians might 
have hoped or feared: neither, given the 2015 election result, does further significant ideological 
adjustment appear likely to be a priority for the Conservatives in the immediate future. 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis set out three central research questions that have been investigated in 
arriving at these broad conclusions. These are discussed, in turn, below. 
 
What are the key concepts informing the Conservative Party’s approach to welfare policy, and 
how are these decontested in relation to one another? 
Chapter 4 identified the key concepts underpinning the Conservative Party’s approach to welfare 
policy and discussed the Conservative decontestation of these, including how they relate to 
unfolding events and to each other in constructing an ideologically coherent theoretical approach 
to welfare provision. This was carried out as a basis for understanding how such concepts have 
been utilised in the pursuit of primary goals such as policy development in government, and 
constructing a winning electoral strategy, and as a means of drawing out possible implications 
for the future of the welfare system in Conservative thought. The four central concepts, 
identified from a thematic analysis of interview data and document analysis, are poverty, 
responsibility, compassion and fairness. 
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The overriding concern within the PCP in relation to this is the malign influence of an over-
extended welfare state on individual morality, portrayed as a central failing of New Labour, even 
if Blair’s party could be seen to have adapted in some ways to Thatcherite ideas. The approach to 
welfare is therefore built around reducing and ending dependency, which is framed as a cause of 
poverty. The concept of poverty is therefore decontested not as primarily income-based, as in 
conventional absolute or relative understandings, but as strongly behavioural and hence 
individualised. 
 
Supporting this, the main solution to poverty is also focused on individuals, through the concept 
of (individual) responsibility. Whether through insufficient conditionality attached to the receipt 
of benefits, overly generous levels of payments for some claimants, or lack of deterrents against 
fraud or deception, the welfare state is widely perceived as having undermined responsibility. 
This is then viewed both as having undermined social cohesion, and as having contributed to 
economic difficulties. This reflects an intensification of the individualised and behavioural 
conception of poverty which leaves little room for addressing the structural factors that 
contribute to this. With the welfare system viewed in this way, the idea of a long-term, positive 
role for the state in providing support to working-age individuals and as a source of social 
cohesion is ideologically incompatible with elite contemporary Conservatism. This has 
significant implications for the longer-term trajectory of change that we might expect to see 
under a Conservative government. However, as Chapter 5 illustrates, political and economic 
contexts cannot be assumed to be fixed and Conservative Party does not have complete control 
over the circumstances in which it governs (although it will certainly have more such power as a 
single-party government). Strategic changes in the direction of policy should not be ruled out, 
particularly if the tide of public opinion on both welfare and wider public sector reforms begins 
to turn against the Conservatives. 
 
Alongside this, however, it is clear that there is a concern within the Party regarding the 
perception of social breakdown as a threat to social order and how a ‘welfare society’ or ‘Big 
Society’ might be constructed. This is linked to the influence of the state: the main underlying 
idea is that as the welfare system has supported more and more people, the ties between people 
and civil society itself have been weakened. This is the area where Conservative ideological 
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innovation might most obviously have been directed. If Thatcherism in part represented a 
reaction against the collectivism of the post-war years and was largely concerned with economic 
decline, then there was little space left in which to really develop a ‘conservative’ conception of 
society.  
 
Here Cameron’s party have drawn in two further concepts – ‘fairness’ and ‘compassion’. 
Compassion contains two key elements. These are an emphasis on mutual responsibilities to 
improve society, and a corresponding emphasis on ‘expecting more’ from people claiming state 
support. This is linked to responsibility and poverty: if the latter concept is understood as a 
consequence of a lack of the former and conceived as fundamentally unjust, then actions that 
push claimants towards taking further responsibility for themselves are justified on the basis that 
they will ultimately improve claimants’ lives. Fairness is decontested as needs-based, linked to 
moral authoritarianism through an emphasis on desert within this. Fairness is linked closely to 
the individual responsibilities of people who require state support, further indicating the 
Conservative belief that current social problems can be resolved through correcting individual 
failings. This ties into thinking around the social benefits of a robust approach to welfare policy. 
What the Conservative decontestation of fairness does not require, linking it to a behavioural 
conception of poverty and disadvantage, is much action from those who are already 
‘independent’. Compassion, while framing independence and the state’s withdrawal as key aims, 
also requires more of the wider society. In this way, it could cross over with a broader concept of 
social responsibility, accounting for some of the detail on the sort of society the Conservatives 
would like to see. 
 
How do these concepts relate to the wider structure of conservatism? In particular, to what 
extent do they reflect, subvert or re-constitute the character of previous Conservative ideological 
traditions? 
The Conservative Party in the post-war period has been associated with two broad traditions or 
schools of thought: One Nation, and Thatcherism. Contrasting with some of the literature on 
these, this thesis rejected the idea that these represent clearly separable manifestations of 
Conservatism or that either can be accurately described as an aberration from conservative 
ideology (Garnett, 2003; Gilmour and Garnett, 1997; Grey, 1995). The party has retained its 
commitment to a limited core based on social order, extra-human justification of this, and a 
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mirror-image characterisation of its opponents or ‘enemies’ (Freeden, 1996). The changes within 
Conservative ideas in the post-war years have occurred primarily because the identified ‘enemy’ 
has changed. Specifically, earlier One Nation Conservatives were willing to accommodate the 
state as a means of ensuring social order and as means of fulfilling the perceived moral 
imperative of helping the poor, with reference to a belief in hierarchy. As the PCP turned 
towards Thatcherism, the expansion of the state’s functions over the post-war period began to be 
perceived as threatening the nation’s order and prosperity. Thatcherism moved to advocate a 
limited state which was thus able to retain its authority. This necessitated a strengthened 
emphasis on individual morality and self-sufficiency in place of state support. 
 
In relation to welfare policy and the issues surrounding it, speculation that Cameron’s leadership 
could herald a retreat from Thatcherism has proven unfounded. One Nation Conservatism no 
longer offers a viable alternative within the PCP, with even Conservatives who profess to be 
more inclined towards One Nation expressing Thatcherite-influenced views of the welfare 
system and its effects on human behaviour. The main indicator of this which is present within 
each of the four concepts (poverty, responsibility, fairness and compassion) discussed above, is 
the clear presence of hostility towards the interventionist state. The identification of the state as 
the on-going ‘enemy’ forms a significant part of the strategically selective context within which 
the Conservative approach to welfare policy is shaped and implemented. It serves to shut down a 
range of alternative approaches to provision that might otherwise be compatible with at least 
some aspects of the concepts outlined above. The clearest example of this is the general lack of 
interest amongst Conservative MPs in a more contributory system which, while ostensibly 
satisfying concerns around responsibility and fairness and through rewarding responsible 
behaviour, would represent an unacceptable and costly extension of state support. The on-going 
identification of the interventionist state as the enemy therefore has a major impact on 
Conservative perceptions of both current social and economic problems and the courses of action 
to be pursued in amending these.  
 
Overall therefore Cameron’s party remains firmly within Thatcherite parameters, with its 
approach to welfare policy clearly reflecting this. This has exerted a considerable influence on 
the scope of positioning available to it. It is committed to a small, strong state, and to economic 
liberalism combined with a strongly moral approach to social issues, emphasising notions of 
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self-sufficiency similar to Letwin’s ‘vigorous virtues’ (1992). These are presented as a counter to 
the area where Conservatives believe Labour does differ significantly from itself, in its use of 
state. Consequentially, while ‘Cameronism’ does not break away from Thatcherism, there does 
appear to have been some attempt to develop ideas within this ideological framework and thus 
re-constituting Thatcherite social policy. The Thatcher governments’ main concern was the 
economy. Despite the onset of the recession, the contemporary Conservative Party has not 
attempted to develop an alternative approach to economic management, instead portraying the 
cause of this as too much state intervention rather than too little regulation. As a result, both in 
opposition and government, Cameron’s party potentially had substantially more latitude to 
develop a Conservative approach to social policy, albeit within these limitations. Notably, this 
has applied around the idea of ‘compassion’ and a communitarian emphasis on responsibility, 
developed in the ‘Big Society’ theme that was centrally placed in the 2010 Conservative election 
campaign. However since 2010, the more society-focused aspects of these concepts have been 
downplayed. This reflects both the perceived reasons for the failure to win an outright electoral 
victory alongside a belief that reducing welfare spending offered a way of reducing the remit of 
the state in a way that was both financially and electorally appealing. As such while 
Conservative thinking early in the period under consideration suggested that Cameron’s 
leadership might lead to a substantive, if recognisably Thatcherite approach to social issues such 
as poverty and disadvantage, the development of the approach has been less fruitful in 
government. 
 
How have these ideas been utilised in practice, in relation to policy and the competing strategic 
motivations that impact on this, and what is the effect of this on the character of the 
Conservatives’ conservatism? 
 
It is relatively easy to talk about party change and to attempt to influence the image of a party in 
this way. However, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, Cameron (and, indeed, many 
of his MPs) has been adamant that the Conservatives could not win back support purely through 
re-branding. Real action in support of these principles was, apparently, needed. Strategies are 
formulated with reference to the context in which the actor finds themselves, but this entails 
managing competing goals and expectations within a context which may change rapidly owing 
to factors outside of the PCP’s control. The challenge, therefore, is putting ideas and the 
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strategies that emerge from specific contexts, responding to particular challenges and events, into 
practice within further contexts that are likely to have changed considerably. Ultimately the way 
that these ideas are implemented within the ‘real life’ context of policy and electoral competition 
shapes the material circumstances within which further strategies are constructed, both within the 
Conservative Party and beyond. This illustrates the proposed dialectical relationship between 
ideas and material circumstances that is proposed in the SRA. Therefore analysing not only 
intent but also outcomes is essential to fully conceptualising the process of ideological chang and 
understanding the future implications of this. 
 
The conclusions outlined above indicate that change at the core of Conservatism has not 
occurred under Cameron. As a result, policy development continues within a Thatcherite 
framework. However, this does not preclude the possibility of ideational development. By 
considering how the concepts underpinning Cameron’s Conservatives’ approach to welfare have 
been utilised and developed between 2005 and 2015, we have a means of establishing the extent 
to which substantive ideational development has occurred. Alongside this, it is possible to reflect 
on the sorts of variables that influence the process of strategic learning and how these impact on 
the transformation of context within which future strategies are constructed (Hay, 2002: 131) 
 
Electoral considerations must be understood as an important influence on the development of 
policy. Prior to 2010 welfare was not a stand-alone electoral issue (although this does not mean 
that policy ideas were not in evidence) but formed a part of a wider narrative around the ‘Big 
Society’, which is concerned primarily with concepts of responsibility and compassion. Since 
2010 welfare policy has been a central part of the Conservative Party’s electoral positioning, 
offering a concrete illustration of how the party is seeking to implement concepts of 
responsibility, fairness and compassion as a means of reducing poverty and dependency. Overall, 
the PCP’s offer to potential voters has been strongly based around fairness. Owing to an 
unwillingness to further extend state support to those who ‘do the right thing’ (for example, 
through maintaining the value of in-work benefits), this has had to focus on showing how the 
party will prevent people who do not engage with the system responsibility from accessing 
support. Where compassion has been deployed, it has been in the form of a ‘tough’ or active 
approach to ensuring compliance. Concurrently there has been little emphasis on the 
responsibilities of those who are in work towards those who are not, suggesting that these people 
234 
  
 
have fulfilled their side of the bargain. The responsibility to build a ‘stronger’ society and to 
ensure fairness is very much placed on claimants themselves.  
 
This has also been connected to the economic narrative and the need to cut spending, with 
welfare spending presented as ‘waste’ because it supports dependency. In turn, this links to a 
more policy-focused dimension regarding how dependency might be reduced. While there is 
evidence of a longer-term approach to reducing dependency and cutting spending in which the 
state plays a transitional role, as discussed in Chapter 6, there is also another approach within the 
PCP that frames cutting spending immediately as a catalyst for reducing dependency. As 
illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, the way that the Conservatives have implemented these two 
strategies means they are frequently at cross-purposes to one another. 
  
Electorally, a lack of knowledge about the sources of welfare spending and hostility towards 
benefit claimants contributes to a context in which there is an incentive to implement policies 
that achieve ‘quick wins’ in this area. This shorter-term approach provides an effective match 
with the Conservative electoral use of welfare policy through providing a number of clear 
illustrations of how the party is seeking to remove support from claimants who are framed as 
‘undeserving’. Mirroring the electoral strategy, more sophisticated concepts of how a stronger 
society could develop are absent in this approach, which heavily emphasises retrenchment but 
has less to say about what might replace welfare support other than ‘self-reliance’. Cameron’s 
Conservative Party had much to say in the earlier years of his leadership about how values of 
compassion and responsibility could contribute to building a stronger society. However, within 
the confines of its own economic and electoral considerations and ideological perspectives on the 
welfare state, the party leadership has struggled to come up with a workable means of 
developing these. Instead the more progressive elements of PCP conservatism have been pushed 
outwards in favour of a narrow individualism. 
 
It is also possible to relate these developments to the shift between being in opposition, and in 
government. The change in tone and in the ideas emphasised between the two periods is quite 
striking. This could be interpreted as the Conservatives playing a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’ role 
prior to the election – and, indeed, this was how some voters interpreted the Big Society 
(Lindsey and Bulloch, 2013). Equally it might be a consequence of the economic downturn – but 
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the Big Society was the main theme of the 2010 election, suggesting there was some longevity 
beyond this. The ability to offer such an alternative vision of society in the 2005 to 2010 period 
was perhaps one of the few luxuries of remaining in opposition, affording the Conservatives 
some freedom to develop these ideas while insulated from the harsher realities of governing. 
However, such plans were really still in their infancy when the Conservatives moved into 
coalition in 2010. The return to government after thirteen years and the failure to win an outright 
electoral victory in 2010 introduced further pressures on the Conservatives to produce results in 
government. The often ambiguous and more risky nature of the newer ideas stood little chance of 
subverting more established, tried-and-tested Thatcherite perspectives that were widely accepted 
within the party itself. This points to some of the over-arching practical reasons for the overall 
lack of ideological development in this period. Having placed such emphasis on the 
undesirability of state intervention, viewing this as a key factor in their continued electoral 
support and a major underlying component of recent policy reforms, the Conservative Party will 
find it very difficult to break away from such ideological frameworks in the future. However as 
far as welfare is concerned, there does not currently appear to be much appetite for this to 
happen in any case. 
 
This also suggests that the usage of ideas and the strategic processes through which they are 
mediated might be quite different between government and opposition parties, indicating that the 
possibility of substantive ideational development once in government might be quite limited. 
Although exploring the extent to which this is accurate more widely is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, such an observation certainly leaves open the possibility of building on these findings in 
future research. In turn, this has implications for the SRA-based framework as a means of 
understanding political change, suggesting that certain circumstances are more conducive to 
change (whether progressive or regressive) and providing an illustration of such processes and 
circumstances within a real-life context.  
 
8.3 2015 and beyond 
It is not yet possible to fully understand or predict the impact that decisions taken in this period 
will have on the trajectory of either conservatism or welfare policy in the more distant future. 
However the idea of strategically selective contexts does suggest that ideas and policy-making 
are to an extent path-dependent, and what has been illustrated here is the longevity of ideas and 
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ideological frames despite considerable changes in context. As such, even allowing for the 
unpredictable input of other actors and events, it is possible to make some informed reflections 
on the potential wider significance of this period. 
 
Given the significance of the welfare reforms enacted during the 2010 to 2015 parliament and 
the importance of this to the Conservatives’ electoral positioning, it is not surprising that the 
topic cropped up regularly in the Conservative campaign in 2015. In a major speech in February, 
three months before the election, Cameron set out what a Conservative majority government 
intended to implement. All four of the concepts underpinning the analysis in this thesis were 
present. Cameron pledged to ‘tackle poverty’ by ‘breaking [the] cycle’ of ‘letting people in their 
teens and twenties sit at home all day slipping into depression and despair’. He alluded to the 
individual-focused aspects of a conservative conception of compassion, linking this with 
dependency and disputing the charge ‘that welfare reform just hits the poorest, changing their 
lives for the worse’. He asked: ‘is it compassionate to leave people on the dole for years with no 
incentive to get into work?’. He pledged to address the ‘sense of deep unfairness’ that saw 
‘hardworking young people…stuck living with their parents into their 30s while others got a 
council house straight out of school’. Finally, Cameron concluded, his party would ‘build a more 
responsible country, where we back those who work hard and do the right thing’ (quoted in le 
Duc, 2015).  
 
The direction of travel taken with regard to policy in this parliament, combined with the policy 
changes that had already been announced ahead of the election, raise a number of questions 
regarding whether the Conservatives can achieve these ends. Viewed in terms of cutting 
financial support to claimants, there are several elements of Conservative plans that stand out. 
These include lowering the household benefit cap to £23,000 per year (and thereby extending its 
reach and its impact on income poverty), replacing JSA for  young people under the age of 21 
with a ‘youth allowance’ and requiring them to do community work after six months, while 
removing entitlement to housing benefit altogether (Cameron, quoted in le Duc, 2015). Universal 
Credit will continue to be rolled out. However, with a continued focus on austerity from the 
Treasury it seems unlikely that the taper will be altered, and other changes will continue to cut 
across this. Notably, in late 2014, following an announcement trailed at that year’s Conservative 
conference, George Osborne announced that all working-age benefits (which had previously 
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been subject to the one per cent up-rating measure) would be frozen for two years from 2015 
(Osborne, 2014b). 
 
The trajectory of the incoming Conservative government therefore looks likely to continue to 
follow the path set by the Coalition, intensifying existing policies and approaches rather than 
diversifying in the immediate future. This means that the problems outlined in this thesis with 
regard to applying work incentives consistently, and incoherence within the overall approach, 
will continue to apply. The wider policy debate about the effectiveness of such measures in 
helping people into work (as opposed to simply moving them off the DWP’s support) will also 
remain significant, as will concern over the wider impacts of such measures (for example, on 
child poverty, or other departments).  
 
In continuing the focus on austerity in such a way that this will also impact on working-age 
benefit claimants who are in employment, the Conservatives have taken a strategic gamble. 
Reforms to working-age welfare support within the context of concerns over the cost of living 
could still end up alienating the lower-paid workers whose support the Conservatives need to 
win, and to retain. The resolution of this will be significant in determining whether or not the 
limited ideational change that Cameron’s leadership has enacted will be enough to adequately 
address Conservative Party weaknesses on social issues.  
 
8.4 Conclusion  
This thesis opened with a simple question: what sort of ‘conservatism’ is embodied in the 
Conservative Party under David Cameron? Given the reforms enacted by New Labour, ‘doing 
nothing’ about social issues was not an option for the Conservatives in 2005. However, despite 
increased attention dedicated to these, what has come to pass since does not support the idea that 
Cameron might have moved the Conservatives away from Thatcherism, towards a new form of 
British Conservatism. 
 
Elite Conservatives have identified two interconnected reasons for why individuals find 
themselves in poverty: either because they are discouraged from working by the present welfare 
system, or because the welfare state itself undermines individual responsibility and hence has a 
detrimental effect on social and individual morality. Frequently, as the preceding chapters have 
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shown, these are two sides of the same coin, falling back on a highly negative understanding of 
the impact of the welfare system on human behaviour. Two ideational strands and policy 
responses have developed in response to this, one emphasising rational decision-making in 
claimants and the other more recognisably conservative moral arguments. It is the former that is 
more ideologically innovative for the Conservatives; the latter falls back on highly moralistic, 
recognisably Thatcherite ideology. In identifying the dominance of the latter strand, this thesis 
questions the extent to which Cameron’s leadership has resulted in ideological ‘modernisation’ 
for the Conservatives. Indeed, even attempts to develop a Conservative approach to society 
within a Thatcherite ideological frame have been rather stunted, with longer-term approaches not 
being implemented as effectively as they might have been thanks to a stronger conviction that 
immediate cuts are necessary both economically and morally.  
 
This can be related to the change in strategic context between opposition and government. 
Having only belatedly accepted during their long spell in opposition that change was needed, the 
Conservatives were left with a comparatively short period of time in which to develop ideas in 
support of this. The modernisation agenda, with Cameron at its forefront, can be identified as 
integral to the upturn in Conservative support in 2010, but the ideas behind this and the policies 
to support it were neither well developed, nor widely embedded within the party at that point. 
Within a more pressurised governing context, the more innovative ideas associated with it were 
pushed to one side in favour of more familiar, reliable options – and, indeed, some Conservatives 
blamed the ambiguous character of these for the failure to secure an outright victory. In turn, the 
ideas emphasised and the decisions taken in government will have a significant future impact on 
both the shape of policy and the landscape of British politics itself, and on the options that 
appear realistically available to a future Conservative Party. Conservative ‘modernisation’ has, it 
seems, resulted in an unexpected victory for social conservatism. 
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Appendix 1 
MP interviewee biographies 
 
Conservatives 
Stuart Andrew MP 
Stuart Andrew was elected MP for Pudsey in 2010, and was appointed as Parliamentary Private 
Secretary to the Rt. Hon. Francis Maude MP, a leading figure in Conservative ‘modernisation’ in 
the Cabinet Office in 2012. He has a background in voluntary sector work, and identifies as a 
‘One Nation’ Conservative. 
 
Robert Buckland MP 
Robert Buckland was elected to Parliament in 2010. He professes to be a ‘One Nation’ Tory and 
is a vice-president of the Tory Reform Group, which seeks to represent One Nation 
Conservatism in parliament. He also served as Joint Secretary of the 1922 Committee between 
2012 and 2014, and as Chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Autism. He lists disability 
issues amongst his main political interests. 
 
Guto Bebb MP 
Guto Bebb was elected to Parliament in 2010. He served on the Public Bill Committee for the 
Welfare Reform Bill, and lists welfare reform amongst his main interests. He was a member of 
the Public Accounts Select Committee from 2012. 
 
Conor Burns MP 
Conor Burns was elected MP for Bournemouth South in 2010. He has served on several select 
committees, including Education and Administration, and was also briefly Parliamentary Private 
Secretary in the Northern Ireland office, resigning in order to vote against the House of Lords 
Reform Bill in 2012. He enjoyed a close friendship with Margaret Thatcher in the later years of 
her life. 
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Neil Carmichael MP 
Neil Carmichael was elected to Parliament in 2010. He views himself as a ‘One Nation’ 
Conservative, and is a patron of the Tory Reform Group.  
 
Philip Davies MP 
Philip Davies entered Parliament as MP for Shipley in 2010. He served on the Executive of the 
1922 Committee from 2006 to 2012. He has claimed to be a libertarian conservative, and is a 
council member of the Freedom Association, a centre-right libertarian think-tank. Davies was 
one of the most rebellious MPs in the 2010 – 2015 and has often courted controversy in his 
remarks to the House, for example when he suggested withdrawing the National Minimum Wage 
from disabled workers in 2011. 
 
Sir Roger Gale MP 
Sir Roger Gale was elected to Parliament in 1983, and represents North Thanet constituency. He 
was vice Chairman of the Conservative Party under Iain Duncan Smith’s leadership, from 2001-
2003. He has expressed considerable scepticism towards aspects of the Conservative 
‘modernisation’ agenda, notably voicing strong reservations on same-sex marriage in 2013. 
 
Kris Hopkins MP 
Kris Hopkins was elected as MP for Keighley in 2010. He was appointed as Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government in 2013, with responsibilities 
including homelessness and housing. It was during this reshuffle that the post of housing 
minister was downgraded from a minister of state level post, prompting speculation that housing 
had become a lower priority issue for the Coalition. Housing is one of his key campaigning 
issues, and he also lists an interest in pensions. 
 
241 
  
 
Kwasi Kwarteng MP 
Kwasi Kwarteng was elected as MP for Spelthorne in 2010. He is a member of the Conservative 
Free Enterprise Group and has published several policy-focused books, including Britannia 
Unchained (2012) and After the Coalition (2011) with fellow MPs Elizabeth Truss, Priti Patel, 
Chris Skidmore and Dominac Raab, both of which reflect on future options for welfare and 
social policy. Kwarteng served on the Work and Pensions Select Committee from 2013 to 2015.  
 
Tim Loughton MP 
Tim Loughton was elected MP for East Worthing and Shoreham in 1997. Since then he has held 
a number of positions in the Conservative Party, including Shadow Spokesperson for Health, 
Shadow minister for Children, and Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Education. He also served 
on the Health Select Committee from 2014. 
 
John Penrose MP 
John Penrose was elected to Parliament in 2005, representing Weston Super Mare. He served as 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Oliver Letwin MP who was, at the time, responsible for 
leading David Cameron’s policy review. He was a member of the Work and Pensions Select 
Committee between 2005 and 2009, was appointed as a Whip in 2013, and as Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Cabinet Office in 2015. 
 
John Stevenson MP 
John Stevenson was elected as MP for Carlisle in 2010. He is the Chairman of the Blue Collar 
Conservative group, founded in 2012, which seeks to improve the Conservative Party’s appeal to 
blue-collar voters. 
 
Gary Streeter MP 
Gary Streeter was elected to Parliament in 1992. He took a strong interest in debates over the 
direction of Conservative social policy after Thatcher, and published an edited book entitled 
There is Such a Thing as Society in 2002 containing contributions from, amongst others, Iain 
Duncan Smith and Oliver Letwin. 
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Charles Walker MP 
Charles Walker was elected as MP for Broxbourne in 2005, and has since served on several 
select committees. He has a strong interest in mental health, and has received awards and praise 
for his parliamentary work relating to this, from organisations including The Spectator, The 
Guardian, and the Royal College of Psychiatrists. 
 
Labour 
Dame Anne Begg MP 
Dame Anne Begg was MP for Aberdeen South from 1997 to 2015. She served on the Scottish 
Affairs Committee from 1997 to 2001, and the Work and Pensions Select Committee from 2001 
– 2015. She was elected as Chair of the Committee in 2010. 
 
The Rt. Hon. Frank Field MP 
Frank Field has been the MP for Birkenhead since 1979. He has published on welfare reform and 
surrounding issues throughout his parliamentary career. He was a Minister for Welfare Reform 
under Tony Blair in 1997, but resigned the post after one year. In 2010, he was appointed as a 
‘poverty czar’ by David Cameron, and led the Coalition’s Review of Poverty and Life Chances. 
 
Sheila Gilmore MP 
Sheila Gilmore was MP for Edinburgh East in the 2010 to 2015 parliament. She has served on 
the Work and Pensions Select Committee since 2011.  
 
Glenda Jackson MP 
Glenda Jackson was elected as MP for Hampstead and Kilburn in 1992, and will stand down at 
the 2015 general election. She served on the Work and Pensions Select Committee between 2010 
and 2015. 
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Teresa Pearce MP 
Teresa Pearce MP was elected to Parliament in 2010, representing Erith and Thamesmead. She 
was a member of the Work and Pensions Selection Committee from 2010, and the Treasury 
Committee from 2011. 
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Appendix 2  
 Sample interview schedules 
MPs  
General 
1. Thinking back to 2010, what were the main issues and challenges in the area of welfare 
policy? 
- What ideas did you have on how to address these? 
- What resources did you have at your disposal to address these/how did you use them? 
2. Would you have identified these same issues at an earlier point in time – for example, 2005? 
 
New Labour 
3. To what extent would you say your approach to welfare policy differs from that of the New 
Labour years? What are the differences and similarities? 
 
Strategy 
4. Where do you feel welfare policy sits within the Conservative Party’s broader electoral 
strategy/‘modernisation’? 
- Has this changed since 2005? If so how and why? 
5. Would you say that the Conservative party is still trying to develop a form of 
‘compassionate’ Conservatism? 
6. Where do you feel David Cameron’s approach to welfare sits in relation to other post-war 
Conservative traditions? 
7. Do you feel that being in Coalition has significantly impacted on Conservative plans for 
welfare reform?  
- If so – how and why? If not, why not? 
 
Think-tanks 
8. What are your views on the proposals for welfare policy put forward by the Centre for Social 
Justice? 
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9. How influential do you feel that the CSJ has been in developing the Conservative party’s 
welfare policies? 
- In what ways has it been influential (in terms of general ideas, or more direct influence 
on specific policies)?  
10. How do you feel that the recommendations put forward by the CSJ have translated into 
policy? Did you feel that the recommendations could be implemented? 
11. What do you see as the main differences between the policy recommendations and the policy 
outcomes? How would you explain these differences? 
12. Are there any other groups that you would say have been particularly influential? Which 
ones and how? 
 
The financial crisis 
13. Do you think that the financial crisis affected the Conservative party’s approach to welfare? 
How and why? 
14. How consistent do you think that the approach has been between 2005 and now?  
 
The welfare state (future of) 
15. In terms of outcomes, what do you think is indicative of effective welfare policy? 
16. Ideally, what would you like the Coalition to have achieved in relation to welfare by the next 
election? 
17. What do you think will be the main issues in the area of welfare policy over the remainder of 
this parliament? 
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Civil servants 
General 
1. What do you see as the main policy issues that the DWP has been trying to address since 
2010? What are the key challenges associated with these? 
2. Have these issues changed since 2005? If so, how? 
- Prompt on spending: was the level of welfare spending a concern before the financial 
crisis? 
 
New Labour, Coalition, civil service 
3. What do you think are the main similarities and differences between New Labour and the 
Conservatives/Coalition in terms of policy priorities? 
4. What about in terms of how policy is made? Has the role of outside groups changed, for 
example? 
- The Centre for Social Justice has been consistently identified as a key influence on IDS. 
Would you agree?  
- How usual/unusual is this kind of relationship, and do you feel it has influenced the 
DWP’s agenda? 
5. How would you characterise the relationship between  the DWP and the Treasury under the 
Coalition? Has this changed since New Labour were in power? 
6. Can you describe the relationship between the civil service and Conservative ministers in this 
policy area? 
- Prompt on Treasury/DWP ‘tensions’. 
7. How has working with a Coalition as opposed to a single-party government impacted on 
your work?  
- Prompt on Coalition relations. 
 
The financial crisis 
8. Do you feel that the financial crisis has had a significant impact on your Department’s 
operations? If so, how and in what way? 
- Prompt on financial crisis versus change of government as a driver of change. 
9. How far is the reform programme shaped by the need to cut spending? 
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10. What are the key challenges of combining welfare reform with spending cuts, and how 
effectively have these been addressed? 
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